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


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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

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AND
WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.


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OCTOBER NO., 1867.

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Page 397, line 2, for "It may," read, "The book may."

Page 423, line 6 of note, for "Speugor," read, "Spinoza."

Page 700, line 34, for "ulterior," read, "actual."

Page 738, for "would not now," read, "would now."

Page 745, line 6, for "seen," read, "given."

Page 750, line 31, for "quickly," read, "quietly."

Page 754, line 4, for "denied," read, "held."

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

EDITED BY


GEORGE F. FISHER, PROFESSOR TIMOTHY DWIGHT,
AND
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1863.

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In addition to the active coöperation of Pres. Woolsey, Rev. Drs. Bacon, Noah Porter, O. E. Daggett, Profs. Hadley, D. C. Gilman, Rev. Drs. Jos. P. Thompson and Budington, the assistance of new contributors, especially in the literary department, has been secured for 1868.

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T H E

NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CIL

JANUARY, 1868.

**ARTICLE I.—AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
OF DEAF-MUTE INSTRUCTION COMPARED.**

A REVIEW of the history of deaf-mute education reveals the fact that great diversities of opinion as to the most desirable means of instruction have been coexistent with the work itself. A record of controversies, of angry disputes even, appears in a department of labor, where from its nature, and from the sad condition of its objects, one would naturally expect the gentlest feelings of the heart to be ever uppermost.

These differences seem to have had their origin in opposite conceptions formed of the psychological condition of the deaf-mute. This was thought on the one hand to be an abnormal state of being. Dumbness was considered a positive quality, the presence of which rendered its subject a monstrosity. The command of spoken language was deemed absolutely essential to a development of the intellectual powers. The possibility of education was therefore thought to depend on the ability of the pupil to acquire the power of speech. Hence all labor was directed primarily to the education of the

mute from his supposed abnormal state, and his induction, as far as possible, into the normal condition of speaking persons.

By another class of thinkers the deaf-mute was deemed to be a normal creature; that is to say perfect of his kind, although lacking some of the powers of other men. Dumbness was regarded as a negative quality, inability to speak constituting no obstacle to a full and vigorous mental development. Education on this theory, therefore, sought means to adapt itself to the condition and capabilities of its object. The initiatory step in both cases necessarily being the establishment of a competent channel of communication between teacher and pupil.

Samuel Heinicke, who founded in Germany, in the year 1760, the method in which the deaf-mute is regarded as an abnormal creature held to the view that "the written word can never become the medium of thought. That," said he, "is the sole prerogative of the voice. Without an acquaintance with spoken language a deaf-mute child can never become anything more than a writing machine, or have anything beyond a succession of images passing through his mind." Consistency, therefore, with such a foundation, left him no alternative in the use of material for his superstructure.

Speech! speech! speech! from base to turret.

The Abbé de l'Epeé, on the other hand, the author of that method which ascribes to the deaf-mute nothing unnatural or monstrous as to his condition, which sees no inherent obstacles in the way of mental fruitage, took him as he found him, already possessed of a language, imperfect it is true, but of easy acquirement by the teacher, and as susceptible of expansion and perfection as any dialect of spoken utterance. Denying the dependence of thought on speech, de l'Epeé found a means of communication between himself and his pupils in a visible language, which conveys thought from one to another as surely through the medium of the hand and eye as is done by means of that which employs the tongue and ear. The theory entering into the construction of this foundation, unlike that of Heinicke, imposed no restriction on de l'Epeé in the use of materials in his edifice, but on the contrary left him and his disciples free to adopt whatever means ingenuity might devise

or experience recommend as serviceable in the great work they had to perform.

The real point of difference then, between Heinicke and de l'Epeé is discovered to lie in a purely philosophical question, the solution of which, in a hundred years of practical labor, proves the former to have been plainly in the wrong, and the latter as clearly in the right.

That much of real good to suffering humanity has resulted from the efforts of both these pioneers in the work of general deaf-mute instruction every candid person will admit; that either was faultless or omniscient none will claim; nor yet, it is to hoped, will it be maintained that the system of either is entirely destitute of worth. To that of Heinicke must be accorded the merit, if merit it be, of having the more ambitious aim, though experience has proved his object to have been unattainable; while to that of de l'Epeé must be awarded the praise of practical success and much wider applicability.

In reviewing the present condition of deaf-mute schools in Europe all the systems in use are found to involve one or both of these fundamental methods. In certain places articulation is made the object of transcendent importance, while in some localities it is entirely rejected; and again, institutions are found where attempts have been made to harmonize and combine the once conflicting methods.

The imparting of the power of intelligible oral utterance to one born totally and incurably deaf is an achievement so nearly approaching the miraculous as to dazzle the mind and well nigh unseat the judgment of him who, for the first time, has convincing proof of its possibility. Indeed, one of the earliest recorded instances of deaf-mute instruction, in England, in the seventh century, by the Bishop of Hagulstad, is alluded to in the well known work of Bede, as a miracle, when it was doubtless nothing more than has been accomplished by teachers of articulation in later times. That *toto-congenitally* deaf persons have been taught to speak fluently, and in tones that could be understood by strangers is an indisputable fact. The inference, however, drawn by some writers, and even, though rarely, by practical teachers, that because success is attained with one such case, it is therefore to be expected with all, or

nearly all, has not been sustained by actual results. Among more than one hundred instructors recently consulted by the author of this Article during his examinations of forty-four of the most prominent deaf-mute schools of Europe, but one was found who claimed that success in articulation might be looked for as the *rule* among deaf-mutes. And this gentleman acknowledging that many deaf-mutes, even in respectable German schools where articulation was made the basis of instruction, did not acquire the power of speech, ascribed the failure to a want of skill or industry on the part of their teachers, thus assuming to sit in judgment on the great body of German instructors, whose zeal, ability, and infinite good temper have received the applause of their most decided opponents.

The subject of teaching deaf-mutes to speak having been discussed at some length in our public journals during the past two or three years, and the claim having been made in certain quarters that the German system of instruction was productive of far more beneficial results than that obtaining in this country, it seemed important in the tour of examination already spoken of, that special attention should be paid to the matter of articulation in the European states generally, and in the institutions of Germany in particular. It is this peculiar line of effort, and this alone, which essentially differences many of the European deaf-mute establishments from those of this country. Hence in the comparison of methods proposed in the title of this Article, attention will be mainly directed towards a consideration of the practicability of teaching deaf-mutes by a system based on articulation as the prevailing principle of instruction.

The metaphysical blunder of Heinicke, the founder of this system, that thought is impossible without speech, is now everywhere acknowledged, even by the most zealous supporters of his practices. The single instructor to whom reference has been made, as claiming the possibility of teaching all deaf-mutes by articulation is the able and distinguished Mr. Hirsch of Rotterdam, who may be taken as the most extreme and ultra advocate of this method in Europe. His views on the subject are clearly expressed in the following terms, quoted from

an address delivered by him before the ninth Scientific Congress of the Netherlands convened in Ghent last August:—

“The object to be attained is to render possible the admission of the deaf-mute into society by teaching him to see, that is, to understand the movements of the lips, and to speak in his turn.

“To attain this end the act of seeing or comprehending and of speaking must be made the exclusive principle of instruction, and neither the palpable alphabet nor the language of signs can have any connection with it.

“The daily observations which I have made for more than thirty years, that I have devoted to the deaf and dumb, have convinced me that *the art of seeing speech in the movements of the mouth is the most important* of all the branches of instruction, and that, therefore, it should be most sedulously cultivated.

“Next to the art of seeing or understanding, the act of speaking is the principal object of the instruction of the deaf and dumb. By this system ninety-nine out of every hundred deaf-mutes may be taught, and their progress will depend entirely on the talent and patience of the teacher; this truth, too long and coldly doubted, is now penetrating everywhere.

These claims and opinions gravely put forth, and no doubt fully believed in by Mr. Hirsch, so far from being sustained by facts are refuted and proved wholly untenable by a mass of evidence too strong to be questioned for a moment. Not in a single instance was an instructor of deaf-mutes met by the writer of this Article who supported these last cited views of Mr. Hirsch, and in critical examinations of schools containing in the aggregate upwards of three thousand deaf-mutes, far less than fifty per cent. were found succeeding with articulation.

Probably no practitioner of the so-called German method more faithfully represents the views of his class of workers in Europe than Mr. Hill of Weissenfels in the Prussian province of Saxony. He has been engaged in teaching the deaf and dumb for upwards of forty years, has published many valuable professional works, and is everywhere looked up to as authority among his countrymen.

Mr. Hill says, in answer to queries recently propounded in regard to the proportionate success of his pupils in learning to speak and read from the lips:

“Out of one hundred pupils, eighty-five are capable, when leaving school, of conversing on common place subjects with their teachers, family, and intimate friends, sixty-two can do so easily.

“Out of one hundred, eleven can converse readily with strangers on ordinary subjects. Others learn to do this after leaving school.”

So far from agreeing with Mr. Hirsch that "the language of signs can have no connection with the process of instructing deaf-mutes," Mr. Hill, in a recent work, takes decided ground in favor of that leading agent in the system of de l'Epeé, which Heinicke declared to be no less than "delusive folly, fraud, and nonsense." Speaking of those who pretend that in the German schools every species of pantomimic language is proscribed, he says :

"Such an idea much be attributed to malevolence or to unpardonable levity.

"This pretence is contrary to nature, and repugnant to the rules of sound educational science.

"If this system were put into execution the moral life, the intellectual development of the deaf and dumb would be inhumanly hampered. It would be acting contrary to nature to forbid the deaf-mute a means of expression employed even by hearing and speaking persons, * * * * it is nonsense to dream of depriving him of this means until he is in a position to express himself orally. * * *

"Even in teaching itself we cannot lay aside the language of gestures (with the exception of that which consists in artificial signs, and in the manual alphabet, two elements proscribed in the German school), the language which the deaf-mute brings with him to school, and which ought to serve as a basis for his education.

"To banish the language of natural signs from the school room and limit ourselves to articulation is like employing a gold key which does not fit the lock of the door we would open, and refusing to use the iron one made for it; * * * at the best it would be *drilling* the deaf mute, but not *moulding* him intellectually and morally."

Mr. Hill then goes on to make an extremely philosophical analysis of the sign language, and its special uses, under thirteen different heads, which it would be tedious to detail in this connection, but which has been translated, and will be given to the public at no distant day.

It is to be borne in mind that this gentleman is one of the most successful teachers of articulation living, that he was trained in a German school, and has given a lifetime of labor to this peculiar species of deaf-mute instruction. When he claims, therefore, but eleven per cent. of his graduates as being able to converse readily with strangers on ordinary subjects, the inference is unavoidable that the system founded by Heinicke, which would make articulation the fundamental principle of instruction, has, *as a system*, on which the mass of

those for whose benefit it was devised may be taught, most completely and signally failed, and this, too, in a country where it has had every opportunity for success that could be afforded by governmental patronage, private benevolence, undisputed sway, the labor of scores of talented and indefatigable men, and a hundred years of trial. Nay, more, the schools of Heinicke and his disciples have only been able to succeed in educating the large majority of their pupils by the adoption and practice of that much abused, but ever indispensable language of signs, the discovery and adaptation of which will reflect immortal glory on the memory of de l'Epeé. And it is not until within a comparatively brief period that this fact, long understood by experts, has been admitted in the frank and honest manner of Mr. Hill.

This adverse judgment as to articulation as a system of education for the mass of so-called deaf-mutes must not, however, be taken as a total condemnation of its practice in cases where success is possible. Among this class there always appears a varying proportion of persons who acquired deafness after having learned to speak. The power of speech in these, having already germinated, may, in nearly every instance, be cultivated and brought to a good degree of perfection.

Others also, who having once heard became deaf before gaining any command of language, may in some instances learn to speak and read from the lips. Others still, born partially deaf, and retaining defective hearing, may do the same: while a very few are found born totally deaf, who may acquire artificial speech to a useful extent. But taking all these classes together, we fall short of reaching a majority, or even a large majority, of the so-called deaf and dumb who can achieve sufficient precision or clearness of utterance to be able to make themselves understood by strangers.

No argument will be necessary to secure from intelligent minds the admission of the fact that not all persons are endowed with a talent for music; that not every human being can succeed in art essays; that few men are capable of oratory, and fewer still of poetry. So well established by the experience of ages are these conclusions that a teacher of youth would be thought little removed from insanity who should attempt

to make all his pupils poets or orators, or artists or musicians, though all might learn to sing, to draw after a fashion, to declaim, and even to rhyme. And at the same time he who should endeavor to foster and develop talents for painting, sculpture, oratory, or poetry, wherever among his pupils he found these choice gifts in existence, would draw forth universal commendation.

Thus experience proves it to be with articulation among the deaf and dumb. To the mass it is unattainable, save in degrees that render it comparable to those sculptures and paintings that never find a purchaser; to books and poems that are never read; to music that is never sung. Involving much patient labor on the part of teacher and pupil, it exhibits only that limited degree of success which honest criticism is compelled to stamp as no better than failure. And yet, when the congenital mute *can master* oral language, the triumph both of teacher and pupil is as deserving of praise as the achievement of true art, music, poetry, or oratory.

The actual removal of the affliction of deaf-dumbness may be looked for only at the hands of Him who, when on earth, spoke the potent *Ephphatha* as a proof of His divinity. But those who labor in His name in behalf of his stricken ones should welcome *every* means of lessening the disabilities under which the objects of their care are found to rest. And so while articulation has failed *as a system*, the *method* has proved so useful in certain cases, that it has been accepted among the institutions of Europe, until of thirty-three continental schools, recently visited by the writer, but one was found where it was not regularly taught. The introduction of stated instruction in artificial speech and lip reading to those found capable of acquiring it (this task to be performed by additional teachers), would undoubtedly prove a valuable accession to the system of deaf-mute education as now carried forward in this country. And no obstacle stands in the way of the adoption of such an improvement by the existing institutions.

In those European schools where articulation has been accepted as an adjunct, the main reliance being on the language of signs, the manual alphabet and writing, the highest degree of general success in a given term of years has most unques-

tionably been attained. No time is wasted, out of respect to exploded but ancient ideas, in vain attempts to achieve that which if gained at all will be of no practical value to its possessor, while at the same time no efforts are spared to impart any and every species of useful knowledge, attainable to the pupils according to their various abilities.

No candid person at all conversant with the wants and powers of the deaf and dumb, and familiar with the workings of our American institutions for this class of persons, who will examine critically similar institutions in Europe, can escape the conviction that in essentials ours equal the best, and far surpass the great majority of foreign schools.

So entirely defensible, both in the soundness of its theories and the success of its practical workings, is the American system of deaf-mute instruction, that he who should attempt, in the light of the present advanced age, to build anew from the starting points of the Holders and Wallises, the Ammans and the Heinickes of former centuries, or even to experiment with methods of whose worthlessness the most ample proofs exist, would richly deserve the contempt and reproach which would be swift to follow upon his certain failure.

With the addition, easily effected, of classes for articulation in our existing institutions, in the manner generally adopted on the continent of Europe, the deaf-mute schools of the United States may justly claim to be exercising every means at present employed in any country for the most thorough and enlightened education of their pupils.

And yet it must be confessed that there exists a common defect, from which no system can claim to be free. It is a fact, admitted abroad as well as at home, that very many deaf-mutes of fair intelligence, on leaving school after a five, six, or seven years' course of study under faithful and accomplished teachers, have not acquired an ability to express their thoughts on all subjects in absolutely correct written language. In other words, they have not learned to think in their vernacular. They commit errors in composition that are termed by their teachers "deaf-muteisms," and which can hardly be described except by examples.

It will be unnecessary to enter into an argument to prove

that a child born deaf labors under great and peculiar disadvantages in acquiring language. All teachers, whether basing their efforts on articulation or signs, agree in acknowledging the difficulty of imparting to their pupils the power of idiomatic, and absolutely grammatical, composition. The great loss of that daily, and almost hourly, tuition in conventional and exceptional forms of language, received passively, but none the less effectively, by hearing children, is apparent in the deaf-mute at almost every stage of his education. Common justice would seem to demand that a period of tuition in schools equally extended with that afforded to their more favored fellows, should be accorded to the deaf and dumb. That such a length of time is secured when they are limited to five or six years for the acquirement of a new and complicated language, and for all the education wherein they are ever to receive the assistance of competent teachers, no one will undertake to claim.

That the defect just alluded to might be removed in great measure by an extension of the period of tuition, and the beginning of the education of the mute at an earlier age than has been customary, is most probable. Great interest, therefore, attaches to efforts recently inaugurated in England, and in this country, for the establishment of infant schools for the deaf and dumb.

At Manchester, England, an institution of this description has been in operation several years, but not as yet a sufficient time to exhibit full results; and if the school recently opened at Northampton, Mass., be kept rigidly within the bounds of its present organization, it may solve the question whether a general system of infant schools for mutes be desirable, than which a more important point does not remain to be decided in the whole range of efforts for this class of persons.

The idea has been brought rather prominently before the public during the past two years, that special institutions for the deaf and dumb are to a great extent unnecessary, and that this class of persons may, with little difficulty, be educated wholly, or in large part, in schools for hearing and speaking children. The opinions and writings of a certain Dr. Blanchet of Paris, have been cited in support of this theory, and it has been claimed that success has attended efforts exerted in this direction.

To one who has made the instruction of the deaf and dumb his daily labor for any extended period, the discussion or even the suggestion of an idea so impracticable seems the height of absurdity. The public generally, however, understand so little the condition and capabilities of the deaf-mute that they may be led to believe the most impossible things as quite feasible, provided he who recommends them be ingenious in his arguments, and persistent in his efforts.

In several countries of Europe attempts have been made to effect the education of mutes in the common schools, ending uniformly in failure, the highest end attained being the preparation of the child in some small degree for the essential work of the special institution. The recommendations of Dr. Blanchet have been followed in certain schools for a considerable period, with results so decided as to lead to the hope among the true friends of the deaf and dumb that all further experiments in this direction may be abandoned.

A single incident which came to the notice of the writer in Paris will serve to show how entire has been the failure of the so-called "Blanchet system." On entering the office of the Director of the Paris Institution one day he found there a mother and son, the latter fifteen years of age. The boy was deaf and dumb, and had been attending for eight years a common school where the teachers had endeavored to instruct him on the Blanchet system. He had attained no success in articulation, and in his attempts at written language committed errors that would be regarded as inexcusable in a pupil of two years' standing in our special schools. His mother was seeking to secure his admission into the Paris institution that he might be educated before he became too old; and it may justly be claimed from what was seen and heard on the occasion now referred to that the benefit he had derived from his eight years' instruction in the common school was less than would have been secured by two years' enjoyment of the advantages of the Paris institution. Professor Vaisse, the Director, stated that this was but one of many similar cases which had been brought to his notice, and that the testimony of competent witnesses was agreed as to the entire failure of the Blanchet system in France.

ARTICLE II.—DIVORCE.

PART IV.—DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LAW IN EUROPE SINCE THE REFORMATION.

THE Catholic doctrine of marriage and divorce was settled long before the Reformation, and was only reaffirmed by the Council of Trent. The nations which retained their allegiance to the old church did not, so far as we are informed, make innovations in the law of divorce, but continue until now under the system handed down from the middle ages. Far different has been the history of legislation in most Protestant countries, and in that Catholic land which broke away at once from the old religion and from all faith in the Scriptures. The leaders in the changes of matrimonial law were the Protestant reformers themselves, and that, almost from the beginning of the movement. It will be our endeavor in this Article to exhibit briefly the prevailing opinion at the Reformation in regard to divorce, and then to give a sketch of the law as it has shaped itself in some of the principal countries of Europe, especially in Prussia, France, and England.

The reformers, when they discarded the sacramental view of marriage, and the celibacy of the clergy, had to make out a new doctrine of marriage and of divorce. That doctrine was honestly derived from the words of Christ and of Paul. They saw, as they thought, in the rule of celibacy the source of boundless profligacy, a clergy all over Christendom living in secret sin and hypocrisy, or under the burden of a broken heart. They observed how the strict rules of the church were neglected in the case of the great by pliant priests, and how concubinage was almost tolerated. To this the doctrine that no crime dissolved marriage, that adultery only separated the marriage pair without giving relief to the innocent party, almost forced the church. Adultery, too, as a part of the same system, seems not to have been visited with severe church censures in the later centuries; we are led to judge that it was very common in the highest and the lowest classes;

and to have an unfaithful wife was a matter to call rather for ridicule than for condemnation. The old Catholic system, in short, was practically a failure in all its parts, in its ascetic frown on marriage, in its demand from the clergy of an abstinence not required from the Christian laity, in teaching that nothing but death could release a married pair from their obligations. When it sought for impracticable virtue, and forbade to some what God had allowed to all, it opened a fountain of vice with the smallest incitement to virtue. Besides this, it received, they thought, as far as divorce went, no countenance from the Scriptures. Christ had made a special exception allowing the innocent party to put away his wife on account of her crime and to marry another, while Paul, according to the interpretation of Chrysostom and his school, released, as they claimed, the deserted believer from all ties to his or her unbelieving partner. Thus they needed to have no fear of changing the law of divorce. Marriage, second marriage, marriage of priests had become honorable; marriage was no more a sacrament; why should its dissolution in cases provided for by the Scriptures be doubted? If to all this we add the minor considerations that Roman law, which allowed great freedom of divorce, must have grown in its authority as canon law became disregarded, and that the northern nations, where Protestantism spread, are probably less capable than southern of being retained by such rules as the church had enacted, we shall have mentioned the leading influences which affected Protestant legislation on the subject of marriage and divorce.

The opinions of the reformers it is sometimes a little difficult to ascertain, as they seem to contradict themselves in different passages of their works. Thus Luther in his sermon on marriage, delivered at Wittenberg in 1525, uses the following language: "that [Matth. xix. 9] is a blunt, clear, plain text, which says that no one, either on account of leprosy or stinking breath or other defect, shall forsake his wife, or the wife her husband, except on account of whoredom and adultery. For only these causes separate man and wife. Yet it must be satisfactorily proved before separation, as reason demands, that adultery and whoredom have occurred." But in other places Luther's opinion is most openly expressed that malicious deser-

tion may be followed by divorce *a vinculo*. In an opinion of the year 1525, given to the council and clergy of Domitsch, he writes thus: "since a certain preacher's wife has dealt so dishonorably with him, I cannot make his rights longer or shorter than God has done, who through St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 15, in such cases pronounces the following decision: 'if the unbelieving depart, let him depart; the brother or sister is not bound in such cases.' So say I, too. Whoever will not stay, let him be off. The other party is not bound to stay unmarried, as I in a little book on that chapter have written more at large, to which I refer you. If, then, he cannot remain without a wife, let him wed another in God's name, because this woman will not be his wife." An opinion of 1535, signed by Luther, Cruciger, Major, and Melancthon, allows a woman of Nordhausen, whose husband had absconded several years before, to marry again according to "the decision of Paul, and according to the former practice in Christendom, as a similar case cited by Eusebius from Justin, and the example of Fabiola show." The instances here adduced, by the way, are not in point, for they relate to adultery, and, moreover, Fabiola deeply regretted her step and is praised by Jerome for so doing.* Again, in his sermon "*von ehelichen Leben*," belonging to the year 1522, Luther mentions three causes justifying the dissolution of marriage, of which the first, existing already before marriage, is a reason for a sentence of nullity, and therefore has nothing to do with divorce proper; the second is adultery; the third is, "when one of the parties withdraws from the other, so that he or she will not perform marital duty, or lead a common life with the other." Thus, says he, "we may find an obstinate woman who stiffens her neck, and if her husband should fall ten times into unchastity, cares nothing about it. Here it is time for a man to say, 'if you won't, another can be found that will. If the wife will not, let the maid come.' Yet so that the husband give her two or three warnings beforehand, and let the matter come before other people, so that her obstinacy may be known and rebuked

* The other instance is from Justin, *Apol.* ii. § 2, where a Christian woman divorced herself from a husband "who tried ways of pleasure against the law of nature and against right." Nor is anything said of her marrying again.

before the congregation. If still she will not, let her get herself gone, and procure an Esther for yourself, and let Vashti be off, as Ahasuerus did,"—a queer example without doubt to give to Christians. It is evident that here the refusal of connubial duty is thought of, although malicious desertion may be involved.*

The leaders of opinion in the Lutheran Church followed the first reformers in their doctrine of divorce. We cite but one,—Chemnitz—who, in his examination of the Council of Trent, sums up a discussion on the sixth canon of matrimony in the following language: "We have, then, two cases in Scripture where the bond of matrimony is dissolved—not as by men, but by God himself. 1. On account of adultery a man lawfully, rightfully, and without sin, can repudiate his wife. 2. If an unbeliever will not cohabit with a believer but deserts, dismisses, and repudiates her, without charge of adultery, and only on account of her faith, the unbeliever sins indeed against God and against the law of marriage, but the innocent, deserted, party is not under bondage, but is free from the law of her husband, so as not to commit adultery if lawfully wedded to another man. And these two cases Chrysostom also has noticed on 1 Cor. vii. 'Both the unbeliever,' says he, 'gives cause [for divorce] and so does fornication.'"[†]

Nor did the doctors in the reformed churches differ in their opinions or in their interpretation of Scripture from the Lutherans. Zwingli, in fact, with his characteristic audacity seems to have gone much farther than any one else. In the Zurich marriage ordinances of 1525, adultery, malicious desertion, and plotting against the life of a consort are not regarded as the only causes but rather as the standard causes of divorce, and to the judge it is left to decide what others shall be put by their side. And not only this, but cruelty, madness, leprosy are mentioned as causes which the judge can take into account.[‡]

* These passages are all found in Walch's ed. of Luther's works, Vol. x. See pages 797, 886, 884, 721-727.

† *Examen Conc. Trid.* li. 420 of the Frankfort ed., 1615. We do not find the passage here cited in Chrysostom's Homily on this chapter.

‡ Comp. *Herzog's Encycl.* Article *Ehe*, Vol. iv., written by Göschel, Professor of law at Halle.

It seems to have excited some discussion in that age whether elephantiasis or leprosy—a disease then not so rare as now in Europe—could be a cause of separation from the bond of matrimony. Luther, in a passage already quoted, Calvin, in one of his epistles, and elsewhere, and Beza, in his treatise on divorce, all decide in the negative.*

The views of Calvin are somewhat obscurely expressed in his annotation on Matt. xix. 9, contained in his commentary on the harmony. After speaking of the cause of divorce there contained in Christ's words, he condemns the opinion of those who hold elephantiasis to be another cause, "as being wiser than the heavenly master," and then speaks of the passage in 1 Corinthians in words like these: "When Paul mentions another cause,—namely, that the believing brother or sister is not under bondage, where it happens that a consort is cast off by an unbeliever from a hatred of religion—he does not differ from the mind of Christ. For he does not discourse there on a justifiable cause of divorce, but only whether the woman remains bound to her husband when she has been impiously cast off from a hatred of God, and cannot return into favor but by denying God. Whence it is not strange that he prefers separation from a mortal man (*dissidium cum homine mortali*) to alienation from God." Here it might be said with reason that a case of desertion of a wife by an unsteady, dissipated husband, who had no objection to her religion, would not be covered by Paul's word, as Calvin interprets them. There can be, however, we conceive, no doubt that he would stretch his rule to include such cases. For the "*ordonnances ecclesiastiques*" of Geneva, enacted in general assembly Nov. 20, 1541, some two months after his return from banishment, must have had his concurrence, and divorce *a vinculo* is there expressly allowed in cases of malicious desertion.† "If a man"—it is there said—"being debauched, abandon his wife without the said wife's having given occasion or being culpable therefor, and this has been duly known by the testimony of neighbors and friends, and the woman has brought a complaint in demand of

* Calvin, *Epist.*, pp. 225, 226, of the Amsterd. ed. of his works, last Vol.

† He returned from Strassburg, Sept. 18th, 1541, and the ordinances were passed Nov. 20th following, and went into effect Jan. 2d, 1542.

a remedy, let her be admonished to make diligent search in order to ascertain what has become of him, and let his nearest relations or friends be called to get news of him. Meanwhile, let the woman wait until the end of a year, if she cannot find out where he is, and let her commit herself to God. At the year's end she may come before the Consistory, and if it appears that she needs to marry, let the Consistory, after giving her exhortations, send her to the Council to be sworn that she does not know where her husband has betaken himself, and let the same oath be taken by his nearest relatives and friends. After this, let such proclamations be made, as have been spoken of, in order to give liberty to the woman to marry again. If the absent man return afterwards, let him be punished, as shall be judged reasonable.”*

With Calvin, his disciple Beza agrees in his opinions concerning divorce. In his note, indeed, on 1 Cor. vii. 15, he says, “non hic conceditur divortium, sed desertæ tantum consulitur,” which might leave us in doubt how he explained Paul's words. But in his treatise, *de divortiiis*, he examines the case spoken of by the Apostle, and having asked the question, Whether it is right for the deserted person, while the deserter is alive, to contract a new marriage, answers most expressly that she is entirely free to marry if she will. And in a letter to the churches of Neufchatel, in reply to the question whether leprosy is a valid ground of divorce, while he denies that it is, he reaffirms the doctrine taught in his treatise.†

The Protestant commentators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or the large majority of them, draw the liberty of remarriage after desertion from the word of Paul. Thus Paraeus: “she is free not only *a thoro et mensa* but also from the marriage tie to the deserter.” Aretius of Berne on Matth. xix.: “This one cause of lawful separation [viz. adul-

* For this extract and for all other references to early Protestant church-rules on divorce, we are indebted to a program of Prof. Göschel of Halle, “*doctrina de matrimonio ex ordinationibus ecclesiæ evangelicæ sæculi decimi sexti adumbrata*.” Halle, 1847. In his Article, “*Ehe*,” in *Herzog's Encycl.*, the same learned lawyer gives again some of the same matter.

† Beza *de repudiis et divortiiis*, Op. ii. 94, 95, Genev., 1582, and *Epist.* x., in Vol. iii. 215.

tery] Christ lays down ; but the Apostle on 1 Cor. vii. 15, allows another cause, arising from unequal marriage. Other causes, besides, we have pointed out in treating of the subject of divorce, to which we refer the reader.* So in Century seventeenth, Grotius : "She is not bound to remain unmarried and to wait for or to seek for reconciliation. Christ's law is of force when the parties are his disciples." Calixtus : "She is not bound to cohabit or to remain unmarried." Milton's views are well known. The Puritans seem to have followed this interpretation. But the interpreters within the English church were not all of this mind. Whitby, as nearly as we can understand him, is on the other side, and Hammond, who has no commentary on Paul's verse, in his paraphrase of it condemns marrying again in the case specified. Later still, we find several annotators of the eighteenth century disagreeing with the current Protestant interpretation.†

It is not strange that the ecclesiastical ordinances, which are platforms of discipline and in some Protestant territories took the place of the old canonical law by sanction of the civil power, should express the reigning opinion. A few of them, it is true, permit divorce proper for a single crime only : thus the "renovation" of the church in Nordlingen speaks thus : "In the matter of divorce we follow our Lord Jesus Christ, Matth. xix, not permitting true divorce, as far as it depends on us, except for the cause of fornication, nor without the production of witnesses and before a magistrate, that we may not, by furnishing occasion for fraud, add the force of malice to evils already existing. But in other things we follow the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. vii., and allow persons who seek a divorce to be separated by authority of the magistrate, but on condition that they remain unmarried, according to the precept of Christ, Matth. xix." So the "church-order of the Netherlands at London" (1550) : "from all these words of the Lord one may easily perceive that the marriage bond is exceedingly strong, and that it can be broken only by death and whore-

* He means apparently his *theologiæ problemata*, or *loci communes*.

† See Wolfius, *Cursus philolog.* on the passage in Corinthians, where they are spoken of at large.

dom." So the "sacred liturgy of the church of the foreigners at Frankfort" (1554)* says that "they whom God has joined together, can never be separated but on account of fornication, or for a time by mutual consent, that they may give themselves to fasting and prayer."

But the great majority of the ordinances add malicious desertion to adultery as a second ground of divorce. So those of Lübeck (1531), of Goslar (same year), of Lippe (1538), of Geneva, already mentioned (1541), Calenburg-Göttingen (1542), Brunswick-Lüneburg (1543), Brandenburg (1573), Mecklenburg (1570), Brunswick-Grubenhagen (1581), and Lower Saxony (1585). The last but one of these uses the following words: "By no means shall any divorce be allowed or procured except in two cases which Christ and Paul have allowed in the Gospel. As namely and in the first place, when one of the parties has been satisfactorily proved guilty and jurally convicted of adultery, and the innocent party will not or cannot at all become reconciled to him, in such case at length the sentence of divorce shall be pronounced according to Christ's words, Matth. xix. . . . In the second place, in cases of malicious desertion, running away and abandonment, of which St. Paul speaks, 1 Cor. vii." And the last mentioned ordinance says that "whatever besides these two causes [adultery and desertion] has been brought in by some emperors, as Theodosius, Valentinian, Leo, Justinian, to justify divorce, cannot be sufficient for that purpose."†

One or two only of the ordinances of this period extend the permission beyond the two causes of divorce so often spoken of. Those of Zurich we have already mentioned. A Prussian consistorial ordinance, in cases of cruelty after fruitless attempts to reform the man by discipline, allows a separation from bed and board not exceeding three years, after which the parties might be united again, on the offender's giving sufficient security that he would not repeat his misdeeds. If after this, there should be an attempt by either party on the other's

* That is, as we suppose, the church of the English, which had its difficulties in that year.

† All these instances are from Prof. Göeche's program.

life, by poison or otherwise, they might thereupon be divorced, and the guilty party be remitted from the matrimonial to the secular court.

The question was discussed among the reformers whether the adulterous party ought to be suffered to marry again during the lifetime of the other consort. Luther insists with great energy that death ought to be the penalty for adultery, but since the civil rulers are slack and indulgent in this respect, he would permit the criminal, if he must live, to go away to some remote place and there marry again. So Calvin, in several places, declares that death ought to be inflicted for this crime, as it was by the Mosaic code, but if the law of the territory stop short of this righteous penalty, the smallest evil is to grant liberty of remarriage in such cases.*

The church-laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Germany very generally concede divorce only in the two cases already named, but the Wirtemberg ordinance goes farther than this; it adds as grounds of divorce impotence supervenient on marriage through the fault of one of the parties, and obstinate refusal of matrimonial duty.

Meanwhile, a new turn was given to opinions concerning divorce towards the end of the seventeenth century. Thomasius (ob. 1728), a professor of law at Halle, an audacious but superficial thinker, gave the direction by leaving out of sight the religious and moral side of marriage, and looking at it only

* Luther's words are (Walch x. 724), "but if the civil authorities are slack and negligent, and do not kill the adulterer, he may flee to a distant land and there marry, if he cannot be continent. But it were better he were dead and gone, to prevent evil examples (aber es wäre besser todt todt mit ihm, etc.)."

So Calvin in a letter (Epist. p. 225, Armstard. ed. of his works, last vol.) says that "because the punishment of adultery has not been as severe as it ought to be, so that they do not lose life who violate the faith of wedlock, it would be hard that [a man or woman who had thus sinned] should be prohibited from marrying during lifetime. Thus it is necessary that one indulgence draw with it another. Yet it seems wisest not to let the guilty woman do as she will in regard to marrying at once. Such permission should be delayed, whether by prescribing a certain time or by waiting until the innocent party has contracted a new marriage." In his note on Matth. xix. 9, Calvin expresses the same opinion in regard to the deserts of the adulterous wife or husband, and the "perverse indulgence of magistrates."

as a civilian.* He had vast influence on his age and many followed in his steps. Thus Kayser, afterwards a professor at Giessen, in a disputation of the year 1715, regards as good grounds for divorce, incompatibility of temper, contagious disease, cruel treatment, irreconcilable animosity, and other grounds rarely or never held to be sufficient before. Marriage is now coming to be regarded as a contract for attaining merely outward ends, as an institution to be shaped and modified by the State according to its views of expediency and its opinions as to the best means for securing civil happiness; it is putting off its religious and moral character.

These new views, which tallied so well with the shallow spirit of the eighteenth century, found their expression first in the legislation of Prussia.† In 1749, 1751, part of a project of a general code for the Prussian states was published by Cocceii, the Chancellor under Frederic the Great, and the divorce regulations which formed a portion of this project, although this, as a whole, never acquired a legal existence, passed by degrees into the law of a large number of the provinces composing the Prussian kingdom. In this project the innovations are chiefly the following: first, that consent of the parties can dissolve marriage, although a term of a year's separation from bed and board is required to give opportunity for reconciliation. Should they at the year's end still persist in their decision, divorce may now be granted. Secondly, divorce is allowed on account of "deadly hostility" between the parties, and is made to depend on a variety of indications, as when blows are given by one of the parties, or he has an infamous disease, or he plots against the life of the other, or is condemned to an infamous punishment. To this, it is added, that complaints may be made for smaller faults, as the cruelty (*sævitia*) of the husband, the extravagance or drunkenness of the wife. Here, too, a probation of not more than a year's

* For Thomasius, see Tholuck's Article on him in *Herzog's Encyclop.*, Vol. xvi, and his "preliminary history of Rationalism," ii., 2, 61-76.

† For the legislation anterior to the introduction of the Prussian Code or "*Allgemeines Landrecht*," we rely on an Essay by Savigny, entitled "Reform of the Laws concerning Divorce," in his *Miscell. Works* (*Vermischt. Schrift.*), v. 322-414.

separation must precede a sentence of full divorce. One of the provinces, a little after, did away with this probation in the case of "deadly enmity," and authorized divorces on this ground to be granted at once.

Then came a reaction. The king—still Frederic the Great—while on a journey in Pomerania, in 1782, had his attention drawn to the frequency of divorces, especially in the lower classes. He therefore issued an edict complaining of the frivolity with which divorces were sought, the readiness to contract inconsiderate marriages, the evils to families, etc.; and the Chancellor was required to amend the legislation. In the edict published in consequence of this movement, divorce by consent of parties was restricted to cases where the marriage had been without children for several years, and the judge was to be satisfied that the divorce was sought by both parties freely, and after mature consideration. Divorce for fault of one of the parties is granted on account of those same crimes and differences between the parties, which the law of 1749 regarded as justifying reasons. Soon after this a project of a general code was made, out of which the code of 1791 grew. Here divorce by mutual consent is admitted only when the parties have been four years without children, or when for other reason there is no prospect of any. Divorce for deadly hatred is still admitted, but the law adds that no marriage shall be dissolved on account of invincible disinclination avowed by one of the parties. The proofs of hatred as they appear in former laws are now made distinct grounds of divorce from the hatred itself.

We next come to the code or "Landrecht" which is still in force for the kingdom of Prussia.* Here the grounds for divorce involving wrong of one of the parties are, first, adultery, sodomy, and other unnatural vices, and suspicious intercourse, especially after prohibition by a judge, attended with a violent suspicion of adultery (668—676). Next comes malicious desertion, of which quite a number of cases are given. For example if a woman leave her husband without cause, the judge may require her return. If she refuses, her husband may sue for

* *Preuss. Landrecht*, II., part I., chiefly § 668—834. We quote the sections.

divorce. A husband is not bound to take back a wife who has left him until she proves the correctness of her life while away. If a person is away on urgent and lawful business, his act is not desertion exactly, but his consort must wait ten years, and then sue for a judicial declaration of his death (676—693). Persistent refusal of marriage-intercourse is regarded as equivalent to malicious desertion (694—695). Plots or practices, endangering the life or health of the other party, together with gross injury to the honor or personal freedom of the same, are sufficient ground for divorce. But persons of lower condition shall not have divorce granted to them on account of threats or abuse with the tongue, nor for injurious acts and outrages, unless these are causeless and maliciously repeated. An irreconcilable temper (*unverträglichkeit*) and quarrelsomeness are good grounds only when the innocent party's life and health are endangered (699—703). Gross crimes, for which a disgraceful punishment is suffered, furnish ground for divorce. So, also, when one party falsely accuses the other of such crimes, or intentionally puts the other in danger of losing life, honor, office, or business, or enters into a disgraceful employment (704—707). Drunkenness, extravagance or a loose manner of life (*unordentliche wirthschaft*) may be followed by divorce, if not corrected by steps which the judge takes on application from the innocent party (708—710). So also failure to support a wife, caused by crime, dissipation, or loose living, entitle her to divorce, when after arrangements made by the judge for her divorce the husband persists in his conduct (711—713). In all cases the judge must take pains to restore a good understanding between the alienated parties (714).

The causes for divorce which may be referred to accident or visitation of providence are these: incurable impotence supervenient after marriage, together with other incurable bodily defects exciting disgust or preventing the fulfillment of the ends of the marriage state (696—698), and insanity lasting over a year without prospect of cure (698).

The causes depending on the will of both or of one of the parties are these: "Marriages without children can be dissolved by mutual consent, if neither frivolity nor haste, nor secret force on either side can be discovered. But mere disin-

clination of one party towards the other, not sustained by positive acts, is ordinarily no cause of divorce, and yet in special cases it may become such, where the alienation is deep, violent, and irreconcilable. But in such cases the party urging this plea against the other's will must be declared to be in fault, and is liable to the penalties, or disadvantages in regard to property, spoken of in a subsequent portion of the law (716—718). Where the reasons alleged for divorce are of less weight, and hope of reconciliation exists, the judge can delay making known his sentence for a year, pending which time the parties may live separated, and the judge must decree in regard to questions of property and children. At the end of the term a new attempt at reconciliation must be made, and if this is ineffectual, sentence can then be given (723—731).

No divorce shall be granted where one party has brought the other to the commission of the misdeeds on which the complaint is based. So condonation is an estoppel to suits arising out of the crime forgiven. Cohabitation for a year after knowledge of the crime implies condonation.

No separation from bed and board is allowed if one of the parties is a Protestant. If both are Catholics, such separation has all the civil effects of divorce. And it is left to the consciences of the parties concerned to decide what use they will make of their separation in the matter of contracting new marriages (733—735).

The *consequences* of divorce form an important branch of the Prussian law. Divorced persons may in general marry again whom they will. But a person divorced for adultery may not marry the partner of the crime. Nor may they who have been divorced on account of suspicious-intercourse marry those who have been connected with them in their suspicious acts, and have produced a variance between the consorts. (25—27.) Divorced persons, like others contracting a new marriage, must prove the dissolution of the old one to the clergyman who publishes and solemnizes the nuptials (17), and if there are minor children of a former marriage, must exhibit a legal composition (with them in regard to property), or at least a permit of a court of wards, before the new union can be celebrated (18). As for the rest, no delay is imposed on

the divorced man's remarrying, but the woman must wait according to circumstances, from three to nine months (19—23).

In the bearing of divorce upon the property of the parties, the Prussian law seems to have followed to some extent the provisions of the Roman code. At the time of the process it must be determined by the judge which party is to blame for the divorce, or which is more so, if both are in fault. Wrongs directly violating marriage duty are more blameworthy than such as do this indirectly. Intention also, and lightness of mind must be taken into account in reckoning the fault. This being ascertained, the case may be that neither party is declared guilty, or that one is or is principally so, and provisions are necessary according as the property was held separately, or in common. In the first case, where neither party is pronounced guilty, and the goods were not held in common, they follow the rules prescribed for separation by death. If there was a community of goods, each takes the part contributed by him or her to the common stock before marriage, or added since. But in the case of persons from whom a divorce is obtained on account of certain visitations of Providence, the other party—the sane party for instance—must support the unfortunate one according to their condition in life, if the latter has not the means of support in his own hands. In the other case, where one of the parties is pronounced guilty, the rules in regard to the division of property run into details too long to be described. The general principle is that the guilty party, whether husband or wife, shall suffer in property, as a sort of compensation to the other for crime or indiscretion. Thus, if no community of goods had existed, the party whose conduct caused the divorce is considered civilly dead, and all the advantages conceded by the law to a surviving consort are granted to the innocent partner. If community of goods had existed, the innocent party can choose whether to take half of them, or to demand a division. If they are divided, the portion of the guilty party is liable for the same satisfaction or compensation, as if there had been no community of goods. This satisfaction, if divorce grew out of the grosser offenses named in the law, and there had been no bargain, amounts to one quarter of the property

of the guilty party, and if the offenses were less gross to one-sixth. Instead of this satisfaction, the innocent wife can demand alimony on a scale suitable to her condition in life. And if the innocent husband, through age, sickness, or misfortune, is not in a condition to earn his living, he can, instead of a satisfaction, choose alimony to be paid out of his wife's property. But if the guilty party can give neither compensation, nor satisfaction, nor support, he or she must for the offenses occasioning the divorce be imprisoned, or be put to penal labor, for a time varying from fourteen days to three months (745—823).

Marriage in Prussia, as in most other Christian countries, requires certain religious formalities in order to be valid. If a Catholic curate hesitates to publish and solemnize a marriage allowed by the laws, because the dispensation of his superior has not been asked for or has been refused, he must allow another clergyman to perform these services in his place. For Protestant ministers there is, we believe, no such indulgence. And hence, those who regard the Prussian law of divorce as heathenish and unchristian, who scruple to unite a woman divorced without adultery to another husband and to say that God has joined them together, must occasionally be brought into extreme perplexity. The only way of preventing such outrageous tyranny is to put them on a level with Catholic priests, or to introduce the French civil marriage.

It is natural that the complaints against the Prussian law should be great. Not only has it dissatisfied numbers of the clergy, but some also of the most eminent jurists have desired to see it modified. Savigny (u. s. 353—414) gives us two such documents containing projects of new divorce laws framed by two commissions, the one in 1842, the other in 1844. He must have been in the counsels which originated one or both of these. We have no room to describe their provisions, except to say that they both exceedingly abridge the causes of divorce. Both pronounce against mutual consent, violent contrariety of temper, deficient proof of innocent life on the part of a woman separated before divorce from her husband, disease and defect caused after marriage by visitation of Providence, and suspected intercourse contrary to the order of a court. Be-

sides these, the first commission of 1842 eliminates madness, refusal of connubial duty, injuries to the honor or freedom of one of the parties by the other, unless they run into prolonged and gross outrages, quarrelsomeness, danger to life, honor, office, or business by unpermitted actions, unless these furnish reason for divorce of another kind; together with drunkenness and other loose living, and failure to furnish support, excepting the case when through crime, drunkenness, or dissoluteness a man has taken away from himself the power to maintain his wife, in which case divorce may be allowed. It is a decisive condemnation of the law that jurists of the highest eminence were found ready to make such sweeping changes in the code. But the attempts to change the law were ineffectual, nor have others since made, unless we are deceived, been more successful.

The provisions of the Austrian code applicable to non-Catholics and the Church-ordinance of Baden approach nearest in point of laxity to the Prussian law. All the other States of Germany confine divorce to cases of guilt, although they generally go, in their enumeration of the kinds of wrong-doing which furnish ground for divorce, beyond the legislation of the age of the reformers.

From Prussia we turn to France, where the experiments in divorce legislation coincide nearly with the phases of political revolution. The old system, conformable to the ecclesiastical law of divorce, was overthrown by a new divorce law passed Sept. 20, 1792, at the opening of the National Convention. In this new law three causes of divorce are allowed, mutual consent, allegation of incompatibility of temper brought by one of the consorts, and certain specific or determinate motives derived from the condition or conduct of either of the married parties. These last are derangement of reason, condemnation by a tribunal to a painful or infamous penalty, crimes, cruelties, or grave injuries of either party toward the other, notorious licentiousness of morals, desertion for at least two years, absence for at least five without sending news, and finally emigration from France in certain cases, which was naturally a transitory measure. Separation of body or divorce *a mensa et thoro* was to be hereafter abolished, and separations already

decreed by process at law could be turned into divorces. The divorced parties could marry one another *de novo*, and could marry other persons after a year, in cases of divorce for incompatibility, or on mutual consent. When the divorce was granted for a determinate cause, the wife must wait a year before marrying, except in the case of the husband's absence for five years, when she is allowed to marry immediately after obtaining her divorce.

So far the new law went back to the loose Roman practice, but the mode of procuring divorce was somewhat original. In case the steps for this purpose began in mutual consent, a family council of at least six relations or friends was to be convened by the parties, half chosen by the husband, half by the wife. When after a month's warning the council should meet, it was to hear the reasons of the parties who had desired divorce, and to make observations on the case. If not reconciled, the parties were now to present themselves, from one to six months after the meeting of the council, before the proper public officer of the husband's domicile, who, without entering into the reasons of the case, was to grant the divorce. If the parties neglected to take this step within six months after the meeting of the council, they would need to go through the same formalities again after the same intervals. If they were minors, one or both, or had children, the delays were to be doubled.

In cases where one of the consorts demanded divorce on the ground of incompatibility of temper, the steps were the same as those already described, with this difference, that there were to be three assemblies of the family council at certain fixed intervals.

Where a specific ground for divorce was alleged by one of the parties, if it were absence without news for nine years, or judgment for crime, the public officer could grant the suit at once, unless indeed the nature or validity of the judgment were contested by the other party, in which case the tribunal of the district must first decide the disputed point. If the specific ground were any other, as derangement, profligacy, desertion, injury of the consort, the demandant had first to bring his case before family arbitrators "in the form prescribed for suits between husband and wife." If they regarded his demand as

founded in fact, the divorce could be granted by the public officer of the husband's domicile, but there might be an appeal by the defendant from the arbitrators' sentence, which appeal was to be decided within a month.

This law opened a wide door to divorce, and in so doing disregarded the feelings and habits of the devout Catholics still remaining in France, by banishing all separation *a mensa et thoro* from legislation. But the door was not yet wide enough for a "wicked and adulterous generation." It needed the additional clauses passed by the National Convention on the 8th of Nivôse, An. 2,—Sat. Dec. 27, 1793—and on the 4th of Floréal of the same year—Wed. April 3, 1794—to become perfect of its kind. The first addition, brought forward by Merlin of Donai, who said that it was conformable to a provision of a civil code then in the hands of a revising committee, enacted that a divorced husband might marry immediately after the divorce was pronounced, and the wife after an interval of ten months. The second, a far more immoral enactment, declared that a separation in fact of a married pair for six months, even though proved by common fame only, should be cause for pronouncing them divorced without delay, if one of them demanded it. The document certifying such common fame should be given by the council of the commune on the attestation of six citizens. The demander of the divorce, if a resident for six months in a new commune, could cite the other partner before the public officer of his actual domicile. But no citation was necessary, if one of the pair had abandoned the commune where they lived without giving news of himself afterward. The divorced woman could marry after a certified separation in fact of ten months, but an accouchment in the interval would render such delay unnecessary. Finally, divorces effected and authenticated before Sept. 20, 1792 [and therefore with no law to authorize them], on the ground that marriage is a civil contract, are confirmed in their legality.

These final strokes of the law belong to the worst times of the revolution. A reaction showed itself in the autumn of 1794, and these two last laws were suspended on the 15th of Thermidor An. 3,—Sund. Aug. 2, 1795. The representative Mailhe, who moved the suspension, remarked that by these

laws the hasty outbursts of passion became irreparable, and took from their unhappy victims the refuge even of reflection and repentance. He then goes on to say that the law of 4th Floréal, making separation in fact for six months a ground of divorce, was forced on the legislative committee of the Convention by a "decemvir," meaning, we suppose, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, who had under his protection the wife of a man shut up in one of the "bastilles of terror," and wished to secure her for himself without loss of property, which would be sequestrated if her husband was condemned before her divorce.* "A decree of exemption might have unmasked this new Appius. It was thought better to propose a general law." "You know in fact," says he, "that the decemviral oppression weighed on the committees, and on the Convention generally. Into how many families have not these laws [of 8 Nivôse and 4 Floréal] brought dissolution and despair. How much at this moment do they not aggravate the condition of those who are detained for reasons of general security [who may be separated in fact six months by imprisonment, and so lose their wives by these laws]. You cannot too soon stop the flood of immorality which these disastrous laws are rolling on us."

Thus the law of Sept. 20, 1792, alone was now in force, and continued to govern in cases of divorce for some eleven years.†

The last form which the law of divorce took in France, before the restoration of the Bourbons, was that which appears in the Code Civil des Français, or as it was subsequently called the Code Napoleon. From the year eight of the Republic, corresponding with parts of 1799 and 1800, a project of a code had been sent to the Superior Courts for examination, and then—their observations being placed in the hands of the Council of State—the section on legislation within the council made a new project, which, after discussion in the council, resulted in the *Code Civil*. These discussions are of high interest, as indicating a reaction from the views of the revolution con-

* We are not sure that we have seized the sense here.

† The laws mentioned above may be found in the "reimpression de l'ancien Moniteur," generally a few pages after the date of their enactment. The remarks of Mailhe we have extracted from the same journal.

cerning divorce, and we should be glad to quote from them at large if we could afford the space.* The title on divorce was decreed March 21, 1803, or 30 Ventôse, An. xi., and continued to be law until the fall of Napoleon, with very slight changes, due to the imperial system. The differences between this law and that of Sept. 20, 1792, are chiefly these. The system of family councils is abandoned. The formalities in cases of divorce by consent of both consorts, or on complaint of one, are such as to retard the decision considerably, and give time for reflection and the spirit of reconciliation. The limits within which divorce by mutual consent is confined show a feeling that the license in this respect had gone too far. In case of adultery the offending party could contract no marriage with his or her partner in guilt, and the adulterous wife was subjected to confinement in a house of correction. A divorced couple could never be united together again in marriage. Separation "*de corps*" or *a mensa et thoro* is restored to legislation for the sake of the Catholics.

A long discussion took place in the Council of State on the question whether incompatibility of temper, or in other words mutual consent should be admitted at all as a ground of divorce. The distinguished lawyer Portalis was against divorce for incompatibility of temper. There was no reason for it in the nature of marriage as a contract. This was not an ordinary contract. No legislator would endure such a thing as a marriage for a limited term of years. It subsisted for society, for children; and the interests of the wife repelled divorce for indeterminate reasons. The granting of such divorces multiplied their number, and tended to demoralize France. Others agreed with him, and all the tribunals had been of the same opinion, or like that of Paris, had demanded that the incompatibility should be proved by facts. The first Consul, whose vigorous thinking is continually manifest, objected that mutual consent was a way of hiding shameful family secrets from the public gaze. Tronchet replied that the malignant would say that the pretext of

* We use the "discussions" as arranged by Jouanneau and others according to subjects. Paris, An. xiii. (1805). The chief speakers are Portalis, Boulay, Berlier, Emmerý, Tronchet, the First Consul Bonaparte, and the Consul Cambacérès.

incompatibility had been employed to conceal more shameful reasons. Portalis, too, said that a wife would say to the legislator "you dishonor me by concealing the true cause of the divorce; you give room to all sorts of suspicions; whilst my husband who repudiates me quits me only because he is hurried away by a shameful passion." "And what inconvenience," adds he, "would there be in accusations for adultery being made public. It is the crime which makes the shame, and not the accusation. If we look within we shall find that the only fear that agitates us is that of ridicule; for, we must confess it, in the present state of our morals we seek to save ourselves more from ridicule than from vice itself." These views did not prevail. The council, notwithstanding the arguments against mutual consent as a ground of divorce, introduced it into the law, and principally for the purpose of covering up specific causes of divorce, which it might be disgraceful to have known. Some of those who were consulted in framing the law proposed that this kind of divorce should be interdicted to consorts who had children, but the proposal was rejected—one member of the council remarking that children were thus spared the shame of having the scandalous conduct of either parent spread abroad.

To come now to the law itself (Code Civil, Tit. VI., Art. 229–311), the causes of divorce are the following: 1. for the husband, the wife's adultery; 2. for the wife, that gross form of the husband's adultery, when he has kept a concubine in the common dwelling; 3. for either consort, outrages, cruelties or grave injuries inflicted by the other (*excès, sévices, injures graves*); 4. for either, the condemnation of the other to an infamous punishment (*peine infamante*); 5. "The mutual and persevering consent of the consorts expressed in the manner prescribed by law, under the conditions and with the proofs which it establishes, shall be sufficient evidence that a common life is unsupportable to them, and that there exists in their case a peremptory reason for divorce."

These grounds for divorce are divided into determinate or specific, and indeterminate, or those which rest on no specific act or series of acts. In assigning these grounds the law stops short of the laxness of the Roman law, which it in some re-

spects followa,—for instance, in making ordinary adultery on the part of the husband no cause for the separation of the parties. Under No. 3, the expressions may include a wide range of actions, and much was left to the discretion of the judge. Here, if anywhere in the law, must come in malicious desertion under the head of cruelties or grave injuries.

In a second chapter, the law treats of the forms of divorce for a determinate cause; of the provisory measures to which the suit for divorce for a determinate cause can give rise; and of the pleas in bar of action in such cases. The provisions are careful and minute, such as to guard against any improper haste or advantage of the complaining party. We cite only one or two particulars from this chapter. The demandant of the divorce must always appear in person through the stages of the cause, with counsel if he wishes, but his counsel cannot supply his place. When the plea for divorce is based on outrages, etc. (No. 3, above), the judges are not permitted, although the case may be clear, to decree the divorce directly. The woman is authorized to quit her husband's company, and entitled during the interval, until the case be decided, to receive alimony from him, if she have not herself sources of supply for her wants. Then, after a year of "trial" (*épreuve*), if they are not reunited, the original demandant can make a new citation of the other consort, and the case can go on. When the case has passed onward to its final stage, the demandant is obliged to present himself before the civil officer, for the purpose of having the divorce pronounced, having summoned the other party for that purpose. This must take place within two months after the final judgment, and if such party neglects to have the other summoned, the proceedings are to go for nothing, and he cannot bring a suit for divorce again except on some new ground. Other articles allow the woman, in all causes where specific grounds for divorce are alleged, to quit her husband's domicile for another indicated by the judge, and to receive alimony proportionate to his means, until the case is settled.

Some of the provisions of the chapter on divorce by mutual consent are worthy of note, as showing the anxiety of the redactors of the law lest this principle should multiply divorces

greatly. No mutual consent should have any force unless the husband were over twenty-five, and the wife at least twenty-one, and under forty-five years of age; unless they had lived together two years, and had not lived together twenty; and unless their mutual consent were authorized by their fathers and mothers, or by other living ascendants according to the rules prescribed in the law concerning marriage.* Then the parties are required to reduce to writing their proposed arrangements in regard to alimony and the guardianship of the children, and to present themselves before the judicial officer of their *arrondissement* together and in person, in order to make before two notaries a declaration of their will. After the judge shall have made to them such representations and exhortations as he shall think fit, and shall have read the fourth chapter of the law relating to the effects of divorce, if they persist in their resolution, they are required to produce before him an inventory of their goods, their arrangements already spoken of, certificates of their birth and marriage, of the birth and death of all the children born of their union, and of the consent of the proper relative in the ascending line to their divorce. A proces-verbal is to be drawn up, into which all these acts are introduced, with a notice to the wife to reside in a house agreed upon, apart from her husband, until the case be finished. The declaration of the parties touching their mutual consent shall be renewed with the same formalities in the first half of the fourth, seventh, and tenth month after the first proceedings, at which time formal proof must be adduced that their relatives continue to give their assent. At the expiration of a year from their original declaration they are required to appear, supported each by two friends of fifty years old and upwards, before the judicial officer of the *arrondissement*, in order to present to him the acts drawn up on the four occasions already mentioned, and to demand of him separately, yet in the presence of each other and of the four friends, a decree of divorce. Then the papers of all the proceedings hitherto are to be submitted to the "*ministère public*," who, if

* That is, if no father and mother can give their consent, a grandfather and grandmother must do it, or if they, being of the same line, disagree, the grandfather's consent is enough. Code Civ. § 145-150.

he finds all the formalities of the law complied with, shall give his conclusions in the form "*la loi permet*," and shall refer the matter to "the tribunal." If the tribunal is of opinion that the parties have satisfied the law, it shall allow the divorce and send the parties to the civil officer in order to have it pronounced; otherwise the tribunal shall declare that the divorce cannot take place, and shall draw up the reasons for such a conclusion. The parties are to appear before the officer authorized to pronounce the divorce within twenty days after the decree of the tribunal, failing to do which they render the decree of the tribunal without effect.*

The next chapter on the effects of divorce will show more clearly still, by several of its provisions, the intention, already made apparent, of putting as many clogs on divorce by mutual consent as possible. This chapter prescribes that divorced parties shall never marry each other again; that when the divorce is for a determinate cause, ten months must elapse before the woman can contract a second marriage; that the guilty partner, where adultery is the cause of divorce, can never marry his or her accomplice; and that the woman, if an adulteress, shall be shut up in a house of correction for not less than three months, nor more than two years. When the divorce is by mutual consent, the parties cannot marry again during three years after the pronouncement of the divorce, and half of the property of each of them, from the day of their first declaration of their purpose to procure a divorce, shall be transferred to the offspring of their marriage in full right—they themselves having the enjoyment of the property during the minority of the children, subject, however, to the proper charges for the children's maintenance and education. In all other kinds of divorce, except for mutual consent, the party against whom the divorce has been obtained shall lose all ad-

* These provisions of the Code Civil were reproduced in a *Rheinische Gesetzbuch*, a code once controlling a part of the Rhenish provinces of Prussia. That divorce by mutual consent is there unfrequent is shown by the fact which Savigny mentions, that in thirty-six years only seventeen such divorces took place in a population of more than two millions (*Reform of the laws on divorce*, u. a., v. 282). Probably, however, the Catholic habits of a good part of this population ought to be taken into consideration in explaining this fact, and to this Savigny does not advert.

vantages conceded by the other consort, whether by contract of marriage, or since its consummation; while, on the other hand, the party who has obtained the divorce (the innocent party) shall continue to enjoy the advantages conceded by the other party, whether originally reciprocal or not. Power, also, is given to the courts to grant to such innocent party, if not already having the means of support, an alimony from the revenues of the other party, not exceeding a third part of them, and revocable when no longer needed. Of the arrangements in relation to the children, we omit to speak.

The last chapter of this divorce law relates to separation, "*du corps*," or a *mensa et thoro*. This cannot originate in mutual consent, but only in some determinate ground. If it is obtained on account of the adultery of the wife, she shall be shut up in a house of correction for the term already mentioned, but the husband may terminate the effect of this penalty by consenting to take her back again before it has expired. A separation for any other cause except a wife's adultery, after it has lasted three years, may be converted into divorce by a court on the demand of the party who was originally the defendant, provided the original demandant does not consent to put an end to the separation at once.

Here, as we have said, the authors of the law went back upon Catholic principles, which knew no other separation of a married pair, and never dissolved marriage; it agrees, again, with the old ecclesiastical usage in shutting up for a time the woman guilty of adultery; and it thus contemplates, as the church did, a reconciliation; but its peculiarity consists in converting the separation into full divorce after a term of years. There must be a limit of time after which the party sinned against in the first instance shall decide whether he or she will receive back the other, or shall put it into the other's power to marry some other person. The law, although it runs athwart of the Catholic doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage, yet does no hurt to tender Catholic consciences. For the divorce on petition of the original defendant—who might be a Protestant or of no religion—while it allows the other party to marry, does not force him or her to swerve from the strictest principles of his religion. It only says that he shall

not by his bitterness of spirit put an obstacle in the way both of reconciliation and of the other party's remarriage, except in the case of his wife's adultery, when his refusal to take her back can make the separation perpetual. The guilty woman might thus be placed on worse ground by this process of separation than by divorce, for the law lays no impediment in the way of her remarriage after divorce when her time of imprisonment is served out, except that of marrying the partner of her crime. In the draft of the chapter on the effects of divorce submitted to the Council of State, it was provided that the adulterous woman could never marry again, but on the remark of Mr. Tronchet, that this prohibition would have a dangerous influence on morals by furnishing an excuse for the lewdness of such a woman, the clause was struck out.

This law of divorce continued in force until the fall of Napoleon, when with the Bourbons the old order of things was restored. It was natural or rather necessary that an attempt should now be made to alter the law by abolishing divorce altogether. Of this important change the excellent historian of the restoration, Louis de Viel-Castel, thus speaks: (*Hist. de la Restauration*, IV. 486). "The only proposition which did not meet with serious opposition was that which had for its aim the abolition of divorce. On this point the Assembly was unanimous, and it represented, if not the unanimity, at least the general sentiment of France. M. Trinquelague, the organ of the committee to which the examination of the question had been referred, developed, in a carefully written report, ideas similar to those set forth by M. Bonald. He showed that the proposition made no attack on the religious liberty of the Protestants, since, if their religion permitted, it did not prescribe divorce. He indicated the arrangements to be made in order to remedy by legal separation some of the inconveniences which the authors of the Code Civil thought they saw in the indissolubility of marriage, and thus to determine in case of separation the condition of wives and children. The project of a resolution, voted without being opposed, was sent to the Chamber of Peers. Two bishops spoke there in its support. Another member, although he adhered to its principle and made no formal amendment,

asked whether divorce could not be allowed to non-catholics for determinate causes, but that idea was set aside, and the resolution was adopted by one hundred and thirteen votes against eight. Transmitted then to the government, and by it reduced to the project of a law, it was definitively sanctioned by the two chambers. The majority in the Chambers of Deputies was two hundred and twenty-five against eleven. In the hurry of accomplishing what was regarded as a work of moral separation, time enough was not taken for regulating all the difficulties to which separation substituted for divorce would give rise."

In 1830 an attempt was made without success to alter the law of divorce. Of this A. L. Von Rochau thus writes: (Gesch. Frankreichs von 1814 bis 1852, I. 329). "Some other projects of laws, accepted in the Chambers of Deputies, met in the Chambers of Peers with unexpected opposition. The first of these propositions aimed at the reintroduction of divorce, which, under the Restoration, in mockery of sound reason and sound morals, had been unconditionally prohibited in the name of the interests of Christianity, the demoralizing separation from bed and board being put into its place, which leaves behind only the name of marriage, or rather a bald lie." We are not aware of any new attempt to alter the law since the discussions on this project, which were protracted through several years, and ended in the retention—the final retention, says our author writing in 1858—of the prohibition of divorce.

We close the present Article with a brief sketch of the history of divorce in England.

In the times when England was under the Roman Church, the ecclesiastical courts had cognizance of marriage and its dissolution. No separations except *a mensa et thoro* were known. The same rules in regard to annulment of marriage prevailed, which are still in force in the Catholic countries. The rupture of Henry VIII. with Rome, and the subsequent progress of the Reformation, made no change in the law of marriage and in the courts to which its execution was confided. Catharine of Aragon was set aside by sentence of an ecclesiastical court, because her relation of sister-in-law to the king was claimed to have rendered their marriage null *ab initio*.

Anne of Cleves was put away after betrothal, but without consummation of marriage as it is alleged, on the ground of precontract. Anne Boleyn and Catharine Howard were executed for treason, the treason consisting in adultery, which dishonored the king's person and injured the succession. About the same time, the sister of Henry VIII., Margaret of Scotland, got from Rome a separation from her second husband, the Earl of Angus, on the pretext of a precontract between him and another lady.

There came in, however, with the Reformation and with the denial of the sacramental character of marriage, an opinion that it was right in cases of adultery for the innocent party to marry again. In 1548, Queen Catharine Parr's brother,* the Marquis of Northampton, wished to contract a second marriage after the decision of the ecclesiastical court separating him from his first wife, a daughter of the Earl of Essex, on account of her elopement or adultery; and a commission was issued to Cranmer and others to inquire into the conformity of such a step with the Scriptures. Cranmer, having largely examined the matter, was inclined to allow remarriage in such a case to an innocent party. A few years after, in 1552, the *reformatio legum*, drawn up principally by Cranmer and approved by a commission of divines and lawyers, proposed remarriage in such cases, but did not have the sanction of law, perhaps because the Catholic reaction came on the next year with the accession of Mary. The Puritans in the church would have favored this change in the laws both then and afterwards. Meanwhile, Northampton, having actually taken a second wife, was at first parted from her, then was allowed by sentence of a court to live with her, and finally had his union legalized by act of Parliament. From this time on, we believe, the received doctrine was that a sentence of an ecclesiastical court could only separate from bed and board, and that a special act of Parliament was needed to authorize remarriage.

But for a number of years, although remarriage after divorce

* Burnet's History of the Reformation (Vol. II. p. 56 of the 2d folio edition) gives a history of that affair, and an abstract of Cranmer's investigations into the opinions of the fathers. A number of questions were put to learned men, and their answer is given in the collections, No. 20, in the same volume.

was null and void, so that the issue would not be legitimate, no civil penalties were attached to it, and it was punishable only by ecclesiastical censures. Accordingly, many without scruple married again after obtaining divorce in the reign of Elizabeth. In the first year of James a statute made remarriage, while a former husband or wife was living, a felony, and yet a provision of this act declared that it was not to extend to any, who, at the time of such remarriage, had been or should be divorced by sentence of an ecclesiastical court. At the same time several canons touching this matter were enacted by royal authority, one of which provided that no persons separated *a thoro et mensa* should, during each other's life, contract matrimony with other persons, and that the parties requiring the sentence of divorce should give sufficient caution and security into the court that they would not transgress this restraint. Another canon required the judge who should grant divorce, without observing these rules, to be suspended for one year by the Archbishop or Bishop, and declared his sentence utterly void.*

A very remarkable case of remarriage, in defiance of these laws, occurred in 1605, between Penelope Devereux, Lady Rich, and the Earl of Devonshire, before known as Lord Montjoy. She had had an adulterous connection with Montjoy and had borne him several children while the lawful wife of Lord Rich. Then, by an amicable arrangement between the parties, an ecclesiastical court separated her from her husband, and she immediately married her paramour. William Laud, then the Earl's chaplain, solemnized the marriage. Laud must have done this against his own convictions of duty, and he kept the day as a time of fasting afterward.

The special acts of Parliament enabling a party to marry again, while a former husband or wife was living, were generally preceded by the decree of an ecclesiastical court, but this was not always the case. The Duke of Norfolk, without any such prejudgment in Doctors' Commons, was, in 1700, by

* See "The Romance of the Peerage," by Prof. Craik, Vol. I. Appendix, which rectifies several mistakes on this matter, and from which we have drawn freely. For the case of Lady Rich and the Earl of Devonshire, see the same work. Vol. I, 273. The same work notices the absurd plea made for Laud by Heylyn.

act of Parliament, after evidence had been submitted, released from all connection with his wife, having vainly endeavored to effect the same thing eight years before, when his case seems to have been made a party question. This adulterous wife, after the dissolution of marriage, was married to her paramour. There had been but one act before this enabling an innocent husband to marry again. The case was that of Lord Ross or Roos, afterward Earl and Duke of Rutland. Here the sentence of the ecclesiastical court had preceded the divorce by act, the proceedings on which, begun in 1666, were not despatched until four years afterward. Bishop Cosins seems to have aided the passage of this act by several speeches in the House of Lords, the substance of which is given in the *State Trials*.*

It may be added that the House of Lords, in trials before it, has not necessarily respected the decisions of the ecclesiastical court. In the noted trial of the Duchess of Kingston for bigamy in 1770, she was found guilty, although an ecclesiastical court years before in a process of jactitation of marriage had restrained Augustus John Hervey (afterwards Earl of Bristol) from giving himself out as her husband.

The Parliament was sometimes called on merely to declare children born of an adulteress illegitimate,† but far more frequently to dissolve marriage on account of a decision in the court; until 1857, when the law was remodeled and the jurisdiction in cases of divorce was changed. The law is quoted as 20 and 21 Vict., Cap. 85, and was amended, but not essentially, in 1858 and 1860 (21 and 22 Vict., Cap. 108, and 23 and 24 Vict., Cap. 144). We have these laws before us, and their leading provisions in regard to divorce are as follows:

1. All jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts in regard to matters matrimonial is henceforth to cease, except so far as relates

* Vol. XIII., pp. 1,332-1,338, where the proceedings in the Duke of Norfolk's case are given on his last attempt to get an act for his divorce. The proceedings in 1692 are found in Vol. XII.

† A case of an early date, where the injured husband only asked this, is mentioned in *State Trials*, XIII., 1,348. Also Lord Ross got such an act, before he obtained the other dissolving his marriage. *Ibid*.

to marriage licenses, and a new court is created, consisting of the Lord Chancellor, the Chief Judge, and Senior Puisne Judge of the three Common Law Courts, and the Judge of her Majesty's Court of Probate. Three or more of these judges, of whom the Probate Judge is to be one, shall hear and determine all petitions for the dissolution of marriage, and applications for new trials of questions or issues before a jury. This court is to be called the court for divorce and matrimonial causes.

2. A sentence of judicial separation, superseding but equivalent to the former divorce, *a mensa et thoro*, may be obtained by husband or wife on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without cause, for two years and upwards. Then follow provisions in regard to the way of obtaining such a sentence; to the court, its rules and principles, which are to conform to those of the ecclesiastical courts; to the alimony of the wife, and her status during separation; to the reversal of a sentence obtained during the absence of the other party, etc.

3. Dissolution of marriage may be obtained by the husband for the adultery of his wife, and by the wife not for simple adultery, but for "incestuous adultery, bigamy with adultery, rape, sodomy or bestiality, or for adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled the wife to a divorce *a mensa et thoro*, or for adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years and upwards."* The case is to come before the court on petition of the innocent party, with statement of facts; the alleged adulterer is to be a co respondent to the petition, if presented by the husband, and the alleged partaker of the husband's crime is to be made a respondent to the petition, if presented by the wife, unless in such case the court order otherwise. If the facts are contested either party may have a right to a jury-trial.

4. The court being satisfied of the facts, that there has been no condonation, collusion, or connivance at the crime on the

* Incestuous adultery is defined in the act to mean "adultery with a woman with whom, if his wife were dead, the husband could not lawfully contract marriage, by reason of her being within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity." Bigamy is marriage to any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whenever that marriage shall have taken place.

part of the petitioner, and no collusion with a respondent, shall decree a dissolution of the marriage. But the court shall be under no obligation to pronounce such a decree, if it finds that the petitioner himself or herself has been guilty of adultery during the marriage, or of unreasonable delay in presenting the petition, or of cruelty, or of desertion before the adultery, or of misconduct conducing to such crime.

5. Appeal may be made from the Judge Ordinary to a full court, and from such court to the House of Lords, each within three months, unless the recess of the house make a short extension of the term for the final appeal necessary. When no appeal is made within the prescribed term, or, if made, effects no change in the original decree, the parties may marry again, that is the innocent and the adulterous party both ; but no clergyman of the Church of England and Ireland shall be compelled to solemnize the marriage of persons so divorced.

6. Several other provisions of the act are worthy of mention. We have room only for the following: The old action of a husband for criminal conversation is declared to be no longer maintainable, but the husband may claim damages from the alleged adulterer, and the damages recovered by verdict of a jury, or a part of them, may be applied by the court for the benefit of the children of the marriage, or for the maintenance of the wife. When such an adulterer shall have been made a co-respondent, and the guilt shall have been established, the court may make him pay the whole or any part of the costs. When the wife is the guilty party and is entitled to property in possession or in reversion, the court, at its discretion, may settle such property or any part of it on the innocent party or on the children of the marriage.

This law, it will be observed, grants separation for a small number of specific acts, and dissolution of marriage for all adultery of the wife, but only for adultery attended with aggravating circumstances on the part of the husband. In cases of separation it allows the possibility of renewed cohabitation by mutual agreement, although of this nothing, we believe, is said. In cases of dissolution of marriage it allows both parties to marry again at once, and the guilty one to marry his or her paramour, putting a premium thus on adultery, unless the

injured party is determined not to sue for a divorce. In allowing the court to settle a guilty wife's property on her husband or children, it approaches a principle of the Roman law concerning dower. But it falls below the Roman law in making adultery no civil crime, but only a private injury. It respects the consciences of clergymen in not requiring them to solemnize marriages regarded by them as unlawful. On the whole, with serious defects, it seems to us to be an excellent law ; it does honor to the Christian country where it is in force, and it is certainly a great improvement on the former mode of regulating divorce in England. May the door never open wider in England for the more censurable kinds of divorce, nor the sanctities of domestic life lose that reverence which they now possess !

ARTICLE III.—THE NATIONAL DEBT.

DURING the French retreat from Moscow, vast quantities of artillery and stores were left on the road, owing to the inability of the horses to draw them. The want of physical vigor, the condition of the roads, and the unreasonable amount of material to be transported, furnished surely very plausible grounds for its abandonment and repudiation.

But when the Russian pursuers came along they found many of these horses perfectly available for their purposes. *They had not been properly shod!* The smooth iron on their feet would not allow them to stand upright, much less to carry weight or draw burdens. The simple process of rough-shoeing at once restored to them all their powers. And it is on record that these very animals, but just repudiated by the fugitives, were employed a few hours later in vigorous attacks on their former owners.

In a not altogether dissimilar manner have the people of the United States been staggering under a financial burden, apparently so oppressive as to lead to the belief in many minds, and to the clamorous assertions of many tongues and pens, that it is more than we can bear. Some are confident that the continued increase of interest payable in gold will bankrupt the treasury; some inveigh against the amount of taxation; others, with more reason, against the mode of its assessment and collection; and all are agreed that from some cause or other the wheels of industry are clogged, and that there is really some danger of a stoppage. To comparatively few does it seem to have occurred that the difficulty may lie not so much in the burdens themselves as in the financial system which paralyzes the vigor and neutralizes the efforts of the people on whom they are laid.

The remedies proposed are as various as the conceptions of the disease. But with all their variety they resolve themselves into three classes: changes of taxation, changes of currency and financial system, and partial repudiation. To

ascertain which of these will prove available and efficient, we must first learn the cause of the difficulty. If honesty should prove to be the best policy, it would surely be a mistake to be dishonest. If our resources are substantially unimpaired, and our financial ability undiminished, would it not be better to avail ourselves of them than to destroy them by repudiation?

Before the rebellion, the paper currency of the country was furnished by State banks, and though imperfect and unequal in quality, was, on the whole, maintained on a par with specie. During the first year of the war the contraction of business, the general practice of economy, the unusual export of breadstuffs, the large profits on cotton and other merchandise, produced an accumulation of money at the North, which, for a time, enabled our banks to sustain the extraordinary drain of the government. In the first loan which Mr. Chase attempted to negotiate, he characteristically refused the greater part of what was offered him; and to this determination to dictate his own terms to lenders, in spite of political economy, may be attributed a very large part of the financial mischief wrought during the war, and of which we are still far from seeing the termination. Fortunately for the country, the patriotism of the people came to his aid, and the first great loan of about \$150,000,000 was furnished by the State banks at about 7½ per cent. interest. But, in the meantime, the treasury had issued above \$50,000,000 of demand notes, and the necessity of meeting these, combined with unfavorable political events, compelled the banks to suspend specie payment.

Specie values, however, were not disturbed, and the banks, having still an ample reserve of gold, were ready to undertake the resumption of specie payments, on the simple conditions that the government should issue *no more* demand notes, and that it should procure needed funds by the sale of its bonds in the open market. To protect the government from loss they were also prepared to deposit ample security of its own bonds for all the use it might make of their currency, which was in fact the established currency of the people. But to the perverted conceptions of Messrs. Chase and Stevens, these simple and common sense propositions savored of "dic-

tation to the Government," and they were rejected. The next inevitable step was the legal tender act.

Few thoughtful men, we presume, will now be likely to dissent from the recent utterance of Secretary McCulloch on this subject, and yet it may not be difficult to show that in wiser hands and under better management, legal tenders might have proved a brilliant success. The country urgently needed a national currency, while the continuance of a specie currency, without paper, was obviously impossible. Not only greenbacks, but the notes of any State banks employed by the government, would have been liable to rejection by the disloyal, and the only remedy seemed to be a legal tender currency. The banks had locked up from fifty to a hundred millions of specie in their vaults, and its place in the circulation of the country might be filled with greenbacks without serious depreciation. This, in fact, proved to be the case, and even the issue of \$150,000,000 did little more than stimulate a healthful and necessary business activity.

But now commenced an inexcusable and well nigh fatal experiment. Mr. Chase *could not let well alone*. Elated, doubtless, by his victory over the conservative financial element represented by the State banks, and eager to complete his triumph by the introduction of his favorite "national" system, he plausibly proposed to Congress to *double* the amount of legal tender issues, and Congress complied. Some, like Mr. Stevens, appear to have been deluded by the ridiculous argument that all redundancy would be prevented by the facility of funding, or exchanging greenbacks for bonds—as if the man who had to buy a barrel of flour could buy a bond instead, when the price of flour threatened to advance—or as if the merchant who supplied him would forego his trade and substitute a depreciating bond for a stock of constantly advancing merchandise!

The effect was immediate. Gold was hoarded, and its price advanced with great rapidity—business already active was turned to speculation—stock jobbers and gamblers made rapid fortunes and spent them as rapidly—but the 5-20 bonds continued for the most part unsold, and the State banks obstinately held off from the "national" organization. Congress

authorized the sale of bonds *at their market value*, but Mr. Chase was equal to the emergency and declared that he *could not obtain the market value!!!* Evidently he did not understand the market value to be *what they would bring*, as any merchant would have done. The result was a vote of Congress authorizing a new issue of \$100,000,000 greenbacks to pay the soldiers. During all this time not a single public attempt was made to dispose of bonds, though an advantageous sale had been made of 7-30 notes in this way.

At length, the aspect of the war became more favorable, and in the depreciated state of the currency, the 5-20 bonds, which had hitherto been virtually below par, began to rise above it. The result was a very rapid completion of the subscription, and a demand sufficient to have supplied probably all the wants of the government, and prepared the way for a permanent financial improvement. But Mr. Chase's evil genius did not desert him at this crisis. He had determined to borrow at 5 per cent., and to "dilute" the currency if necessary, till he could do so. Now came in another potent invention of the enemy, which has so recently returned to plague its inventors, *compound interest notes*, redeemable in three years, available at once as investments and as currency. This influx of paper, aided by the new issues of national banks, and almost unredeemed by a single attempt at conservative action, so demoralized the public credit, as to create serious apprehensions of absolute bankruptcy. At this point, however, the sagacity of Mr. Lincoln, interpreting the feeling of the nation, released the Secretary of the Treasury from an office in which his resolute energy, high integrity, and unquestionable administrative ability might, under more favorable circumstances, have earned the gratitude and admiration of his countrymen.

Mr. Chase has recently endeavored to make out a case of still greater inflation against his successors, but he has omitted two important items of the comparison; first, that his own course had so weakened the public credit that no alternative was left them; and secondly, that the increase of national bank currency was beyond their control. On the whole, the policy of the treasury since then has been conservative. We

do not propose to follow its history in detail, but merely to inquire what steps are expedient under present circumstances.

The point really essential to be comprehended appears to be this, that there is no new principle of finance or of political economy involved, no new discovery which can release us from the penalties of war and extravagance, no royal or republican new way honestly to pay old debts. Before the war, the annual production of the country was estimated at \$4,000,000,000 gold value. It is not probable that this amount has increased, considering the great destruction of capital at the South; but neither need we suppose it greatly diminished, considering the rapid increase of population and industry at the North. Supposing the whole debt funded and bearing interest in gold, less than 4 per cent. of the annual income of the people would pay the interest. It can hardly be argued that a nation which annually squanders much larger amounts on the merest luxuries, some of them of the most injurious character, can have any real difficulty in providing this amount.

A great outcry has been raised by professed political economists against the existing system of taxation, as being needlessly diffuse in its application, burdensome to consumers, and ruinous to industry. Their complaints are, undoubtedly, to a certain extent, well founded, but they greatly exaggerate the results they attribute to it. The whole amount of revenue collected is not 10 per cent. of the annual production, and about one-half of this is derived from duties on foreign goods. Under the present system the rich are made to contribute liberally, while, on the absolute necessities of life, the taxation is insignificant.

If, indeed, we could be certain that the public debt constitutes such a mortgage on the national wealth that it cannot be paid, and that the mere burden of annual interest must keep our industry and commerce in their present depressed state, and finally impoverish the country, we should doubtless have the same right to stop payment, to demand an extension from our creditors, or to compromise by partial repudiation, which is conceded to private debtors. This has been done heretofore by Russia and Austria, without any stigma upon their nation-

al honor or distrust of their good faith. Shall it be done by us?

There may be some among us who really believe that to this conclusion we must sooner or later come, but even they must admit that to adopt it now would be not (like Austria and Russia) to yield to the invincible logic of necessity, but only to anticipate what we might be unable to avoid hereafter. So long as we continue to show a hundred millions of gold in the treasury, we cannot plead absolute inability to pay, and if we stop payment, the burden of proof of necessity must fall upon us.

There is, therefore, no *prima facie* case for the repudiation of any part of our national liabilities. But a portion of our 5-20 bonds, having been issued more than five years, are now redeemable at the pleasure of the government, and the contract on their face does not state them to be payable in coin. On the other hand, the legal tender notes are receivable "for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports." The same power which has created four hundred millions of these can of course create two thousand millions more. Why not, then, argues Mr. Pendleton, issue this amount and pay off the obligations of the United States as they mature! The bondholders, it is true, would be ruined, but strict legal faith would be kept with them, and to what more are they entitled? On the other hand, the nation at large, relieved from the chief pressure of taxation, would at once resume its upward progress and regain more than its former prosperity.

Of course it is easy to see that such a step would be for the time equivalent to repudiation, and would prove ruinous to all the interests of the country. The burden now sustained by the whole mass of our national wealth and credit would at once be thrown upon a comparatively small number of bondholders, many of whom would be utterly impoverished. The bonds which had not matured would be flung upon the market, and, for a time, the whole mass of capital invested in national securities would be practically annihilated. It is difficult to conceive the panic and ruin which would ensue.

General Butler's modification of this wild proposition is less dangerous, and therefore more plausible, but it stands on pre-

cisely the same basis, and is not one whit more defensible than the other, except on the ground of expediency. He proposes not to increase the existing issue of greenbacks, but to borrow them by making a fresh loan, payable, principle and interest, in currency, and with the proceeds to extinguish the old loans of the gold-bearing five-twenties as fast as they attain the term of five years.

We do not propose to contest the legal argument of General Butler and his abettors. We are ready to concede that by the strict literal interpretation of the law (the letter which killeth, not the spirit which giveth life) holders of these bonds would have no remedy, even if the Government should create, instead of borrowing, legal tender notes for their redemption. But we by no means admit that the honor, policy, and good faith of a nation can for a moment be left at the mercy of legal quibbles, such as have too often defrauded honest men of their just claims, and enabled guilty criminals to escape deserved punishment. We oppose this and every similar scheme on the following grounds of manifest equity and expediency:—

1. The evident intention of the Government, from the outset, was to use the legal tender notes as a temporary expedient, and to pay principal and interest of all permanent loans in coin. This is proved by the well known and often quoted utterances of leading members of Congress, and of successive Secretaries of the Treasury, not one of which was controverted or even called in question at the time. The fact that legal tenders were not made receivable for interest on bonds, while nothing was said of the principal, proves to General Butler that they were applicable to the latter; but to us it proves the exact contrary, that the Government meant to bind itself to the payment of interest in coin until it should be able to redeem the principal in the same manner, for interest and principal belong in one category of values. The truth, doubtless, was that nobody then expected the suspension of specie payment to be permanent.

2. To pay off bonds in legal tenders would be a violation of the well known maxim that no man may justly profit by his own wrong. The legal tender notes, like bank notes, were issued indeed as currency, but with the declared purpose of

speedy redemption. Every one of them contains a distinct *promise to pay*, generally at the New York Subtreasury. Not one of them has been so paid, but the contract and the obligation remain in full force. The bond and the note alike promise to pay dollars, and the only dollar known to our laws is the dollar in gold coin. The note, indeed, is a legal tender for debts, but it is nowhere called a dollar itself. Now the bond promises to pay *dollars*, not depreciated promises of dollars. It was the duty of the Government, in providing a legal tender, to protect creditors by keeping it substantially at par with coin. Its failure to do so was a grievous wrong, excusable only by the ignorance and incompetency of its officials. For private creditors and past losses there is, of course, no remedy; but for a Government to take advantage of the results of its own mismanagement to defraud its own creditors, would be monstrous indeed!

General Butler has ventured to argue that such treatment is good enough for "capitalists" who purchased the bonds at 40, 50, or 60 cents on the dollar. But this representation is purely fictitious. The great mass of our bonds were issued to American citizens, who paid for them, in some cases, in a currency almost equal to gold, and held them till their gold value was diminished one-half or more. It was not till they became more valuable that they were purchased to any extent in Europe, and the prices paid there must of necessity correspond to their value here, measured by coin. But whatever may have been the loss to the Government, it was a loss caused by its own mismanagement of its currency, and it has no right now to profit by its own wrong. We may add that no nation under heaven could have borrowed and expended such vast sums in so short a time, except at a heavy discount or a high rate of interest.

3. The first attempt to effect a currency loan for the purpose proposed by General Butler would, we are confident, demonstrate its futility. If we are to return speedily to specie payments there is no motive for such a loan. If not, such a loan can have no definite value, and would only be taken on the most unfavorable terms. The latter would, of course, be the natural interpretation; lenders would anticipate further steps

in the same direction, and ultimately more issues of irredeemable paper, and an indefinite postponement of specie payments. The loan would either be declined altogether, or taken at such rates as would even aggravate existing burdens.

4. As one legal quibble may fairly be met by another, we may notice that the first issue of legal tenders was made *exchangeable at par for five-twenty bonds, with interest payable in coin*. As these were the only greenbacks in existence when the first five-twenty loan was issued, it is evident that in equity at least, the holders of the latter (the only ones that are as yet redeemable) may fairly claim in payment greenbacks of the first issue, and may then proceed to demand *new* five-twenty bonds with interest payable in coin, to the same amount. In other words, the bonds would be renewed at the same rate of interest for five years to come. Honesty is emphatically the best policy.

We have left ourselves but little space to discuss the true remedy, suggested in our opening illustration; all we want is to give our industry efficient tools. *Our currency must be restored to a specie basis*. At present we have a mass of some \$400,000,000 of government debt, and \$300,000,000 of bank debt, available solely for one purpose, viz., to effect money payments. This is more than double what was required for this purpose on a specie basis, and there is no proof that more currency is needed now than then. As a consequence prices are in general about double what they were, except where unnaturally depressed; speculation is universal, and legitimate business is paralyzed. A large part of the capital, originally represented by all this paper, has doubtless been hopelessly sunk in unprofitable undertakings. Gold, being deprived of its legitimate function as a basis of currency, is unnaturally depreciated, and thus aggravates our difficulties by enabling foreign merchandise to compete too favorably with our own manufactures, even though protected by an exorbitant tariff. The excessive volume of currency enables speculators to hold large quantities of goods out of the market, while its incessant fluctuations in value encourage many to neglect productive labor and seek their fortunes in every species of speculation.

There is but one remedy, unpleasant, but preferable to finan-

cial disorganization and ruin, as a bitter medicine is preferable to disease and death. Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Walker may scheme to resume specie payments without pressure by a mere accumulation of gold, but the first day of such resumption would either bankrupt the Treasury, or so curtail the existing currency as to create a fearful financial crisis. The gold paid out would not circulate at home—it must go abroad. Even if the Government continued to pay, the banks would stop, for they could not command sufficient reserves to meet the drafts upon them. The return to specie payments must be accompanied by a return to specie values; and this can only be accomplished by a simultaneous decline of prices and contraction of paper currency.

It is mere idle talk to assert that the country cannot bear a contraction of \$4,000,000 a month. Either there is too much money invested in food held at starvation prices, or there is too much labor diverted to production of minor importance, or too many people supported in idleness who ought to be producing food. Contraction does not diminish our real wealth one iota; it only curtails a portion of the fictitious value which preys upon the people. There is never any lack of a medium of exchange where there are real values to be exchanged; it is only the unreal pretence of wealth which contraction takes away.

The tide, especially at the West, seems to be setting with unusual vehemence against contraction and in favor of expansion. We commend to all who share in this movement the salutary lesson taught by the experience of our mother country. In 1797 the Bank of England suspended specie payments; but for some years no additional issue of notes was made, and gold continued at par. Increased issues, however, soon produced their effect, and by 1810 specie commanded a premium which would seem insignificant to us, but which led to the appointment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry. This committee, attributing the depreciation of the currency to the right cause, recommended a compulsory return to specie payments within two years. *This recommendation, however, was not acted upon*, and the result was curiously parallel to our own experi-

ence. On the basis of these irredeemable issues, banks were rapidly multiplied, whose notes and deposits of course swelled the general volume of depreciated currency. The number of these banks increased from about two hundred and eighty to above nine hundred, and speculative farmers and merchants were enabled, as they now are at the West, to maintain breadstuffs at a famine price. But mark the termination! In 1818 came an abundant harvest and open ports. Wheat declined, multitudes of farmers and speculators were ruined, and in three years no fewer than 240 country banks stopped payment! Of course their paper became worthless, and the effect was an unavoidable "contraction," such as they had never imagined, which brought gold permanently down to about par, though the formal resumption was delayed for several years longer.

Let us be wise in time. We cannot long stand still on the steep decline which we so needlessly descended, and have now begun slowly and painfully to ascend. We cannot long continue to float on a sea of uncertain credit, fluctuating from day to day, repelling capital and industry from their legitimate employment, and supplying a perpetual and colossal lottery to demoralize the people. The only real pressure of contraction has been caused by the redemption of compound interest notes which were illegally and unwarrantably employed by the banks as reserves of "lawful money," when they were really investments of capital. If all apprehension of further contraction is removed, speculation will resume its course, and very soon will come an irresistible demand for more issues of irredeemable paper. The only possible termination must be bankruptcy or repudiation. If our Western brethren will insist on a course which may for a time promise to enrich them at the expense of all our commercial and manufacturing interests, they will end by diverting to agriculture an amount of labor and capital which must end in a ruinous collapse, like that of England in 1813 and the following years.

It would be ludicrous if it were not painful to see grave Senators discussing the saving of a few millions of taxes, forming an insignificant percentage of the annual production of the country, when this vast machinery of unlawful credit is not only

left untouched, but threatens to be perpetuated. Of what use is it to diminish slightly the burdens of men or animals, when the power to stand upright and the tools to work with are taken from them? Debt is doubtless an evil, and so is taxation, though both are less evils than dishonesty or insolvency. But of all the financial or economical curses which can afflict a nation, surely none can for a moment compare with that of an irredeemable currency.

ARTICLE IV.—THE MEMOIR OF PRESIDENT WAYLAND.

A Memoir of the Life and Labors of Francis Wayland, D. D., LL. D., late President of Brown University. Including Selections from his Personal Reminiscences and Correspondence. By his SONS, FRANCIS WAYLAND, and H. L. WAYLAND. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1867. Two Vols. 12mo.

ON the morning of the 18th of April, 1865, millions of hearts were struck with consternation at the news of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. At this time ten years had passed since Dr. Wayland's resignation of the Presidency of Brown University; and he was now living about a mile from the thickly settled portion of the city of Providence. At that moment of grief and alarm, the hearts of his fellow-citizens appeared to turn instinctively to him for counsel and comfort. As he was unable without imprudent exposure to attend a public meeting which was called for that evening, a large body of people, numbering not far from fifteen hundred, walked in orderly procession out to his house, and from a hastily erected platform near by he spoke to them of the lessons and duties of the hour. A more impressive evidence of the veneration that was felt for his character, and of the ascendancy which he had gained over the hearts of the people among whom he had long resided, can hardly be imagined. Known only as an academical teacher, as a preacher, a philanthropist and a friend of the poor, there was yet something in him that commanded the deep respect of practical men,—men of the world, who often hold in light esteem the wisdom of scholars. Critics may form what estimate they will of Dr. Wayland as a philosopher, an author, a teacher; it is impossible to ignore the significance of such a tribute to his personal power over the minds of others as this incident involves.

Dr. Wayland was born of English parentage, his father and mother having emigrated to this country a few years before

his birth. Had they been passengers in the *Mayflower*, however, their son could not have been a more thorough American in all the principles and affections of his heart. Both of his parents were singularly devout persons; and his father was at length led to give up his occupation, which was that of a currier, and to devote himself to the work of preaching the Gospel. He became a Baptist pastor in good repute for practical sense, integrity, and piety; and he lived to witness the fame and usefulness of his son. The son records in the "reminiscences" from which his biographers have drawn copious extracts, that in one of his earliest schools the instruction was so far over his head, and given after so mechanical a method, that even the study of Geography became a meaningless exercise of memory. "Perhaps my experience here," he adds, "was not altogether lost. It has at least served to impress me with the importance of doing everything in my power to bring whatever I attempted to teach within the understanding of the learner."* His surviving sister remarks of him as he was at this period:—"Although he was but two years the senior of the sister next him in age, yet, for some reason, he always seemed much older than the rest of us. When a mere boy, he was the companion of our mother." Dr. Wayland had a peculiarity of mind and manner that made him always seem older than he was. He was but thirty-two years old when he went to Providence to preside over the College; yet one of his early pupils speaks of him, somewhere in the course of the *Memoir*, as even then styled by his students "the old Doctor,"—an appellation by which he was very frequently designated in after years. Of course, this was chiefly owing to the standard in reference to youth and age which the young proceed upon, and which they find occasion constantly to modify as they themselves go forward in life; yet not wholly to this cause. We remember to have heard from Dr. Nott an observation concerning his distinguished pupil, corroborative of the remark we have made. At the age of fifteen, young Wayland was admitted to the Sophomore Class, then in their third term, at Union College. He thinks that his mind was

* *Memoir, &c.*, Vol. I., p. 25.

not sufficiently mature to get the full benefit of the college course. "I was soon hurried," he says, "into studies which I could not understand, and in which I had little interest. I was a pretty good reciter of what I understood dimly, or not at all."* For Dr. Nott, the President, he felt an enthusiastic reverence, which, though it sensibly abated, as would be natural in the lapse of years, was never lost. Late in life, he pronounces him the ablest man he had ever known intimately; a man capable of making "himself distinguished in any department of science;" and, in his prime, the most eloquent man he had ever heard.† Yet we are inclined to think that two men were hardly ever more unlike one another in their native tendencies than Nott and Wayland. The former, whatever his merits may have been, was rhetorical to the core, and won his distinction in the pulpit mainly by a few sermons composed in the oratorical style of the French school of preachers. In his relations with men, he had the credit of possessing a certain skill and management which are as far distant as possible from the frank and homely directness of Wayland. The latter was not blind to the well known peculiarities of his revered "guide, philosopher, and friend." "As the President of a College," writes Dr. Wayland, "he devoted himself to its material prosperity. Had he sought more to improve its means of instruction and to teach its teachers, so that these means might be well employed, I think his success would have been greater." "His power of influencing men led him also, I think, into errors. It led him to delight in doing things indirectly which might as well be done directly."‡ The lasting influence of Dr. Nott is probably to be traced in some of Dr. Wayland's methods as a teacher, and especially in the stimulating discussions of the Senior recitations to the President at Brown. The rhetorical side of Dr. Nott was also not without a marked effect on his scholar, making him attentive in the early part of his career to the graces of composition, and appearing, probably, in the eloquent paragraphs of the Sermon on "The Moral Dignity of the Missionary Enterprise." But native tendencies are stronger than arti-

* Vol. I, p. 33.† *Ibid.*, p. 89.‡ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

ficial stimulants as well as hindrances, and the younger doctor in due time relapsed into that disregard of fine writing and that supreme interest in the substance rather than the form or apparel of thought, which belonged to him in middle and later life.

Immediately after graduating Mr. Wayland began the study of medicine, which he prosecuted, for the most part, in the office of Dr. Eli Burritt, of Troy. Although this study did not bear directly on the career upon which he afterwards entered, it was far from being unprofitable. Apart from the value of the knowledge acquired, an association with a strong and disciplined mind, such as Dr. Burritt is said to have possessed, could not fail to exert a wholesome influence. In this period there occurred what Dr. Wayland's biographers term his "intellectual regeneration." He describes himself as having, up to that time, read with avidity novels, books of travel, descriptive poems, and the like, but to have turned away with disrelish from everything of a didactic or abstract nature. The papers in the *Spectator* of this character he passed over. On a sudden he found that his taste was changed, and an appetite awakened for a kind of reading which he had before regarded with aversion. This mental progress is not remarkable; it is only worthy of note that, in his case, it was an epoch so distinctly marked. "I remember," he says, "with perfect distinctness, the time when I first became conscious of a decided change in my whole intellectual character. I was sitting by a window, in an attic room which I occupied as a sort of study, or reading-place, and by accident I opened a volume of the *Spectator*—I think it was one of the essays forming Addison's critique on Milton—it was at any rate something purely didactic. I commenced reading it, and, to my delight and surprise, I found that I understood and really enjoyed it." * After that he read with eagerness what he had formerly shunned. It was a revolution of taste suddenly discovered to himself. He draws the natural inference that in the education of children there should be no attempt to elicit abstract thinking, until the time for it comes. They must first learn through the imagination and the senses. His own mind he supposes to

* Vol. I., p. 42.

have been slow in developing, and to have arrived at this era of conceptive thought at a later time than is usual.* Just as he completed his medical studies, he underwent another change, which was destined to be vastly more influential upon his future course. With his serious turn of mind, and under the guidance of such parents, whom he regarded with a reverential spirit, he could hardly fail to be impressed with the truths of religion. But most of the preaching that he heard was of a too frigidly doctrinal cast to come home to his heart; he had marked out for himself a series of mental experiences, through which he was expecting to pass if he should ever be converted, and he conceived that he must wait for the mysterious, overpowering influence of the Spirit to illuminate and comfort his soul. Various causes, among which the preaching of a returned missionary, Rev. Luther Rice, was prominent, delivered him from his mistaken impressions, moved him to surrender himself to the service of God, and inspired him with the hopes of the Gospel. "The precise time," he writes, "when a moral change took place in my character I cannot determine. I have had many seasons of religious declension and revival; I have been harassed with many doubts of my state before God, and have rarely attained to that full assurance of faith which is the privilege of so many of the disciples of Christ."†

After he had resolved to study theology, it was a fortunate conjunction of circumstances that brought him to Andover, and gave him a year under that most kindling of theological professors, Moses Stuart. At this time young Wayland was poor in this world's goods. He writes to his parents:—"Your letter containing fourteen dollars was received in due time. Permit me to thank you and the other givers for it. It arrived very opportunely. It has cleared me from debt, and brightened my prospects for a short time. I have some work in the library, which will probably bring me in about ten dollars; this, as I shall board myself, will keep me during vacation."‡ Once he was much in want of a coat, but having only ten dollars he chose to do without it for the sake of a copy of Schleusner's Lexicon, which he procured for that sum. The recollec-

* Vol. I., p. 44.

† Vol. I., 56.

‡ Vol. I., p. 76.

tion of his own conflict with poverty gave him afterwards a warm sympathy with his pupils when they were in like circumstances, and he knew how to aid them with a liberal hand. Dr. Wayland's delight in the exegetical study of the New Testament, and a certain jealousy of systematic divinity, were to some extent imbibed from Stuart. He experienced to the full the quickening power of this learned, vivacious, eloquent, but most inaccurate scholar, whose characteristic faults as well as merits he well understood. The tutorship in Union College was an episode in his life, and was followed by his ordination as pastor of the First Baptist Church in Boston. The society were not unanimous in their call, but Stuart advised him to comply with it, saying that nothing was needed to pacify discontent "but a little personal, kind attention," and a little preaching without notes, to let them know that he could be inspired as well as his brethren.* His parish became united in support of him, but it was not a prosperous one, and his qualities as a preacher were not of a sort to allure the multitude. "His manner in the pulpit was unattractive; he was tall, lean, angular, ungraceful, spoke with but little action, rarely withdrawing his hands from his pockets save to turn a leaf, his eye seldom meeting the sympathetic eye of the auditor.† To those who conversed with him he appeared abstracted and embarrassed. The work of composition was laborious, and, with his habit of study, consumed so much time as to leave him little leisure to win, by personal intercourse, the affections of his people." But all discerning hearers knew at once that he was no common man. His week-day lectures were more free and spirited in the manner of delivery. He grew in power and in influence. Yet he was far from being satisfied with himself, and was more sensible than his hearers were of the faults of his pulpit performances. He would pour into the ear of his friend Wisner, the pastor of the Old South, the discontent of his heart at the character of his sermons, and at the unprosperous condition of his congregation. The morning after he preached his famous missionary sermon he told Wisner it was a failure. But the reception that was accorded to

* Vol. I., p. 119.

† Vol. I., p. 121.

the discourse soon relieved him of this apprehension. The ability and eloquence that were displayed in it excited general applause. Read at this distance of time, this sermon on the moral dignity of the missionary enterprise, must be acknowledged to take rank with the most striking productions of the American pulpit. It showed that the author had a greatness of soul proportioned to the breadth and vigor of his understanding. The familiar passage on the progress of the Church in the first three centuries will bear to be quoted again :—

“The Church has commenced her march. Samaria has with one accord believed the Gospel. Antioch has become obedient to the faith. The name of Christ has been proclaimed throughout Asia Minor. The temples of the Gods, as though smitten by an invisable hand, are deserted. The citizens of Ephesus cry out in despair, ‘Great is Diana of the Ephesians!’ Licentious Corinth is purified by the preaching of Christ crucified. Persecution puts forth her arm to arrest the spreading ‘superstition.’ But the progress of the faith cannot be stayed. The Church of God advances unhurt, amidst racks and dungeons, persecutions and death; yea, ‘smiles at the drawn dagger, and defies its point.’ She has entered Italy, and appears before the walls of the Eternal City. Idolatry falls prostrate at her approach. Her ensign floats in triumph over the Capitol. She has placed upon her brow the diadem of the Cæsars!”

Dr. Wayland’s reflections on the character of his ministry form a very interesting passage of the Memoir. A more candid, discriminating piece of self-criticism it would be hard to find. He considers it a capital error that instead of accustoming himself to speak without notes, he became “a reader of sermons.” Having “little power of self-excitement,” being, as he supposes, awkward in the pulpit, and with not much practice as a speaker, he was easily persuaded to tie himself to the manuscript. “Had I,” he says, “at this time boldly thrown myself on my own resources, with reliance on the promised aid of the Spirit of God, I might have been more useful.”* “I never set myself resolutely to become a *preacher*, that is, one who, out of a full heart, and without reading, delivers his message to the people.” “If I had gained a proper victory over myself, over my love for reputation, and desire to be useful to my denomination by raising their intellectual character—and if I had, in reliance upon the Holy Spirit,

* Vol. I., p. 195

labored simply for the conversion of souls—I firmly believe that I should have been more useful, and I should now look upon the past with far greater satisfaction.” “I see that I had a sort of idea that I might so construct and deliver a discourse that, by its own inherent energy, it would produce a moral effect. Hence my work of preparation was an intellectual rather than a moral and spiritual effort. I relied in a certain way, it is true, on the Spirit, and looked to Him for His assistance, but far too inadequately.” He erred, also, as he supposes, in not visiting his people more, and in not making his visits more distinctly and faithfully religious. All this, to be sure, is the self-criticism of one who tries himself by the purest standards, and is more careful to avoid undue self-praise than undeserved self-reproach. Yet it rests, doubtless, on a foundation of truth, and deserves to be pondered by all who have taken on themselves the sacred office. There is no portion of these volumes which we should sooner select in proof of Dr. Wayland’s perspicacity, fairness, and humility, than this honest and masterly review of his own characteristics as a parish minister.

On the whole, he was quite willing to leave the First Baptist Church, after a service of five years, and accept a professorship in Union College,—the professorship of Natural Philosophy, with the prospect of exchanging it soon for that of Moral Philosophy. This anticipation was happily frustrated by his speedy election to the presidency of Brown University, which had become vacant through the retirement of Dr. Messer. A young man of thirty-two, not a graduate of Brown, it was certainly a remarkable proof of the esteem in which he was held that he was invited to this important station. Under his untiring, vigilant, and vigorous administration of its affairs, the College quickly began to recover from the depression and disorder into which it had fallen in the last years of Messer. A stricter discipline was introduced, improved methods of teaching raised the standard of scholarship among the students, the friends of the institution greatly increased its pecuniary resources, and younger professors, who had been trained under the President’s system, took the place of the old and lent their industrious support to his plans

Success within the walls of College was followed by fame and usefulness without. The publication of valuable text-books, in departments where new text-books were especially needed, gave the President distinction throughout the country, and thus added to his power of doing good to his immediate pupils. We must refer the reader to the pages of the Memoir for information respecting the details of President Wayland's long term of service, and for a full description of the principles which guided him in the work of government and instruction. As an academical teacher he has certainly had few equals. Although he exacted hard study of his pupils, and put their faithfulness in this point to a daily test, the members of the successive classes which passed through the Senior year at Brown, with few exceptions, found their hour of recitation with the President the most delightful, as well as the most profitable, of the day. There are three modes of college teaching. According to the first, the officer simply hears the recitation, questioning the student upon the portion of the text-book which has been assigned to him for the lesson of the day. The exercise merely puts to the proof the pupil's diligence and his power to master the prescribed task. Properly speaking, this is not to *teach*, since nothing is communicated by the instructor. He discharges a *quasi* police function, which requires, however, a fair degree of knowledge and attentiveness. Somewhat more is done when the professor elucidates the text-book and connects with it supplementary instruction. This is teaching in the proper sense. But a far nobler work is done when the teacher is possessed of the ability and tact to put himself in communication with the scholar, so that the latter is no longer merely a recipient of that which is imparted, but is rather prompted to think for himself, and to meet the teacher half-way by questions and suggestions of his own. His own mental activity is elicited, and the recitation frequently resolves itself into a conference, where in the friction of mind with mind, in the resolution of problems and difficulties, the intellect even of the sluggish wakes to new life. Ancient teachers, and preëminently Socrates, the chief of them, considered it essential to adopt methods which were directly fitted to spur the minds of their pupils to the origina-

tion and the accurate statement of thought. In their judgment, if this was not accomplished, nothing was done. The Great Teacher, by question, and parable, and paradox, compelled his disciples to abandon the position of passive recipients for one in which they must revolve and independently appropriate the lofty truth which he came to impart. Dr. Wayland believed in the ancient idea of teaching. Under him, in all the recitations at Brown University, the pupil had full liberty to interrogate the professor, to bring forward objections to the doctrine advanced from the chair, and, if he chose, to vindicate an opposite thesis by such arguments as he was able to produce. Of course care was taken not to consume time to no profit, and to leave room for the recitation proper, whereby the amount of work which had been done by the pupil in private could be ascertained. This quickening method of instruction was carried to perfection in the recitation-room of the President. The subjects on which he taught were best adapted to it, the students were in their last year and had begun to take on a more sober and manly tone, and the qualities of the instructor were such as to render his peculiar method most effective. His unruffled temper, his patience in listening, his quaint humor joined to a profound seriousness that made the class feel that they were engaged in earnest business, his noble elevation above all trammels of party and sect, the unaffected homage that he paid to truth, the pithy and often homely style of his observations, conspired to render him one of the most attractive of teachers. He called no man "Master," and he, himself, laid claim to no dominion over the minds of others. No teacher was ever more free from the spirit of dogmatism. It was evident that though his convictions were strong, his mind was open to new light, come from whatever quarter it might. The scholar must be dull, indeed, who could mingle in those conferences without feeling their influence on his intellectual and moral nature, through all the subsequent years of his life.

For the good government of a College, the right adjustment of the powers of the faculty, with reference both to the President and to the board of trustees or overseers, is a matter of prime consequence. Important acts of discipline, and all im-

portant measures connected with the immediate management of the institution, should, in our judgment, emanate from the faculty as a body. Such acts and measures should be the subject of common conference, and be determined by vote. The President may be entrusted with the veto power in regard to the action of the faculty meetings; but it is far better for him and for all concerned, that he should share his judicial and executive functions with his colleagues in the work of instruction. Under this system not only does every important measure proceed from the united wisdom of the governing body, but every member, inasmuch as his opinion has been heard and his vote counted, is free from the temptation to murmur at the result. Harmony among the officers is much more likely to be maintained. The President is far less likely to be obliged to encounter the concealed or open disaffection of his fellow-instructors. Discipline becomes impersonal, so that no special odium falls on the President more than on any one of his associates. In this last particular the system of divided responsibility has a great advantage over that in which the administration is concentrated in the hands of one man. Nor need there be any delay or uncertainty in matters of discipline. All ordinary cases of delinquency should dispose of themselves, it being only necessary to apply to them the rules, written or unwritten, which have been previously established. But in affixing punishments, as well as in determining the question of guilt or innocence, the knowledge which members of the faculty may have of the individual concerned is of essential service. Justice is much more likely to be done, and to be tempered with mercy, than if everything is left to the President.

The other point is the relation of the faculty to the trustees or overseers. The latter, if they understand their office, will not wish to be overseers in the Southern sense of the word. They should avoid everything that looks like intermeddling with the special work of the Professors. The general supervision which belongs to the trustees should qualify them to discover abuses before they have taken root, and to provide the proper remedy. They are charged with the duty of seeing that the endowments of the institution are not misapplied.

No important change can take place in the course of study, or in the system generally, without their express approbation. The faculty initiate no new measure without the consciousness that it must pass under the eye and receive the sanction of the governing board. This consciousness operates constantly as a check upon hasty or irregular proceedings. A competent board of trustees will occasionally suggest and introduce improvements; but a thirst for innovation, a restless disposition to do something without knowing exactly what, are among the worst qualities that can belong to a college overseer. The faculty must be allowed to feel that they are trusted, and that they are not liable to be hindered in the prosecution of their plans by unseemly interference. It must be taken for granted that they understand their business, as well at least as other people whose callings are different. An uneasy, ambitious, conceited, meddlesome, dictatorial trustee, is a positive nuisance in a college. If an instructor is for any cause incompetent, let him be removed; but so long as he remains in his station, he must not be cramped in his work. Dr. Arnold of Rugby refused to carry out suggestions of his trustees in regard to methods of instruction. Their remedy, he said, was to remove him, but as long as he remained in his place he must follow, on these points, his own judgment. One rule, of course, is not applicable to all institutions; but, generally speaking, the faculty, on grounds of policy as well as of right, should be heard on the question of filling vacancies in their own body. In most cases there are no better judges of the fitness of candidates; and the intimate association in which it is desirable for the Professors to stand with one another, and the necessity that all should work together with one spirit, are obvious reasons in favor of conceding to them this privilege.

We have the impression that at Brown University, in the days of President Wayland, at least, the system was defective in both the respects we have named. Too much power belonged to the President as related to the faculty, and too little power to the faculty as related to the governing boards, however judiciously the latter may have managed. If we err in this regard, the foregoing remarks will still be not without value. We are disposed to believe, however, that the President would have found his position more comfortable to

himself, and not less useful to the College, if the system had been conformed to the ideas we have suggested. Occasional complaints of arbitrary government would have been stripped of their plausibility.

We do not propose to enter, in this place, into an examination of Dr. Wayland's writings. We will only refer briefly to the little treatise on the Limitations of Human Responsibility, which appears to us to be one of the most characteristic and, on the whole, one of the most meritorious of his productions. The idea of the book is implied in the motto,—*non omnes possumus omnia*. Religious persecution, voluntary associations, ecclesiastical associations, are among the topics handled. Everywhere the rights and the responsibility of the individual are strenuously maintained. It is true that misgivings are expressed as to the moral right of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia without the consent of Maryland and Virginia, the States by which the district was ceded,—misgivings which the author shared, if we mistake not, with so determined an enemy of slavery as John Quincy Adams. On this particular point it is probable that Dr. Wayland changed his opinion, although he never entertained any sentiment concerning slavery itself but that of intense condemnation. The general tenor of the book, as we have implied, is in favor of the rights of free opinion and independent action on the part of the individual, as opposed to a meddlesome and intolerant spirit, and to the exaggerated influence and dictatorial tendency of reform associations. The following short extract, from the chapter on the propagation of truth, will convey a correct idea of the general drift of the treatise :—

“Truth, in the sense in which it is explained above, is a valuable treasure, frequently the most valuable treasure of which we can be possessed. On what do our hopes for eternity rest, our hopes of pardon, and salvation, and everlasting life, but on the truths of the Gospel, which have been communicated to us by others? But, valuable as even this treasure is, we have no right to *force it* upon another. I have no more right to fill my neighbor's pocket with diamonds, than with gravel stones, unless *he consent*. I may *offer* him diamonds, but if he refuse to accept of them, he must go away without them. I cannot help it. If I offer him abundance, and he prefer poverty, I am not responsible. He must, after all, do as he pleases.

“Such is the case in the present instance. I desire to communicate to my

neighbor valuable truth. He has *the right* to hear it or not, and I may not, on any pretence, violate his right. He has the same right to the use of his ears, that I have to the use of my tongue. I may, if I please, plead with him, and entreat him to hear me. I may present to him all the motives with which I am acquainted, to induce him to attend to my instructions; but this is all. If he still persist, nay, if he will neither hear my truth, nor listen to the motives by which I urge him to do so, his decision is ultimate; I can do no more. I have no right to do anything more. The reason of this is obvious. Every man believes his own opinions to be true, and what could be a greater absurdity, than to allow every man to inflict upon his neighbor whatever conversation he pleased; nay, to oblige him by force to listen to it, simply because he supposed it to be true and important?"

The thoughts of this unpretending treatise are far from being obsolete. They may well be commended to the thoughtful attention of that numerous class of reformers, who presume to denounce everybody who ventures to think that a good end may be best reached by other measures than those which they prefer.

It is well known that Dr. Wayland, towards the end of his presidency, introduced into Brown University an essential modification of the college system. He believed that the opportunity of higher education should be opened to a much wider class than those destined for the learned professions; that courses of study should be established for the benefit of persons looking forward to occupations which involve an application of science in the useful arts, or to other similar pursuits; and that in these courses Latin and Greek should retire to make room for other branches. He desired to render the facilities possessed by the college for imparting knowledge available to the practical farmer and the artisan, as well as to those who had heretofore profited by them. Many of the ideas at the foundation of the new system indicate the enterprise, foresight, and large benevolence of the author of it; and they are realized in the various schools of science which are springing up in different parts of the country. There was a call for that species of higher training which President Wayland was desirous of organizing, and which he so earnestly advocated in his Report to the Corporation of Brown University. So far as his plan aimed at this result, none will doubt that it is deserving of praise. It is our settled conviction, however, that a liberal education is to be distinguished

from all forms of special or technical education, whatever value may belong to these in their place. And the fundamental parts of a liberal education, it is not left to fancy or choice to determine. The constitution of things, and the course of history, as well as the structure of the human mind, define what these shall be. The study of the classical languages and literature is a leading, essential, indispensable part of such a scheme of education. The clamor which we are now hearing about "heathen learning" and "dead languages" is the outcry, to a great extent, of ignorance and superficiality. The proper study of mankind is man; and man is to be known through the study of history and literature. The foundation in this study, as well as the necessary key to large attainments in it, lies in the knowledge of the Latin and Greek. The disciplinary and humanizing influence of classical studies is something of inestimable value, and what nothing else can provide. The modern languages and the physical sciences will not do the work that is done by Latin and Greek, and that appears even when the ancient tongues are defectively taught. Mr. Lowe, a member of Parliament, has lately amused an Edinburgh audience by a lively piece of declamation against the accepted system of university training. There are faults in that system, and there are faults in that mode of teaching Latin and Greek which is prevalent in England; and we are quite willing to see both these classes of faults exposed. But Mr. Lowe could never have made a speech having the rhetorical merits that belong to his late address, had he been educated on the method which he recommends; and whatever brilliancy pertains to his harangue he owes chiefly to the drill he has had in the branches which he decries. As for his argument, it is a tissue of sparkling fallacies. A much more sound and discriminating view of the whole subject is presented in a lately published address of Mr. J. S. Mill. Entertaining these opinions, we hold, as a natural corollary, that the course of liberal education, *par excellence*, should be recognized and held in honor as such, and, in the arrangements of university education, it should not be thrown in among other courses of study in a way to convey the impression that it stands on the same footing

with them, and that all are only different paths to one goal. So far as the new system at Brown University was liable to this objection, and so far as in the advocacy of it there was a disparagement of the value of classical studies and of education substantially on the model of the old curriculum, we must say—as of new wine compared with old,—“the old is better.”

The opinions which President Wayland published, in the latter part of his life, on the subject of theological education, were the theme of much comment, and met with no little opposition. It is singular that in the early part of his career he was considered the advocate as well as the representative of a higher type of culture than prevailed at that time in his own denomination, and his settlement in Boston was favored by Stuart and others of his Congregationalist friends, as a means of promoting the interests of literature and education among the Baptists. But in his closing years he seemed to deplore a departure on the part of his Baptist friends from the old-fashioned dependence on the “gifts of the spirit” and an “unlearned ministry.” To do justice to Dr. Wayland, it is necessary to give attention to the great idea which he was attempting, in his later utterances, to enforce. This is, that “every disciple should be a discipler;” every believer in Christ should be an active propagator of the Gospel, by personal efforts to convert men to the same faith. He must persuade all within the reach of his influence to repent of their sins and enter on the Christian life. The special character and extent of his efforts in this direction must depend on his talents, his knowledge, and his opportunities. If his circumstances do not permit him to become a scholar, or to attend much to scientific theology, he may still be qualified for usefulness as a preacher, and he is not to be discouraged from choosing the ministry as a vocation on account of his lack of learning. The want of ministers in the country vastly outruns the ability of the Theological Seminaries to supply it. The harvest is great, and the thin ranks of the laborers must be recruited from the counting-houses and work-shops, and wherever respectable talents and a fair amount of knowledge coexist with an absorbing consecration of the heart to Christ.

These considerations must be admitted to be sound. There

was need, moreover, that they should be urged on the public attention. At the same time, the necessity and the benefits of a learned and regularly trained body of ministers are so patent, that an argument on this side, at this late day, would seem to be gratuitous. To interpret the Bible, an ancient book, written in distant lands and in unfamiliar tongues; to vindicate Christianity against skeptical objections, and to resolve the perplexities of honest minds respecting its contents; to discern and set forth the harmony of the Christian system of doctrine; to bring out and illustrate the truths of the Gospel, week after week, in the midst of an enlightened community, and to apply these truths in their manifold bearings on human life and duty, commending them to every man's conscience,—all this constitutes a work for which a few years of special preparation and forethought are surely not too long. The old plea that study fosters a dry and frigid intellectualism may be answered by the fact that the most fervid and effective of preachers, Luther, Whitefield, Wesley, Edwards, and more whom it were easy to name, have been trained scholars. And the additional fact must never be forgotten, that there is not less danger from the enthusiasm that is begotten of ignorance, than from the undue influence of the intellectual element among the clergy. A zeal, not according to knowledge, giving birth to wild opinions and disorganizing, wasting excitements, is not less to be dreaded, if history be our witness, than the intrusion of human philosophy within the province of sacred truth. It is too late to contend that study and knowledge properly tend to chill piety, and that ignorance is the mother of devotion. If every disciple is to be a discipler, and if the comparatively uneducated are to be invited into the ministry, it is all the more indispensable that many—as many as possible—should receive a thorough training for this exalted office, in order that from them light and guidance may be diffused among less favored associates, and thus the obvious perils arising from the existence of an unlearned ministry be avoided. There are numerous instances, it must be added, of individuals who, from a neglect to prepare themselves by prolonged study for the clerical office, have brought to their work inferior resources, and labored under a great dis-

advantage through the whole remainder of their lives. To call men to repentance, and so produce conversions, is far from being the sole work of a Gospel minister in a community like ours. He has to quicken, instruct, edify the people under his charge. Preaching should be direct, and should be addressed to the conscience; but the prime duty of repentance must be presented in varied aspects, and from diverse points of view. A preacher who can do no more than reiterate the ordinary statements on this subject, and follow them with an exhortation, may produce an impression for a little while, but his discoursing will soon become as ineffective as it is wearisome. His little round of topics is soon exhausted, and being destitute of the resources which reading and reflection are adapted to give, his harangues become "stale, flat, and unprofitable."

It is probable that Dr. Wayland would have assented to what has been said in the foregoing paragraph. He was himself too much indebted to his Seminary training under Stuart, to undervalue such an advantage. The year that he spent at Andover enhanced his usefulness and enlarged his power in a degree which it would be difficult to estimate. Had his course of theological study been twice or thrice as long, he would never have found cause to regret it. But he somehow made the impression of being unfriendly to theological study, and theological instructors in his own denomination complained that his influence was cast in the opposite direction. This impression was partly owing to his urgency in favor of admitting and inviting to the ministry a larger class for whom an extended course of study is not practicable. It was natural that he should seem, in the warmth of his advocacy of his favorite idea, to disparage a regular theological training. His language occasionally was such as might naturally leave this impression. Thus, in a letter to Dr. Anderson, he says:—"In this country Congregationalism and Presbyterianism advocated a learned ministry. They did not increase except by hereditary succession. The Baptists began on the other principle, and overrun the country in spite of all opposition. The Methodists followed, and did the same thing. They both now are aiming at a learned ministry, and they are standing still,

except in new parts of the country where these ideas do not prevail.”* In reading these sentences, one is tempted to ask whether Dr. Wayland disapproves of the earnest desire of the fathers of New England to have an educated and learned ministry? Whether he considers them mistaken in founding Harvard and Yale Colleges for this end? Whether their success in their self-sacrificing endeavor has brought good or evil to the church and the nation? That he adds the remark that he has “of course no objection to education in the ministry,” does not remove the impression which his previous words are naturally fitted to make. Our inference from the experience of the several denominations to which he adverts, would be that while an educated ministry is indispensable, there is room in the pulpit for the exercise of diverse gifts, and that the church does well in employing all the zeal and earnestness within its bounds in the work of proclaiming the Gospel. While, therefore, we believe that Dr. Wayland was right in his main principle that “every disciple must be a discipler,” and in the proposition that all ministers need not be liberally educated or receive a systematic training in theology; while we think, also, that his efforts to impress this idea on the churches were timely and useful, we are still of opinion that, to say the least, he sometimes used unguarded language.

Dr. Wayland complained of the prevalent style of preaching, that it is too discursive, that it lacks directness and simplicity, and that the severe, uncompromising demand of the Gospel upon every soul is either left in the background or veneered with smooth verbiage. He complained that fine orations are often substituted for Gospel sermons; that the philosophy of Christianity is discussed, while the direct inculcation of Christianity itself, in its personal bearing on the hearers immediately addressed, is neglected. He thought that he discerned a tendency to dress up the truths of the Gospel in a garb to suit the lovers of this world. A spirit of accommodation, he believed, was operating to dull the edge of that doctrine which is adapted, when taught in its naked simplicity, to pierce the conscience, humble the soul in penitence, and bring guilty

* Vol. II., p. 325.

men to the cross of Christ. He was, also, impressed with the conviction that, of late, pastoral labor has been either given up to a great extent, or has parted with its religious character, and turned into an intercourse of mere friendship. In 1857, in consequence of a request to fill temporarily the place of a pastor in the First Baptist Church in Providence, an opportunity was given him to put his theories in practice. The record of his labors for eighteen months in that parish presents a remarkable example of Christian zeal and fidelity. He did not confine his labors to the pulpit, but went from house to house, conversing with every family on the subject of personal religion, and following the men who could not be met at home to their places of business. The very sight of the man as he moved about the city, engaged, as was well known, in urging the claims of the Gospel upon the attention of the people, was itself an impressive sermon. The weight of his character, not less than the momentous nature of the message he bore, secured for him everywhere a respectful hearing. Besides these exertions, Dr. Wayland's closing years were largely devoted to works of philanthropy, such as teaching in the prison at Providence, and effecting an important reform in that establishment. In every humane enterprise, his aid was sought and efficiently bestowed.

We shall attempt no studied estimate of the qualities and services of President Wayland. The readers of the Memoir will naturally vary somewhat in their judgments concerning him, according as they sympathize, or fail to sympathize, with the guiding principles and spirit of his life. It is obvious that in him there were blended, with an understanding of uncommon strength, profound moral and religious sentiments; and that these elements were so mixed as to impart a singular dignity and elevation to his character. He stood intellectually midway between a speculative, metaphysical, and an empirical cast of mind; dwelling in a region of principles, yet of principles in close contact with practical life. A muscular, manly quality belonged to his thinking, as to his character. He was fitted by nature to be a leader and commander. Wherever he might be, he would be acknowledged as a man of power. He will hold in the history of Brown University,

and in the hearts of its graduates, now and hereafter, the same rank that is accorded at Yale to President Dwight.

The literary execution of the Memoir is quite satisfactory. The sons of Dr. Wayland have wisely preferred to let him speak for himself, as far as was practicable, and have added to his own letters and reminiscences the recollections and testimonies of his pupils. None of the "pupils, parishioners, and friends" of Dr. Wayland, to whom the biography is inscribed, will find it either too long or deficient in interest. In the case of such a man, it is right to construct the memoir with special reference to the numerous class who will make up the major part of its readers, and others who stand at a greater distance have the liberty of omitting what they do not desire to read. It will be no matter of surprise if persons who see little to honor in the religious earnestness of Dr. Wayland, should wish that his biography had been shorter; but, to our minds, it will be no argument either against the Memoir or the subject of it, should they fail to satisfy the taste of a literary pagan. These volumes form a becoming tribute of filial piety towards one who deserves to be honorably remembered, not only within the circle of his own family, but also wherever exalted worth, both intellectual and moral, is a title to respect. Probably there are special aspects of Dr. Wayland's noble career which each of the authors of this biography may have been better qualified to depict than the other; but their combined exertions have produced a full and faithful portrait-ure of his public work. As to his private life, the tenderness and charm that belonged to him in the domestic circle, and the instructive flow of his familiar conversation, they had only to draw on their own grateful recollections. We feel sure that from academical teachers, from ministers and candidates for the ministry, and from intelligent laymen who are attracted by an illustrious example of Christian excellence, and in particular from all of the class to whom the Memoir is dedicated, it will receive a thankful welcome. The former students of Brown University will take pleasure in brightening their memory of a venerated instructor, and of the able band of professors whom he called around him, and who lent him their devoted and wise coöperation.

ARTICLE V.—THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM.

ONE of the distinguishing features of Congregationalism is its system of Church Conferences. Although of comparatively recent date, they exist now in all the States where Congregational Churches are to be found, and their influence has been most happy in promoting a deeper religious life, and in awakening a new interest in the practical duties belonging to churches and their members. They afford a much needed opportunity for Christian intercourse and acquaintance, and lay the foundation for mutual confidence and coöperation. In these assemblies the ministers and members of the churches are brought together for friendly and religious conference, and together they commune concerning what may make for the peace and prosperity of Zion. The Conference system may be justly claimed to be a part of the ecclesiastical polity of Congregationalism, for its independence of all legislative control and its principles of church fellowship fit the denomination in an especial manner to receive and profit by this system. The fact that Congregationalism is so apostolic in its character, so natural in its development, is the reason that it needs, and has no other formal union than such as is realized through the Conference, in which the separate churches meet together as one. It is an outgrowth from the churches ; not something invented and then imposed upon them. It requires no pope, or bishop, or presiding elder to call it into being. Only Christians are needed ; and these, as representing the membership of the churches, are its sole constituency. At the present time the nature and workings of this system are being scrutinized, with a view to calling attention to some of its salient features, as well as securing for it a wider extension. Its adaptation to the wants of the churches, its relation to the new forms of Christian activity which the religious condition of the country has made necessary, serve to invest it with an altogether unwonted importance. The system, too, needs a more general

and popular appreciation, that it may reach its highest possible efficiency, and connect itself with the common interests and work of our churches.

ITS ORIGIN.

It was the earnest desire of our New England fathers that the churches might agree and act together, as an harmonious body, as a friendly and faithful brotherhood. Such desires found expression as early as the Synod of 1662. The general principle asserted was, "that there is, and ought to be, a communion of churches." Accordingly the above Synod defined that "communion" to be "the faithful improvement according to capacity and opportunity of the gifts of Christ, bestowed upon them for His service and glory, and their mutual good and edification." The acts of communion, it declares at length, with careful scripture proofs cited, are :

I. Hearty care and prayer one for another.

II. Affording relief by communication of their gifts in temporal or spiritual necessities.

III. Maintaining unity and peace by giving an account, one to another, of their public actions when it is orderly desired, and strengthening one another in their regular administrations, as in special by a concurrent testimony against persons justly censured, &c.

These objects it was thought could in a general and effectual way be accomplished in that plan of stated intercourse termed Conference of Churches. Further objects proposed by the same Synod imply and require the existence of Councils, and hence need no mention here. Even previous to the year 1662, the subject of the Communion of Churches, exercised in some stated permanent way, had arrested the attention of the churches at large. Cotton's name stood forth conspicuous in this matter, and the plan he proposed is substantially the one now in vogue. Dr. Increase Mather, some time before his death, which occurred in 1652, amended Cotton's plan, and submitted the following (*vide* First Principles of New Eng.).

1. It is fit that the number of churches so to meet be regulated to the nearness or distance of churches, and as other conveniences or inconveniences shall require.

2. For the times of meeting it may seem best to leave it to the wisdom of each society of churches, to meet more frequently or seldom as they shall see cause.

3. Concerning their exercises, it is meet that the elders (ministers, there being anciently two to each church), where the Conference is to be held, should choose, with the consent of the church, some other elder as they see best, whom they may entreat to preach at their meeting, and also desire some to moderate in the Conference, and agree upon such questions as they see fit, three or four, and send them to the elders of other churches, at least fourteen days before the time of assembling.

4. For the ordering of the time it may be fit that the sermon should end at eleven o'clock, and after it the Conference follow, and continue so long as shall be meet and reasonable.

This, in the main, will be recognized as the form of the local or county Conferences subsequently adopted, and still in existence. This plan, however, of Mather's was not carried out, the churches not being ripe for such a movement as this contemplated. Nevertheless there were instances where neighboring churches met together by regularly appointed delegates, and spent the time in religious Conference. No *permanent* union for this end was as yet effected. The idea was before the churches, and it needed only fitting time and feeling to consummate what had been so early proposed.

We come down to 1822, when, in the meeting of the York County (Maine) Association of Ministers, it was voted that at the annual meeting of the body, to be held on the first Tuesday of October, all ordinary business be suspended; and that the churches in connection with the members of the Association be invited to appoint one delegate to unite with their pastor in attending. The object of this yearly meeting was declared to be "the union and prosperity of the churches in this county." This Association of churches at or before its next annual meeting in 1823 adopted the name of the York Conference. In Dec. 1822 representatives from the churches in Cumberland County (Maine) met and organized the Cumberland Conference. Measures were soon taken to have the various County Conferences combine in some form, which was

effected in 1826, when the General Conference of Maine, with its present constitution, was organized. This was the first of the kind in the country, and from it have sprung similar Conferences in other States. Several District Conferences were formed in Massachusetts as early as 1827, but no State Conference till 1860. The General Association of New Hampshire, established in 1809, became all but in name a General Conference, by voting in 1860 to admit lay delegates from existing Conferences, and from such as may hereafter be organized. The General Convention of Congregational and Presbyterian Ministers of Vermont, organized in 1795, amended its constitution in 1840, so as to adopt its present name, "The General Convention of Congregational Ministers and Churches of Vermont," and admitted lay delegates from district Conferences. Previous to this, laymen had been received from Consociations, but as the latter were few in number, only a very small lay representation was thus introduced. In 1857 this was increased by allowing each local Conference to send as delegates one minister and two laymen. While the Evangelical Consociation of Rhode Island, which was organized in 1809, and was supposed to have some of the characteristics of a Standing Council, though in fact it had not, voted in 1864 to change its name to that of the Rhode Island Congregational Conference.

ITS FORM.

The different Conferences now existing in the several States do not all agree in their particular regulations or titles. Having the same general object, they are, however, with various modifications, governed by the same general principles. The constitution of each states the number of delegates who shall compose its membership, what district bodies shall elect them, the number and duties of its officers, the time of annual meeting, the prominent religious exercises, and whatever else may relate to the usefulness and permanency of the Conference. In particular, there is found in their several constitutions an Article disclaiming all legislative or judicial authority over the churches. This is true of both local and general Conferences. In this respect they differ from the Consociation, which is a sort of Standing Council, with powers of a decisive and

authoritative nature. And yet the Consociation resembles the District Conference in having a constitution and a like constituency and composition. The Conference differs again from Ecclesiastical Councils, which are occasional bodies created by letters missive, and called together for some specific object, and then dissolving. And yet the latter bear some likeness to the Conference, in that lay delegates are admitted.

The variety in the form of these General Congregational bodies, known as Conferences or Associations, may be seen from the following summary: —

1. The General Conference of Maine is composed of delegates, both lay and ministerial, elected solely by District Conferences.

2. The General Association of New Hampshire, and the General Association of Massachusetts, into which the State Conference has just been merged, after an existence of eight years, and the General Convention of Vermont, are each made up of delegates from the several District Associations of Ministers and from District Conferences.

3. The General Conference of Connecticut, organized in November last, is made up of delegates elected by "the several district ecclesiastical organizations by which the several churches may choose to be represented; provided that no two constituent bodies shall represent the same churches." Thus is left happily untouched the question as to whether the Consociations or county Conferences shall appoint the delegates. And in more strict agreement with the principles of Congregationalism it attempts no division of these into lay and ministerial; all are delegates and on perfect equality, whether they are ministers or mere members of the churches. The ratio of representation was fixed at one delegate for every three hundred church members resident in the State.

4. The General Association of New York is composed of delegates from District Associations of ministers, and of ministerial and lay delegates from district organizations representing Congregational Churches, and of acting Pastors, and {one delegate from "any Congregational Church assenting to the Confession of faith of this body."

5. The General Conferences of the States of Rhode Island, Ohio, and Minnesota, and the General Associations of the

States of Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, California, Oregon, Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska—also the Congregational Union of Canada—are severally composed of ministers and laymen appointed by particular churches. The General Presbyterian and Congregational Convention of Wisconsin is not enumerated among the organizations embodying the principles and objects of the Conference system, because it assumes to exercise certain judicial functions which is altogether foreign to this system.

These State organizations are for all practical purposes General Conferences, though not all assume that name. Their mode of constitution, and their substantial agreement as to the essential objects of their existence, authorize their being considered and enrolled as Conferences. Uniformity in the title these general bodies shall bear has not yet been attained, because in many instances the already existing ecclesiastical organizations are retained, but so modified as to admit the lay element. We can but think that the longer continuance of these popularly constituted bodies will, for the sake of uniformity and increased efficiency, necessitate the adoption of district Conferences as the most appropriate constituent bodies. In the new States this is the policy that is being pursued. Where these district Conferences do not exist, they will be called into being, and their direct connection with the General Conference or Association will give them permanency; or rather the existence of the former will make these last a necessity. It has all along been owing to the variety and number of these district organizations that the general body has been so differently constituted. Where local Conferences exist, as in Maine, there the representation is simple and systematic. But where Associations, Consociations, and Conferences are found side by side, the difficulty has been in adopting one of these, to the exclusion of the others, as the constituent body. Practically, however, the wants of the churches are answered whenever the representatives of their membership are brought into these State organizations, and the voice of the churches is heard through these lay delegates, and the duties and responsibilities connected with church life are impressed upon

them so that they go back with enlightened and quickened hearts to move their respective churches to increased activity and life.

ITS POSITION.

This is necessarily both a central and an important one. The Conference system constitutes an essential part of our general church polity. It has therefore a province of its own, and exerts an influence peculiar to itself. Its position relative to other bodies is not antagonistic, but supplemental. For it does not contravene the necessity for Ministerial Associations, or Ecclesiastical Councils. These have each their own separate functions, and the Conference can never assume to supersede them. And yet it takes the precedence of both of these in general importance and influence. Not confined in its membership to ministers, it has a wider reach, and represents a broader constituency. At the same time being a permanent organization, it has altogether a different sphere from that of the Council. Nor can the Conference be regarded as a supernumerary, a needless addition to the number of meetings which the ministers and members of the churches are expected to attend. It is the largest popular gathering known in the Congregational denomination, and in this respect is the most important. It is the only stated representative assembly Congregationalism allows. Its position is therefore first among all the ecclesiastical organizations comprehended in its church system. Relative to the *people*, the Conference holds the same place. For it is so constituted that every church may be intimately connected with it; and to its deliberations the utmost interest will attach, and its discussions and utterances will do much to secure a sound Christian sentiment respecting the practical duties of the day. By means of this system, the churches confederated together give expression to their wants; and it is therefore the only agency by which the popular Christian thought and purpose can find a voice. The common life in the churches is by the means of the Conference concentrated, and the highest moral authority is given to all the measures it sanctions for building up the Master's kingdom. No other ecclesiastical body represents so much, nor combines features of such immediate and universal interest. This position is

generally being conceded to the Conference system, and everywhere it is becoming recognized as foremost in importance. Inquiring for the reason of this prominence and power, it will be found, (1.) In its practical religious influence. It claims no ecclesiastical authority, and has nothing of the judicial and legislative in its character, as is true of the Synods and Assemblies of other Christian sects. It holds its position because of the earnest spirit it awakens, and the results it reaches. (2.) In its agency in securing harmony of action between the churches. It is the instrument of their outward union. (3.) In the more earnest and systematic diffusion of Gospel institutions within the limits embraced, which it aims to secure. This gives it rank above all the other stated forms of church and ministerial association, and makes the Conference system of the highest consequence to the churches.

ITS TENDENCY.

(1.) The natural tendency of the Conference system is to foster a *closer fellowship of the churches*. This, in fact, is one of its principal objects. It therefore arrays itself against that bald Independency which was once confounded with Congregationalism. The Conference is the outgrowth of fellowship, is one of the chief organs of that fellowship. If it had no other effect than the maintenance of a visible union of churches organized in accordance with the teachings of the New Testament, this would be a sufficient vindication of its existence. No agency so effectively promotes and provides for this practical fellowship in doctrine and labor as the Conference. With no judicial assumptions, it unites the churches in a oneness of spirit and purpose which must augment their individual prosperity and power. This intercommunion of the churches is essential for a regulated and useful church life. It prevents that isolation and segregation of churches, which would reduce them to separate societies, acknowledging none of the duties of courtesy or communion. The best practicable method of true church fellowship is found in the Conference system. By it the churches are brought into most fraternal relations, are made acquainted with each other's wants and condition, and are quickened by the interchange of thought and feeling. We cannot,

therefore, afford to be indifferent to a system, the direct tendency of which is to emphasize and enforce church fellowship. For this is not only a cardinal feature in the polity of the Congregational Churches, but is the source of their greatest strength as a denomination. Fellowship is a duty as well as a power, and to this the Conference system gives completest expression, and for it makes the amplest provision. The dream of visible unity is through it realized, for it unites churches, in themselves distinct and complete, into a fellowship which makes the many—one.

(2.) Another tendency is to a more comprehensive and earnest church activity. The Conference is the agency through which the churches, by it brought into fellowship, coöperate in advancing the Master's cause. While each church is responsible for its own local field, it needs to confederate together with others of like faith and polity, to undertake for destitute sections, and to engage in some systematic effort to reach the neglected portion of the population. By means of public discussion and addresses before these general Congregational bodies, the movements of public opinion can be affected, and currents of sentiment may be created which will be helpful to individual churches. The best practical wisdom of both ministers and laymen will, through them, be brought to the consideration of the great questions of home-evangelization. The benevolent operations of the day will thus be presented to the churches, and the interest attaching to them thrill the hearts of Christians. The inevitable tendency of such earnest religious conference as our system contemplates must be to bring into prominence matters of universal, and permanent interest. Commissions on popular christianization will result from these gatherings. The experience of the past has shown us, that nothing so tends to increase the activity of the separate churches, and systematize the work they have in common to do, as these general Conferences. From them, in many of the States, have sprung the movement to realize a more thorough home-evangelization. In Massachusetts this subject as had imparted to it through its State Conference an altogether new importance; and its committee, together with their efficient secretary, has systematized this home work, and

aroused the churches to enter upon it by their practical recommendations to them. A like result is attained in reference to the subjects of Sabbath Schools and Temperance. The assembling together of the representatives of the churches creates the body and the opportunity for the consideration of plans of labor and questions of duty. There is in this way infused into the churches a new sense of responsibility, and they are led to feel more deeply the necessity for earnest and united effort. Christian Conference is required to develop both the necessities and best methods of Christian labor. By it the benefits of the common experience and the common wisdom can most widely be diffused. The tendency of the Conference system in this respect can be seen in Maine. The deliberations of its general Conference are in the highest degree both instructive and quickening. From it originate the suggestions which the churches eagerly take up and realize ; by it are fostered or contrived all the movements which require united action on the part of the churches. Its Home Missionary and educational interests are connected with this Conference, and its annual meetings are felt in every part of the State. In fact, the tendency of the system everywhere is to secure community of interest and coöperative effort among the churches. And as through it alone they are confederated for purely religious ends, so only by this system can such a spirit and activity be generated as will enable each church to do its part, and in connection with others to engage in comprehensive work for promoting a universal christianization of the people.

(3.) Still another tendency of the system we are considering is to secure a higher *position* and wider *usefulness* for the *lay-element* in the churches. The earlier general ecclesiastical organizations of New England were composed exclusively of ministers. They exercised a kind of supervision over the churches, and undertook, as the General Association of Connecticut has done, to discuss the practical questions which grew out of their wants and condition. But by these discussions little popular interest was excited. The latent jealousy of ministerial bodies, which has always existed, prevents their affecting to any great extent the hearts of those

connected with the churches. The Conference system, on the contrary, aims to bring out the lay-element, and by giving it a place and part in the religious assemblies for which it provides, to secure for these a more popular character and influence. Accordingly laymen are made to divide the responsibility in these meetings with the ministers. Their counsel and support are sought in all the plans and questions which come before the General Conferences or Associations. The work devolving upon the churches they are led to believe is their work. And while they contribute of their practical wisdom and zeal to the deliberations of these bodies, they in turn are more directly interested and impressed. They carry back to the churches the spirit and wisdom obtained at these gatherings, and the churches are brought in this way into sympathy with the purposes of these last, and feel more as if they had been represented in them. It is the voice of the churches for which this system seeks to gain expression, and when this is heard through delegates chosen from its own ranks, it cannot fail to command attention. Moreover, we are living in times when every Christian man is summoned to engage in some form of personal labor for the Master, and the tendency of the Conference system is to deepen this obligation, and give the best direction to this activity. Its influence is educational. It develops the proper spheres of personal effort, incites the most capable to engage therein, and tends to associate such personal workers together, so that their exertions will be more widely useful. Lay-preaching, individual labor in Sabbath Schools, Christian visitation—such are the methods of work which at present are being pressed upon Christian laymen. And the Conference system has done no small part in teaching us the worth of every disciple of Jesus, and the good he can do to others in the name of the church, if only he can be induced to attempt it. Bishop Clark declared at the recent Pan-Anglican Council, that the Episcopalians in America were the first to perceive the importance and value of introducing the laity into their annual Conferences. But they now form a constituent part, as we have shown, in all the general bodies of our denomination. They have been benefited by this arrangement, while their presence has given greater

popular interest to these assemblies, as well as served to bring the latter into closer sympathy with the churches. The objects provided by the Conference system made it necessary to have lay-representatives, and the result has been that a greater activity and earnestness have been developed on the part of the laity. The latter, by this system, are being taught that they are the guardians and educators in part of the unconverted masses, and a position consequent upon such serious responsibilities is provided for them in it. The conviction is spreading that laymen must be set to the work of personally extending the Gospel, and the great incentive to such labors comes from the appalling destitution that the gathered statistics show to be existing, and comes, too, from the meeting in fraternal sympathy, and for Christian counsel, with the representatives of other churches. It is, too, the Conference system which tends to bring out the best workers, and to inspire them with increased devotion. Their voices mingling with those of like spirit, in prayer and exhortation, are never lost, and it is the popular element this system develops which we need to enlist in active support of all the schemes of Christian effort. This system, making more prominent and useful the lay-membership of the church, carries thus its own recommendation.

(4.) Yet another tendency of the system is to generate a deeper *spiritual life* in the churches. The object of the system, as already shown, is to benefit the churches. Hence the collection of religious statistics which it contemplates, the strengthening of the ties of Christian sympathy, the spiritual character of these yearly gatherings, all tend to produce a direct religious impression on the churches. The harvest of good resulting from attendance upon these meetings cannot be overestimated. This system tends to draw out the religious feeling latent in the churches, and to send back through the representatives of the same a wave of spiritual interest which shall affect all hearts. The annual meetings of these General Conferences, in many of the States where they are firmly established and have undivided right to the whole field, are looked forward to with eagerness, are attended by large numbers, and are seasons of rare spiritual enjoyment. They are the religious feast days of the churches. Their exercises are

such as not only profit those present, but interest all who hear or read accounts of the same.

In the State of Maine, which is still the model in all that relates to the development of this system, the General Conference is the great religious assembly of the year. A profound interest is awakened in respect to it in all parts of the State; and it is not infrequently followed by revivals and religious refreshings. No more effective agency can be found by which to inspire in the churches a more earnest piety. And every State needs the Conference system in order to be stirred as by the pulsations of one religious heart, to have its churches quickened by the spiritual communion it fosters, to be charged with a holy zeal such as it tends to excite. Let any one seriously consider the influence of a system which brings the churches of a State or County, through their representatives, into Conference concerning things pertaining to their life and duty, which provides for the earnest discussion of questions of common interest, which gathers them in oneness of spirit about the Lord's Table, which gives opportunity to kindred bodies of believers to present their Christian salutations, which maps out before them the religious condition of every church embraced within the limits named, which brings home to them their responsibility for extending the gospel of Christ, and moves them to activity by every motive drawn from the necessities of man and the goodness of God,—and can he think of anything more likely to intensify the spiritual life in these churches, anything so calculated to quicken their faith and zeal. The testimony is most ample on this point; and if for no other reason, then for this alone we need the Conference system. These late Christian Conventions which have been held in different parts of our country have this tendency in common with our system to arouse in the churches a more earnest life. The Conference system, however, does this continuously, while its existence and farther extension carry the promise that this will be increasingly its tendency. By it the popular heart can be most effectively reached, and its blessed influence in helping the churches to a pure life, will become each year still more apparent.

THE OBLIGATIONS IT IMPOSES.

Connected with the Conference system are certain personal obligations which need to be recognized and discharged before it can become as practically effective for good as is possible. Churches and individual Christians owe to this system a cordial support. For inasmuch as it is dependent upon them, it must grow feeble, and ultimately fail whenever their support is withheld. Church members and ministers must think it no waste of time, nor beneath them, to gather with glowing hearts at the meetings of these Conferences. The idea of communion and fellowship to which it leads should be accepted not merely as theoretically correct, but as of great practical utility. The coöperative union in the Master's cause, which it seeks to realize, must also be held as of signal importance. Every church is apt to be so occupied with its own wants and condition as to be unmindful of the relations it sustains to others, and to neglect the duties which grow out of this connection with those of like faith and order within the limits of County or State. Naturally there is little enough of sympathy between churches in the city and those in the country. There is even an undisguised indifference on the part of some churches as to all those obligations to which our doctrine of fellowship gives rise. The Conference system, it will be observed, purposely disclaims all ecclesiastical authority, and plants itself upon the simple and essential aim of inciting to a more elevated piety, and of stimulating Christians to increased activity, in order that the churches may cordially unite together for the realization of these common ends. In States where the system has not been in long or very successful existence, there is a latent scepticism as to its expediency or benefit. In New Hampshire and Connecticut there has been a strong attachment to the older General Association, from which lay representatives were excluded. But in both States this system has at length found admission, and has already begun to yield the fruits claimed for it. If we believe in it, as consonant with the spirit and principles of Congregationalism, then we should personally, and through our churches, secure for it such development as will assure to us its best results. Every church should manifest a personal interest

in the Local and General Conference meetings, every minister should contribute whatever he can individually to increase the life and influence of both. And this will call for not merely an assent to what these propose to accomplish, but an earnest coöperation on the part of the ministry in realizing those aims. Largely, too, is this system dependent upon laymen for its efficiency, and it will therefore require from them personal interest and support. Frequent intercourse with other Christians, in which the very best feelings of the heart and conceptions of the mind are evoked, will prepare them to exert a happy influence over men of the world. By the Conference system they are brought into Christian acquaintance and intercourse with each other. The grasp of the friendly hand, the sight of familiar faces, the exchange of thought, the rehearsal of religious experience, the making of new acquaintances—break in pleasantly upon the monotony of life, and help them out of the old and fast growing ruts. Such assemblies will keep our business men—immersed in secular pursuits—from forgetting the personal claims of Christ upon them, and the necessity there is for their engaging individually in some form of religious labor.

On the whole we should remember that this is but the development in one direction of Congregational church polity, and we cannot be true to this, and advance successfully the Master's work, if we treat the Conference system with indifference, or concede to it only a feeble support. Procuring for us a visible church union with the utmost local freedom, renouncing all constraint, and relying on spiritual forces for its success, this Conference system is worthy of the place and part that have been accorded to it. On the ministers and members of Congregational Churches will rest the obligation of making this system the great means of securing church fellowship, of promoting a more fervent Christian life, and of building up the Redeemer's kingdom.

ARTICLE VI.—COINCIDENCES RESPECTING SLAVERY.

THE startling events in favor of the colored race in the United States have led us to inquire whether European nations have been dealt with upon principles at all analogous. To go no further back than 1776, are there indications that their progress in liberty and general prosperity has been measured by their willingness to do justice to the enslaved Africans under their charge? Have they been allowed to secure for themselves great advantages without doing something essential for the benefit of the slave; either putting an end to the trade in slaves, emancipating them, or incurring expense for their future advantage? There are, at least, some curious coincidences which we will briefly point out.

Take England, for example: she was interested in the slave trade from the reign of Elizabeth, steadily, persistently. No substantial effort was made to abolish it until Wilberforce and his friends began the work in 1790, and completed it in 1806.

Perhaps it would not be entirely safe to say that England lost her American colonies as a penalty for her adherence to the slave trade, but it is worthy of notice that she forced slavery upon them, and refused to allow them, or her West India Islands, to check the slave trade; and this was a recognized grievance stated at large in the declaration of Independence. It is also worth noticing how resistlessly England was drawn into the French Revolution, with hardly an interval for breathing; how fruitlessly she carried on the war, through four coalitions against Napoleon, until she had cleared her skirts, in 1806, by the abolition of the slave trade. Then followed the successful campaigns of Wellington in Spain; then Waterloo, the result of the fifth coalition.

True the main work of the French Revolution was the abolition of White serf-hood, not African slavery, and in England white serf-hood, and other remnants of the feudal times, had passed away more than a hundred years; there was no

obvious reason why England should be so much complicated in this French Revolution, commencing in 1789, and ending in 1815 by the treaty of Vienna. If there is any penal character to be ascribed to England's share in our Revolution or the French, the penalty is by no means a slight one that she paid.

Again: England had no success in breaking up the white slave trade of Algiers until 1816, ten years after she herself had abolished the slave trade. This captivity of white men, in Algiers and other countries of Northern Africa, continued to be the standing terror of Europe, from the beginning of the sixteenth century. At times captives were taken from the shores of England, and hurried through France to these African prisons. The first expedition of England in the Mediterranean, after the Crusades, was in 1620, against these pirates, but it was unsuccessful. Blake, in 1655, under Cromwell, bombarded Algiers; and Cromwell gave out the next year that peace was concluded with the "Pagan nations," but this was merely temporary. Bishop Kenn, author of the "Evening Hymn," was chaplain to an English expedition on those coasts in the year 1685; through the eighteenth century the Algerines were the means of awaking nearly all the pity that was awakened in Europe or America for men in captivity, but it seemed impossible to reach them. At length the United States, after paying tribute through Washington's administration, beat them in 1804; and Lord Exmouth in 1816, in behalf of England.

It will tend to confirm our views of the influential nature of the black man's interests if we notice again what occurred immediately after the French Revolution. For some reason England entered at once upon her expiatory work. From being the enslaver of the black man, doing her full share in transporting the hundred million of slaves from Africa, she became forthwith his efficient friend.

Looking over the treaty of Vienna, in 1815, we find boundaries settled, rivers opened, trade regulated for European States, but nothing in favor of human liberty, until we reach the clause, inserted at England's suggestion at the close of the instrument, abolishing the slave trade: a very different clause

from the one inserted in the treaty of Utrecht, a hundred years before, when the Sovereigns imagined they had secured the perpetuity of the trade.

Again, at Leybach and Verona, 1816 and 1817, the interests of the colored man receive attention. Following up this beginning in behalf of her humble client, England, in twenty years, made twenty-three treaties on the subject with European nations; with African powers sixty-five treaties; the first with Madagascar, in 1817, which has been faithfully observed. To keep the faithless Spaniards, Portuguese, and French to the mark, she has kept a fleet on the west coast of Africa, at an expense of nearly one million pounds per annum, and she has supported the colony of Sierra Leone at a further expense of one hundred thousand pounds per annum. By such expenditures, to say nothing of Niger expeditions and other explorations of the interior of Africa, England has testified her repentance for the enslaving of the black man, and her desire to make reparation.

While England is thus engaged in the cause of the black man abroad we notice a curious interdependence between it and English liberty at home. Wilberforce and his friends, after 1806, strove in vain to ameliorate the condition of slaves in the West Indies, with the aid of the planters; until 1825 they had no thoughts of emancipation; finding they could make no headway in this direction, they gave their influence to the Reform Bill of 1832, when legal, municipal, and social reforms flowed apace. Among the first fruits of reform was the Emancipation Act, 3 and 4 Wm. IV., giving freedom to the West Indies, on the 1st of August, 1834, at an expense of twenty million pounds sterling.

If England, thus far in our examination, has been dealt with on principles analogous to those that have marked our own history, how has it been with *France*?

Cochin, the latest and most exact writer on slavery and emancipation—himself a Catholic and a Frenchman—notices with sadness that the year 1685, in the reign of Louis XIV., was distinguished by the black code and the revocation of the edict of Nantes. This combination of bad laws set back the progress of France, and made her revolution peculiarly violent.

It is strange to see Lafayette, Mirabeau, Petion, Taleyrand, and Brissot, in the very first year of its outbreak, affiliating with Wilberforce and his friends for the abolition of African slavery; and later, making Wilberforce, Tom Paine, and Anacharsis Cloots citizens of France on the same day in the year, 1792. By some instinct of justice or expediency emancipation was decreed in 1794, and St. Domingo temporarily freed; but Napoleon, in 1802, reëstablished slavery and the slave trade, on which France had been paying a premium from 1784 to 1792. Without ascribing too much to the spasmodic decrees of the revolutionists, or to Buonaparte's proclamation, during the hundred days, abolishing slavery and the slave trade, it will be enough if we attribute to the Revolution the solid work of breaking up white servitude in France and Catholic Europe generally, retarded as it had been by Romish influence since 1685.

The Bourbons, from 1815, endeavored to help neither whites nor black, and they were driven away in 1830. After the three days' revolution of 1830, which gave the kingdom to Louis Philip, attempts were made to ameliorate the condition of slaves by special laws, with the slaveholders' consent, very much as the English had done from 1806 to 1825. Emancipation was urged by their best men, Montalembert, De Broglie, De Tocqueville; but all in vain. The Court, unwilling to disoblige the planters, hesitated between immediate emancipation, deferred but simultaneous emancipation, and progressive emancipation. But no sooner had Louis Philippe fled in February, 1848, than emancipation was completed. The Act of March 4, 1848, gave the owners indemnity in part out of a fund of twelve million francs, after the example of England in 1833, which had made a great impression upon the French people.

Looking at France since 1776 it may be said, at least, that the black man's cause has, by some means, been advanced step by step, and almost abreast, of the white man's cause.

Countries like Spain and Portugal, that cling to slavery, have had a suggestive history; laying at least a foundation for our impression that France and other European countries, ac-

tive heretofore in enslaving the African, have, like the United States, not escaped the penalties.

Spain, after farming-out the slave trade from the beginning of the sixteenth century to various parties (England had it from 1713 to 1743), still continues the traffic, and allows her Governor-General of Cuba an ounce of gold per head, for all slaves imported there. In the year 1852 so insecure did she feel, that she attempted to obtain from England, France, and the United States the guaranty of Cuba; insisting at the same time that slavery and the slave trade were necessary to her existence.

If Spain and Portugal in the past have escaped ruin, which is quite a problem, it is not to be supposed that they can go on with impunity where France and England have felt obliged to amend their ways; where Russia, not chargeable with African slavery, but urged by the lessons of the Crimean War, and by the general instinct of self-preservation, has manumitted her serfs by the decree of September 24th, 1858.

If we trace the history of the United States we shall find that, *volens volens*, she has from the first been obliged to aid in lifting the colored race. At the revolution we were compelled to inscribe on our banner "All men are born free and equal," and we have never been released from the grasp of that motto. Immediately on the close of the revolution matters were shaped, as it were, for obtaining the freedom of all mankind, more especially the ultimate freedom of the black race. The slave trade was early abolished; the New England and Middle States became free; and the ordinance of freedom was extended north and west of the Ohio.

At the breaking out of the slaveholders' rebellion, by arrangements dating back from 1776, we are found ready to enter the field and carry on to advantage the contest in behalf of mankind. Before the war closed the black man is converted into a freeman and a soldier; after the war closes, so thoroughly is his interest linked with our own interest that we are obliged to give him the ballot, and make him a jurymen and witness—privileges which were considered incompatible with his condition in the English colonies in 1825; privileges that we should have withheld from him in any other exigency.

As we look over the whole subject, and see how the interests of this poor man have been obviously cared for; how he has a Lofty Friend who has apparently hindered the white man in France and England, and the United States (and where else we have not time now to consider) from obtaining his full rights until he has first reinstated the black man, in a measure, in his rights; we are inclined to make other inquiries respecting the dark parts of history:—to ask whether this matter of slavery, white in former times, black since the sixteenth century, may not be employed, as a key, quite as good as others that have been employed to explain and account for Divine favors bestowed upon a large scale. Republican and monarchical forms of government, Catholic and Protestant institutions, have had their full share in this class of speculations. In the light of our recent history may not more emphasis be laid on human slavery as an obstacle in the past to Divine favor and the temporal prosperity that flows therefrom. The things which have been better revealed by the slaveholders' rebellion, than they ever were before, "belong to us," and may we not apply them, with reverence, to some of the problems connected with the sudden and long continued check of the Reformation; to the new impulse to foreign missions imparted since 1800 to England and the United States? Without correlating too exactly Divine and human forces, may not the check and the impulse have some connection with the doctrine that until men have begun to clear their skirts of human slavery they are not the most eligible promoters of the gospel of peace and good will to man?

Thus much for the past. Looking towards the future, hopefully, we may nevertheless expect that the United States will be, for a long time, held to the work of elevating the colored man, whose bondage she has for so many years guaranteed; doing, in a measure, on this side of the Atlantic and in Africa, the somewhat painful and expiatory work that England has been engaged in since the beginning of this century.



ARTICLE VII.—"WHAT SORT OF SCHOOLS OUGHT THE STATE TO KEEP?"

By Daniel Coit Gilman.

Report on the Common School System of the United States and Canada. By Rev. JAMES FRASER, M. A. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty. London: 1867. 8vo. pp. 435.

Circular of the National Department of Education, embodying the Constitutional Provisions respecting Education in each of the United States. By HENRY BARNARD, U. S. Commissioner of Education. Washington: 1867. 8vo. pp. 44.

Die Fortschritte des Unterricht-wesens in den Culturstaaten Europas. Von ADOLF BEER und FRANZ HOCHEGGER. Erster Band. Wien.: 1867. 8vo. pp. 694.

"WHAT sort of Schools ought the State to keep?" This pithy question is one which, sooner or later, suggests itself to every thoughtful citizen. It is at least as old as Plato, and we might do worse in modern society than to carry out some of the suggestions which he lays down respecting its solution in the government of a republic. Philosophers have delighted to discuss the question whenever they have been interested in the relations of the commonwealth to the good of individuals. At times, in the history of a people, the question becomes of the greatest practical importance. Just now, for example, in England, France, Austria, Italy (and, perhaps, we should add, in certain other countries of Europe), the happiness of generations to come depends upon the answer which will soon be given to this very inquiry.

So in our own country, several of the States at the North, and all the States at the South, are engaged in the solution of the problem, and with our decentralized political organization, a difference on this single point is likely to divide in bitter-

ness many a district and many a town. Whether or not we shall have a permanent class of white paupers at the North, and of black paupers at the South, depends, in no slight degree, on the views respecting public instruction which may prevail in this period of social agitation and political reconstruction. The discussion is not to be governed by individual whims or by personal controversies. It is beyond the control of any individual, class, church, or political party. It is not merely of local but of universal interest. It will not be settled in any land till it is settled by the popular will, and settled right; the agitation will not cease till a good education is provided for every child. Restrictions on the civil rights of individuals are rapidly disappearing—slavery at home, serfdom abroad; and barriers to the acquisition of useful knowledge are also destined to fall, so that Freedom and Learning will go hand in hand the world over.

Some thoughts upon this topic may therefore have at least this claim to the attention of our readers, that the inquiry is timely and general, for, whether we like it or not, the Public School holds a prominent place among the themes which engage the attention of European and American statesmen.

A thorough student of this subject cannot proceed beyond the elements, without discovering that in all the modern discussions in respect to public education, a certain system is spoken of as peculiar in its essential features to the United States of America. Abroad it is called "the American system," at home "the New England system;" and both abroad and at home it is regarded as an important contribution to the theory of public education, and even to the civilization of the world.

This system is one in which as Americans, and especially as New Englanders, we feel an honest pride. It makes us indignant when we see insidious attacks upon its beneficent principles; when we hear it openly assailed; when we find the very men who are indebted to it for the little they know, or the much they have, refusing to extend its benefits to all the rising generation; or when we see the legislature of a State (even though led by accidental haste, or uninformed prejudice) beginning to take the backward track. To any individual, the common school may seem to be a "bore;" he may shrink

from getting involved in local controversies; he may find the burden of taxation heavy; he may have no children to educate; or he may prefer private schools to public for satisfactory considerations; but, notwithstanding all this, he has neither the right nor the power to separate himself from the people with whom he lives, or to be indifferent to the general good. So closely are human interests interwoven in the fabric of human society, that the web cannot be parted from the woof, without the ruin of the pattern. Every man, whether he has children or not to educate, and whether his taxes are much or little, has, in spite of himself, a personal interest in the public schools of the district, the town, the state, the nation, and the world; and he will do well to bear in mind that as "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," a good system of instruction for the people cannot be secured at a lower rate. For ourselves, as we enter upon the graver aspects of this inquiry, we recoil from the local squabbles, and the petty selfishness by which ingenious and designing men are seeking to divert attention from the fundamental question, "**WHAT SORT OF SCHOOLS OUGHT THE STATE TO KEEP?**"

We need not assure our readers that we advocate this "New England system" of Public Schools, as admirably suited to the wants of a free people,—particularly in the flexibility with which it may be adapted to the various needs of different localities and of different generations; and also in the penetrability with which it carries useful knowledge into every nook and corner of the republic. This may sound to some, commonplace; but designedly or ignorantly these views have been lately called in question, and need in consequence to be quietly examined. But instead of giving in detail, at the present time, our own opinion of the New England system, we propose to bring forward a few striking statements which have made a strong impression on many minds of the richness of our inheritance; and we hope thereby to strengthen the confidence of any whose faith may have been shaken, or whose views may have been befogged by secondary or tertiary issues. These illustrations will be chiefly drawn from the writings of foreigners, who represent very different classes of

observers. We begin with one of the latest reviews of the system, from the pen of a gentleman personally known to many of those readers whom we desire to reach.

In the summer of 1865, an English traveler found his way to New Haven for the purpose of examining our systems of education, public and private, primary, secondary, and superior. It was obvious, on the slightest acquaintance, that he was an observer of more than ordinary claims to attention and respect, for in addition to the attractive personal qualities which he possessed, he was the bearer of a commission from the government of Great Britain, directing him to investigate the principles and methods of American education.

He did not appear to be in haste, but remained in town long enough to visit leisurely the college, the high school, the graded schools, the Hopkins grammar school, and one, at least, of our large private schools, coming thus into contact with men of very different opinions and points of observation. All who saw him were impressed with his thoroughness and candor. While it was clear that he went beyond the surface, deep enough to discover both merits and defects which might escape a hurried, prejudiced, or unpractised inquirer, he was so cautious and even reticent in the expression of any generalizations, that it was not easy to prognosticate the tenor of his report.

A graduate and a fellow of the university at Oxford, an ordained minister of the church of England, and rector of a rural parish, it was not strange that he was an earnest friend of the conservative and aristocratic traditions of his native land, and that nothing in his station and antecedents (always excepting his genuine goodness, and his love of the human race), seemed to predispose him to commend the peculiarities of American institutions. His tour was not confined to Connecticut or New England, but extended to Chicago and St. Louis, to Quebec and Montreal, and the results of his observations, inquiries, and reflections, have recently been presented to the Parliament of Great Britain.

When this volume came into our hands, a short time ago, we turned to it with a good deal of curiosity to see in what

terms so fair a critic would characterize our country. From a perusal of its pages we have derived much valuable information respecting the aspect of our schools, both East and West, and we feel grateful to the author for the clearness and fidelity with which he has pointed out what seemed to him our weakness and our strength; but to those who have not seen the volume, no single sentence which we can quote will give a better idea of the conclusions to which Mr. Fraser was led, than that with which he terminates his report on the United States: IT IS NO FLATTERY OR EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS, IF NOT THE MOST HIGHLY EDUCATED, ARE CERTAINLY THE MOST GENERALLY EDUCATED AND INTELLIGENT PEOPLE ON THE EARTH.*

An American gentleman, who has traveled in England, informed us on reading the above quotation, that he had heard a very similar remark from the mouth of Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh.

We have quoted Mr. Fraser as a representative of the established Church and of Oxford University. Now let us look in another direction. Richard Cobden and John Bright are known to every one as men of a very different type from the Oxford fellow; as agitators and leaders in popular reform, who care much less for precedents than for practical measures fitted to promote the liberty, happiness, and prosperity of the English people. Through all, or nearly all his public life, Cobden was the intelligent advocate of the essential features of our American common schools; but Bright, his powerful colleague in other movements for reform, long kept aloof from the educational platform, while he did not neglect to study the theory and practice of various systems of popular instruction. For several years, as we have heard from his own lips, he cherished the purpose of visiting the United States, and

* We have placed the title of this report at the heading of this Article without any intention of making it the occasion of a formal review, but we desire to add in passing, that if the document itself could be reprinted, or if a good abstract of its contents could be given in some one of the periodicals devoted to education, a valuable service would be rendered to the public.

thoroughly investigating the working of its educational institutions; but being prevented from this journey, he collected and digested so large an amount of evidence, oral and printed, that he felt "almost as well acquainted with the system here prevalent as if he had seen it in actual operation." These candid studies resulted in his conversion, and on the eighteenth of January, 1854, he came before a crowded assembly in Manchester, on the platform with Cobden, Milner Gibson, Alexander Henry, William Brown, and other well known members of Parliament, and amidst the loud applause of his friends upon the stage and on the floor, announced himself as an advocate of a system of schools in England corresponding in its essential features with that of the United States. In the course of his remarks he dwelt upon two objections to the system which are often raised in England, and which appear to have embarrassed for a time the speaker himself; the well-known objections of the conservative, religious, or church party, on the one hand, who object to secular education; and the less familiar objection of the extremely radical party, on the other, who object to all interference on the part of the State with so private a concern. Here are the views of John Bright upon the latter topic.

Mr. Baines and Mr. Miall claim that "State interference is a thing which enfeebles a people; that a nation becomes less free by government doing anything which the people can do even clumsily for themselves; and that any interference by rates and taxes, or law and authority of any kind, can only have the effect of destroying the zeal of voluntary effort, not in questions of education only, but generally as regards all questions affecting the public weal. Now, this is true to a certain extent, and to a certain extent it is not true. It is true under certain circumstances and systems of government, but there are others in which it appears to me to have no kind of truth whatever. * * * [It may be true in Russia, but] * * I turn to the United States, and I say that there all that this association has ever proposed to do has been done for a long time past; and that *no man living can say that the fears which Mr. Baines and Mr. Miall have expressed find any kind of con-*

firmation, from any results that have taken place in the United States." *

One of the illustrations employed by Mr. Bright in his long and admirable speech was a comparison of the towns of Providence, R. I., and Rochdale, Eng., in order to bring out how the latter would fare in educational advantages, under the New England system. It is pleasant to us to remember that the school system of Providence, thus happily held up as an example before an audience of intelligent and influential Englishmen, was largely due to the wisdom and foresight of Francis Wayland, that eminent teacher, in whom (as it has truly been said) "the common school, the high school, and the academy found a sympathizing friend, a skillful adviser, and a most efficient helper." We do not know whether Mr. Bright had ever seen the suggestions and the principles laid down by President Wayland in a report, which was written in 1828, on the school system needed in Providence, but we are confident that in all our American educational literature, he could hardly have found a more compact and convincing exhibition of the true New England views.†

Fourteen years have passed by since that conference of the National Public School Association in Manchester, at which these tribunes of the people, Richard Cobden, John Bright, and Milner Gibson, called so loudly for better education for the English nation. They have been years in which the Crimean war has brought to the proof the military prestige of England; in which Universal Exhibitions of industry have brought into comparison, with no flattering results, her skill in manufactures; in which her naval supremacy has been rendered questionable at least by the iron-clads and monitors of her transatlantic descendants; and in which the value of popular education as an element in battle, more powerful than needle-guns or rifled cannon, has been tested in the Prussian victory of Sadowa.

In illustration of this remark in respect to British skill in manufactures, let the reader consult the "*Chemical News*," published in London, August 16, 1867, where, among other Eng-

* *Manchester Guardian*, Jan. 21, 1854.

† *Life of Dr. Wayland*. By his Sons. Vol. I., p. 322.

lish criticisms on England, Professor Tyndall remarks, "that he has long entertained the opinion, in virtue of the better education provided by the Continental nations, that England must one day, and that no distant one, find herself outstripped by those nations both in the arts of peace and war."

The credit due to the education of Prussian soldiers has been very generally admitted. Among other allusions to it, may be quoted the following letter, which we cannot err in attributing to the pen of Dr. Francis Lieber of New York :

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

To the Editors of the Evening Post :

One of the most distinguished of our generals in the West, during the civil war, who traveled in Germany and France on the eve of the war between Prussia and Austria, has recently sent a letter to this country, from which the following extract will interest the public :

"There is no doubt that the two main factors of the amazing success of the Prussians over the Austrians have been the actual nationality of the army (which in Prussia is simply an armed generation), intelligently as well as stringently organized, and the individual intelligence of each soldier, inspired by the great cause of Germany. *The universal system of education established for the re-education of Prussia, after the ruin of the battle of Jena, has borne its fruit at Sedan.* These two great elements, however, are wanting in the Austrian army.

* * * * *

"How very different are the physiognomies of the Austrian and (I say it without hesitation) the French armies; all nicely dressed and splendidly set up, true enough, *but no books and no maps and no newspapers, no discussion on political topics among them.* All this is universal in the Prussian army. The Emperor Napoleon understands this all very well, and he therefore is the most peaceful man in France; but at the same time he is making breech-loading guns as fast as possible."

F. L.

Let us prolong this digression far enough to give a counter paragraph, which appeared in a recent number of the *Siècle*, in Paris, occasioned by the publication of two maps, entitled "France that can Read, and France that can Write :

"One-third of France unable either to read or write. Fifty-five departments out of 89, in which the number of illiterate persons is from 80 to 75 per cent. Is it not a shame! And we talk of a new military organization. Let us rather busy ourselves with the instruction of this black phalanx of ignorance; let us devote to this national work a tithe of the millions we uselessly squander. *Let us begin by beating Prussia on this ground.* As regards primary instruction we are in the lowest rank of the European Powers, and we imagine ourselves to be marching at the head of civilization!"

These fourteen years of English history have been years of

incessant discussion on national education, in reports, commissions, conferences, newspapers, and parliamentary debates, and still no results have been reached, though men of every shade of party acknowledge that something must be done. But as we write the debates grow warm, and intelligence reaches us that Earl Russell (whose name as Lord John Russell is familiar to many as the President of one of the two great voluntary educational associations of England, the "British and Foreign School Society"), has given notice that on the second of December, 1867, he will bring before the House of Lords four resolutions on the subject of national public instruction. His speech in introducing these measures may reach the eye of our readers before the pages which we now write, but it can hardly be more telling than the resolutions themselves to which we here give place.

EARL RUSSELL'S RESOLUTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

1. That in the opinion of this house, the education of the working classes in England and Wales ought to be extended and improved; every child has a right to the blessings of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right. In the opinion of this house the diffusion of knowledge ought not to be hindered by religious differences, nor should the early employment of the young in labor be allowed to deprive them of education.

2. That it is the opinion of this house that Parliament and Government should aid in the education of the middle classes by providing for the better administration of charitable endowments.

3. That it is the opinion of this house that the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge may be made more useful to the nation by the removal of restrictions, and by the appointment of a commission to consider the better distribution of the large revenues, for purposes of instruction in connection with the said universities.

4. That the appointment of a Minister of Education by the Crown, with a seat in the Cabinet, would in the opinion of this House be conducive to the public benefit.

The comprehensiveness of this fundamental movement is one of its most remarkable features; for while it recognizes the rigid class distinctions still firmly maintained in English society, it tends towards a national system embracing the lowest primary classes and the highest university instruction. But the first resolution is the most significant, for in it, as a careful reader will remark, three principles are laid down, which became a part of the fundamental system of New

England two hundred years ago. "English instruction must be UNIVERSAL, SEULAR, AND COMPULSORY.*" This *is* progress!

These English gentlemen are not alone in their admiration of the Public Schools of this country. A series of thorough articles, from the pen of Mons. E. de Laveleye, has recently appeared in the leading literary review of France,† a journal to which the best writers of that nation are contributors. These essays are studies on the educational systems of modern society. At the outset of his remarks the writer calls attention to the fact, that in all the world there are four nations which can proudly say, that all their citizens know how to read, North Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States; but in respect to the United States, he adds this remarkable comment: "It is not simply true that every one knows how to read, but every one does read for purposes of instruction, entertainment, participation in public affairs, direction of labor, gaining of money, or investigation of religious truth. The American Union in consequence uses up as much paper as France and England combined!" In illustration of these assertions, the writer recurs to a recent visit which he made to our national frigate Niagara, as it lay in the harbor of Antwerp, and he tells his readers (as if it were something remarkable), that every sailor who was not on duty had in hand a book, a review, or a newspaper. This general love of reading he rightly attributes to the Public School, which he delineates in these words: "Free to all, open to all, receiving upon its benches children of all classes and all religious denominations; it obliterates social distinctions, deadens religious animosities, roots out prejudices and antipathies, and inspires in all a love of their common country, and a respect for free institutions." It is surprising, he continues, to see what number of foreigners are absorbed every year into the American nationality. The Public School assimilates them.

* The very year in which the fundamental agreement of New Haven Colony was entered into, a master was required to keep an apprentice "at school one year, or else to advantage him as much in his education as a year's learning comes to, if at all," &c. p. 39. Kingsley's Hist. Disc., 1838.

† *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 60, *et seq.*

It would be easy to fill our pages with extracts from the speeches of American statesmen, quite as laudatory as foreign testimonials in respect to the New England Public Schools; from Daniel Webster, whose first speech on entering public life was in their behalf, and whose pithy saying, "If I had as many sons as old Priam, I would send them all to the Public Schools," has become a Massachusetts maxim; or from Edward Everett, the eloquent expounder and defender of the normal school and other improvements in the system, who said in the Hall of Representatives at Boston in 1849, "If my tongue is ever silent when it ought to speak the praises of the Common Schools of Massachusetts, let it never be heard with favor in any other cause;" or from the long series of gubernatorial messages in which the chief magistrates of the New England States are accustomed to commend to the several legislatures the various public interests; or from the innumerable thanksgiving-day discourses, and fourth of July orations, which are even surer indications of the established sentiments of the people. Indeed, so universal is the satisfaction with the essential features of the New England system, and so firm the confidence that its acknowledged hindrances and defects can be eliminated, that a man, desirous of promotion, who should openly in public meeting, or under his own signature in the columns of a newspaper, declare himself an opponent of the Common School as it now is, would be from that time onward politically dead. The obituary of his public life might at once be written.

We may go even farther and say that we have never heard of an American who carried the non-interference theory of government so far, that he would have the State abstain entirely from the business of instruction. We do remember to have seen in a newspaper the phrase, that perhaps it will be found that the State cannot keep school after all, but we regarded it as an expression which the writer himself would hardly have advocated with his voice in public. On the other hand, all parties seem to admit, that in this country the State must do something to encourage education; some would place that something at the *minimum* and advocate (perhaps without knowing it) a system of "pauper schools;" a very few

would place it at the *maximum*, and include the administration of colleges and professional seminaries; while the great body of the people, in public or in private life, would avoid both extremes, and would be almost as sorry to see our New England colleges and universities all absorbed by the State as to see our public schools maintained on an alma-house basis. Just at present the advocates of "the pauper system" are very active, and it is important to consider the measures which they propose, looking directly or indirectly to the introduction of their views.

In these days there is very little danger of our going too far in the education of the people; there is great danger of not going far enough. Indeed, we beg our readers to remark that it is the extent of *popular ignorance*, not the diffusion of popular intelligence, which makes us so strenuous in advocating the New England system of instruction. We believe that while it has done more for the people at large than any system which has elsewhere been devised, it has done far less than it might and should have done, so that all who would see the republic thrive should not enroll themselves with the down-pullers, but with the up-builders of the Common Schools. Far be it from us to flatter the pride of our countrymen, by untrue pictures of the workings of our institutions; far be it likewise from us to discourage them because these institutions have not brought the millennium. We can labor with zeal for the improvement of common schools, because we continue confident of the principles which underlie them.

There are many persons who will acknowledge the truth of all that has thus far been said, who yet will feel some distrust of what they call the modern improvements in public instruction. They commonly have a very vague idea as to what these innovations are, and a still vaguer notion of their reputed advantages, reminding us, in some such cases, of good old-fashioned housekeepers who cannot be induced to substitute a modern range for the ancient brick oven, or who have a vague apprehension that gas brought into their dwellings will lead to some awful accident or some extravagant waste. To these dwellers in Doubting Castle especially, would we put the question, "What sort of Schools ought the State to keep?" and to help them in their answer, we would add, that there are

but four sorts which the State can keep—Private, Parish, Pauper, and Public.

The State may say to private parties, you may maintain the schools, and we will inspect them; you shall have the responsibility, and we will bestow encouragement and bounties. This would give us universal Private Schools. Or the State may say to the churches, you may do this work in your own religious way, and we will oversee and assist your efforts. This would give us universal Parish Schools. Neither of these plans stands any chance of adoption among us, at least in this generation. Again the State may say, we will maintain schools for the destitute and neglected only, and all who can afford to pay must look out for themselves. This would establish Pauper Schools,—like pauper homes in the almshouses. Or, finally, the State may establish Public Schools adapted to the wants of all. The discussion is virtually narrowed to a choice between these two conflicting theories. Which system, doubter, would you have? "*What sort of Schools ought the State to keep?*"

The people generally have pronounced themselves in favor of Public Schools, though it is true that there have been times, and there are localities, in which the pauper theory has gained ascendancy, sometimes even among entire communities,—for example, in Pennsylvania, under the constitution of 1790; yet, as a general rule, throughout the United States, the decree has been uttered by the popular voice in favor of Public Schools, not only in the sense that they should be entirely controlled by the public, without private or associate or ecclesiastical interference; but that they should be Common Schools, that is to say, open to all classes, without reference to social station. Commonly it is also held that when practicable these schools should also be graded or classified schools, because this is the cheapest and most efficient way of teaching a large number of children; that they should be maintained with special reference to the wants of special cases, so as to avoid a routine too monotonous; and finally, that they should be as good as the wealth, the intelligence, and the enterprise of the community can make them. If any one doubts that such views as these are generally adopted, we refer him to the constitutional provisions of the various United States, as col-

lected by Dr. Barnard in the circular quoted at the commencement of our remarks. If such inquiries are not conclusive, then let search be made for more definite information in the statute books of the several States.

But before considering the modern operations, or so called innovations, derisively attributed to Horace Mann and the Prussian school-masters, let us now proceed to look with a closer analysis at this "New England school system," so generally commended and so widely adopted. If we understand it, seven principles, aside from those of a secondary or non-essential character, may be regarded as peculiar to its administration. Many minor regulations which are certainly important, but are not of invariable worth proceed from these primary or fundamental laws.

1. There is an admirable combination of local responsibility, supervision, and taxation (secured in the various towns, school societies, and school districts), with legislation, coöperation, and pecuniary aid from the State at large.

2. Entire publicity is secured by frequent reports to the district, the town, and the State, by requiring a popular vote for the erection of a school house, the selection of a site, or the election of school officers, and by opening the doors of every school room to a visit from anybody at any time.

3. There is a persistent avoidance of all offenses against individual consciences; or against the tenets of particular churches; while there is a steady enforcement of the doctrines of a pure morality.

4. There is no recognition of the poor as a class, or the rich as a class, or of any social distinctions based on birth or money.

5. The right of the people to tax themselves in districts, and towns, to any extent they please, for purposes of instruction, is every where acknowledged.

6. The system is very pliable, so that cities and dense villages can maintain very different schools from country towns in which the population is scattered; and the extent to which education shall be provided is governed by no universal law, but by a consideration of the wants, the wealth, and the other institutions of different localities.

7. The civil authorities are bound to protect the public from the barbarism of ignorance, by seeing to it that all the youth are instructed in at least the elements of useful knowledge.

In accordance herewith, it is often found best to establish graded or classified schools, including a school of higher grade for the pupils more advanced; and also special schools for special cases,—like "evening schools" for youth who are kept at labor through the day; or "sewing schools" for girls who may not be taught at home the indispensable art of using the needle; or "truant schools" for those boys who will stay away from the regular schools, or who are so indifferent to the laws of propriety and morality as to require peculiar discipline. It is also possible to adapt the instructions of each particular locality, in a greater or less degree, to the wants of the boys and girls who are soon to be the men and women at work in that community in the various departments of human industry.

These principles preclude the administration of the schools in the exclusive interest of any race or color, or of any social class. If the schools are so conducted that the poor are excluded, because of requirements to which they cannot conform, whether these requirements are exacted by the regulations of the school authorities, the rules of the teacher, or the current sentiments of the community,—then these fundamental principles are violated, and every friend of the system should protest; or, on the other hand, if the schools are so neglected, the houses so ill kept, and the teachers so forlorn that none but the extremely destitute can think of entrusting their children to such influences, then, again, the equity which should govern all public transactions is offended, and a great wrong is perpetrated.

Moreover, if covertly or avowedly, the Public Schools are managed so as to promote the peculiar or exclusive interests of any religious party; if scholars are exposed to instructions or influences which violate their consciences, or which are hostile to the views of religious faith and doctrine enjoined by parental authority, the fundamental principles of our educational system, and not only so, but the fundamental principles of our republican government are directly opposed; and it is

therefore the interest of us all, whatever our faith, to insist upon such an administration of the system as will protect the opinions and the faith of all. Some would advocate the adoption of a standard treatise on Christian morality, to which all Christian bodies might assent; some would advise the total abandonment of religious instruction to Sunday schools and churches; but whatever plan is followed there must be nothing in the public school room obnoxious to the charge of tending to proselyte from one faith to another; and nothing which will tend to advance the interests of one church system at the expense of any other. We need only dwell on the workings of the school system in the Pacific States, where not only Roman Catholics and Protestants, but Mormons, and Buddhists, may be brought into close proximity, to discover the vital importance of adhering to this doctrine.

A recurrence to these principles will help to answer a question which, like the story of a ghost, tends to puzzle if not to alarm, and disturbs some honest friends of popular improvement when they see the erection in our towns of stately "graded schools," and "normal schools," with a very vague conception of the meaning which these to them unwonted terms convey. How far do you propose to go, they ask? Where will you stop? What line will you draw between public and private responsibility? This is a fair question, often put by thoughtful citizens when a proposal is made to improve the schools of a given locality.

We have a ready answer. The point beyond which the Public Schools shall not go is determined by no general rule. It is and it must remain variable. The limits affixed by one generation are not the limits which need govern another. The line for a thriving and populous commercial or manufacturing town is not the line appointed for a scattered community of farmers. The solution of the problem, the determination of the level or the height, must be accomplished by those principles of civil engineering which are involved in the local self-government of our land. Every town, the unit of our political system, must be a law to itself, subject only to such requirements and such restrictions as may be appointed by a necessary

regard to the welfare of that commonwealth of towns which we call the State. The will of the people in any given locality must decide how far in that locality the system of schools shall go. In determining a conclusion, the wealth of the town, the density of the population, the degree of good management observed in other public affairs, the possibility of securing good school officers, the existence and characteristics of endowed institutions, the sort of private schools which are maintained, and other like considerations, deserve attention. They differ continually in different communities, as a few examples will show.

By the great liberality of Mr. Russell Hubbard, Governor Buckingham, and other public spirited citizens, who contributed a sufficient capital for the purpose, a Free Academy is maintained in Norwich. It is a classical and scientific School of a very high order, and receives, without any charge for tuition, the older boys and girls of Norwich, fitting them for college or the scientific school, or for the various duties and avocations of life. How unnecessary it would be for Norwich to establish now a Public High School! Hartford, from the very earliest days, has maintained a public Latin School, which received about two hundred years ago a small endowment from Governor Hopkins and so became a private trust, useful in its way but quite inadequate to the wants of the community. By the harmonious action of the Hopkins trustees and the people of the town, an English High School has been added to the endowed Latin School, and the two foundations, one a permanent corporation, the other a popular appropriation, have been combined since 1847 as the Hartford High School, and now constitute one of the foremost schools in the land. Springfield, on the other hand, had no endowment, partial like Hartford, or sufficient like Norwich, and her citizens found it wise to establish a High School, for both English and classical studies; and they have long maintained such an institution to the entire satisfaction of all classes in the community, even of those who were at first opposed to it.

New Haven, once more, affords a good example of the different aspects of the question in different generations. In the days of John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton, a Common

School, a Grammar School, and a Collegiate School, were advocated as essential grades in the system of public instruction. We have the authority of a local historian for saying that in the earliest colonial days,

Not only were the advantages of a common school education immediately secured to all, but with a wise reference to what is essential to the full success of common schools themselves, provision was very early made for the higher branches of instruction, and a grammar school was established. As early as 1654, when the colony was suffering from the failure of their commercial projects, and when the estates of individuals were greatly diminished, and even doubts were entertained by some, whether it was expedient to struggle any longer against disaster; Mr. Davenport gave a strong proof of his confidence in the stability of the settlement, and its ultimate prosperity, by the efforts which he made for the beginning of a college. He brought forward before the General Court a plan for such an institution; and the town of New Haven, notwithstanding its depressed state, made a donation in land for its encouragement.*

Because it was then thought wise for the town to contribute to the support of the college, it does not follow that it would be wise to ask such help in 1868 (though the town might do worse with its money); but we cite the illustration merely to show, that even if the public interest in education should go so far as to grant some land to aid the college, it would not be a new proceeding in the history of New Haven. Forty years ago there was in this same town no public High School; probably the number of persons who cared for one would not have made a corporal's guard, because the Hopkins Grammar School fitted boys for college, and the calls for other sorts of educated labor were not very loud.

Now this community of nearly 50,000 inhabitants gives incessant calls for educated young men and young women in the various walks of mercantile and mechanical enterprise; and a high school is imperatively needed. The movement for its establishment, which began with Judge W. W. Boardman, Judge E. K. Foster, Rev. Dr. Dutton, and other well known citizens, in 1852,† received in 1866 the popular approval. Those who declaim the loudest against the "modern innovations" of a high school have not yet carried their love of an-

* Prof. J. L. Kingsley's Historical Discourse at New Haven in 1838, p. 40.

† See the printed Report which they presented to the School Society, 1852.

tiquity so far as to propose a repetition of that liberal action of two hundred years ago, the bestowal of a town grant upon the college.

Having thus shown what sort of schools the State may keep, where the old New England system is established, let us enquire what sort of schools such a State should keep? We are here led at once to the consideration of secondary or non-essential points, which are very important it is true, but on which a difference of opinion may exist among those who are heartily devoted to the work of popular education.

Every one, whether a friend of good public schools or not, must recognize at the present time the existence of social circumstances quite unknown to our forefathers. Once the people of New England were all of English stock, now all the nations of the earth have their representatives among us; once the same religious faith was held, now the diverse creeds of Christendom are openly taught; once there were none very rich, now there are many; once farming was the predominant interest, now manufactures and traffic are ascendant; once the demands of social life were few and simple, now they are infinitely complex. Let the reader recur to Dr. Dwight's *Travels in New England and New York*, written in 1810, if he would see what a simple, homogeneous, and quiet people then lived in New England, and he will not wonder that such a happy land has attracted the oppressed and down trodden of the nations of Europe.

As our society has changed, principles have not changed, but methods have. It is just as true now as it was forty years ago, that virtue and intelligence are the foundations of social prosperity; it is just as true that the State requires good schools for all, and that boys and girls should be fitted for all the ordinary avocations of life; it is likewise true that the system of public schools should be free from sectarian influences, or from class distinctions, or from poor teachers, or from unjust and illegal expenditures of money. But modern society, so busy, so complex, so multiform in its activity, may require different sorts of schools from what were known forty years ago; and a wise public policy will enquire what meth-

ods in these days will best carry out our fundamental principles. Some would pretend to believe that Horace Mann, or Henry Barnard, or the Prussian school system, or Teachers' Institutes, or Normal Schools, have introduced these changes into modern society. But steam and lightning have had a great deal more to do with it than Mann or Barnard. It is Fulton with his steamboat, and Morse with his telegraph, and Hoe with his printing press, and Whitney with his cotton gin, and all the rest of the inventors' tribe ; it is Cunard steamers, and ocean telegraphs, and Pacific railroads, and Nevada silver mines, and daily newspapers, and steam manufactories which have brought us from the quiet life of the boy to the busy life of the man.

Now, in view of this altered society, and in view of the obvious dangers to which the republic is exposed by the intermingling of heterogeneous elements, by the growth of large cities, by the accumulation of enormous fortunes in the hands of a few, and by the reception of so many foreigners who are destitute of American ideas, we who desire to see the knowledge and the virtue of all the people maintained at its former standard are striving to introduce improvements in school administration, which shall apply the principles inherited from our forefathers to the requirements of to-day. The friends of common schools are not agreed upon all the points of secondary importance to which attention is directed, but on the following there is very close accordence :

1. Education should be made compulsory to such an extent that none of the youth shall waste their time in idleness and truancy ; and hence, the adoption and the enforcement of statutes against the excessive and injurious employment of children in factories, and against truancy in towns and cities, are loudly called for. It is deemed especially important to enlighten public opinion on the necessity for such proceedings, as otherwise the best of legislative or municipal enactments become at once a dead letter. The cry of the children arising from factory villages in the new world as well as the old has been expressed in verses none too strong from the pen of Mrs. Browning. Would that it might be heard in every church and every household of the land, till there should be

a universal clamor for the physical, mental, and moral improvement of those children whose parents are too sordid, too ignorant, or too weak to provide for their education !

2. Education should be made so cheap that pecuniary obstacles shall form no barrier to the acquisition of knowledge. Generally, schools which are absolutely free are advocated by the friends of public instruction, and even the few who advocate a slight tax upon parents recognize the value of a property tax, and also the necessity of putting the parental fee at the very lowest point. Accordingly we find that in nearly all the States of the Union, "Free Schools" are established by fundamental law, and in those where a rate bill for tuition is maintained, its effect is to shorten the period during which the schools are kept, and to deter the very children who ought not to be driven off, thus doing more harm than good.

3. Teachers should be encouraged to make teaching a permanent occupation, and also to qualify themselves for proficiency in their calling. Some would be glad to see a system of examinations of teachers, uniform and thorough, akin to such as is advocated by Mr. Jenckes for the civil service of the nation ; or such as is now maintained in England by the coöperation of the universities ; but where such views as these do not prevail, the necessity of making some provision for the training of young women to be the teachers in country schools is almost universally recognized. Women have become the teachers of New England schools, not exclusively but generally. Their advantages, compared with those of young men, are very poor, though they are rapidly improving. Multitudes engage in the work of teaching district schools, with no other preparation than the education they have themselves received in district schools of an inferior sort. Hence something like a Normal School, or a prolonged Teachers' Institute, becomes an absolute necessity if the public schools are to be maintained with vigor.

4. Public Schools should be graded,—which simply means that the scholars should be classified under different teachers and in different rooms, so that in a given time a higher education can be secured. How far such gradation should be

carried, and how many scholars should be taught under one roof, are questions of local administration, on which we shall not enter now. Teachers and school authorities differ among themselves. None but ignorant or bitter opponents of a good school system object to the gradation or classification of scholars. Little children are taught by themselves with all the appliances which make a school attractive; those who are more advanced come under different teachers, and the older boys and girls under the direction of the principal. We can understand how public schools may be intelligently opposed, but how "graded schools," or the classification of the scholars, can be objected to, surpasses our comprehension.

Mr. Fraser, to whom we have before referred, thus explicitly advocates the adoption in England of our graded school system: "It is the one thing," he says, "which our elementary schools have not, and which they most need. I do not care so much about Common Schools; I have no particular preference for Free Schools; but I do see most clearly the advantages of a Graded School."

5. High Schools are advocated because of their great influence upon schools of a lower grade, awakening a love of knowledge, and an aspiration for its attainment in all the younger scholars; and also, because, at a very slight cost, young men and young women, who would otherwise be excluded from education beyond the rudiments, have the doors of higher education thrown open to them. Whether these high schools should be maintained by districts, towns, or counties, and what should be their range of studies, are variable questions to be determined in different localities according to the principles already laid down.

6. The influence of the State, and the distribution of State school-funds, should tend to the encouragement and reward of local fidelity and enterprise, and to the removal of local negligence and meanness; and, so, also, the whole power of the town, pecuniary and moral, should be brought to bear on those forlorn and decaying districts which, without this outside influence, will descend into the very "barbarism of ignorance."

Such are some of the secondary principles, or rather the applications of fundamental principles, which are now-a-days

advocated by the friends of good public schools. No radical changes are proposed, but only the united and vigorous carrying out in our day of those very doctrines which have made New England hold so honorable a position in thrift, intelligence, and general uprightness.

Why is it that the views which we have laid down awaken such bitter opposition?

Part of the hostility to public schools undoubtedly comes from the dread of increased taxation. We do not know whether the custom is a general one; but, in Connecticut, the taxation for schools is a distinct item which every tax payer is particularly reminded of when the collector calls upon him. Other taxes are consolidated in such a way that the citizen cannot tell his proportion of the tax expended for a given object. He pays town or city taxes for all the manifold wants of the community except for schools. He cannot tell what the tax is for maintaining the fire department, or the police, or the alms-house, or the jail, or the support of out-door poor, but he can tell exactly what he pays for the public school; and it is not every one who stops to think that the money paid on school account is money saved from the account of vice and crime; though if the school tax should be given up, property holders may be very sure that it would not be many years before the town and city taxes would be augmented to a like amount by increased expenses for constables and jails.

We acknowledge that public schools are costly; but in itself this is no reason for abandoning them. Railroads, and steam-boats, city halls, and fire departments, courts of justice, post offices, poor-houses, and prisons—all are costly; but some of these establishments are worth what they cost. Is it not so with the public schools? Do they not save the cost of other outlays for police and prisons? Do they not add to the material wealth of the State by training up a higher class of citizens? Do they not add to the social happiness of the community by making the citizens of every occupation intelligent and sensible?

But, after all, public schools are not so costly as many people think who look at the aggregate sums which are paid, and not at the number of children who are taught. Mr.

Fraser, from inquiries made in eleven of the chief cities of the Union, ascertained that the average cost to the public for tuition only, in the public schools, was \$10.39 per annum; and that an American farmer can educate his children at a cost to the community of not more than one-third the amount at which the Committee of Council in England estimate the cost of educating the laborers' children.

Another source of opposition is found in the apprehension of dangerous "tendencies" in the views we have laid down. We can imagine a person going so far as to claim that if public schools are maintained, public theaters must be, public trips to Europe, public education in foreign universities and the like, as if there was no common sense in the community to govern public outlays. We can imagine that the great cry of hostility to the public school system will be its tendency, but not that public legislatures will be deceived thereby.

Let us pause for a moment to enquire what means this cry of "tendency," a cry which was used so absurdly a short time since when we were told that the improvement of Connecticut common schools would end in a National University at a cost of thirty millions. These alarmists forget that where there is a current, there is also a counter current; and that the Gulf of Mexico is not likely to be emptied because there is a tendency in the gulf-stream to carry northward its waters. There is a tendency in the emancipation of human thought which took place in the sixteenth century to evoke a race of irreligious freethinkers, but is there anybody who would prefer the days of mediæval darkness? There is a tendency in republican institutions to send such men as Morrissey to Congress, and to make a Mayor of Fernando Wood; but we are yet to find the American who would prefer a crown in place of the ballot-box, as the emblem of sovereignty. There is a tendency in the earth to fly away from the solar source of heat, but who thinks it a necessity to lay in extra coal?

Obviously, in estimating a tendency, our work is but half done if we do not estimate also the counteracting force. It is the equation of centrifugal and centripetal forces which keeps the earth in its orbit; it is the equation of opposite tenden-

cies in public affairs which maintains the equilibrium of the State; and while a few may cry out against "a tendency to communism" as they call it in the common school, as commonly conducted, because it is largely supported by a tax upon property, and is open to all the people, that is, to the commons, we agree with the advocates of popular enlightenment at home and abroad, in discovering here the same counteracting influences which regulate many other of our common institutions, the common-park, the common-highway, the common-wealth, and, if the reader please, the common-prayer. **COMMON SENSE IS THE KING** in this democratic republic. It is sovereign in resisting all tendencies to communism; it governs the state, it governs the nation, it governs public opinion, it governs the Common School.

The English statesman was right when he told his hearers that the fears which are entertained of enervating influences from the establishment of a system of Public Schools find no sort of confirmation in the history of the United States. As this royal rule of Common Sense has guided us for two hundred years, we are not afraid to trust it now. Some of those who would represent the people may be frightened by this tendency cry; but the people themselves will not be easily misled by an argument so specious.

We urge upon those who dread this tendency, to study the records of the past, and see that for more than two hundred years in New England, the Public School has been at work without producing any dreadful results. We will not fill these pages with the extracts which could be easily made from the Colonial Records of Massachusetts and Connecticut, now everywhere accessible, but we refer to the documents themselves with entire confidence that the historical student will agree with us in the statement, that what we have presented as the essential principles of the New England or American system of Public Schools were recognized two hundred years ago; and have not been essentially modified from that time to the present. Even most of the points to which we have referred as secondary and non-essential were regarded by the fathers in the same light in which they are now regarded by the most diligent and intelligent advocates of popular education.

See the views of Mr. Bancroft :

"The constitution of Massachusetts required a system of universal public education as a vital element in the State. The measure was a bequest from their fathers, endeared by a long experience of its benefits, and supported by the reflective judgment of the people. As yet, the system was established nowhere else except in Connecticut. Pennsylvania aimed at no more than 'to instruct youth at low prices.' The difference between the two systems was infinite. The first provided instruction at the cost of the State for every child within its borders; and bound up its schools in its public life; while the other only proposed to dole out a bounty to the poor."*

While we anticipate very great improvements in the public school systems of the United States, and welcome accordingly all criticisms and recommendations which proceed from a sincere desire to carry out those fundamental principles to which we have called attention (such, for example, as those suggested in a recent pamphlet by Mr. Harrington of New Bedford), we look at the same time for a different kind of criticism, tending not to reform, but to destroy. Very few will be bold enough to say that the pocket is the source of their hostility to modern public schools, and fewer still will advocate so offensive a doctrine as the establishment of pauper schools, but the dread of higher school taxes is a subtle cause, and the establishment of pauper schools is a sure result of some of the measures which are advocated among us. One writer has gone so far as to complain of "the new measures," which are based on "the deceptive plan that the schools for the poor should be made as good as the schools for the rich," and to talk of "the clap-trap declamation about the children of the poor sitting on the same seat with the children of the rich." But there are many whose opinions indirectly involve the establishment of the pauper system. Let us show how this is true.

One man objects to Normal Schools, having an idea that they are useless excrescences. He does not stop to ascertain that the great reason for advocating Normal Schools is because it is so hard to get good teachers. College graduates are, in these days, in haste for professional employment. Other competent young men are drawn into business which will "pay," large numbers being of late years led away from teaching to

* Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. IX., p. 270.

serve as book agents and solicitors for life insurance companies. Women have already taken the places once filled by young men. Many of these ladies are young and inexperienced, and have had no other advantages than the district school of the country town. They are bright, and earnest, and have native adaptation to the teacher's work, but unless they have some training for it, their schools will be so poor, that only the poor will accept their instructions. New Haven and Hartford, Boston and Springfield, can get along without State Normal Schools; but for the country towns it is indispensable that some means should be contrived for the training of young women for the work of teachers, or otherwise pauper schools alone will flourish in the rural districts.

Another person objects to the High School, without stopping to see how great its influence is upon the schools of lower grade, how it tends to keep the scholars longer under the influence of instruction, how it opens the door to higher education to those who would otherwise be excluded, and how it tends even more than the primary school to bind together in the brotherhood of American citizens those who might otherwise be estranged. The High School is a constant reminder to the public that the Public School is for all. To dispense with its influence is to impair the system, and render it less attractive to those who are taxed for its support, and who have a right to demand a system for all. The pauper system needs no High School.

Another objection is brought against Graded School houses. These are simply good buildings, erected so as to last, and designed to provide in the most efficient and economical way for the instruction of the large number of children who must be taught in large towns and densely peopled villages. It is an arrangement which parents know how to value, and which tax-payers, if they understood it, would be the last to dispense with. But do away with graded schools, mix up in one room children of all ages, provide no course of study, let each teacher manage as she likes, without help or oversight, and the schools are at once deserted by all who can get away, and become inevitably pauper schools.

Another says, "I object to free schools. Make every parent

pay for tuition, and don't tax those who don't use the Public Schools for their own offspring." This is another device to get the rich by themselves and the poor by themselves. Practically this very thing is done at this very day in many a country town in New England,—and with what results? The schools are, in such cases, so forlorn, the teachers so ill-paid, and the local obstacles to progress so great that a constant outcry of dissatisfaction arises from all who are intelligent enough to see that a good school, at whatever cost, is one of the greatest blessings which a community can desire. All who can afford it resort at great cost to other means of education, and the pauper school remains for the few who can get no better.

Thus, one by one, all the features which make up a good school system are opposed and put down in theory if not fact, by those who advocate, often without knowing what they propose, a system for paupers. Experience has demonstrated that the prevalence of their views involves such results. It is not a question of "tendency" or of theory. Mr. Gradgrind himself can be shown that it is a matter of fact. "Give me the little red school of forty years ago," we can hear these objectors say, "and we will be content." We can tell them that there are plenty of just such school houses left all over Connecticut, and, indeed, throughout New England. They stand at the corners of the cross roads, unenclosed, looking "brown and bare" as Maud Muller's ancle, with the window lights broken, and the benches hacked up by the scratches and cuts which have come down from a former generation. We heard the other day of the sale of one such little red school house in Windham county, which was purchased by some farmer for a hen-house, at the price of five dollars, "the opinion of the neighbors being that the hens had the worst of the bargain." A year or two ago we met with an account of another little red school house, in a district we could name. It is said to be one of the richest of agricultural districts in Connecticut, and is famous for its perpetuation of the old fashioned method. Its school house has been figured in a well known work on School Architecture as an example of the schools which *were*. "A few years since a denizen of the district left a few hundred dollars, the income to be expended in support

of the school, provided they should read and spell in school at the same time, and just as many times a day as they did when he was a boy." Last year they received a Webster's Dictionary, in common with other districts, from State appropriations. Their last act was to vote to sell it for eight dollars!

Clergymen and school visitors, familiar with what are called the "outlying districts," away from villages and churches, will recognize the truth of the picture we draw, and will be the last to desire to see perpetuated the little red school house at the corner of the cross roads.

We wish our space was ample enough for an expansion of the benefits of maintaining a Public System of Schools. With all its imperfections the New England system works better than any other which the human race has yet devised; it sheds more penetrating light upon the darkness of the land than any other agency of man; it makes books and newspapers fruitful; it promotes industry, ingenuity, and wealth; it prepares the citizen for the duties of the commonwealth; it trains the factory operative for domestic enjoyment; it Americanizes the foreigner; it binds together the more favored and the less favored in ties of acquaintance and friendliness; it fits us all for the brotherhood of a republic; it promotes morality and virtue, and prepares the mind for the reception of sound religious truth. It is a cheap, a satisfactory, a pliable, and a penetrating influence for good which may reach every farm, every workshop, every store, and every house with its perennial good. What substitute can be given?

Though we are well aware of the dangers to which this system is exposed, from local mismanagement, from unwise or extravagant expenditures, from the apathy of the community, and various other circumstances, we believe, that the system which we have expounded is destined to live a thousand years. Mankind was long in arriving at the notion of a Free Church, long in securing a Free State, long in obtaining a Free School, but once discovered and acquired, the three will go hand in hand. Together they will rise; together they will fall. The least of all our dangers is the danger of going too far in the education of the people.

The idea of the Public School, devised and developed by the

earliest settlers of Massachusetts and Connecticut, has been adopted through New England and through the land. New York accepted it before the close of the last century. It has followed the line of New England emigration. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and the other Republics of the West have planted the school for all in all the towns within their borders. The golden State has added this jewel to its radiant crown. The Pacific Railroad will carry with the log cabin of the settler the public free school for his children. Even Utah has adopted the New England system. The States of the South have recognized the fact that it was the Common School which fought the battles of the war, and fitted the Northerners for victory. Tennessee and Louisiana have sent to Connecticut for counsel and aid. Kentucky has discovered that her people will not remain at home while the agents of other States are able to offer free public education to all who will avail themselves of it.* Other States, southern and midland, are devising measures to adopt the system. Even the mother land looks favorably on our results. Earl Russell, while pointing to the fact that three persons in every ten in England cannot write their names, quotes Mr. Fraser in proof of the general intelligence of the American citizen; and the *Pall Mall Gazette*,† in a vigorous leader, claims that education should be regarded "by the legislature and by the people, neither as a benefit conferred by the rich upon the poor, nor as a lesson taught by spiritual superiors to spiritual inferiors, but as a great advantage purchased for the nation at large, by the nation at large, just as we purchase for ourselves a thousand other things, protection from violence, the administration of justice, supplies of gas, water, and other conveniences." Even John Stuart Mill, the able opponent of State interference in the concerns of individuals, makes a clear exception of education, in which he claims that the State may rightly interfere.‡ Thus spreads the notion of a school for all, maintained by all.

* See the able report of Z. F. Smith, Superintendent of Public Instruction in Kentucky, Dec. 2, 1867.

† December 3, 1867.

‡ Political Economy, Vol. II.

ARTICLE VIII.—METEORIC ASTRONOMY; AND THE
NEW HAVEN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ITS PROGRESS.

SCIENCES, as well as empires, are perpetually changing their boundaries. New provinces are annexed here, or old ones relinquished there, according to the exigencies of discovery and progress. As our government has taken in Aliaska, so Astronomy has just been adding fresh territory to her already magnificent domain—territory mapped, indeed, from time immemorial as within the confines of meterology, yet remaining, until lately, like our new acquisition, almost a *terra incognita*. Astronomy has, in short, extended her scepter and laws over those wild tribes of fiery Meteors, which, at times, like flying Bedonins or Camanches, have shot forth upon the heavens from realms of mystery and darkness, to perplex and alarm mankind. Lawless nomads they seemed—independent hordes—with little in common, save the indefinite theatre of their irruptions—the regions of the air; yet, thanks to the assiduity of astronomers, they have all at last, it is believed, been tracked to a common haunt, and shown to be essentially of one origin, and under one regime.

For long centuries, down indeed to recent times, *Meteorites*, *Fire-balls*, and *Shooting-stars* were scarcely suspected of belonging to the same class of bodies; and it is only within the last few years that they have been finally demonstrated to be, in reality, cosmical bodies, having their native range in or beyond the interplanetary spaces, and owning the sway of astronomical laws. They are now, in fact, among the most interesting objects that astronomy presents to us. Their complete naturalization as proper subjects of that science has, indeed, wonderfully enhanced the interest and importance that previously attached to them; for while as phenomena of the upper air—meteors proper—they are still as magnificent, if not as marvelous as before, they now are known to come to us, all of them from regions extra-terrestrial, and some of them from the remotest depths of space; and while thus representing

even, perhaps, the remotest outskirts of the universe, they yet, in their appointed circuits, approach at times, not only like other astronomical bodies, within the range of our vision, but some of them, at least—the aerolites—even of our actual touch. We handle them, weigh them, analyze them. We apply to them the microscope, as well as, or instead of, the telescope; which can be said of no other cosmical bodies. They become indeed samples to us of the materials of which other worlds are made; “pocket planets,” as Humboldt called them,—revealing to us knowledge that the grandest telescope and the profoundest mathematical analysis cannot give. Is it not then a splendid conquest that astronomy has made, in thus taking captive these meteor-tribes, and annexing their territory to her own domain?

And the steps of this conquest have been scarcely less brilliant than those by which Le Verrier and Adams added the planet Neptune to the solar constituency, or even those by which Copernicus and Newton extended the dominion of true science and known law over the whole planetary system. And to Americans it will be a reflection not without interest, that this achievement has been due, in no small degree, to the labors of scientists on this side of the Atlantic. It is freely acknowledged we believe in Europe, that Yale College has taken the lead of European observatories, in the study of meteors. Long ago the zeal of her *cavans* in this direction, secured for her among her neighbors the sportive designation of “proprietor” of these bodies, or more seriously of “head-quarters” of operations relating to them. President Olap in the last century (1781) wrote and published on the subject. The names of Olmsted, Twining, and Herrick, of later date, are familiar to men of science the world over, as associated with the observation and discussion of meteoric phenomena. But, by a noticeable coincidence, the name most eminent, whether here or elsewhere, in connection with these bodies, is the same name that was made illustrious, two centuries ago, in connection with the theory of gravitation. If the first Newton extended the laws of gravity to the greater bodies of the system, the second Newton has done essentially the same thing for these minuter bodies. Not that he has been the only

successful laborer in this field, as his illustrious namesake was not alone in his. But while the grand result has been due, as is usually the case when science takes a new step forward, to the combined efforts of many and widely scattered laborers (among them Chladni, Brandes, Benzenberg, Olbers, Quetelet, Haidinger, Schiaparelli, Greg, and many others abroad, with especially the three above named at home), nevertheless, Prof. Newton, we believe, is recognized by those most competent to judge, whether at home or abroad, as having contributed to this result in a larger degree, both in the way of observation and analysis, than any other one man. We have before us, in a French Scientific Journal, two extended Articles devoted almost exclusively, and indeed professedly, to an exposition of the labors of Prof. Newton in this field, and freely assigning him the position we have just indicated ;—a position, we are confident, which no faithful history of the subject, however brief, can fail of also according to him.

In the cursory glance which we propose to take, in this Article, at Meteoric Astronomy (as it is called by some, or Astro-Meteorology by others), we cannot, of course, expect to even name all the laborers in so broad a field, much less assign to each his due portion of credit ; nor can we hope to make anything like a complete survey of this new branch of science, either in its facts, theory, or history. Our aim will have been accomplished, if we shall succeed in presenting such an outline of its leading points, and of the results of recent investigations, as may reasonably be expected in a single Article unillustrated by diagrams, and, as far as practicable, untechnical in language. We attempt thus much in response to the general interest recently awakened among all classes, by the striking fulfillment of a new species of astronomical prediction—that of showers of shooting stars ; prediction we mean, not in the sense of vague conjecture, from the fact of previous occurrence merely, but as the result of definite knowledge of the laws governing the phenomena. The annual recurrence of showers of shooting stars on particular days, as that of the 10th of August, is well calculated to awaken interest, especially in scientific circles ; but such a recurrence after the lapse of a cycle of years, and in confirmation of mathematical theory, is

an event of a much more impressive character. The repetition on the mornings of the 14th of November, 1866 and 1867, though on a diminished scale, of the magnificent meteoric display, which, on the morning of November 13th, 1833, so startled observers throughout the United States, and led to those investigations that have since been so successfully pursued by men of science, has been well calculated to reawaken the popular interest in these phenomena, which followed their occurrence a third of a century ago.

But, though shooting stars are the class of meteors freshest in our minds, and claim chief attention as having been most directly the occasion of settling on a scientific basis the general theory of meteors, the other two classes under which these bodies are commonly treated—viz., aerolites and fireballs (or bolides)—are those that earliest attracted attention, and are calculated, in some respects, at least, to excite the deepest interest. Showers of stones from the sky—the sudden opening of masked batteries in the heavens, the flash and glare of flaming masses suddenly dashing through the firmament and exploding with the noise, sometimes, of thousands of bursting bombs, scattering ponderous projectiles, stones and rocks, or iron boulders, at random among the habitations of men—are phenomena, it must be confessed, by no means well adapted to quiet weak nerves, or calm susceptible imaginations. Such discharges of celestial grape and canister figure largely among the ancient prodigies. *Æschylus* introduces a “shower of round stones” into the machinery of tragedy. *Livy* tells us of a fall of aerolites on Mount Alba, about the close of the first century after the founding of Rome; a prodigy for which a nine days’ festival was observed, as was afterwards the custom, in case of similar occurrences. One of the most celebrated meteorites of antiquity is that described in the *Parian Chronicle* as having fallen at *Ægos-Potamos* in Thrace, in the 781st Olympiad, and said to have been of the size of two mill-stones, and of the weight of a “wagon load.” Its fall is mentioned, by many ancient authors, as an event which excited the greatest wonder among all classes, and which the Greeks, in their reverence for *Anaxagoras*, gave him the credit of having predicted. Another, of immense size, fell, in the year 921, into the river

Narni, near Rome, and remained projecting more than a cubit above the water. In a church at Ensheim, in Germany, may still be seen a stone weighing 260lbs., which fell from the heavens on Wednesday, November 7th, 1492, and penetrated the earth "to the depth of a man's stature, which everybody explained to be the will of God that it should be found," as runs the narrative drawn up at the time by order of the Emperor Maximilian, and deposited in the church with the stone. So strange an event naturally excited the greatest wonder among all ranks, and was looked upon as "really a miracle of God." Later history abounds in similar stone-showers. "Pieces of rock of enormous dimensions and of immense weight—ten of them weighing a hundred pounds each"—fell, with 1,200 lesser aerolites, on the 14th of September, 1511, at mid-day, on the plain of Crema, in Italy, "where never before was seen a stone of the size of an egg." There was almost a "midnight gloom," and "unheard of thunders, mingled with awful lightnings, resounding through the heavens." Two stones of 200 and 300 pounds fell also near Verona, in 1762; an extensive shower of stones, near Agen, in 1770; a stone of 56lbs., in Yorkshire, England, Dec. 13, 1796. Nearly 3,000 rocky fragments fell, in open day, on the 26th of April, 1803, at L'Aigle, in France, penetrating the earth to a considerable distance, and one of them weighing seventeen and a half pounds. As in other cases of the fall of aerolites, this also was preceded by an immense fire-ball, which shooting with great rapidity through the atmosphere, exploded with a tremendous noise, like thunder, which was heard for seventy miles around. A shower of meteorites fell, in broad day, in 1825, at Honolulu, in the Sandwich Islands, accompanied by the usual thundering detonations, resembling discharges of artillery, which led the natives to rush to the nearest hill-tops, commanding a view of the ocean, in order to see the man-of-war, or naval fight, from which they supposed the sounds proceeded. A similar bombardment from the skies took place near the French village of Orgueil, May 14th, 1864, after the passage and violent explosion of a brilliant meteor, which was seen from Paris to the Spanish border. Aerolites fell in 1865, January 19th, at Mouza Khoona, in India; August 12th, at Dundrum, Ire-

land (weight 4lbs. 14oz.); August 20th, one of 3½lbs., at Erinpoorah, India; August 25th, at Shergotty, India; the same day, two near Aumale in Algeria, one of them weighing 50 pounds, and penetrating 20 inches into very hard earth, and another, nearly as large, 12 miles away. In 1866, May 30th, there was a fall of several stones, at St. Mesmin, France, one of them weighing five pounds, another four pounds, another one pound. Ten days later, June 9th a great volley of stones, amounting to half a ton weight in the aggregate, was discharged with a report "like that of a hundred cannons," from a flaming meteor, which exploded, in broad day, over Knyahinya, in Hungary, leaving in its path through the sky a dense cloud, ten times the apparent width of the sun. One of the fragments weighed 675lbs., and there were nearly 1000 smaller ones. But, to come nearer home; on Monday morning, December 14th, 1807, a splendid meteor came streaming through the sky from the northwest, "like a burning firebrand carried against the wind," passing fifty miles above the Helderbergs in New York, and finally exploded with the usual artillery-like detonations, at the height of seven or eight miles, over the town of Weston, in Connecticut, discharging in various directions a great number of stones, some of which, striking on solid rock, were shattered into minute fragments. One of these it was thought must have weighed 200 pounds before it was broken. The path of this meteor, as given above, is that determined by Professor Newton, from a recent and critical reëxamination of the subject, and differs widely from that originally assigned by Dr. Bowditch.

A shower of stones, equally remarkable, fell on the 1st of May, 1860, at a little before one o'clock, P. M., near New Concord, in Guernsey county, Ohio, with a series of twenty-three distinct cannon-like explosions, followed by a blended roar, as of a railway train, or the "rattling fire of an awkward squad of soldiers." These sounds proceeded from a blazing meteor, which was observed from places scattered over the several adjacent counties. The stones were seen falling from the sky, first as "black specks," then as "blackbirds," striking upon an area of ten miles long, by three broad;—the largest fragment weighing 103 pounds.

The stone-falls we have named are but a few examples of the large number of well authenticated cases on record; but they are surely enough to dissipate any lingering scepticism—if such a thing can be supposed among our readers—as to the reality of the fall of material masses from the skies.

But is there no *danger*—nervous people may ask—from these random discharges of deadly missiles into thickly populated countries? A little, undoubtedly! As long ago as 616 B. C. (Jan. 14th), an aerolite is said to have broken several chariots, and killed ten men, in China. A monk was killed at Crema by the volley of A. D. 1511; another monk (a Franciscan), at Milan, in 1650. Two Swedish sailors were killed on shipboard in 1674. A man was wounded in the arm by one of the aerial missiles at L'Aigle, in 1803. An aerolite, shot from a brilliant fire-ball, set fire to a barn and stables, which were burnt, with corn and cattle, Nov. 13th, 1835, near the Castle of Lausières, in France. A like catastrophe happened in the department of Haut Garonne, on March 22d, 1846. An aerolite of thirty pounds weight came crashing down through a house at Braunau, in Bohemia, on the 14th of July, 1847, but harmed none of the inmates.

These examples are sufficient to show that showers of meteoric stones are not wholly without danger. But when we consider the fact that there are many such falls of aerolites every year, in different parts of the globe (hundreds probably), it is somewhat remarkable that so few casualties appear on record.

But more important inquiries, in a scientific point of view, are those respecting the *nature* of these missiles, their *relation* to the fire-balls or bolides, and their *origin*.

That they are veritably solid, ponderable masses of matter is sufficiently evident. They vary in specific gravity from that of iron down to that of the lighter stones, or from 7.9 to 1.9. Some are composed almost wholly of a peculiar alloy of metallic iron and nickel. Others are of a stony character, specific gravity 2 to 4, light gray in color, granular in structure, and containing more or less of nickel-iron disseminated in grains, or particles, through the mass. It is remarkable that none of them have revealed to us any new elementary substances. Of

the sixty-five elements found in terrestrial minerals, nineteen have been detected in these bodies.

But we cannot dwell on this part of the subject, nor more than name the recent interesting researches of Sorby, Daubree, Graham, and others, on the composition and physical history of these bodies. Suffice it to say, that the mineralogist detects a meteorite by its looks, or by analysis, though it may never have been seen to fall. Only thus are identified most of the known meteorites, including all the largest, as the Red River siderite of 1635 pounds, in the Cabinet of Yale College, the four ton specimen lately sent from Australia to the British Museum, and the huge ones, *in situ*, in Mexico and South America (one in Buenos Ayres weighing fifteen tons). Among the surest tests are the alloy of iron and nickel before mentioned, and in the case of meteoric iron the "Widmanstadt's figures"—a certain reticulated configuration developed on a surface of it, first polished, and then etched with an acid. They are all mixtures, in various proportions, of nickel-iron and several earthly minerals, chiefly silicates, as feldspar, augite, olivin, &c., and are called *siderites* or *aerolites*, according to the preponderance of the metallic or the earthly constituents. The siderite usually contains 80 to 90 per cent. of iron, with 6 to 10 of nickel, and has in general the characters of ordinary bar iron, for which it has sometimes been used as a substitute, as in the forging of a sword for the Indian Emperor Jehangir, from the siderite which fell in the Punjaub in 1620.

As to the relation of meteorites to fire-balls enough has been said, in speaking of the fall of the former, to show that the fire-ball is merely an earlier stage of the same phenomenon—the aspect presented by the meteoric mass, while shooting with excessive velocity through the atmosphere, in approaching the earth. Nearly, if not quite, every known fall of meteorites has been preceded by the majestically moving fire-ball lighting up the heavens, and by thundering detonations that shake the solid earth, and are heard many leagues away. There is almost always the same conical or elongated form of the blazing object, a head, as of a comet, with a tapering flaming tail—likened variously to a firebrand carried against the wind, a trumpet broad end foremost, a blacksmith's bellows, a

blazing churn, a flaming besom, and the like, all indicating the appearance of a swiftly moving mass surrounded by a blazing envelope, which streams off behind in a short flaming train, often flickering and waving, and exhibiting various prismatic hues. Not unfrequently two or more of these startling objects go chasing each other through the heavens, not far apart, as in the splendid meteor which, on the evening of July 20th, 1860, streamed across the United States from over northern Lake Michigan to its point of disappearance over the Atlantic, far to the eastward of Long Island. The apparent diameter of the head is frequently half or three-quarters that of the sun, and the tail two, three, or even many degrees in length. As to the absolute diameter, it would seem in some cases, as deduced from the apparent diameter and known distance, to be as great as from half a mile to two, and even two and a half miles, and in others, as small as one or two hundred feet. It is difficult to account for the great disparity between these dimensions and the small volumes of the aerolites that have fallen, in known instances, from large and totally extinguished fire-balls, except by attributing it partly to irradiation, and partly to a really immense volume of inflamed gases thrown off from and surrounding the solid nucleus, somewhat like the envelope of a comet. Their paths through the atmosphere almost always slant downwards; sometimes, indeed, they are horizontal, or nearly so, but rarely, or never, vertical. This sloping direction is indicated, not only by the direction in which the stones penetrate the earth, but even by the form of the area within which showers of them sometimes strike the surface. This area is almost always oval or oblong, in the direction of the meteor's path, being ten miles by three in the case of the Ohio fall, before mentioned, nine by six in that of L'Aigle, eight by four in that of Stannern in Austria, eighteen by five in that of Orgueil, and ten by four in that of Knyahinya. And, as might be expected from their inertia, the largest stones are almost always found at the farthest extremity of the ellipse.

The direction and slope, as well as length of a meteor's path in the heavens, are ascertained by observing, from two or more stations, the altitudes of its points of appearance and disap-

pearance, and then from the inferred parallax, or angle subtended by the base, computing the vertical heights, and distance apart of these points. The altitudes are usually determined by noting the meteor's track among the stars. From such observations the visible paths of a hundred or more fire-balls and detonating meteors, from some of which meteorites are known to have fallen, have been computed with more or less precision. The great meteorite of Orgueil, already mentioned, first became visible at a height of more than fifty-five miles, and exploded at a height of twenty miles, having descended on a slope of 20° or 25° angle with the horizon, with a velocity of fifteen or twenty miles a second. The remarkable meteor of August 18th, 1783, traversed the whole of Europe, from Shetland to Rome, with a velocity of about thirty miles an hour, at a height of about fifty miles from the surface of the earth, with a light surpassing that of the full moon. In its course it separated into several distinct bodies, accompanying each other in parallel courses, and each followed by a tail or train. The brilliant meteor of July 20th, 1860, before mentioned, was about one hundred and twenty miles above the earth, when first visible above Lake Michigan, sixty-two miles when over Buffalo, and forty-two over Long Island Sound, traversing a visible path of a thousand miles in length, with a velocity, relative to the earth, of fifteen or twenty miles a second. As a general thing, fire-balls become visible when from fifty to eighty or a hundred miles above the earth, and continue their flaming course earthward until either they reach the surface, or explode at some distance above it, and let fall the scattered fragments; or in the case of the silent fire-balls or bolides, until they are dissipated or consumed in the denser strata of the atmosphere; or, possibly, in some instances of great elevation, till they pass on out of the atmosphere into space. Their time of flight varies from a second or two to half a minute or a minute, and sometimes more. This interval of time, compared with the computed length of path, gives their velocity, relative to the earth; which ranges from three or four miles to twenty or thirty, and even, in some cases, forty or fifty miles a second.

Now, what must be the effect of a body's passing through

even the rarest atmosphere with such an almost inconceivable velocity? The recent researches of physicists respecting transformations of energy serve to show that when a body in motion is arrested, or its velocity checked, its store of mechanical energy is changed to some other form, such as the motion of other bodies, heat, light, sound, &c.; and when it is transformed into heat, the amount of heat corresponding to a given expenditure of mechanical force is easily computed by applying what is known as "Joule's equivalent," or the mechanical equivalent of heat; that philosopher having shown by experiment that the raising of 772lbs. one foot high, is equal to the heating of one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit. Now, the momentum of a body weighing one pound, and moving with a velocity of twenty-five miles a second, is sufficient to raise 270,000,000 pounds one foot, or if transformed into heat, to raise the temperature of 350,000 pounds of water one degree Fahrenheit, or the same weight of stone five degrees, or a third of a ton of stone twenty-five hundred degrees. It is easy to see, then, that the momentum of a meteoric mass, when checked or destroyed by passing into a resisting medium, must be amply sufficient to account for all the heat involved in the phenomena of fire-balls and meteorites. Their friction against even a very rare atmosphere, with the rapid condensation of it before them, checking, as it must, their own velocity, will readily explain the intense light produced, and the generation of heat sufficient to rapidly fuse and ignite the surface of the body, and thus produce the flaming tail, or train of sparks by night, or the smoke and cloud by day, so characteristic of fire-balls.

A marked effect of such heat is seen in the black vitreous crust which always covers the surface of meteorites. Even the fresh surfaces formed by the bursting of a meteor into fragments, while in mid air, are often found similarly coated, from the heat generated by the still remaining momentum of the pieces. This intense heat lasting usually but a few seconds, its effects are produced chiefly on the surface; the low conducting power of the stony mass preventing the heat reaching far into the interior. One consequence of this mere surface-heating is the surprising fact, observed in the fall of several aerolites, that the stones, when first handled, are sometimes intensely cold,

even though they have fallen quite hot; a fact noticed in the meteorites, of Knyahinya, in those of Dhurmsala, India, and some others. If these bodies come from beyond our atmosphere, they must possess, on entering it, the intense coldness of space, estimated by physicists at some two hundred degrees below zero, more or less. No small portion of this low temperature, notwithstanding the intense heat applied momentarily to the surface, might well remain in the interior, and communicate itself to the whole mass soon after it had escaped further heating by reaching the earth.

This sudden application of intense heat to so cold a body affords also a satisfactory explanation of the explosions (usually in a series), that always accompany the fall of meteoric stones. If Hannibal broke asunder the rocks that obstructed his army over the Alps by artificial heat, and if in a conflagration massive buildings are prostrated by the cracking and crumbling of heated granite columns, much more may we expect that the sudden heating, to tenfold more than furnace heat, of the exterior portions of a body which retains within a tenfold more than arctic cold, will result in violent disruptions of the mass; block after block being thrown off with successive explosions, as the intense heat gradually penetrates the interior. Sometimes the fragments from a meteorite, when gathered and fitted together, present the form of a hollow shell; a fact that finds its explanation in such a process of heating as we have supposed. This was particularly noticed by Professor Maskelyne in the aerolitic fall at Batsura, India, on the 12th of May, 1861. But without entering further into details, we are confident that a careful consideration of the problem will convince any one that all the phenomena attending the passage of a meteor through the air—the luminosity, the backward streaming flame, the scintillations, the train of sparks, the explosions, the enameled surface, and other characteristic features—are all due to the cause we have named—the heat generated by the moving body, in passing through the atmosphere.

It has been objected to this view, that the atmosphere is too rare at the heights indicated to produce the resistance supposed; and various hypotheses have been suggested by certain philosophers of eminence, among them Poisson, Biot, Quetelet, and others, assigning to the upper regions of the atmosphere

a composition essentially different from that below, or supposing even an exterior atmosphere of an entirely different nature, as of hydrogen, electricity, or the like.

But such suppositions seem hardly called for, when we have in the known relations of air in a highly attenuated state, and of mechanical resistance, to heat, causes apparently ample for explaining all the phenomena in question. It may be true, and probably is, from the known law of diminution of density with height, that the atmosphere at fifty miles above the earth is less than a thirty thousandth part as dense as at the surface, and at one hundred miles high, only a thousand millionth part as dense. But it has been shown by Mr. B. V. Marsh, in a late volume of the *American Journal of Science*, that at heights greater than about thirty miles, the latent heat, or heat of expansion of air, for a given volume, is sensibly constant, and hence that the condensation of a given volume of air, however attenuated, will produce the same heating effect at all heights in the atmosphere above the point named; and further, that that effect will be far greater than at points nearer the earth's surface. Granting this to be true, and remembering also the relation of mechanical energy to heat, we need for the explanation of the phenomena in question, no new hypothesis respecting our atmosphere. Great, indeed, is our ignorance of its actual constitution and properties at great elevations, and of the height of its outer limit. A limit it undoubtedly has, at that point where the repulsive force of its particles is just balanced by their gravitation toward the earth. If so, it follows that there must be a separate limit for each of its constituent gases, depending on their respective specific gravities and quantities; for, though Graham's and Dalton's laws of gaseous diffusion, irrespective of specific gravity, must secure certainty of mixture below these limits, they cannot carry either of them above its own particular limit, or that which it would have, if it existed alone. There could be a common limit only in case the specific gravities were inversely as the quantities; which they by no means are. Hence, possibly, the upper regions of the atmosphere may have peculiarities of constitution which do not exist below; may consist, perhaps, almost wholly of nitrogen, the lighter and more voluminous of its two principal constituents.

The undetermined element of temperature, however, comes in with other uncertainties, to complicate the problem, and prevent its definite solution. But it is rather the fact of an atmosphere, than its constitution, that concerns the questions before us. The study of meteors and auroras has compelled us to admit the existence of some sort of atmosphere, at far greater heights than the commonly assigned limit of forty-five miles, deduced from the phenomena of twilight. The meteors carry it up certainly to one hundred or one hundred and fifty miles, and the auroras to at least four or five hundred. It is in the further study of these two phenomena, that we recognize the most promising means within our reach, of gaining additional light respecting these high aerial regions.

Having tracked the meteorites and fire-balls up unto those regions, the inquiry naturally arises, how come they there? This question is intimately associated with that of the origin of shooting stars, and we propose to touch here only on those points of it, in which it is distinguished from the general question to be considered further on.

We pass by as crude and long ago exploded, the earlier conjectures; such as that of Aristotle, endorsed by Halley in the early part of the last century, which ascribed fire-balls to the combustion of a train of inflammable gas, in the manner of a train of gunpowder, at the top of the atmosphere; or that which ascribed aerolites to the aggregation in the upper air, by unknown forces, of matter somehow drawn up from the earth; or that which regarded them as masses projected from terrestrial volcanoes; and we put in the same category, also, that quasi-combination of the two latter ideas which has received, to some extent, in later times, the sanction of respectable names, (having been advocated in "The American Journal of Science," by a distinguished mineralogist, as lately as 1848). This theory ascribes the origin of meteorites to the gathering, in the upper regions, of clouds of magnetic and diamagnetic dust, ferruginous vapor, and other mineral exhalations, thrown off by volcanoes, and their condensation into masses under the action of electric, magnetic, and other forces, in such a way, that if, in a magnetic storm, "the disturbance was confined to the magnetic dust, iron masses would fall; if to the diamagnetic dust, a non-ferruginous stone; if it should

extend to both classes simultaneously, a blending of the two characters would ensue in the precipitate, and a rain of ordinary meteoric stones would take place." Of this theory it may suffice to say, that it is understood to have since been renounced by the author just quoted, as it doubtless has been by other men of science who may have at any time held it.

That meteorites come from the sun (the reverse of the recently broached theory that the sun is fed by meteors falling into it), though an old fancy of the Greeks, and not without advocates in later times, may be dismissed as wholly destitute of a scientific basis, although maintained as lately as 1860 by Professor Hackley, of Columbia College, in a paper published in the Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and lately, in a modified and more plausible form—that of the condensation of meteorites from vapors thrown off by the sun—by Professor Brayley, and the "Edinburgh Review."

The *selenic* theory, which refers the origin of meteorites to lunar volcanoes, is more deserving of respect, from having been sustained by the authority of many eminent names. First suggested by Terzago, an Italian physicist, on the occasion of the fall of an aerolite which killed a monk at Milan, in 1660, it has since been maintained by Olbers, La Place, Berzelius, Poisson, Benzenberg, Arago, Quetelet, and many others; though it is but just to say that some of the astronomers named subsequently renounced it, as new light was thrown upon the subject by the study of shooting-stars. Notwithstanding this light, however, an elaborate memoir, by Professor J. Lawrence Smith, advocating this theory, both on chemical and physical grounds, appeared in "The American Journal of Science" in 1855. The close resemblance of meteorites, in many points, to certain volcanic rocks, lends some color to this hypothesis; and it is undoubtedly true, also, that a body projected from the moon with a velocity of a mile and a half a second (only five or six times that of a cannon ball), would pass the neutral line between the spheres of attraction of the earth and moon, and consequently *might* reach the earth. But Dr. B. A. Gould has conclusively shown, by an elaborate mathematical investigation, contained in the Proceedings of the American Association for 1859, that only bodies projected

from a very small district of the moon, with masses, velocities, and directions differing from a fixed value only within very narrow limits, could by any possibility reach the earth; or, in other words, that, by the doctrine of chances, "of all the ejected lava masses, only about three in 5,000,000 of each possible size, would probably ever reach the earth as aerolites." It can hardly be imagined that our little neighbor, even if she had the explosive force necessary, could afford to expend so disproportionate an amount of ammunition for so few shots to hit. In order to send us our known stock of aerolites, she would have blown herself all to atoms long before our day.

President Clap, in a work before alluded to, on "Terrestrial Comets, or Meteors which are above our Atmosphere," very clearly discusses the general phenomena of these bodies, maintaining that they are satellites of the earth, or rather terrestrial comets, traversing at their perigee the upper regions of the atmosphere. Theories, in some points, analogous to this, have been held by many others; but we doubt whether, at the present day, they find intelligent advocates. No satellite of the earth, however close, can have a greater velocity than seven miles a second; that of meteorites is often five or six times as great: a fact fatal to the theory.

Only one other theory remains now to be spoken of. This is the cosmical. The immense velocity of these bodies—comparable with that of the planets in their orbits—points unmistakably to an origin beyond the limits of our atmosphere. Halley vaguely suggested this from the observed facts of the great meteor of 1686, and Chladni and others, towards the close of the last century, perceiving the true relation that exists between meteorites and fire-balls, had no hesitation in maintaining their cosmical origin. Humboldt, in his *Cosmos*, supports this view, and calls them pocket planets—bodies of the same class with the swarm of asteroids between Mars and Jupiter, and like them moving in more or less eccentric orbits around the sun. They are smaller, indeed, than any of the known asteroids; but some of these are estimated to be not more than fifteen or twenty miles in diameter, while greater optical power would doubtless reveal others smaller still; so that we have in the bodies of our system a pretty regular gradation from Jupiter, nearly 90,000 miles in diameter, down through

the greater planets and their satellites, and the ninety-six asteroids of various magnitudes to these minute masses; which, in numbers, doubtless proportional to their smallness, must, like the larger masses, move each in its own orbit about the sun, or through space, in obedience to the laws of gravitation; some of them, as they chance to meet the earth in its annual circuit, plunging into its atmosphere with a velocity compounded of that of the earth and their own, and thus giving us, as a natural result, the fire-balls and meteorites. Some meteors, from their more than planetary velocity, have been held with great reason to have come from beyond the limits of our solar system,—even, perhaps, from the remotest depths of space. Professor Graham has inferred this, also, from finding imprisoned, or secluded, in the pores of certain meteorites, as if by absorption, large quantities of hydrogen—a substance indicated by the spectroscope as abounding among the stars.

Be this as it may, meteorites unquestionably belong to the domain of astronomy. Their individual orbits cannot, indeed, be computed from the short and disturbed portion of them lying within our atmosphere, yet much can be inferred respecting them from the analogous orbits of shooting-stars, which do admit of a much more definite determination, and have already led to a knowledge of certain astronomical relations of meteors, that are of the deepest interest, and to which we shall revert further on.

We turn now, then, to *shooting-stars*—the portion of our subject which has in recent times excited the deepest interest, and chiefly through the investigation of which, meteoric astronomy generally has reached its present stage of progress.

Ordinary shooting-stars, such as may be seen, now and then, on any night of the year, were generally regarded, until within the last half century, as phenomena only on a level with will-o-the-wisps—mere phosphorescent squibs—electrical perhaps—possibly streaks of gas or flying specks of combustible matter, inflamed in the air just overhead—apparitions at all events scarcely more worthy of the attention of philosophers than ghosts are commonly thought to be. Kepler, on such grounds, expressly excluded them from the jurisdiction of astronomy. Yet, occasionally, they excited in thoughtful

minds, something more than mere idle curiosity. In 1798, two German students, Brandes and Benzenberg, undertook simultaneous observations, at the extremities of a base line about nine miles in length, for the purpose of determining their heights above the earth. This was the first systematic attempt of the kind, and was entirely successful in placing their paths in the higher regions of the atmosphere along with those of fire-balls and aerolites. This was a great step forward; yet, though Brandes, retaining his early interest, conducted another series of observations for heights in 1823, little attention was given to the subject by men of science generally, until 1833—the epoch of the grand display in the United States, so fully described by Professors Olmsted and Twining;—since which time, shooting-stars have found multitudes of zealous observers, and enlisted the efforts of many able minds. So magnificent a spectacle as the one referred to, exhibiting as it did, when at its height, thousands of shooting-stars, filling the whole heavens—a spectacle so unheard of at that time even among the learned, and so obviously of the deepest scientific significance—was certainly well calculated not more to astonish and alarm the ignorant, than to attract the attention of philosophers, and open a new era in the science of meteors. Especially did the scientific interest deepen, when it appeared, on consulting history, that this was not the first event of the kind on record—the old chronicles containing notices of many others, some of them equally grand.

Shooting-stars, consequently, became at once an object of earnest study with many individuals, both in America and in Europe. Among American observers, Mr. E. C. Herrick, at New Haven, for many years took the lead; and, since his death, one of his later associates, Professor Newton, seems to have received his mantle, and has held, by general acknowledgment, the same leading position, both as an observer himself, and as a guide of others. In England a special committee of the British Association on meteors, of which Prof. Baden Powell was the originator, and Glaisher, Greg, Brayley, and Herschel (son of Sir John) are the present members, has, within the last twenty-five years, reported in the annual volumes of the Association, some thousands of observed meteors, and contributed otherwise largely to our knowledge of the subject. On the continent,

Brandes, Boguslawski, Olbers, Quetelet, Heis, Schmidt, Secchi, Schiaparelli, and many others, have been equally zealous and successful. Newton and Schiaparelli have been among the foremost in deducing important results.

Observations on shooting-stars differ from those of ordinary astronomy, very much as shooting a bird on the wing differs from shooting at a target. Instruments are of little avail. The most that is usually attempted is, first, counting the numbers seen, with special reference to the quarter of the heavens, hour of the night, brightness, color, time of flight, &c., and, secondly, mapping on a star-chart such paths as can be thus fixed, for the purpose of comparison with simultaneous observations elsewhere for parallax, and the determination of the directions of the paths with respect to each other.

From such observations have, at length, been satisfactorily settled the leading facts in the phenomena of shooting-stars, and the most important astronomical relations of these bodies. They turn out to be, indeed, beyond question, bodies of cosmical origin—subject to gravity, moving like planets and comets in conic sections around the sun (some groups of them, indeed, in orbits pretty well determined)—periodical also like other astronomical bodies in some of their phenomena; but, like the aerolites, visible only when they plunge into our atmosphere, generating by their loss of velocity the light that marks their track, and the heat by which they are consumed and dissipated.

We can only touch briefly on some of the steps by which these results have been reached.

Their *cosmical* character was first forced upon the conviction of astronomers, by the great star-shower of 1833. The critical test was the *radiant*. Though to people generally, in their amazement, the meteors seemed to be dashing at random in all directions, to the more discriminating there was a point in the heavens from which they all appeared to radiate, or in which their paths, if traced backward, would meet. So numerous were the meteors, that this point could not well escape observation, and it was accordingly noticed by many. No one in particular therefore can claim the credit of its discovery. A more important consideration is the significance of the radiant. Was it a real focus from which the meteors

were shot outward in all directions, in the manner of fire-works, or was it merely an optical effect, the vanishing point of parallel straight lines seen in perspective? If the former it might be within our atmosphere; if the latter, it could not be a real center of emanation, at least within our atmosphere, but indicated a different relation of the meteors to the earth. Was it fixed, or in motion, with respect to the stars? Prof. Olmsted showed, from the observations, that it was fixed. This was a significant fact. Both Professor Twining and he saw the interpretation. The meteors must be from beyond the atmosphere. Their relations were cosmical, not terrestrial. The radiant was simply the vanishing point of the parallel lines representing their paths after entering the atmosphere. But at what point, with respect to the stars, was the radiant fixed? The best observations, with no great discrepancy, placed it in the neck of the constellation Leo, Prof. Olmsted near the star *gamma*, Prof. Twining at the little star in the center of the Sickle—the precise point, in the latter case, as Alexander Herschel takes notice, where the best observations placed it in the star-shower of November 14th, 1866, as seen in England. But what was the significance astronomically of this position of the radiant? Professor Twining discovered that that point was the point in the heavens towards which the earth at the time was moving in its orbit—a point 90° from the sun reckoned backwards along the elliptic—the direction (if the illustration can be excused) of the horse's head in a cider-mill—called more elegantly by Pritchard, the Apex of the Earth's way. The inference from this fact was almost irresistible, that the earth was simply plowing its way through a swarm of meteors in space, as the horse might plunge through a swarm of gnats or bees happening to be in his path; meteors not stationary of course, but moving, as all free bodies in space must be; and moving also about some center, doubtless the sun, and moving necessarily nearly in the direction of the earth's motion or the reverse; for the apparent direction (that of the radiant) must, by the laws of mechanics, be the resultant of the real directions of the two motions taken conjointly. Such, essentially, was the inference drawn both by Professor Olmsted and Professor Twining. Professor Olmsted's theory of an elliptic orbit for the

November meteors, with its aphelion near the earth's orbit, its perihelion within that of Mercury, and the period about six months, was published the following summer. Prof. Twining did not decide upon a definite orbit; but the necessary astronomical relations of these bodies, as indicated by the facts respecting the radiant, were stated by him almost as fully and perspicuously in a letter written two months after the shower, as if the statement had been penned in the light of our present knowledge. We have dwelt on this point, because the credit of discerning the coincidence of the radiant with the direction of the earth's motion, and its astronomical significance, has been sometimes attributed, as by Humboldt, to Encke. But Encke's conclusions were confessedly derived only from the observations made in the United States, and these were gathered and published chiefly by Professors Olmsted and Twining themselves, who had previously elaborated their own conclusions. After the publication of the facts, many philosophers joined in the discussion of them, and naturally arrived at similar results, but if we rightly apprehend the matter, the credit of settling the two great facts on which the cosmical theory of meteors primarily rests, namely, the fixedness of the radiant and its coincidence with the Apex of the Earth's way, is due, in the case of the first, to Professor Olmsted, and of the second, to Professor Twining.

The *periodicity* of the star-shower was, in the first instance, merely a *prima facie* inference from the fact of previous occurrence at the same date. After the display of 1833 it was soon discovered that there had been previous displays on the same month and day, with an interval between them of thirty-three or thirty-four years. It was a natural inference, at once in everybody's mouth, and referred to in print, that a recurrence of the phenomenon might be anticipated in 1866 or 1867. Yet, on such a basis, Professor Kirkwood, in his recent book on Meteoric Astronomy, ascribes to Dr. Olbers the honor of first predicting that event, likening it to Halley's first prediction of the return of a comet—an honor, however, assigned much more justly by Sir John Herschel and other European men of science to Professor Newton; inasmuch as prediction from the settling of a scientific theory is of a higher order

than that from the fact of previous occurrence, just as the prediction of eclipses from a mastery of the Lunar Theory is of a higher order than that from the ancient *Saros*, or cycle of eighteen years.

The years 1866 and 1867 have come and gone, and in both of them the prediction referred to was fulfilled. In England, throughout Europe, far into Asia, and even to southernmost Africa in 1866, and throughout the United States in 1867, there was witnessed on the morning of November 14th, a veritable recurrence of the old star-shower of 1833, or at least a shower from the same *cloud*,—though, in each case, on a much less magnificent scale; the stars in the two recent showers numbering, in three or four hours, some six or eight thousand only, against probably five or ten times as many in 1833.

But history brings to light star-showers in former times, rivaling, if not surpassing, in splendor that of the year just named. From the general catalogues of previous showers, compiled by Quetelet, Herrick, and others, it appears that there is more than one annual date on which unusual displays of shooting stars have been repeated. The two best determined are August 9th and 10th, and November 13th and 14th. Of the star-showers belonging to the November epoch, Prof. Newton has brought together the original accounts, so far as known, and subjected them to a critical discussion. The dates of their occurrence are: Oct. 13th, 902; Oct. 18th, 931; Oct. 14th, 934; Oct. 14th, 1002; Oct. 17th, 1101; Oct. 19th, 1202; Oct. 22nd, 1366; Oct. 25th, 1533; Oct. 27th, 1602; Nov. 9th, 1698; Nov. 12th, 1799; Nov. 13th, 1832; Nov. 13th, 1833. Some of these, it appears, were of great magnificence, and in those ages of superstition naturally inspired excessive terror and alarm. In the year 902, on the same night in which died Ibrahim ben Ahmed, "there were seen, as it were lances, an infinite number of stars, which scattered themselves like rain to right and left, and that year was called the year of stars." In 1002 a grand display of thousands of shooting-stars was seen in China. Just two centuries later (1202), according to an Arab chronicle, "On the night of Saturday, on the last day of Muharram, the stars shot hither and thither in the heavens, eastward and westward, and flew one against another

like a scattering swarm of locusts, to the right and left; this phenomenon lasted until daybreak; people were thrown into consternation, and cried to God the Most High with confused clamor." The display of 1366 was one of the most remarkable in all history. The heavens were so filled with flying meteors, large and fiery, "that the sky and air seemed to be in flames, and even the earth seemed ready to take fire." People in their dismay "imagined that the end of the world had come." The star-showers of 1533 and 1602 were grand displays in China, as was also one in 1768, B. C.—the earliest on record. It is worthy of remark in passing, how these Chinese records of meteors, as of comets and eclipses, running back some of them many centuries before the Christian era, fall rigidly into line with European observations, and with astronomical theory, confirming at once the fidelity of the records and the antiquity of that remarkable empire. The shower of 1799 was seen, as a very surprising exhibition of thousands of shooting-stars, by Humboldt and Bonpland in Cumana, and by Andrew Ellicott, Esq., in the West Indian seas. Though it must necessarily have exhibited a radiant, it is somewhat surprising that so acute an observer as Humboldt did not notice it. Entertaining apparently the popular notion of the local and trivial character of the phenomenon, he doubtless did not observe it with the attention he otherwise would.

The November star-shower, as appears from a glance at the dates, has both an annual period and a longer cycle of about a third of a century. The first, Professor Newton determined from his discussion of the dates, to be 365·27 days, and the second 33·25 years. From this length of the annual period it follows, that if the shower is seen, say in Europe, one year, it will be seen the next if at all in America, the earth having made in the interval 27 hundredths of a revolution more than 365 complete ones, thus bringing a part of the globe about a quarter of its circumference further to the westward to face the meteors; as in the recurrences of 1832 and 1833, the first being seen in Europe and Asia, the second in America, the same as again in 1866 and 1867. Professor Newton found further, that after correcting the dates for change of style, they showed a regular advance of the epoch, in the year, of about three days in a century. About one half of this ad-

vance could be accounted for by the difference between the tropical and the sidereal year, caused by the precession of the equinoxes. The other part, or a change of date forward of about one day in seventy years, could be due only to an actual advance, or *procession*, of the node of the meteors' orbit along the ecliptic, with respect to the fixed stars;—an advance amounting to thirteen degrees since A. D. 902, and caused, as in other cases of nodal motion, by the action of the earth and planets. From the fact that this motion of the node is forward, and not backward, it is a necessary inference that the motion of the meteors in their orbit is in a *retrograde* direction, or contrary to that of the earth; so that when the two meet, it must be with a relative velocity equal, nearly, to the sum of the orbital velocities of both.

From the same investigation, Professor Newton showed further, that there were but *five* possible orbits, in which the meteors could move, consistently with the two periods above mentioned as given by the dates; and that which of these five was the true one might be determined by computing the disturbing effect of the planets upon the place of the node, in each case; since in each that effect would necessarily be different. The five possible orbits were, first a small ellipse, interior to the earth's orbit, and intersecting it near the aphelion, with a period of 180.0 days; second, a similar ellipse with a period of 185.4 days; third and fourth an orbit nearly circular, with a period of either 354.6 or 376.6 days; and fifth, a large elliptic orbit, intersecting the earth near perihelion, and extending at aphelion beyond that of Uranus, with a period 33.25 years. Each of these orbits would satisfy the conditions of periodicity, direction of radiant, and (so far as it was a known quantity) velocity. Twice either of the two first-named periods, or once either of the two next, differs from a year, just $\frac{1}{33\frac{1}{2}}$ th part of a revolution; consequently, if in either of the five cases the earth and the meteoric swarm should be simultaneously at the node so as to give a meteoric shower, the swarm, when next the earth came round to the same point, would be a certain distance either behind or in advance of that point, and so would escape the earth; unless, indeed, it were so extended along its orbit that the earth would plunge through some other

part of it, thus giving two successive annual returns. Though Professor Newton was inclined at first to prefer the period of 354.4 days, and provisionally adopted it, he referred the final decision to the computation of the nodal motion already mentioned. That computation he left to be made by Professor Adams, well known as the computer, simultaneously with Le Verrier, of the famous hypothetical orbit of Neptune, which led to the discovery of that planet. The result of Professor Adams's computation, as well as of another by Le Verrier, was in favor of the long period of 33.25 years, with the corresponding orbit; the inclination of the orbit to the ecliptic being 17° or 18° , that is, nearly twice the distance of the radiant from the elliptic, as it should be by the law of the composition of motions.

On the grounds indicated, then, even were there no other, we must accept this as the extremely probable, if not rigidly demonstrated orbit of the November meteors. This conclusion is strengthened by the consideration (suggested by Prof. Kirkwood) that of the more than 100 known bodies which revolve about the sun in orbits of small eccentricity, not one has (like these meteors) a retrograde motion, and also by the observed fact, that the velocity of these meteors, on entering the atmosphere, is so great (often forty-five or fifty miles a second) as to imply an orbital velocity considerably greater than that of the earth (the latter being nineteen miles a second); which greater velocity, at the earth's distance from the sun, could only result from motion in a long ellipse or parabola.

It is highly probable that such also is the character of the orbits of other groups, and of meteors generally; for the reasonings of Professor Newton, and, lately of Mr. Schiaparelli of Milan, from the distribution of ordinary shooting-stars through the hours of the night, seem to show that their mean velocity is comparable to that of comets in parabolic orbits, and is almost certainly greater than the orbital velocity of the earth.

If the orbit of the November group is such as has been described, it is plain that the meteors cannot be so distributed in it as to form a continuous ring; for if they were, we should have a November shower regularly every year. They must then constitute a limited swarm, stretching some distance along

the orbit, and requiring two or three years for the denser portion of it to pass the node, since the earth meets it two years at least in succession, and falls in with its scattered members, or outriders, for several years before and after meeting the denser portion. It must stretch therefore several hundred millions of miles along its orbit. The thickness of the stream is easily computed from the time occupied by the earth in traversing it, that is, the duration of the meteoric shower. That of 1866, in England, lasted about an hour and a half; hence, as Professor Newton computes, the thickness of the group at that point must have been about 33,000 miles. From a comparison of the times of maximum frequency, as observed in England and at the Cape of Good Hope, it appears that the latter was a quarter of an hour earlier, absolute time, than the former. This was obviously owing to the oblique direction in which the earth passed through the meteoric stream. Approaching the stream on its northern side, the southern portions of the globe would enter first and then in succession those farther north,—England fifteen minutes later than the Cape of Good Hope. As to geographical extent, a meteoric display can, of course, be visible only at those places which, at the time of the earth's traversing the group, have the radiant above the horizon, and also are not covered by daylight. Usually, the nearer to the zenith the radiant, the finer the display. The star-shower of 1833 was visible from the equator over nearly the whole northern part of America, having its greatest splendor however in the United States. That of 1866 was seen from Central Asia to the middle of the Atlantic, and from Northern Europe to the Cape of Good Hope.

But we have lingered already too long on the steps by which Professor Newton and others have established the theory of the November meteors. As the type however of other groups, the one which, while involving all the phenomena characteristic of star-showers, has been the most thoroughly studied and the first to be assigned a satisfactory orbit, it is certainly an object of peculiar interest, and worthy of filling even a larger space in our survey than we have given it. Of other epochs of shooting-stars we cannot speak in particular. The one best known is that of August 9th–10th; first pointed out by

Professor Quetelet of Brussels, and Mr. Herrick, and afterwards diligently observed by them. Ten or twelve ancient star-showers belong to this epoch, some of them as far back as the ninth century. Its radiant has a high northern declination, indicating a large inclination of orbit. It is a peculiarity of this epoch that there is every year a more or less complete return of the shower, though never in modern times at least any remarkable display; a fact implying the probable distribution of the meteors in a continuous ring. A rough computation of this ring by Professor Newton in 1862, from observations on a single meteor, deserves mention as the first attempt to determine the orbit of shooting-stars. From observations at Melbourne in Australia, it appears that shooting-stars are not unusually numerous there at the August epoch; for the obvious reason that the radiant (in Persens) is always below the horizon.

Another epoch is that of April 20th, to which attention was first called, we believe, by Mr. Herrick of New Haven, and on which several remarkable showers have occurred in former times, including some of the earliest on record. Its radiant was placed by Mr. Herrick near alpha Lyræ, where it has since been identified by others.

There are several other epochs more or less distinctly marked, among which may be named, January 2d-3d, and December 6th-7th, discovered by Herrick, each having its own radiant. Over fifty different radiants indeed have been pointed out by the meteor committee of the British Association; but very many of them are quite indefinite, and can hardly yet be regarded as based on sufficient data.

We pass now to the most remarkable step of progress yet taken in meteoric astronomy, and, except the original discoveries respecting the radiant, apparently the most promising in results; viz. the identification of shooting-stars with *comets*; —no fancy, no mere speculation, but the veritable tracking of these tiny luminous sprites of the upper air, into the very lair and bosom of the grim old hirsute monsters that so often have terrified the nations with omens dire. This discovery is due, in the first instance, to the able director of the Brera Observatory at Milan, Mr. Schiaparelli. A certain superficial re-

semblance between shooting-stars and comets has often been noticed. Kepler, though regarding shooting-stars as a local atmospheric phenomenon, yet speaks of them as passing through the air, "*ceu minutos cometas*." The "terrestrial comets" of President Clap were the bolides or fire-balls, not shooting-stars; the latter he classes with "thunder, lightning, and such like lower meteors." Professor Olmsted speaks of the source of the meteors of 1833 as a comet; Humboldt, also, notices a general resemblance of meteors to comets. Professor Kirkwood, in an Article published in 1861, recognizes the close analogy between the two classes of bodies, and suggests the name of *cometoids* for luminous meteors. But it remained for the Italian astronomer to detect as an actual fact, comets and shooting-stars pursuing the very same track through space. He first tested his suspicion of this fact on the August meteors, and found their orbit strikingly identical with that of the third comet of 1862; this was a comet discovered nearly simultaneously by Tuttle at Cambridge, Mass., and Simons at Albany, N. Y. Mr. Schiaparelli has since found a still closer coincidence between the elements of the orbit of the November meteors and those of the first comet of 1866. The degree of coincidence can be best seen from the figures.

	Elements of Nov. Meteors.	Elements of Comet 1866 I.
Longitude of perihelion,	56° 26'	60° 28'
Longitude of Ascending Node,	231° 28'	231° 26'
Inclination,	17° 45'	17° 18'
Perihelion distance,	0.9873	0.9765
Eccentricity,	0.9046	0.9054
Semi-major axis,	10.340	10.324
Periodic time, years,	33.25	33.176
Motion,	retrograde.	retrograde.

Such a coincidence, of so many elements, could not be by chance. The conclusion is inevitable. This comet can be regarded as only a huge meteor of the November group. It passed its perihelion in January 1866, and consequently was just in the van of the meteoric train, which had begun to pass the same point in November, 1865, and through which the earth plowed its way in November, 1866, and again in 1867.

Had the comet been ten months later in its orbit, it might have struck "our English cousins" with greater consternation than have even the Fenians, and if twenty-two months later, it might have proved a very bad omen for ourselves.

Several other comets have been strongly suspected of relationship with certain star-showers, as, for example, the first comet of 1861 with the shower of April 19th-20th; the fourth comet of 1819 with the shower of December 6th-9th; the second comet of 1792, and the fourth of 1860, with the shower of January 1st-4th. The latest identification, however, and one of the most interesting, is that by Professor Newton (see "American Journal of Science" for January, 1868), of a comet seen in China in 1366 with the November meteors, a grand display of which occurred in the same year. From an analysis of the reported observations, Professor Newton concludes that there were in reality two comets, the second following in the path of the first, and both being *conformable* to the November radiant.

It is worthy of remark that Mr. Schiaparelli was led to his brilliant discovery by a strikingly beautiful and harmonious theory, which he had previously developed, of the constitution of the universe. Infering from their high velocities that both meteors and comets come, originally at least, from stellar space, through which the solar system is known to be pushing its way, and that that space must be everywhere filled with such bodies in every state of aggregation, he was led to consider what must necessarily be their motions and changes under the known laws of matter. He shows that a diffused cloud of minute independent bodies (suppose of a globular form) would, by the laws of motion and gravity, on coming within the sphere of the sun's attraction, be drawn towards that body in a parabolic orbit, and, as it approached perihelion, be gradually extended along the orbit, in such a manner as to have at perihelion a very narrow tranverse section, with great condensation and very great length; constituting, in fact, an extended stream, which, after passing the perihelion, would tend gradually to regain its original form, yet remain more elongated and diffused than before the perihelion passage; and if by planetary perturbations it should

be thrown from a parabolic into an elliptic orbit, it would become at each revolution more and more lengthened and diffused, until ultimately it would form a closed ring. It seems highly probable that the August meteors represent such a group after its transformation into the ring, while the November meteors have not yet reached that stage, but are still in the process of stretching out. The effect of the sun's attraction on such a loosely constituted and diffused cloud, Mr. Schiaparelli shows, is to disperse its elements. It is only within certain narrow limits of distance, that the elements will have sufficient mutual coherence to prevent this result. But we have not space to follow further his course of investigation. At the risk, however, of sacrificing intelligibility to brevity, we cannot withhold a condensed synopsis of the leading points of his theory of falling-stars.

1. Matter is disseminated in celestial space in all possible grades of division; as first, the larger stars, either isolated or in systems of few members; second, large agglomerations of small stars (resolvable nebulae); third, smaller bodies, visible only when they approach the sun as comets; finally, cosmical clouds, the minute elements of which are comparable in mass to such as we can handle or transport.

2. Bodies of the last class may have been formed in space by the local concentration of the celestial matter, analogously to the crystallization of substances dissolved in liquids.

3. Such clouds, subject to the same laws of motion as the fixed stars, when they come within the sphere of the sun's attraction, cannot come near enough to be visible to us unless their orbits are very greatly elongated conic sections.

4. Such a cloud cannot come within the solar system except as a parabolic current, which may take years or ages to pass its perihelion, forming in space a river, very narrow with respect to its length. Such a current encountered by the earth will yield showers of meteors diverging from a radiant.

5. Such currents, however numerous, and however various their directions within the solar system, may, from their rarity, intersect mutually without disturbance, and may slowly change in form and position, like rivers changing their bed, sometimes becoming closed elliptical rings.

6. Permanent orbits of short period for cosmical clouds are impossible, by the laws of gravity.

7. The matter of a current after passing the perihelion, returns into space more dispersed than before the passage; if scattered by great perturbations, the minute masses may some of them take special orbits, and become the *sporadic* shooting-stars.

8. Thus the meteoric stars, of all grades, belong to the category of the fixed stars, and may be called simply and truly *falling-stars*. They have the same relation to comets, as the planetoids to the planets. The smaller they are, in both cases, the greater their number.

9. Since shooting-stars, fire-balls, and meteorites, differ probably in nothing but size, our cabinet specimens of the latter are doubtless fragments of the matter of the stellar universe; and since they contain no new elements, we may infer the similarity of composition of all the celestial bodies.

The views thus dryly stated receive, in many points, strong support from many of the more recent investigations in physical science, particularly those with the spectroscope, and in meteoric mineralogy with the microscope. Views closely resembling these have been deduced also by Le Verrier from analogous reasonings. His conclusion, however, that the November meteors entered the solar system by the disturbing action of Uranus so lately as A. D. 126, is not acquiesced in by Schiaparelli, on account of the insufficient mass of Uranus. Jupiter, and Saturn were more probably the perturbing bodies, which gave us this meteoric stream.

In our sketch thus far we have dwelt mainly in respect to shooting-stars, on the phenomena of groups and special showers, as those which have been chiefly instrumental in developing meteoric science. But, though our Article is already too long, we should be guilty of a culpable omission, if we failed to notice the important investigations of Prof. Newton respecting *sporadic* shooting-stars, or those seen singly on ordinary nights. Very few persons have any adequate idea of the actual number of these bodies that are daily losing themselves in our atmosphere. The paper of Prof. Newton on this subject is published in the first volume of the National Academy of Sciences.

He determines first, from an analysis of more than 300 observations collected from various sources, the law of distribution of their paths in vertical height above the earth. He finds that there is a pretty definite upper limit to the meteor-paths, and that about two-thirds of them lie between the heights of thirty-seven and seventy-four miles; the mean height of their middle points being fifty-nine and a half miles. The number of shooting-stars that come into the atmosphere each day, over the whole earth, he finds by a careful investigation to be over *seven and a half millions*, including only such as are commonly visible to the naked eye on ordinary nights. This number is obtained by determining first the number visible by one observer at any one place. This has been found by repeated observations to be on an average eight an hour. But, one person, as Professor Newton has shown elsewhere from observations conducted by himself for the purpose, sees not more than one-fifth or one-sixth of the whole number that might be seen if his eye could take in the whole heavens. Suppose he sees one-fourth, this will give at least thirty an hour, as the number visible at one place. Assuming an equal distribution over the earth's surface, Professor Newton finds by a special investigation, that the area within which meteors are seen at a given place is less than a ten thousandth part of the area of the whole atmosphere. The daily number for the whole earth is, then, $30 \times 24 \times 10460$, or 7,531,200; which is probably less than the actual number, though certainly large enough to startle those who have not given the matter special attention. But those visible to the eye are by no means all. From special observations of Pape and Winnecke, with and without a comet seeker, Professor Newton estimates that more than 400,000,000 shooting-stars, such as that telescope showed daily, enter our atmosphere. From the same data he finds, further, "that in the mean, in each volume of the size of the earth, of the space which the earth is traversing in its orbit about the sun, there are as many as 13,000 small bodies, each body such as would furnish a shooting-star visible under favorable circumstances to the naked eye." This would make the average mutual distance apart of these bodies about 300 miles. If telescopic meteors be counted, the number just stated should be increased

at least forty fold, or their mutual distance reduced to 100 miles. By a like estimate from the number of meteors counted at maximum frequency in the November showers of 1866 in England, and 1867 in the United States, Professor Newton has found that their average mutual distance from each other was about thirty miles. There were doubtless immense numbers of smaller ones, that could only have been seen with a telescope. But, even reckoning in these, so as to make their mean distance apart many times less than that just stated, it is easy to see that two or more streams of such bodies might readily flow through each other with very little chance of collision of the individuals; or if a few should jostle each other, they would scarcely be missed, and the great intersecting streams would still move on as before.

The mean length of visible path in the atmosphere of the ordinary sporadic shooting stars he concludes is from twenty-four to forty miles. Hence, if the mean duration of flight is half a second, as numerous observations seem to indicate, we have a mean velocity of between forty-eight and eighty miles a second, which is three or four times that of the earth, and probably too great. Schmidt, of the Athens Observatory, makes the average time of flight of 1357 shooting-stars equal 0s.93, the time being different for those of different colors; viz., 0s.71 for the white, 0s.95 for the yellow, 1s.79 for the red, and 2s.69 for the green—the color doubtless being due to the velocities. These durations imply velocities ranging from ten to fifty miles a second. The average velocity will be less in the early than in the later hours of the night.

Other results of Professor Newton's investigations, of interest chiefly to the scientific reader, we cannot stop even to name. Suffice it to say, in general, that they tend to confirm the cosmical and cometary theory of meteors.

With regard to the physical constitution of shooting-stars, it is a point for science yet to determine. The spectroscopic observations of Herschel and others seem to indicate that the nuclei of some may be solid, of others gaseous, and that for the August meteors at least, "the material is probably a mineral substance in which sodium is one of the chemical ingredients." This observation connects at once shooting-stars with

aerolites, since sodium is a constituent of some of the latter, as of that which fell at Annale, Aug. 25th, 1865. The estimates of the weight of shooting-stars (ranging from a few grains to a few ounces), based on the mechanical equivalent of light, can scarcely be regarded yet as entitled to much confidence. Whatever their mass, however, it is pleasant to know they are effectually dissipated high in the atmosphere, which serves as an impenetrable shield to protect the earth from their peltings.

There are many other points of interest in the recent progress of the new science on which we should be glad to touch, were not our Article already of too great a length. From the present imperfect sketch, however, it must appear evident, that the science of meteors, though its recent progress has been so remarkable, is yet in its infancy, and opens up to zealous cultivators a field of rare promise in the future. In a study of the mutual relations between the greater and the minuter bodies of the universe, whatever discovery we make respecting the one class immediately throws light upon the other. From the motions of the greater, as taught by astronomy, we learn at once the motions of the smaller; and from handling and analyzing the smaller, as they drop within our reach, we learn the character and composition of the larger, and so, in general, of the material universe. Meteorites and shooting-stars thus form, as it were, a ladder by the steps of which we climb into the highest material heavens, and go where we can touch and handle the remotest masses that float in the realms of space. Thus phenomena that until lately were deemed too trivial to engage the serious attention of philosophers become, by the progress of science, a source of our profoundest knowledge, and carry us in our conceptions of the divine wisdom and power, as exhibited in the material creation, to a point we had not otherwise been able to attain.

The reader will have gathered also from this brief sketch, which, though confessedly incomplete, we have endeavored to make impartial, that, as was intimated at the beginning, the leading steps of progress in this new branch of astronomy have originated on this side of the Atlantic, and chiefly under the auspices of Yale College. In saying this we would not disparage the arduous and varied labors of scien-

tific men abroad. With respect to meteorites and meteoric mineralogy, they have done confessedly the greater part of the work; though even in this department we cannot forget that one of the most zealous laborers is Professor Charles Upham Shepard, who was for many years a resident of New Haven, whose cabinet of meteorites, now at Amherst College, representing over a hundred and fifty localities, is the largest in the country, and one of the four largest in the world, and whose contributions to the chemistry and classification of meteorites are everywhere acknowledged to be of the highest value. It is in the department of shooting-stars, however, as we have seen, that the great steps of progress have been made, and that the theory of meteorites themselves has found its best development. And in this department the European interest was, with a few marked exceptions, very small, until it was awakened by the showers of the last two years; while, in this country, the interest excited by the display of 1833, and by the discoveries connected with it, has never been lost. The truly scientific zeal and persevering labors of Mr. Herrick, though they have been touched upon incidentally in this Article, have not, we fear, received the share of notice they justly deserve. Other laborers, also, might very properly have been named; especially that able astronomer and mathematician, Mr. S. C. Walker, of Philadelphia, whose elaborate paper on the November meteors, published in the transactions of the American Philosophical Society, in 1841, was one of the earliest and ablest mathematical contributions to the astronomical theory of these bodies. We regret, also, that a paper of great value, the Washington Observatory Report on the Meteors of Nov. 1867, has come to hand too late for us to avail ourselves of its results. But without saying more, we cannot doubt that the facts, even so imperfectly presented, will bear us out in assigning the share of credit we have to American science, and show that the title prefixed to this Article is not inappropriate.

NOTE.—Since the suggestion on page 141, respecting the separate upper limits of the different gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, were in type, our attention has been directed to an analogous view of the sun's atmosphere, in an interesting communication lately made to the Royal Society, by Mr. Stoney, of Queen's University, Ireland.

that Christianity is "*Christian truth speaking through the lives of Christian men.*" Important as the history of dogmas may be, and of those fierce and noisy word-battles which have been fought to define and defend the propositions of Christian theology, the history of Christianity itself is quite another thing. "The voice of Christian life," sounding along the ages, in song and prayer—in testimonies for Christ from prisons or from exile, from scaffolds or from the fire—in words of comfort for human sorrow and of cheer for the oppressed—in Christ-like protestations against wickedness—in aspiration and endeavor for the glory of God and the welfare of men—sighing or shouting in the ceaseless conflict with the rulers of the darkness of this world—"that voice of Christian life," wherever it is uttered and in whatever tone—gives evidence that Christianity is there, not dead and embalmed in dogmas like a mummy in its swathings, but alive. This idea of Christianity as Christian life is what gives unity to the succession of volumes denominated by the publishers "The Schonberg-Cotta Series."

Here we find an explanation, in part, of the great favor with which these books have been received by religious readers of various ecclesiastical denominations. "In part" we say; for we would by no means imply that there is no other explanation. Much of the success which these books have gained is due no doubt to the genius and skill of the author—much to the charm attendant on her almost dramatic representations, especially in the best of her stories; for without the power by which she calls up the buried past, and makes it live again, such success would have been impossible. Yet to the best sensibilities of her religious readers, there is an added charm in her broad and sympathizing recognition of the Christian life manifested under wide diversity of forms in "many lands and ages." She writes not in the interest of any ecclesiastical system, nor as a theological partisan; it does not appear from her writings (nor indeed have we learned from any other source of information), whether Mrs. Charles is a worshiper in the parish church, or sits under the ministry of a dissenting pastor. Whether she is a Wesleyan, a Congregationalist, or an Episcopalian, we cannot tell, nor do we care to know. We only

know that as we read we hear "the voice of Christian life"—we see the experience of living Christian souls—we feel ourselves brought into the communion of the saints and not merely of the orthodox. Not as if Christian truth had no relation to the Christian life. The author of these books is far enough from so preposterous a theory; nor do her writings tend in that direction. Instead of having any fellowship with the shallow sentimentalists, who teach that Christianity is nothing but philanthropy, and whose theory, that Christ brought nothing into the world but the precept "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," would abolish the church and extinguish the light of the world, she holds plainly enough, and firmly, that "Christ came into the world to save sinners;" and all her illustrations of the Christian life show us a life of faith, a life "hid with Christ in God." Her view of Christianity—or the view to which her writings lead—is that which the purest and noblest souls of Christendom are at this day consciously or unconsciously beginning to receive. To her the Gospel is not a syntagma of abstract propositions, ontological, psychological, or even theological; still less is it a system of church government, a directory for public worship, or a body of prescribed devotions with rubrics telling how they shall be said or sung; it is simply the "faithful saying and worthy of all acception that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." It is not the difference of opinion between Luther and Calvin, nor the difference between Richard Baxter and Jeremy Taylor, nor between John Owen and John Tillotson; it is what Luther and Calvin, Baxter and Taylor, Owen and Tillotson, John Robinson the pilgrim, and Joseph Hall the prelate, John Cotton the Congregationalist, and Roger Williams the Baptist, held with one accord notwithstanding their differences, and which the great Apostle defines as "Christ in you the hope of glory." The author of these volumes makes one of her personages say to herself in exile and sorrow,

"My heart is one great craving unfathomable void. But Christianity fills it. Christ fills it, He Himself; satisfying every aspiration, meeting every want, being all I want. Pitying, forgiving, loving, *commanding* me. The commanding sometimes most satisfying of all. Always, always; all through my heart. Redeemer, that is much; Master, that (afterwards) is almost more; Father! that is all." —"On Both Sides of the Sea," p. 271.

Another of the *dramatis personæ* is made to say,

"I have seen many die, men of all stamps; Covenanted, Uncovenanted, Resolutions, Protesters, Presbyterians, Sectaries; and within all these grades of theological men (and outside them all) I have seen not a few, thank God, to whom dying was not death." * * * "Resolutions, Covenants, and Confessions may like other perishable clothes, be needful on earth. But they have to be left entirely behind, as much as money, or titles, or any other corruptible thing. If they have been garments to fit us for earthly work, well; they have had their use, and can be gently laid aside. If they have been veils to hide us from God and ourselves, how terribly bare they leave us. Alone, unclothed, helpless, the only question then is, can we trust ourselves to the Father as a babe to the bosom of its mother? Does the Christ, the Son, who has died for us, offering Himself up, without spot to God, and lives for ever; does He who, dying, committed His spirit to the Father's hands, enable us to offer ourselves up in Him—commit our spirits, helpless, but redeemed, into the Father's hands? Then the sting is plucked out." * * * "If there is ever to be a confession of Faith which is to unite Christendom, I think it should be drawn from dying lips. For these will never freeze the confession into a profession. On dying lips, the Creed and the Hymn are one; for they are uttered not to man but to God."—"On Both Sides of the Sea," pp. 219, 220.

The two volumes now before us are evidently the result of much and careful study. In this respect, certainly, they are among the best of the author's works. Related as they are to parties which in one sense have not yet ceased to exist, they can hardly be expected to satisfy all readers. The questions over which the Cavalier and the Roundhead fought on bloody fields are questions with some heat left in them after two hundred years. Even at this day, there are some readers to whom King Charles is a blessed martyr, and Laud a canonized saint. Even in this country there are some whose ecclesiastical antipathy to the party of Hampden and Pym hardens them into political sympathy with the party of Strafford and his faithless king. Such readers, instead of being convinced or enlightened, will rather be offended, by the representation which these volumes give of persons and parties, in the age which saw the transitory commonwealth of England, and the disastrous restoration of royalty. But readers who are not incurably and too passionately prejudiced, and who are willing to compare the author's portraiture of that age with authentic sources of information, will acknowledge, we think, that she has at least attempted to be impartial. Her sympathy with one party is not inconsistent with a hearty recognition of

whatever in the opposite party was generous, or brave, or Christian.

A very simple fiction, carried through these two volumes, answers the purpose of giving distinctness and life-like reality to historical events and persons. Two neighboring families, one a little more Saxon than Norman, the other a little more Norman than Saxon, but both of the old English gentry, take opposite sides in the conflict between royal prerogative and traditional liberty, and at last in the war between King and Parliament. Connected by habits of intercourse and ties of friendship, they are nevertheless attracted in opposite directions by differing tastes and sympathies. The Draytons are Puritans, the Davenants are of the Court party; and the fortunes of these families, beginning with the year 1637 (and a reminiscence then recorded from one who was present when King Charles I. was proclaimed at Whitehall twelve years before), and continued till the revolution which ended the dynasty of the Stuarts, are the thread of fiction running through those long and terrible years of history. The only son of the Drayton family and the only daughter of the Davenants are the Romeo and Juliet of the fiction. He finds his place among Cromwell's Ironsides, and remains in that famous army till it is disbanded after the Restoration. She goes with her father over the sea, and lives among the exiled Cavaliers in France, returning to England in the train of Charles II. At last the pride of the Cavalier father breaks down in the extreme humiliation of England under her dissolute and shameless King; the Romeo and Juliet of the two families, after so many years of separation and sorrow, are united; and the story ends in New England, where the survivors have found refuge.

This inartificial plot is so managed that the reader finds himself growing familiar with the successive events in that changeful and turbulent age, and seems almost to have had a personal introduction to many of the men whose names are inseparable from the history, civil and religious, of the period. Hampden, Cromwell, Milton, Jeremy Taylor, Owen, Bunyan, John Howe, Baxter, the Port-Royalists in France, the Apostle Eliot in New England, pass before us while we read, not as mere names, but as living men—not in fictitious circumstances

and with words imputed to them which they never uttered, but in the light of honest history, and speaking for themselves in language of their own. To Mrs. Charles, one man above all others is the hero of that age. Oliver Cromwell holds in these volumes the place which Luther holds in the Chronicles of the Schonberg-Cotta Family. Of course those who accept as unquestionable that representation of Puritanism which is found in *Hudibras*, and in the ribald literature of the restoration, and that representation of Cromwell, which no Englishman, till within the last few years, could call in question without hazarding his reputation as a loyal subject, will have no better opinion of these volumes than a Roman Catholic, devoutly believing all that Papal writers have told about Luther and Protestantism, might have of the Schonberg-Cotta Chronicles. With what feelings would a malignant secessionist—for example, a Southern clergyman whose Christianity never had any relation to politics, or a Southern lady—regard Dr. Holland's "Life of Abraham Lincoln?" With just such feelings would an "Anglican priest," who scorns the thought of being simply a Protestant minister of the Gospel, and to whom abhorrence of Puritans, and above all of Cromwell, is a veritable fortieth article more sacred than all the thirty-nine—or one of those Episcopalian young ladies who figure in "Bryan Maurice"—regard the representation of Cromwell by Mrs. Charles.

Slowly, but surely, the great Protector is gaining his proper place in history. Even the English people—and what is more significant, the Scotch, with their Presbyterian animosity against liberty for schisms and heresies—are beginning to revise the traditions which have come down to them from the age of the restoration. The comparison just hinted at may help us to an illustration of why it is that those traditions need to be revised and must vanish away. We in this country have been passing through another chapter of the long war between the Divine Right of liberty and the pretended Divine Right of oppression. The "good old cause" which was victorious at Naseby, at Dunbar, and at Worcester has been victorious at Fort Henry, at Vicksburg, at Gettysburg, at Lookout Mountain, and before Richmond. Suppose now—for sometimes we may suppose even that which we know to be impossible—a

restoration as of the Bourbons in France, or the Stuarts in England, with nothing learned by the experience of defeat, and nothing forgotten. Cotton is king again. Negro slavery has become again an established religion, and abolitionists refusing to worship at its altars, or to acknowledge its divine authority, are liable to disabilities and outrages not less numerous and more arbitrary than those to which dissenters from Episcopacy and the Book of Common Prayer were subjected after the restoration of the Stuarts. The good old days of Buchanan and Pierce have returned; the Fugitive Slave Law and the Dred Scott decision are rehabilitated; the high-toned aristocracy of a chivalry that breeds negroes for market reigns in "society" at Washington; the crack of the plantation whip resounds in the capitol; Preston Brooks are allowed to cudgel disrespectful senators at the cost of only a nominal penalty; the bay of the bloodhound follows the negro who attempts an escape from his normal condition; and woe to the man who will not glorify the blessed compromise! Conceive of all this—conceive of literature chained to the triumphal chariot of oppression—editions of Longfellow expurgated as of old for Southern purchasers—the New York Tract Society carried back to its "catholic basis"—the general mind besotted by the spirit of subserviency—the higher law hooted at, and the doctrine of liberty driven into holes and corners—and tell us, gentle reader, where, and what, in such a restoration, would be the memory of Abraham Lincoln. Restore to more than its former ascendancy in politics, in commerce, in literature, and in religion, the power that fought against him, and, so long as that ascendancy shall remain, the prevalent opinion concerning Lincoln will be just that which his enemies, in affectation of contempt, and in unaffected malice, professed to hold when they called him "buffoon," "ape," "gorilla," "drunkard." Such injustice as the memory of Lincoln would suffer in the restoration we have been trying to imagine, is the injustice which the memory of Cromwell has suffered, till lately, among his countrymen. But in proportion to the progress of political reformation in Great Britain, and of ideas and principles tending to a reformation of the ecclesiastical establishment, traditionary prejudices against that great name are

weakened, and history brings out the truth. We do not propose to maintain that Cromwell was the greatest of English rulers and statesmen—much less that he was faultless; but it may be said with truth that the estimate of his character and work, which was commonly received in England without being questioned for a century and a half, is the opprobrium of English history.

An American reader of these volumes can hardly fail to observe the parallel (perhaps not intended by the author) between the conflict in England two centuries ago and that which has been called "the great American conflict." To such a reader the remembrance of how the great English conflict terminated in the horrible prodigacy and the national debasement introduced by the restoration, cannot but be painfully suggestive of what may befall our country in the termination of our conflict. The completeness of the victory gained in war was not the end two centuries ago; nor did our conflict end in the surrender of Lee's army, and the capture of the fugitive Davis. In England, the fatal difficulty was found, not in the overthrow of the despotic institutions which had caused the civil war, but in the task of reconstruction. The monarchy, the aristocracy, and the prelacy and priesthood, as represented by armies, had been overthrown; but how to organize the freedom which had been gained for the people—how to establish a government which should give security and permanence to liberty—was the great problem; and because the wisdom and patriotism of England were not competent to work out so great a problem, all that had been gained was lost—at least for a time. So the question of to-day is whether the wisdom and the patriotism of the American people are competent to solve the problem that is waiting for solution. Can we organize in the States that have lost their governments a new and better civil order? Can we institute in each of those States, or in any of them, a government by the people for the whole people without distinction of class or caste? Or are we to have in those States—what a powerful faction under most unscrupulous leaders is striving for—a restoration of the sort of government which in former years has brought upon the nation so

much of shame, and, in these recent years, has cost us so much of treasure and of priceless blood?

In England, the men who, as statesmen and warriors, had conquered liberty for their country, could not work together in any practicable plan of reconstruction. Had there been any sufficient unity of thought among them—had men of extreme opinions been able to see the impossibility of realizing their favorite schemes, and willing to accept the best attainable result—had the Presbyterians, the Independents, and the idealizing Republicans, been able to see that the common interest of them all was far greater than their several interests as parties distinguished from each other, their united force would have overcome the tendency to reaction always consequent on such a struggle as that from which their country was emerging. But they were mutually distrustful, and therefore incapable of acting together. Every fragment of the great party would have its own scheme or nothing. While Cromwell lived, his strong hand kept all parties in check. The Presbyterians might complain of the liberty which Independents and other “sectaries” had to preach, and to set up “gathered churches;” and the Republicans might complain that their ideal commonwealth was postponed for what seemed to the Protector more practicable in the existing condition of affairs; and the Fifth-monarchy men might complain that their ideas were not accepted at Whitehall; but there was a power which maintained peace in England, and kept out the Malignants. As soon as that power was taken away, the reaction came. The Presbyterians, in their horror of the Radicalism which seemed to threaten a full toleration for all sects and heresies, brought back the worthless king, reinvested him with all the power of mischief which his father had lost, and then found no toleration for themselves. The restoration in 1660 brought with it twenty years of unparalleled baseness in the government, of the most demoralizing and corrupting influences let loose upon the people, and of national dishonor. Then another revolution was found inevitable. Even to this day the British nation, with all its progress in liberty and in Christian civilization, has hardly outgrown the disastrous efforts of the madness that brought back the Stuarts.

Must our country pass through a similar experience? It may, if on the one hand men of extreme opinions—idealists and political pedants, as some would call them—men in advance of the age, as they would call themselves—insist on some impracticable scheme of reconstruction, and will have that or nothing; and if, on the other hand, the self-styled conservatives are willing to surrender all that the nation has fought for in the fear that something may come which was not in their programme. Our hope is that under the Divine guidance, which has brought us through so many perils, the PEOPLE will find the way of safety. The instinctive sagacity of the people is ordinarily wiser than the schemes of party leaders,—often wiser than the foresight of statesmen.

ARTICLE X.—THE JARVES COLLECTION IN THE YALE
SCHOOL OF THE FINE ARTS.

Descriptive Catalogue of "Old Masters," collected by James J. Jarves, to illustrate the History of Painting from A. D. 1200, to the best Periods of Italian Art; now on exhibition in the Yale School of the Fine Arts. New Haven: 1868. 8vo.

IN the year 1863, Mr. Augustus Russell Street, of New Haven, signified to the authorities of Yale College his willingness to erect upon the College grounds a large and enduring edifice adapted to the wants of a School of the Fine Arts. Three objects seemed to be prominent in the plans of this liberal benefactor,—the professional or technical training of individuals in any department of Art which they propose to take up as a permanent occupation or calling in life; second, the culture of the students assembled in all departments of the University, in a knowledge of the history, principles, and methods of the Fine Arts, and in an appreciation of the beautiful; thirdly, the education of the public by making them familiar with the works of gifted painters, sculptors, and designers, and by bringing before them lectures and instructions of a theoretical and practical character.

The large and costly edifice, erected in accordance with these purposes, itself a work of art, was provided with lecture-rooms, studios, and exhibition-rooms adapted to the various classes of students and visitors who may here resort for instruction. The gallery of Colonel Trumbull, unique in its historical associations, was transferred to the new building as soon as it was completed. Besides this, the College was the possessor of the celebrated Berkeley group by Smybert, and of good examples of the work of Sir Godfrey Kneller, Gilbert Stuart, and a few other early portrait painters. Professor S. F. B. Morse made the first donation to the new institution, by purchasing for it Washington Allston's "Jeremiah,"—and other liberal gifts were quickly added to the collections. In

the summer of 1867, a large number of modern pictures, loaned for the purpose by gentlemen in different parts of the country, were placed in the galleries; and a sum of several hundred dollars resulting from this exhibition has been appropriated by the Council of the School to the purchase of casts selected from the best European collections. All this looked very promising for the early accomplishment of the expectations of the founder.

A much more hopeful step has now been taken. The Catalogue, of which we give the title, is a public announcement that the well known collection of paintings by the old masters, brought together by Mr. James J. Jarves, has been secured for two or three years, at least, as a part of the educational apparatus of the Yale School of the Fine Arts. By an arrangement in which the College, Mr. Jarves, and some lovers of early Italian painting are participants, this collection has been brought to New Haven, and now covers the walls of the North Gallery in the building just referred to. Those who have seen the Jarves pictures in rooms which were poorly lighted, or which were too small to receive the entire number, express themselves delighted that these choice works of art have at last found a home where they can all be seen and satisfactorily examined; and they tell us that the collection has never appeared so well as in its new abode.

Those who are not acquainted with the acquisitions of Mr. Jarves may be interested in the following paragraph, which appeared in *The Nation* (N. Y. December 26th, 1867), from the pen of its accomplished critic in art.

"The collection consists of one hundred and twenty pictures. They are hung and will be catalogued nearly in chronological order, and, taking them in that order, there are first perhaps a dozen pictures by unknown artists, by monks or traveling lay painters, of the time of the Neo-Greek influence over Italian art, and of what is called 'Byzantine' in Italian painting. These, painted on wood and with gold backgrounds, mark the first rise into beauty and expression, out of dead formalism, of the Christian art of Western Europe. Archaic still, at once rude and conventional, these pictures before Cimabue partake at once of the old mannerism and of the new life. A

large picture by Margaritone of Arezzo marks the end of the reign of formality. Cimabue was Margaritone's contemporary, and his work begins the new day, of which the light shines pure and bright in the work of Cimabue's pupil, Giotto. A picture ascribed to Cimabue is in the collection, and five pictures by Giotto and by his immediate followers. From this time the stately march of Italian painting is well and closely followed by the Jarves pictures, where Simone Memmi succeeds to Duccio; Orgagna to Memmi; then, after a wider gap than we find elsewhere, pictures by Fra Angelico, Gentile da Fabriano, the great Masaccio, who exercised an influence over his followers only second to that of Giotto himself, and Benozzo Gozzoli, who adorns the solemn cloisters of the Pisan Campo Santo. With these are five of those most interesting pictures, painted upon the 'cassoni' or chests for bridal wardrobes. The best painters of the time worked at these. Many of them are, as these in the Jarves collection notably are, of great artistic merit, and some of them are interesting because of secular subjects, in an age when art represented few but sacred scenes and characters. Of later works, there is a small picture attributed, and probably with justice, to the early style of Raphael, a fine Sodoma, a large picture by the younger Ghirlandajo, a canvas which shows the hand of no less a painter than Veronese, and two small pictures by Giorgione, which are, perhaps, the gems of the collection. There are several portraits of extraordinary historical interest, especially one of Amerigo Vespucci; but we speak to day of the value of the collection in the history of art alone, and leave unconsidered the subjects of pictures."

The same authority, one of the most competent judges in such matters, assures us not only that this is the finest collection of early pictures in America, but that it comes nearer in permanent and historic value to a great European gallery than anything outside of a favored region of Western Europe. It is sure to draw to the Yale School of the Fine Arts large numbers of the most cultivated and studious artists and lovers of pictures, from different parts of the country; for nowhere else, without an ocean voyage, can be found so many examples or so complete a series of the early masters, beginning with

Cimabue and Giotto, and continuing to Veronese, and Giorgione.

Such pictures must not be looked at with the same eye for entertainment and amusement, with which people are accustomed to run through the annual exhibitions of modern pictures. There is need of the same appreciative inquiry and study which is needed for the works of Dante or of Homer. The aims of the painters, their beliefs, their surroundings, their aspirations, must be borne in mind, or the visitor will turn away unrewarded by the sight. In a private letter which we take the liberty of copying, the following appreciative comments are given:—

The earlier pictures are of the time when facts and things were not represented with any completeness, but a certain number of ideas were beautifully symbolized. Art, at that time, did not record nor relate; its business was to suggest and remind of well-known truths and unquestioned beliefs. The painters made their work beautiful, because they were true artists—because they couldn't help it, but it was, as it were, accidental.

Then, when the greater time came, ushered in by Giotto, there was the gain of fact and life; with it was the necessary loss of some brilliancy and flushing of color (incompatible with elaborate light and shade and shadow); and then came also the danger that artists would forget their subject and their end, in their work and their means. This danger they escaped while they had the primitive directness and singleness of purpose of Giotto, Masaccio, Perugino, and Raffaele in his youth. They fell when the Renaissance had gone on to its results, and painting became the first thing, what you paint the second; as Raffaele completely exemplified in his later indifference, whether he painted Christ and the Apostles, or the Amour of Cupid and Psyche. This latter time was so rich in the number of its works of art, that the few pictures here exemplify it less perfectly than the older time is shown. But there are thirty pictures of its better (earlier and more promising and youthful) half, all of great importance and wholly unique in this country.

We congratulate New Haven, we congratulate Yale College, we congratulate the country, that so choice a gallery of paintings, illustrative of the most interesting period of modern art, has been secured as a part of the university collections. To Mr. Jarves, the learned and enthusiastic originator of the gallery, to Mr. R. Sturgis, Jun., who prepared the catalogue, and to Mr. Luther M. Jones, by whose agency the pictures were brought to New Haven, and to the college authorities, who were so quick to recognize and so ready to secure the great attractions of this collection, especial thanks are due.

We can think of no one thing which would contribute so much as will this gallery to the accomplishment of the three designs which were in the view of Mr. Street.

The pecuniary value of these pictures is very great, estimated, by one competent to judge, at one hundred thousand dollars. If other endorsements are needed, they can be found in the printed letters of Mr. T. A. Trollope in the *London Athenæum*, Sig. Bucci, Inspector of the Uffizi gallery at Florence, Sir Charles L. Eastlake, Miss Hosmer, Mrs. Stowe, Mr. Sumner, and others, who have expressed themselves in the strongest terms of appreciation of the success of Mr. Jarves. Many of these letters were addressed to Mr. Charles E. Norton, of Cambridge, who was making an effort to secure the collection for Boston, and whose own judgment of their value is given in these words :—

It is several years since I saw the collection, and I have no doubt that its value and importance have been much increased by the additions which Mr. Jarves has made to it ; but even as I knew it, it was a collection of the highest value in this country, as illustrating by well chosen examples the historic development and progress of Italian art. There are few collections in Europe, if we exclude the galleries in the great capitals, which surpass it in this important respect, and very few in which the proportion of valuable and interesting pictures is so great as compared with the whole number. Such a collection would make a truly magnificent foundation for a gallery, and the institution which should acquire it, would have an easy præminence over all other schools of art in America.

ARTICLE XI.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

MURPHY'S COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF EXODUS.*—This volume, as was to be expected, is very similar in character to the Commentary on Genesis by the same author, and will no doubt be followed by others like itself. It is hardly to be hoped that he will stop before he has gone through the Pentateuch at least. The exegetical rules contained in the Introduction to the former volume have been, Dr. Murphy claims, admitted by reviewers to be just, and in one instance pronounced a series of truisms. An extract will serve the double purpose of giving us the key to his method of interpretation, and a specimen of his logic.

"The Bible is the word of God. All the other elements of our fundamental postulate are plain on the surface of things, and therefore unanimously admitted. This, however, some interpreters of the Bible do not accept, at least without reserve. But notwithstanding their rejection of this dogma, such interpreters are bound to respect the claims of this book to be the Word of God. This they can do only by applying to its interpretation such rules as are fairly deducible from such a characteristic. In so doing they put themselves to no disadvantage, they only give the claimant a fair stage, and put its high claims to a reasonable test. Now God is a God of Truth, His word is truth. Hence all Scripture must be consistent with truth and with itself. It contains no real contradiction. This gives rise to the following rules:

All Scripture is true historically and metaphysically, not mythical or fallible," &c. &c.

It is not often that one meets in the field of sober reasoning so perfect a circle described in so small a space. If a believer in the Book of Mormon were to take his stand on the same ground, how would Dr. Murphy dislodge him? Perhaps he would go back to the very reasonable but very inconsistent statement which we find two pages earlier,—“The Bible is written by men. This is admitted on all hands. Hence it is subject to the ordinary rules of interpretation which apply to all human writings; not to rules

* *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Exodus, with a new Translation.* By JAMES G. MURPHY, D. D., T. O. D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1868.

arbitrary in their nature, modern in their invention, or unexampled in the day of the writer." Unfortunately we have not been able to discover any trace of these rules from the beginning to the end of his commentary.

In the history of biblical interpretation there are three clearly marked stages, which we can best observe in the attitude it assumes toward the truths of physical science so far as these have a bearing on the Bible. In the first period the statements of Scripture are received without question, and in their natural sense. Scientific investigation has not yet come in to put the interpreter out of sympathy with the ideas of the writer. To the apprehension of both, the sun rises and sets, and neither finds any difficulty in believing that the world was created in six days. And when the real order of nature is first announced, interpreters of the Bible, apprehensive of the consequences to their faith, are very slow to receive it. Witness the opposition from this quarter to the discoveries of Astronomy in the seventeenth century, and of Geology in our own day. One might have predicted the issue of the latter contest from the results of the former, but the geological theories of the Bible were too closely interwoven with the narrative to be given up without a struggle. But in the end the conclusions of Science are admitted and the interpreter takes up a new ground. Still holding fast to the truth of the Scripture statement, he is bound to harmonize it with the newly admitted truth, and with greater or less straining, according to the necessities of the case, this is accomplished. The error of the old interpreters, it is assumed, lay in understanding the Bible to speak of facts when appearances only were described, or in taking literally what was meant figuratively. This is the position which Dr. Murphy occupies. The opening sentence of the present volume contains his whole argument: "If the one God make a world and a book, it is to be expected that nature and Scripture will agree." And his object is not to ascertain what the Scriptures teach on these subjects,—that he knows already from the teaching of science which he assumes to be one with it,—but simply to put his ideas into the language of Scripture.

For a time the judgment is not satisfied indeed, but quieted by these expedients, but in the end, just as certainly as the truths of physical science, though more slowly, because they appeal to a finer sense, the rights of interpretation assert themselves. That the interpreter should strive at least to enter into the ideas of

the writer and make these the starting point and the guide of his interpretation is so obvious a requirement, that even Dr. Murphy would admit the justice of it, though he makes not the faintest approach to it in practice. And experience proves that this rule, apparently so simple, is the last and most difficult to the learned. To enter fully into the mind of another, living in our own day and educated under the same influences, is an effort of which not every one is capable, and at a distance of thousands of years is well-nigh impossible. But this is the aim which the historical school proposes to itself. The smaller the amount of light to be gained from other sources, the more searching the criticism that must be applied to the Bible itself. The utmost fairness and delicacy of judgment are essential, and above all there must be no fear of the conclusions that may be reached. The practical tendency of Dr. Murphy's teaching is to encourage those who are unable in any particular to reconcile the statement of Scripture with the facts of Science, to reject the Bible altogether.

Constructed on so false a method Dr. Murphy's Commentary would be of little importance, even though it contained vastly more learning than it does. The execution, however, is quite in keeping with the plan, and we shall dismiss it with a word or two. The title of a "critical" commentary, which it assumes, is apparently intended to cover the valuable matter, consisting chiefly of the meanings of some of the more common Hebrew roots and the etymologies of the proper names, which he prefixes to each section. In the translation, since he has substituted *Mizraim* for *Egypt*, why does he persist in retaining *Lord* for *Jahveh* (or *Jehovah* if he prefers), especially in Chap. vi., 2, where it renders the meaning quite unintelligible? We are not sure but the reprint is responsible for the new order of Egyptian priests introduced on page 80. "We have no doubt the *hieroglyphs* of Pharaoh had wit enough to make the experiment."

THE ANTE-NICENE CHRISTIAN LIBRARY.—T. & T. Clark of Edinburgh have published, and Charles Scribner & Co. have for sale, the first four volumes of the series of translations of the Christian Fathers down to A. D. 325. The volumes thus far issued comprise the Apostolic Fathers; Justin Martyr and Athenagoras; Tatian, Theophilus, and the Clementine Recognitions; and a portion of Clement of Alexandria. The publishers propose to issue in this form all the ante-Nicene ecclesiastical writers, with the

possible exception of the less important works of Origen. The volumes are accompanied by brief introductions; but the annotations are few, and relate to questionable points in the rendering of the text. We should have preferred the Clementine Homilies to the Recognitions; as the former is, without doubt, the original work, and the latter is a mutilated and amplified copy. The translations appear to be fairly executed, and the series will prove of great value to theological scholars.

HAGENBACH'S LECTURES ON THE CHURCH HISTORY OF THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES.*—The lectures which bear this title, and have passed through several editions in Germany, form a semi-popular exposition of the history of theological thought in Germany for the last century and a half. They are in a style to which Hagenbach is specially adapted, since they cannot be called superficial, although they are neither profound or exhaustive. The biographical matter which is intermingled, together with the rather full notices of German Literature outside of theology, are very agreeable features of the work, making it an excellent introduction to the study of German authors, even for non-theological readers. At the same time, a minister or theological student who would *sich orientiren*, as the Germans say, in the progress of German speculation and the achievements of German scholarship, may profitably begin with these well written, entertaining, easily understood lectures. We could wish that the entire work were translated, without abridgment, and just as the author wrote it. In the absence of such a complete version, they who do not read the original, must content themselves with the rendering of Messrs. Gage and Stuckenberg, who have reduced the work to about half its primitive size, by leaving out paragraphs, chapters, and sentences, and have given to the product of their labors a new name, much longer than the one chosen by the author, yet not ill-fitted to describe his book in its dwarfed dimensions. The translators, it is right to add, claim the author's permission for the changes they have made in his production. Some may be enticed to read these

* *German Rationalism.* In its rise, progress, and decline. In relation to theologians, scholars, poets, philosophers, and the people. A contribution to the Church History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. By K. R. HAGENBACH, Professor of Theology in the University of Basle. Edited and translated by Rev. WILLIAM L. GAGE and Rev. J. N. W. STUCKENBERG. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1865. New Haven: Judd & White.

lectures in the shorter form, who would be repelled by their greater bulk as they appear in the German.

DR. MAHAN'S NATURAL THEOLOGY.*—This volume is a valuable contribution to the science of Natural Theology in its present aspects and necessities. The existence of a Personal God, who is the intelligent originator and moral ruler of the finite universe, is frequently called in question at the present time by earnest minds, far more frequently perhaps than at any previous period. Many, also, who fully believe in its truth, are at a loss how to reconcile their faith with the principles of their own metaphysical philosophy, or the philosophy which they suppose is most worthy to be trusted. Rational theism seems to be equally incompatible with the systems of Mill and Spencer on the one hand, and those of Hamilton and Mansel on the other.

The writer who would successfully defend Theism against the scepticism and questionings of modern times must necessarily discuss the philosophical principles which lead men to reject or doubt this truth. Of this Dr. Mahan is fully aware, and he has constructed his treatise accordingly—devoting a large portion of it to the discussion of some of the most difficult and the most vexed of the problems that are now agitating the followers of the different philosophical schools. Of these, he attaches chief importance to that which concerns “the validity of the human intelligence as a faculty of world-knowledge.” This was first seriously called in question by Kant, and the discussion of this question involves the examination of some of the fundamental positions of his philosophy, as well as those of Hamilton and Mansel, so far as they agree with Kant. This discussion is able, and often very satisfactory. It is to be regretted that the author is not more simple in his method, clearer in his style, and more direct in his reasonings. Every page of the work gives evidence of these defects. The subjects treated are of themselves so difficult and remote from ready apprehension, as to require that any one who professes to instruct the public should write with the utmost simplicity, clearness, and directness. Dr. Mahan has followed the bad example of Hamil-

* *The Science of Natural Theology*; or, God the unconditioned cause, and God the infinite and perfect as revealed in creation. By REV. ASA MAHAN, D. D., author of *The Science of Logic*, &c., &c. Boston: Henry Hoyt. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

ton, in making a needless parade of principles and scholastic terminology, without Hamilton's uniformly condensed vigor of style and kindling energy of thought. His iterations and reiterations would be suitable enough in a sermon, but are out of place in a philosophical treatise. His digressions retard the progress of his argument far more than they give point to the impression.

We notice that Dr. Mahan follows what we consider a bad usage in the frequent employment of the word *envisage*, not infrequently spelled by him *invisage*, for the German *anschauen*. The word is of recent introduction, Dr. Hickok in this country and Dr. McCosh being two authors of authority who have given it their sanction. But it is bad wholly, being ignoble in its origin and barbarous in its perpetuation. It was first introduced into the English vocabulary by some translator of Kant, who, to say the least, was more familiar with French translations than with German originals, and who obviously employed *envisager*, *envisagement* for the imperfectly understood *anschauen*, *Anschauung*. These words as used by Kant have a precise signification which neither the French equivalents nor their barbarous *oversetments* into English by any means suggest.

Dr. Mahan very justly attaches great importance to the problem which we have referred to, but he is not right in our view in saying that all the questions at issue between Theism and the various forms of Antitheism stand in visible dependence upon the single issue of the validity of the human intelligence as a faculty of world-knowledge. The relation of purpose or final cause, in our view, is an issue of as great if not of greater importance. This is not overlooked entirely by Dr. Mahan, but it is by no means placed in the relief which it deserves. There are very many who have no sort of trouble in respect to the validity of the human intelligence as a faculty of world-knowledge, but who are entirely incredulous as to the existence of anything besides "hard matter." The number of devotees of the positive philosophy is as great as is that of the idealists. There is many a man who is quite ready to believe that his own faculties are valid in their affirmation of the reality of the world, who is by no means ready to assent to the proposition that the world is designed by a personal spirit. Dr. Mahan thinks that there can be no difficulty to any mind in respect to this point. It is true there ought not to be, but there is. Moreover, we believe that so far as any previous false or defective philosophy is responsible for Atheistic tendencies, it is the philosophy

that denies the relation of purpose, and limits all knowledge to the recognition of the actual and positive. Dr. Mahan's treatise would have been more complete had he given greater attention to the untenableness of this form of Atheistic philosophy.

PROFESSOR BARROWS ON THE EVIDENCES OF REVELATION.*—The American Tract Society of New York have lately issued several books of unusual value. We are glad to notice, among their publications, biographical and historical works of a popular cast.—as the "Life and Times of Martin Luther," the "History of the Huguenots," the "Life and Times of John Milton." These last we have not particularly examined, but from a short inspection of them, we should judge them to be well prepared. We have especially in mind the brief treatise of Tischendorf—"When were our Gospels written"—of which the Tract Society has published a translation; and the first part of Professor Barrows's "Companion to the Bible," comprising a survey of the historical evidences of Revelation. This little treatise of 139 pages is concisely yet plainly written, is marked by accuracy of statement, and by candor and cogency in reasoning; and it may be read with profit by the educated preacher as well as by any layman of ordinary intelligence. In its thirteen chapters, the genuineness of the Gospel narratives, their uncorrupt preservation, their authenticity and credibility, the origin of the Acts and the Epistles, the Canon and Inspiration, the authorship and credibility of the Pentateuch, and of the remaining books of the Old Testament, together with the internal proof of the supernatural origin of the Gospel, are dispassionately considered. We do not agree on all points with the learned author. The space given to the discussion of the Old Testament books hardly suffices for the satisfactory treatment of a theme in some respects so difficult. But, as a whole, we know not where to find, in so short a compass, so valuable a presentation of that department of the Evidences which the author more particularly considers. Professor Barrows is both a clear thinker and an erudite scholar.

The two American Tract Societies, if they are to exist in separation, should vie with one another in the effort to circulate books of sterling merit. The tracts of Tischendorf and Barrows are of this

* *Companion to the Bible. Part I. Evidences of Revealed Religion.* By Rev. E. P. BARROWS, D. D., Professor of Biblical Theology. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York.

character. The more recent publications of the Boston Society on kindred subjects—translations of foreign works—are decidedly inferior to them. The utterances of the Geneva School, or of any other extreme school, on the subject of the Canon and Inspiration, are quite open to criticism, and hardly deserve to be sent forth under the patronage of a charitable society.

REASON AND REVELATION, FROM A ROMAN CATHOLIC POINT OF VIEW.*—It is gratifying to be able to record the appearance of various Roman Catholic publications which treat of Protestantism in a courteous tone, and show a disposition to substitute argument for invective. The *Catholic World*, a monthly journal, has printed several essays of this character. We have to complain, to be sure—as in the case of an article on “Justification,” in the last number—that essential features of the Roman doctrine are passed over in silence, and justice is not done to the strength of the Protestant positions. But the tone of this and other essays is to be commended. For ourselves, we welcome argument and investigation on the great points of separation between the two theologies. Let them be canvassed thoroughly in the light of Scripture and Ecclesiastical History, and we have no fear for the result. The author of the “Lectures,” the title of which is given below, makes frequent profession of fairness. “Here we shall endeavor to reason with the utmost candor,” &c., &c. His book, indeed, is repetitious, and might be compressed into half its present bulk without any loss. He means to write in a popular style, but the schoolman betrays himself, not unfrequently, in the choice of phrases not intelligible to general readers. “The order of fact,” and “the order of being,” (p. 71), are terms not familiar to the unlearned. “The will is *prevented* and assisted by Divine grace;” “the *formal* motive of faith,”—are theological phrases to which most readers need a key. Mr. Preston sincerely thinks that he is constructing a solid argument for the claims of his Church. He concedes that reason has its rights; that the fact of revelation must be established on grounds satisfactory to reason. He often reiterates these statements, although to all Protestants they are common-places. The fact of revelation once made out, the

* *Lectures on Reason and Revelation*, delivered in St. Ann's Church, New York, during the season of Advent, 1867. By the Rev. THOMAS S. PRESTON. New York: The Catholic Publication House, 126 Nassau Street. 1868. 12mo.

contents of it must be received with unquestioning faith, as the testimony of God. He makes miracles and prophecy—and prophecy fulfilled is a form of miracle—the one proof of Revelation, and represents the truths of “the supernatural order” in such a light as to leave no room for what we call the “internal argument” for revelation. This we deem to be a mistake; and it is a mistake to which the author does not consistently adhere, for he speaks of the intrinsic adaptation of these truths to the necessities of the soul. He affirms (p. 158) that “when the first teachers of a revelation have thus, by signs and wonders which Divine power alone can work, proved the supernatural character of their doctrines, there is evidence to convince all to whom their words may be addressed.” But how, he asks, shall the revelation be preserved and handed down? “We can conceive,” he replies, “of no other way than that of a succession of teachers who shall receive the sacred trust intact, and be able to impart it to others.” He supposes the revelation made and set down in the Bible. Well, why shall not the revelation be preserved by a providential preservation of the *Bible*? But how shall we know, he inquires, what belongs to the Bible? We answer, by historical evidence—the same sort of evidence by which we know what orations are Cicero’s, and what are not. What better evidence do we seek? But, adds our author, how shall we know how to interpret it? Why, just as we know how to interpret the decrees of Popes and Councils? Is not the Bible as easy to understand as these decrees are? Then Mr. Preston gravely proceeds to prove that the Catholic Church is constituted the infallible expounder and teacher of of Scripture. How does he try to prove this? Why, by an appeal to Scripture. This is the old circle which Chillingworth and a thousand others have exposed. We can’t interpret Scripture without the authority of the Church; and we must interpret Scripture before we can get at this pretended authority. It is a bad situation to be in. Mr. Preston assumes, throughout his discussion, that Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church are one and inseparable; that the promises of Christ to his people are made to that visible Corporation of which the Pope is the head. It is astonishing that he can convince his own mind by so flimsy reasoning. Yet his book contains some good thoughts, and, as we have said, is generally civil in its tone. We judge that he is one who will sympathize with Dr. Döllinger (“Church and Churches,” p. 16), in the hope that the time will come when “the

personal character of Luther and the Reformers will be no more dragged forward in the pulpit," and when the Catholic clergy will make "the great truths of salvation the centre of all their teaching."

PRAYERS FROM PLYMOUTH PULPIT.*—Plymouth Church is as remarkable, to the minds of the attendants, for the prayers as for the preaching of its celebrated pastor. The history of this collection is itself interesting. One of his hearers and friends procured the reports, at his own expense and for his own pleasure, without the pastor's knowledge. After keeping them awhile, getting Mr. Beecher's consent, he has compiled this volume, giving the principal prayer, with a designation of its leading themes, and also the opening invocation and brief closing prayer, of the ordinary Sunday services, and adding prayers on special public occasions. They are entirely characteristic of the gifted author. His tenderness of feeling, rich imaginativeness, and simplicity of style (this last quality distinguishing all his productions, more than is generally noted), are as marked in these printed prayers as in his printed sermons, while (as it seems to us) still more effect is added by his manner, or more particularly his voice. They cannot fail, upon acquaintance, to interest devout readers generally, and may aid private devotions and family worship. If it should be claimed that they are examples or models for ministers generally in the conduct of public worship, we dissent. Certainly they are favorable examples of one kind of prayer, which may be either private or public, which strongly expresses the individuality (it may be the idiosyncrasy) of the petitioner, and for its effect depends largely on his genius as well as his piety. Mr. Beecher is the man to move others, as well as to be moved himself, no less in this exercise than in popular address. But there are few such men, and his imitators are not such. There is another kind of public prayer, which is described in the phrase "Common Prayer," as being the utterance of the assembled worshippers in common, the voice of their convictions, wants, and experience, the minister not so much speaking for himself as representing them before God. We hold that public worship ought to be chiefly of this character—though not to the exclusion of the other kind,—and, with few exceptions, ministers can carry out

* *Prayers from Plymouth Pulpit.* By H. W. BEECHER. Phonographically Reported. New York: Scribner & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 322.

this conception more profitably than the other. But as far as Mr. Beecher is concerned, none who have heard him will question the interest and effectiveness of his public devotional services. This book, moreover, is handsomely brought out.

Along with what are lamented as the "bad signs" in our times, even croakers must acknowledge something like an indication of good, that within a few years past not only the printing of sermons, volume after volume, has greatly increased, showing that they are more "popular reading" than used to be supposed, but collections of hymns and other sacred poems have been multiplied, and now also collections of prayers are published, as likely to interest a sufficient number of readers to warrant the expenditure.

PRAYERS OF THE AGES.*—Besides the "Prayers from Plymouth Pulpit," which have been just noticed, we have the beautiful volume entitled "Prayers of the Ages." The matter is distributed in fifteen parts, according to its sources, subjects, and forms, beginning with examples of heathen and Mohammedan prayers, some of which may edify even Christian suppliants; then grouping together some excellent "Opinions and instructions concerning prayer;" and occupying the bulk of the volume with prayers on a great variety of subjects and occasions, chosen from Christian authors of different ages, countries, and creeds, including some of doubtful or scanty creeds, who yet appear to greater advantage in their prayers than in their controversies. The conception of the work is certainly happy, and, as far as we have been able to examine, happily executed. We expect much pleasure and profit from reading it all deliberately, stage by stage—indeed devotionally—as such matter merits. It cannot fail to be a desirable selection for a Christian gift.

ADDITIONS TO OUR HYMNOLGY.—Whatever may be said of poetry in general at this day, certainly a lively interest is shown in English Hymnology. Collections and selections are multiplied both for private and public use, and the old stores are enlarged and enriched. It is Dr. Ray Palmer's privilege to have composed one of the few hymns that appeal to, and will ascend from devout souls everywhere and always, in their solitude and in their assemblies.

* *Prayers of the Ages.* Compiled by CAROLINE S. WHITMARSH. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 12mo. pp. 385.

The place given him by "My faith looks up to Thee," in Christian memories, might well content him. A few other pieces from his pen, though inferior to this, have found, and will keep a place in modern collections for public worship. Besides the volume which he published some time ago, we have now "*Hymns of my Holy Hours*,"* twenty-one in number, with twelve "Additional Pieces." They are full of fervent and tender evangelic sentiment, and besides good versification have the merit of that simplicity of structure which is so necessary for lyric use, and yet is so often wanting in the hymns attempted by more brilliant writers. Among all the pieces in this volume, we have been most impressed by the "Chorus of all Saints." Besides higher merits, the beauty of the mechanical execution will render the book the more acceptable at this season.

While eagerly appropriating new hymns of superior merit, it is well that the public mind recurs, with devout interest, to the best of the ancient Latin hymns, as known through repeated translations. "*The Hymn of Hildebert, and other Mediæval Hymns*,"† with Mr. Benedict's translations, about twenty pieces in all, the Latin and the English on opposite pages, with notices of their reputed authors, is a volume similar in externals to Dr. Palmer's, and full of interest to thoughtful Christian readers. The earnest, ingenious, and often gifted old authors deserve to live again in this attractive form. The "*Dies Iræ*," "*Stabat Mater*," and other Latin hymns here brought together, are constantly stimulating modern translators to new trials of their skill. Mr. Benedict has evidently wrought with patient love and care in this field. The work is ever difficult, and the translator is more sensible than his readers of the imperfections that must attend his execution, especially when a close imitation of the form of the original is attempted; yet the labor well rewards both them and him. The glory of those strains, borne down to us from old monastic cells, is their sweet, tender, adoring loyalty to Christ. The minds of the writers are saturated with the great evangelical facts. Such compositions belong truly to the church universal. Intelligent readers of every denomination, procuring this volume, will thank us for recommending it.

* *Hymns of my Holy Hours, and other Pieces.* By RAY PALMER. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1867. 12mo. pp. 108.

† *The Hymn of Hildebert, and other Mediæval Hymns, with translations.* By ERASTUS C. BENEDICT. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1867. 12mo. pp. 128.

"*The Heavenly Land*,"* from a longer poem of Bernard De Morlaix, Monk of Cluny, is an example of a single hymn, of the twelfth century, celebrated for the qualities we have ascribed to the class, translated by Mr. Duffield, with an introduction bearing loving testimony to the character of the poem and the author, and to the merits of other translators. The Latin original, which is printed over against the English version, is indeed a curiosity in its structure. Only the numerous and easy rhymes afforded by that language (which might have made the older classic poets recoil from rhyme altogether, through fear of excessive jingling) could tempt or enable the devout and laborious monk to undertake such a composition. "Each line consists of a first part composed of two dactyls, a second part containing two more dactyls, and a third part made up of a dactyl and a trochee. The last dactyls of the first and second parts rhyme together, and the lines are in couplets—the final trochees also rhyming" All this is imitated in the translation, line for line, foot for foot, rhyme for rhyme. The structure may be well represented to the mere English reader by two lines from the translation:—

"Land of delightfulness, safe from all spitefulness, safe from all trouble,
Thou shalt be filled again, Israel built again, joy shall redouble."

We confess that we like the courage of the translator in attempting such a version through some two hundred and eighteen lines, and the result shows much ingenuity as well as loving labor. It gives the reader the pleasure of seeing great difficulties manfully encountered, and often, to a great extent, successfully. Yet, even in the original Latin the higher merit of the poem must suffer from the fetters of such verse, and much more in the translation. We do not believe that an English version can be constructed, under these conditions, which shall be in itself, as a poem, satisfactory or pleasing. Mr. Duffield, failing to the English eye and ear, has only failed in attempting the impossible. We readily noticed, however, one instance in which the force of contrast in the original seems to have been lost sight of, the significance of the word *reus*, in the eighth line, not appearing in the translation. The in-

* *The Heavenly Land*: from the *De Contemptu Mundi* of Bernard De Morlaix, Monk of Cluny (Twelfth Century), rendered into corresponding English verse. By SAMUEL W. DUFFIELD. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1867. 12mo. pp. 19.

terest of this beautiful volume, is enhanced by a Latin version, at the end, of the famous English hymn, "Just as I am."

Yet another is added to the many collections now offered to the Churches for use in public worship. "*The Church Hymn Book*"* is without other title, without preface, or compiler's name, or any other auspices than those of the publishers in New York and at the West. It contains seven hundred and ten hymns, with one hundred and fifty-seven tunes placed together after them, and only on the right hand page, for convenience in use. In both departments, as far as we observe, the standard compositions, new and old, are meant to be included, with due provision for special occasions. Ample indexes are added. We reckon it certainly a mistake, however, to put the Doxologies immediately after the hymns on the Trinity, instead of at the end, where they can be always most readily found.

All readers of sacred poetry will be glad to see another issue of the "*Hymns of the Church Militant*," which has already established for itself a place in that Christian use for which it was designed. It needs no new commendation.

The same may be said of Roundell Palmer's "*Book of Praise*." This edition, however, contains thirty-four additional hymns. The collection has obtained the more notice from the high position of the compiler in civil life. That amidst his professional labors he attempted such a work, signified his devout and amiable spirit, and the preface and the selections show his cultivation and judgment. The brief notes contain much curious information about old hymns. We are glad to see that this edition accredits Dr. Palmer, as the first did not, with "My Faith looks up to Thee." And in general much care has been taken to make the text of these choice hymns correct.

THE COMEDY OF CONVOCATION IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH.†—The Pan-Anglican Council has called out much comment, grave and gay. The full attendance of American and Colonial bishops, compared with that of the home bishops, reminded the London Times of the fact that persons whose social status is uncertain always

* *The Church Hymn Book*. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. Burlington, Iowa: J. J. Brown. Chicago: Root & Cady. 1867. 12mo. pp. 284.

† *The Comedy of Convocation in the English Church*; in two scenes. Edited by Archdeacon CHASUBLE, D. D. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 126 Nassau street. 1868.

accept invitations. The small result of an assembly thus composed and convened—the only utterance of a dogmatic nature being a condemnation of poor Bishop Colenso and of the worship of the Virgin—hardly corresponded to such a parturition of the mountains. One of the leading English Journals entitles the Pastoral Letter a Parody on the Epistles of Paul. Here we have from the Roman Catholic side—it is said, from the pen of Dr. Newman—"The Comedy of Convocation," consisting of imaginary debates between Dr. Easy, Archdeacon Jolly, Dean Critical, Rev. Lavender Kidd, and various other personages, on the doctrines and Constitution of the Church of England. There is much logical *finesse* in the pamphlet, of which a specimen is given in the attempt at the outset to show it to be the duty of every member of the Anglican body to doubt its teaching on every point except that of its own fallibility. The writer is familiar with parties in that Church, and with all the various aspects of the controversy between it and Rome. But he is too much in earnest to jest well. A tinge of bitterness mars seriously his attempts at mirth; and his book, for a comedy, is much too long. We commend it, however, to all Roman Anglicans as a wholesome correction of mistaken ideas and aspirations.

BARNUM'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE*—We have before us the first eleven parts of this work, which the editor has had in course of preparation for more than two years. Each part consists of forty-eight pages, and all together comprehend that portion of the Dictionary which extends from the letter A to L. As many parts are still to be published in the course of the next six or eight months, when the whole will appear in one large octavo volume. For the convenience of purchasers, however, the different sections are issued semi-monthly, and thus are placed in the reader's hands as soon as they are printed. The book, as indicated on the title-page, is mainly an abridgment of

* *A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible*, mainly abridged from Dr WILLIAM SMITH'S Dictionary of the Bible, but comprising important additions and improvements from the works of Robinson, Gesenius, Fürst, Pape, Kell, Pott, Winer, Lange, Kitto, Fairbairn, Alexander, Barnes, Bush, Thomson, Stanley, Ayre, and many other eminent scholars, commentators, travelers and authors in various departments. Edited by Rev. SAMUEL W. BARNUM. Illustrated with five hundred maps and engravings. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 1 vol. 8vo.

the larger edition of Dr. William Smith's Biblical Dictionary, and is designed for the use of those persons who feel the need of a help of this kind in their reading and study of the Bible, and who yet find themselves unable to purchase the larger work. But, at the same time, many additions have been made from the writings of distinguished scholars both of this and other lands, and a number of original articles of greater or less length have been inserted by the editor himself. As an abridgment, the work seems to us to be very well and thoroughly done—the most useful part of the original to the general reader having been retained, and the results of the whole concisely presented. If we are rightly informed, a portion of it was accomplished before the appearance of Dr. Smith's own abridged volume in England, and, consequently, in entire independence of that volume; but it is equally good throughout, and the striking similarity of the two in the manner of condensing many articles, may be regarded rather as an additional evidence of the carefulness and wisdom of each of them, than of any servile imitation on the part of the later edition. Mr. Barnum, however, has not contented himself with a mere condensation of the three volumes into one. He has examined the original work everywhere with that minute accuracy which is so well known by his friends to be characteristic of him, and has exhibited everywhere in the new volume the results of his investigations. The careful reader only of both Dictionaries will become aware of all the additions, larger and smaller, which he has made, or be prepared to appreciate fully the extent of the labor which he has bestowed, in his endeavor to realize his idea of a more perfect work. Very numerous additions have been made to the maps and pictorial illustrations of the English edition, and, as we think, with much good judgment. The editor has evidently taken great pains in this department, selecting the best illustrations from the best sources at command. He has, in this way, presented to the eye, in many cases, such a view of the place or object referred to as to aid the mind in gaining a clear apprehension of that which the text contains, and, in this regard, all who give the volume even a hasty examination must acknowledge its excellence. Of the original articles by Mr. Barnum, by far the larger number are very brief—many are simply a reference of some word omitted in Dr. Smith's work to an article on some kindred or explanatory word where its signification is set forth. But a considerable part even of these shorter ones will not be re-

garded as out of place by those who use the book, while, if any might easily have been omitted, they are so concisely given and occupy so brief a space that their presence will not be regretted. On the other hand, a few important articles have been newly inserted or rewritten. The one of greatest length, which we have discovered, is that on Inspiration, in which the editor gives a brief summary of the different classes of views, and then, declaring his assent to the dynamical theory—"that inspiration, without impairing the free use of each writer's own natural powers, so moulded his views in regard to the subject-matter to be communicated to men, and, when necessary, in regard to the very language to be used by him, as to secure the communication in the Scriptures of that, and that only, which, properly interpreted, is truth"—develops concisely the arguments by which he conceives this theory, as distinguished from and opposed to the others, to be supported. Other articles on the words "Eternal," "Faith," &c., present a careful list of different passages where these words occur, and an explanation of the Greek and Hebrew words which they are employed to translate in those different passages. The editor has endeavored, as he says, "to make everything intelligible to those who understand only English, and to place them as nearly as possible on a level with the scholars who are familiar with the original languages of the Scriptures;" and to all such persons, and, indeed, to all that great class, both ministers and others, who regard the original work as too large or too expensive for their use we heartily commend this excellent volume.

SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.—The VIIth part of the American (unabridged) Edition of Smith's Bible Dictionary has just been issued. The work will be much improved by the labors of Professor Hackett and Mr. Abbot. Their edition will be of much greater value than the English edition, and will probably long remain the best dictionary of the Bible in our language.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

FROUDE'S ESSAYS.*—On page 108 of this volume occurs the following sentence: "It is characteristic of Erasmus that, like

* *Short Studies on Great Subjects.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A., Late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

many highly-gifted men, but unlike all theologians, he expressed a hope for sudden death, and declared it to be one of the greatest blessings which a human creature can receive." "Unlike all theologians!" It might be suggested that Erasmus himself was quite as much a theologian as he was anything else. Luther, one of Froude's heroes, is generally considered a theologian. He would certainly have little fancy for Mr. Froude's contempt for all abstract or accurate statements of religious truth. These flings at theology and theologians which abound in Mr. Froude's writings contain a touch of flippancy which is rather characteristic of him as an author, notwithstanding his unquestionable merits. When he attempts to paraphrase Luther's doctrine of faith, he makes a sorry show of acumen. "It amounts to this," he tells us, "that between truth and lies there is an infinite difference; one is of God, the other of Satan; one is eternally to be loved, the other eternally to be abhorred. It cannot say why, in language intelligible to reason." These sounding phrases remind us of Carlyle as he was in former days. They are about as far from being a description of Luther's doctrine of faith as they well can be. If Mr. Froude does not believe in the reality of sin against God, of condemnation under the law, and of gratuitous forgiveness through Christ, in the simple, accepted meaning of these words, he has only a superficial sympathy with Luther. The Reformer would have demolished the modern essayist by words as telling as those which the latter quotes from him against Erasmus. The article, of which we are speaking, is, however, on the whole, well written. It presents a graphic picture of Erasmus and Luther in their mutual relations and their diverse influence on the world. In the *Essay on Criticism and the Gospel History*, it would, perhaps, not be unjust to say, that the author wades beyond his depth. He tells us that Irenæus had persuaded himself that there are four, and only four, Evangelists, because there were four winds or spirits, and four divisions of the earth, &c. He half takes back the assertion, but still thinks that such reasoning shows "the difficulty of deciding at our present distance from them [the Fathers] how far their conclusions were satisfactory." The character of this reasoning of Irenæus confirms, instead of weakening, his testimony to the genuineness of the Gospels. He speaks as a witness, giving his sources of information; and his fanciful analogies only show how well established was the authority of the documents in question. It would be easy to show how many other statements in

this Essay are fitted to mislead. They betray an imperfect appreciation of the nature of the proof on which our belief in the authenticity of the Gospels rests. Besides the two discussions to which we have adverted, the book contains about fifteen other essays. They all have the merit of being readable. Froude is never dull, whatever other faults he may have. He is diligent in his historical researches, as well as remarkably skillful in his grouping and description. Were it not for a few weaknesses, among which we reckon a rather puerile horror of positive doctrines in religion, and an ambiguous attitude in reference to Revelation, he would stand in the very front rank of historians.

THE LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING.*—Timothy Pickering, or, as he was once more commonly called in familiar parlance, Tim Pickering, was a conspicuous public character in the old days of Federalism. His expulsion from the cabinet of the elder Adams was a part of that great schism among the Federalists which ensured their destruction as a party. Afterwards he was one of the main pillars of the Anti-Adams section of the party in New England, and a leading standard-bearer of Federalism in Congress at the time of our second war with Great Britain. The present volume—the first of a promised series, brings his life down about three years after the close of the revolution.

Colonel Pickering was born in Salem in 1745, was graduated at Harvard College in 1763, studied law, and was admitted to the bar in 1768. He took an active part in the patriotic movements which preceded the armed resistance to Great Britain. When the king's troops marched out to Lexington, he marched with his regiment to encounter them, and was blamed—unjustly, as his biographer proves—for not bringing his men into action. He joined the army of the revolution, became Adjutant-General, then a member of the board of war, and at last Quartermaster-General, in place of General Greene. He was present in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, and at the surrender of Cornwallis. In the bitter controversy about the Cunningham correspondence in the latter part of Colonel Pickering's life, he was charged with making disparaging observations respecting Washington. He virtually confesses, as we remember, in his pamphlet, that he had not

* *The Life of Timothy Pickering.* By his son, OCTAVIUS PICKERING. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

entertained so high an opinion as some, of Washington's intellectual powers. His biographer speaks of "a hardness towards Washington, which occasionally betrays itself in his letters" (page 481), and thinks he may have been displeased with that praise bestowed on Washington's military abilities, which he thought excessive. He took part in drawing up the response to Washington's farewell address to his officers, and was careful to conform the phraseology to his own estimate of the General's merit. This "hardness," however it may testify to Col. Pickering's independence, is hardly creditable to his head or his heart. Of his qualities of mind and character, however, we abstain from speaking until subsequent volumes of the memoir shall provide us with additional materials for forming a judgment. We are not aware that either his integrity or firmness was ever called in question. This first volume is printed on good paper, in large and clear type. In these points nothing better could be desired.

THE QUEENS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY.*—In selecting particular individuals as specially worthy of notice, from among the great number of true "social queens" which our country has known, Mrs. Ellett has undertaken a difficult and delicate task; and we think that she has needlessly enhanced its embarrassments by including the names of living personages in her record. Of course in a work of this kind we are constantly surprised, and in some degree dissatisfied, both by the inclusions and the omissions—yet perhaps, considering the nature of the compilation, and its inherent difficulties, the selection is, on the whole, as good as could be expected. The book is made up of sketches, full and meager, interesting and uninteresting, yet always lively and pleasant of many ladies of the past and present generations who have been distinguished figures in American social circles, and especially in those of Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Many of these, as Mrs. Hancock, Mrs. Jay, Mrs. Knox, Mrs. Adams, and Mrs. Madison are already well known as historical personages. Others have no less interest on account of the influence they are shown to have exercised by their brilliant qualities in social life; and others still, hardly less distinguished as leaders in society, impress themselves still deeper in the memory by their beautiful lives,

* *The Queens of American Society.* By MRS. ELLETT. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 8vo. pp. 464. New Haven: Judd & White.

and acts of benevolence and self-sacrifice. The records of such as these are worth all the rest, and the snobbish trash occasionally found in Mrs. Ellett's pages is amply redeemed by her feeling tributes to such women as Mrs. Van Ness, Mrs. Harrison Gray Otis, and Mrs. James W. White.

Mrs. Ellett, in her descriptions of personal beauty, does not spare adjectives, and the words "extraordinary," "dazzling," "wonderful," "indescribable," &c., &c., might possibly left a decided impression on the mind had they not been unfortunately accompanied, in several cases, by steel portraits. It is to be presumed that the originals are not flattered by these "counterfeit presentments," yet nothing is more certain than that while very handsome and lovely women are frequently to be met, "dazzling" female beauty is one of the rarest of phenomena.

The following incident in the life of Mrs. John Hancock, narrated by Mrs. Ellett, we think has not been before published:—

"While the French fleet was in Boston Harbor, Count d'Estaing and some other persons of rank, with their life-guards, visited the Governor. Hancock sent a note to the Admiral of the fleet, inviting him to breakfast, with thirty of his officers. The Admiral accepted the invitation, but sent a request to the Governor to permit him the pleasure of bringing all his officers, including the midshipmen. This request was granted, but not without some solicitude as to the possibility of accommodating three hundred officers and providing for their entertainment. In those days, there were not the facilities of confectioners, and other resources of the present time. It was summer, and carts and wagons were pressed into the service to bring from the surrounding country the various fruits of the season.

"It was found that milk sufficient for the demand could not be obtained, even from the whole vicinity of Boston. Boston common was at that time used as a place of pasturage for cows; and Mrs. Hancock, in her dilemma, requested the life-guards and the servants of the family to take pitchers, mugs, and bowls, and to milk all the cows on the common. If any persons interfered, they were to be sent to her for explanation. This novel proceeding made a laughable exhibition to the public, but it was a success, and offended no one.

"Eleven o'clock was the hour for breakfast. At the appointed time, the officers were seen entering the farthest end of the Common, in front of the Governor's house. Mrs. Hancock often in after life described that scene; and, though naturally very calm and tranquil in manner, when speaking of that day she always showed great animation, seeming to feel again the fire and excitement of the scene. She said the sun shone brightly on the gold lace that elaborately adorned the French officers; and, in their march to the house, the brilliant display exceeded anything she ever saw before or afterwards of military parade. The Admiral soon after returned the compliment by giving a grand dinner on board his ship to the Governor and his wife. Mrs. Hancock occupied the seat of honor, and at her right hand was a large rosette of ribbon, attached by a strong rope to something under the table. This mysterious apparatus caused her no

small curiosity. At the moment when the toasts were to be given, the Admiral's aid, who sat next her, requested that she would draw up the ribbons. She obeyed, and in doing so she fired the signal gun, which in an instant was answered by every vessel in the fleet. This was a distinguished honor paid her, in return for the attention shown to the Admiral and his officers.

MISSIONARY PATRIOTS.*—Mr. Tarbox's "*Missionary Patriots*" is a loving record of the life and character of two brothers, whose names deserve to be long remembered. The elder was most highly esteemed by his classmates and instructors for his clear and solid understanding, his manly and open disposition, and his sweet Christian temper. He was a person of rare promise. Few young men acquit themselves better in their college career; but the work which he accomplished there was so modest and unpretending, that the development of the ten or twenty years following was required to fulfill the promise which his achievements betokened. Had he been spared in life, and had he chosen an ambitious career, he would have gained distinguished eminence. But it was reserved for him to follow the course of duty with simple and severe obedience in a series of self-denying acts and sacrifices, such as are appointed to but few, and to obey the call with a cheerfulness which fewer still exhibit. The spirit with which this American, born in Broosa, gave himself to his country's service, because he was drafted, just at the moment when his life was first ceasing to be a struggle and a sacrifice, can scarcely be appreciated except by those who knew the circumstances and knew the man. The account given by Mr. Tarbox is perhaps as full as it was proper to give; but the strength of his resolution and the singleness of his views of duty, can only be adequately estimated by those who knew the earnest solicitations and the strong dissuasions from friends whom he loved and esteemed, against which he formed his heroic resolve. The memoir by Mr. Tarbox is excellent in its matter and style. We only wish that he had used all his materials, and produced a narrative fitted for young men in a course of higher education.

The story of the younger brother is a contrast to that of the elder in many particulars, but is singularly fascinating and sad. Who shall say that two such youths were not a brighter crown than is given to many Christian parents?

* *Missionary Patriots*. Memoirs of James H. Schneider and Edward M. Schneider. By INCREASE N. TARBOX. Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath School Society. 1867. New Haven: F. T. Jarman.

ORIGIN OF MORMONISM.*—In this book Mr. Tucker has given, in a style somewhat obstructed by the use of long words, but otherwise simple and interesting, a needed and apparently authentic account of Mormonism in its earlier history. The author says in his preface: "In claiming for the statements herein set forth the character of fairness and authenticity, it is perhaps appropriate to add in this connection, that the locality of the malversations resulting in the Mormon scheme is the author's birthplace; that he was well acquainted with 'Joe Smith,' the first Mormon prophet, and with his father and all the Smith family, since their removal to Palmyra from Vermont in 1816, and during their continuance there and in the adjoining town of Manchester; that he was equally acquainted with Martin Harris and Oliver Cowdry, and with most of the earlier followers of Smith, either as money-diggers or Mormons; that he established at Palmyra, in 1813, and was for many years editor and proprietor of the *Wayne Sentinel*, and was editorially connected with that paper at the printing by its press of the original edition of the 'Book of Mormon' in 1830."

By the timely publication of this work, from a source so well informed, many important facts respecting the origin and the founders of Mormonism, which might otherwise have been lost, have been placed beyond the chance of oblivion or falsification. Joe Smith is shown to have been no shrewd, far-seeing architect of a great system, as he is sometimes imagined, but one of those low-minded, ignorant, and shiftless creatures who are to be found in every village, with a reputation chiefly for unbounded lying and the cunning which not unfrequently accompanies that trait. Being too indolent to obtain a living by the usual means of labor, he followed the profession of stealing, lying, and fortune-telling for a subsistence. The accidental discovery of a curiously shaped stone in digging a well, which he obtained possession of and pretended to consult in his divinations, led him gradually to enlarge the scope of his pretended revelations; and abler and bolder coöperators coming to his assistance, the number of his ignorant believers was gradually increased, until the new faith obtained a foothold from which it has spread to its present dimensions. The Book of Mormon appears, from the extracts given, to have been more des-

* *Origin, Rise, and Progress of Mormonism.* Biography of its Founders and History of its Church. Personal reminiscences and historical collections hitherto unwritten. By POMEROY TUCKER, Palmyra, N. Y. New York: D. Appleton & Co. New Haven: H. H. Peck.

picable as a literary production than its history had led us to suspect, and completely vindicates itself from any suspicion of having advanced the delusion by its intellectual influence. Altogether, Mr. Tucker's book is a valuable contribution to the history of our times, and renders essential aid in the study of this strange delusion, whose growth, while it astonishes and humiliates, seems likely to prove to have been of very great importance in the history of our country.

BELLES LETTRES.

LESSING'S "*NATHAN THE WISE*."*—The publishers of this neat volume are doing a good work for American culture. By a series of careful translations they are bringing some of the most noted foreign poems within the reach of readers who lack the leisure or the inclination to study them out in the original languages. There are probably few, even among American scholars, to whom the first two volumes of this collection, the graceful legend of "*King René's Daughter*," and the wild "*Saga of Frithiof*," are not easier reading in the versions of Martin and Blackley than in their native Danish and Swedish. And the little volume of Selections from the *Kalevala*, the national epic of Finland, translated by the late Professor John A. Porter, and already on the booksellers' tables, as the fourth in this series, will probably give to many readers their first intimation that Finland *has* a national epic. It is to be hoped that the publishers will find sufficient inducement to bring forward the other volumes already promised, for we doubt if a series of translations has ever been undertaken in this country, covering so vast a field, chosen with so much judgment, and carried out with so great care.

To include in it a poem like "*Nathan the Wise*" was a somewhat hazardous adventure, for it holds so high a place in German literature, is so well known to German scholars, and derives so much of its interest from its style, that one would hardly expect any translation to be satisfactory. Previous attempts confirm this expectation; for the piece has already been three times rendered into English, by Raspe in 1781, by Taylor in 1791, and in

* *Nathan the Wise*: a Dramatic Poem. By GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING. Translated by Ellen Frothingham. Preceded by a brief account of the Poet and his works, and followed by an Essay on the Poem by Kuno Fischer. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868.

1860 by Dr. Adolphus Reich. Of these the two former are little known, and the third may be judged by the following verses, which are no unfair specimen of the style of the translator:—

. "I ask, does lie the proverb:
That monk and woman,—that the woman and
The monk are the two clutches of the Devil?"

and by this stage direction:

"During the silent repetition of reciprocal embraces, the curtain drops."

Miss Frothingham would not thank us for saying that her version contains no such jargon as this, for it deserves much higher praise. We have no hesitation in pronouncing it not only the best English version of Lessing, but one of the best translations in the language. It was prepared with great care, submitted to the examination of accomplished German scholars, and after their criticisms and suggestions had been carefully weighed, wholly rewritten from beginning to end. It is surprisingly literal; indeed, the only blemishes which we have found in it, come from an occasional too close adherence to the German forms of expression. Yet this happens rarely, and the poem has but a slight foreign accent. To one who is familiar with the diffuseness of most translations, it will seem no slight praise to say that this one, without the omission, so far as we have observed, of a single important phrase, contains twenty per cent. fewer lines than the original. To be more terse than Lessing is to waste no words; but Miss Frothingham's verse has an ease and naturalness which is not infrequently wanting in that which she was reproducing. Her translation is not a mere verbal rendering, for it gives us the spirit as well as the words of the author. Through her work, the great German, who drew many of his best inspirations from English literature, talks to us now in our own language as easily as if he had passed his life within sight of Boston Common.

It is not much to our credit that, until recently, American students have been restricted, for their knowledge of so great a man as Lessing, to the translations which we have named, and to the encyclopædias. The French have no less than six versions of "Nathan the Wise;" it has been published in Danish, Swedish, and Dutch; it was represented in 1842 at Constantinople, in Modern Greek; and a Polish translation has recently appeared. The past year has contributed somewhat toward supplying our deficiencies in this respect, for it has given us Professor Evans's

translation of Stahr's "Life of Lessing," and Professor Lowell's entertaining Article on it, in the April number of the *North American Review*. Messrs. Leypoldt and Holt have added, also, to the volume before us extensive extracts from an admirable Essay on "Nathan," by the distinguished German critic, Kuno Fischer. This is at least an introduction to the study of one of the noblest characters of the last century. Lessing was not a great poet, but he was a brave, earnest, strong-minded man. His influence on the literature of his country was immense, not so much by the master pieces which he composed himself, as by those which he led others to compose. For it was he who, more than any one else, purified the national taste, corrupted by French influences, led back the national mind to classic models, established the principles of criticism, bore the brunt of the battle for freedom of thought on all subjects, and scattered, as he said he sought to do, the "*fermenta cognitionis*." The reader who expects to find in "Nathan the Wise" a great drama or a great poem, will be disappointed. It is little more than a discussion, in the form of a dialogue, of those ideas for which he spent his life in contending. It is not his most profound or most original work, but it is one of his most characteristic and most noble. It violates both historic and dramatic probabilities; it exalts natural above revealed religion: but for nearly a hundred years it has been teaching in Germany a noble lesson of tolerance, and it reveals perhaps better than anything else the spirit of the man who wrote, ten years earlier, "I think I have been as serviceable to truth, when I miss her, and my failure is the occasion of another's discovering her, as if I had discovered her myself."

THE HERMITAGE AND OTHER POEMS.*—Mr. Sill's first volume of poems will be received by his college friends with no little interest, and will be read with favorable judgments. He will certainly be satisfied if they say of it as they may that it does not disappoint their expectations, and that it gives the promise of something better. He has a poet's eye and a poet's sensibility. There is no lack of felicitous words or appropriate imagery. In both words and imagery there is at times a rare refinement and beauty. But were there more strength of conception, force of language, and

* *The Hermitage and other Poems*. By EDWARD ROWLAND SILL. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

fire of feeling, he would attain a higher strain than any which this volume contains. Of all the pieces in the volume, "The Ruby Heart" pleases us as well as any. We hope the author will write many more as good as this. If he does, he will write many that are better.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE CULTURE DEMANDED BY MODERN LIFE.*—This volume contains a number of interesting essays of unequal value from various authors; the most of which are directed to a single object. This object is to vindicate for scientific and physical studies a prominent place in the system of liberal education against the exclusive predominance of classical studies, which has till lately obtained in the English schools and universities. So far as the considerations relate to this conclusion, they are pertinent to the design for which they were originally prepared. A few of them are more radical in their principles and design, and urge for what are called scientific studies a possession of the field nearly or quite as exclusive as has been accorded to the classics. These essays are preceded by what is called an essay on Mental Discipline in Education, and followed by a lecture entitled Observations on the Scientific Study of Human Nature, both by Edward L. Youmans, M. D. To the volume thus made up is prefixed the high sounding title, "The Culture Demanded by Modern Life."

We do not propose at this time to discuss the subject of most of these essays, much less to treat of the more general topic which is announced in the title of this volume. We cannot, however refrain from one or two observations upon the special contributions of its editor. Prof. Youmans seems somewhat ambitious of acting a conspicuous part in introducing what he confidently believes to be the new and better dispensation. Perhaps we are mistaken in this conjecture. If we are, and he is really in earnest in advancing the cause of educational reform, we advise him to keep himself out of sight. If the results of the "culture demanded by modern

* *The Culture demanded by Modern Life*; a series of addresses and arguments on the claims of scientific education. By Professors Tyndall, Huxley, Huxley, Paget, Whewell, Faraday, Liebig, Draper, DeMorgan; Doctors Barnard, Hodgson, Carpenter, Hooker, Acland, Forbes, Herbert Spencer, Sir John Herschell, Sir Charles Lyell, Dr. Seguin, Mr. Mill, etc. With an Introduction on Mental Discipline in Education, by E. L. YOUMANS. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. New Haven: H. H. Peck.

life" may be judged by these two essays, we cannot conceive of a more damaging argument for the cause than these essays furnish. The advocates for the old system would need only pray—Oh that our adversary might write many more such books! Culture in a writer requires a just conception of the facts adduced, the capacity of deriving from them valid inferences, and the power to apply these inferences to the subject which is under discussion. Prof. Youmans illustrates the culture which he has attained in such remarks as the following: "The predominant culture of modern times had its origin, more than eight hundred years ago, in a superstition of the middle ages. A mystical reverence was attached to the sacred number *seven*, which was supposed to be a key to the order of the universe. That there were seven cardinal virtues, seven deadly sins, seven sacraments, seven days in the week, seven metals, seven planets, and seven apertures in a man's head, was believed to afford sufficient reason for making the course of liberal study consist of seven arts, and occupy seven years. Following another fancy about the relation of three to four, in a certain geometrical figure, these seven arts were divided into two groups. The first three, Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, comprised what was called the Trivium; and the remaining four, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music (the latter as a branch of Arithmetic), formed the Quadrivium. This scheme has been handed down from age to age, and, with but slight changes, still predominates in the higher institutions of learning, and still powerfully reacts upon the inferior schools." p. 8.

This is Prof. Youmans's way of stating and generalizing the facts of history—exhausting in his view the facts and the philosophy of the history of the modern systems against which he contends. We can scarcely conceive where he picked up this precious morsel, or by what extraordinary "cerebral paths" the "nerve force" could have walked in a very peculiarly ramified brain before it culminated in the theory which, in his view, casts such a flood of light upon the vicious methods which prevail in the higher institutions of learning.

In speaking of the value of Latin and Greek in mental discipline, he asserts: "Indeed, the most thoroughgoing advocates of these studies claim that their disciplinary value is in the ratio of the naked retentive power which they call into exercise." To which we have only to say, if this is so, it is news to us. We never heard a single advocate for these studies urge this claim. We

doubt whether the veriest tyro of a pedagogue in the Latin grammar in the classic land where Pompey and Marcellus and Solon have given names to the towns, has ever entertained the opinion here expressed. So far as we know, the advocates of the study of the classics on the ground of their disciplinary value have never made this to consist in the fact that they train the memory to the power of reproducing unrelated words, or words unconnected with thoughts and their relations.

But again, Prof. Youmans observes :

"If now it be said that it is not mere memory of words that is contended for, but the discipline and judgment afforded by the grammatical study of the structure of language, the crushing answer is that a dead language is unnecessary for this discipline, which is far better secured by the systematic study and thorough logical analysis of the vernacular tongue." p. 6.

Then, as if to justify this position, he argues at length, and quotes authorities to prove that it is very absurd to begin the study of language with a study of grammar at all. In this, the logical power of the advocate for culture demanded by modern times is made salient and conspicuous.

After thus disposing of the languages, he dispatches the mathematics by a process equally summary.

He then proceeds to discuss the question, "What is the real significance of the phrase, 'discipline of the mind?'" To this he replies: "By mental discipline is meant that systematic and protracted exercise of the mental powers which is suited to raise them to their highest degree of healthful capability, and impart a permanent direction to their activity."

This definition being presented, to which no one need object, he proceeds to enquire :

"But, what is the basis of this great fact of mental habits, by which so spiritual an agency as mind becomes fettered? It is a property of the *organic constitution*, and its consideration brings us down to the firm physiological basis of the whole subject." p. 13.

"Nothing is more certain than that in future, mind is to be studied in connection with the organism by which it is conditioned; when we begin to deal with the problem of mental discipline, metaphysics no longer avail; it is the organism with which we have finally to deal." p. 18.

"The basis of educability, and hence of mental disciplines, is, therefore, to be sought in the properties of that nervous system by which mind is manifested. That basis is the law that cerebral effects are strengthened and made lasting by repetition. When an impression is made upon the brain, a change is produced, and the effect remains in the nerve substance; if it be repeated, the change is deepened, and the effect becomes more lasting. If we have a perception of an

object, or if we perform an action only once, the nervous change is so slight that the idea may perhaps never reappear, and the act never be repeated; if experienced twice, the tendency to recur is increased; if many times, this tendency is so deepened, and the links of association become so extended, that the idea will often be obtruded into thought, and the action may take place involuntarily. Intellectual 'capacity' is thus at bottom an affair of physical impressibility, or nervous adhesiveness. Regard being had to the law that all nutritive operations involve repose, cohesion or completeness of association depends upon repetition. Of course, constitutions differ widely in this property, some requiring many more repetitions than others, to secure acquirement. This view leads to important practical conclusions." p. 15.

Some of these practical conclusions are well stated, but then are not new, but are as old as Aristotle. Nor are they at all dependent upon the physiological basis upon which the author makes them rest. We have perused with the utmost attention the author's attempts to set forth the theory of the mind's operations, and which he conceives to be furnished by the physiological facts which he so ambitiously parades; but we cannot discover what his theory is, nor can we see that either the physiological facts or the mental theory, obscurely shadowed forth, furnish the slightest grounds for his conclusions in respect to mental discipline, or the kind of studies which are best fitted to promote the culture demanded by modern life.

The physiological facts are not new—they are familiar to scores of physiologists far more eminent than Maudsley or Bain, who find in them no reason for adopting the materialistic view of the soul and its operations, which these writers either very dimly conceive, or else dare not distinctly avow.

Common places about the waste of the structure of the brain, and the reflex action of the nerves, are all very well in their place, but when these are put forth as a newly discovered and only solid basis for mental discipline and a special theory of education, they must be shown to have some real or logical connection with the conclusion to which they are applied, if the writer expects to gain the attention or convince the judgment of sensible men.

MODERN INQUIRIES.*—The first two of the essays in this volume have already attracted the chief attention of the public, as it

* *Modern Inquiries*; classical, professional, and miscellaneous. By JACOB BIGLOW, M. D., late President of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, and late a Professor in Harvard University. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

might be expected they would. The first is "on the limits of education," and was delivered before the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nov. 16, 1865. The second is "On Classical and Utilitarian Studies," and was read before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dec. 20, 1866. They both take extreme ground in favor of giving very great prominence to the study of the sciences and the modern languages, at the expense of the classics. They may, therefore, be regarded as, in the most eminent sense of the word, representative essays, and coming from a person of eminent respectability, they are likely to exert a powerful influence. We differ from the author upon almost every position which he takes and seeks to defend, but do not deem this the occasion to give the reasons for our dissent. We may do this at another time. The author expresses his views with entire good temper, and with a charming abandonment and thoroughgoing consistency.

There was a time in the boyhood of the writer of these lines, when a work written by Dr. Bigelow was almost the only volume which he possessed, and was certainly esteemed as of the highest authority and value. Dr. Bigelow's "Plants of Boston and its vicinity" was the much prized companion for two years of delightful devotion to botanic excursions and researches. Had he known at that time the views of Dr. Bigelow respecting classical and utilitarian studies, they might have exerted a decisive influence upon his mind. But some personal interest in and experience of both these branches of knowledge, and some opportunities of observation upon the influence of both in the mental culture and discipline of children and young men, have only served to confirm the impression that the advocates of Dr. Bigelow's system are the one-sided men.

TYNDALL ON SOUND.*—We doubt whether many men have ever lived who knew so well how to popularize science without divesting it of the qualities of science, as the author of this book. Prof. Tyndall is master of the rare art of lecturing and experimenting in print. He enables the mere reader not only to see the apparatus, watch the processes, and notice the results, but even to

* *Sound*. A course of Eight Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain. By JOHN TYNDALL, LL. D., F. R. S., Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution, and in the Royal School of Mines. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 13, 335.

hear, as it were, the sounds, and to feel the inspiration of the lecturer's tone and manner. As rich in matter as he is simple and perspicuous in style, he unfolds to us the results of the latest and profoundest researches, often of those original with himself, so clearly and beautifully as not only to impress them vividly on the memory, but even to make of the dryest science very excellent poetry. The Science of Sound—Acoustics—is commonly regarded as by no means the most attractive branch of Natural Philosophy. Yet, if any of our readers, whether of scientific tastes or not, shall take up this book, we venture to predict that they will read it through not only with the greatest ease of comprehension, but also with a positive delight growing as well out of the freshness and intrinsic interest of the scientific truths, as the novelty and aptness of the illustrations. The cuts are numerous, and the best substitute possible for the apparatus and diagrams of the lecture-room. The work will prove particularly valuable and interesting to teachers, and to those who wish to understand the physical theory of music and of musical instruments. It is a fit companion volume for the Lectures on "Heat as a Mode of Motion," by the same author.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL.

The works of President Edwards, in four volumes, with valuable additions, and a copious General Index, and a complete Index of scripture texts. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1868. [This edition of the works of President Edwards is a reprint of that published at Worcester, with some variation of the arrangement, and considerable additions from other sources. It is provided with a copious General Index, the references in which are generally made in the language of Edwards].

Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity in the Nineteenth Century. Delivered in New York, January and February, 1867, on the "Ely Foundation," in the Union Theological Seminary. By Albert Barnes. 12mo. pp. 461. Harper & Brothers, New York. \$1.75.

The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels. By Andrews Norton. Abridged Edition. 12mo. pp. 584. Amer. Unit. Assoc. Boston. \$1.50.

The New Testament; with Notes, Pictorial Illustrations, and References. Vol. I. The Four Gospels; with a Chronological Harmony. By Israel P. Warren. American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 8vo. pp. 896.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, compared with the Old Testament. By the

Author of "The Song of Solomon, compared with other parts of Scripture." Fifth edition. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. pp. 306.

Ecce Deus-Homo; or The Work and Kingdom of the Christ of Scripture. 12mo. pp. 207. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia. \$1.50.

Jesus before Caiaphas and Pilate: being a Refutation of Mr. Salvador's chapter entitled "The Trial and Condemnation of Jesus." By M. Dupin. Translated from the French by the late John Pickering, LL. D. 18mo. pp. 86. American Tract Society, New York. 30cts.

Short Studies for Sunday School Teachers. By C. S. Robinson, D. D. 16mo. pp. 247. Wynkoop & Sherwood, New York. \$1.50.

Lessons for the Instruction of Children in the Divine Life. By Rev. F. D. Huntington. 18mo. pp. 160. E. P. Dutton & Co., Boston. 30cts.

Thanksgiving: Memories of the Day, Helps to the Habit. By William Adams, D. D. 12mo. pp. 372. C. Scribner & Co., New York. \$2.

The Three Gardens; Eden, Gethsemane, and Paradise: or Man's Ruin, Redemption, and Restoration. By W. Adams, D. D. 12mo. pp. 284. C. Scribner & Co., New York. \$2.

Home Work; or, Parochial Christianization. By Rev. A. S. Chesebrough. 18mo. pp. 285. American Tract Society, Boston. \$1.

The Visitor's Book of Texts; or, the Word brought nigh to the sick and sorrowful. By the Rev. Andrew A. Bonar. Fourth edition. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 230.

Bible Hours; being Leaves from the Note Book of the late Mrs. Mary B. M. Duncan. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 319.

Letters to a Young Christian. By a Lady. Originally published in the "Advocate and Guardian." American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 16mo. pp. 174.

The Heavenly Life: being Select Writings of Adelaide Leaper Newton. Edited by the Rev. John Baillie, author of her Memoirs. Third edition. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 372.

Bible Jewels. By Rev. Richard Newton, D. D. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1868. 13mo. pp. 320.

The Glories of the Virgin Mother, and Channel of Divine Grace. From the Latin of St. Bernard. By a Catholic Priest. 18mo. pp. xvii., 172. P. Donahoe, Boston. 60cts.

Hymn Writers and their Hymns. By Rev. S. W. Christophers. 12mo. pp. xiv., 490. A. D. F. Randolph, New York. \$3.50.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. Third Series. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1868. 12mo. pp. 324.

The Reunion of the Old and New School Presbyterian Churches. By Rev. C. Hodge, D. D. (Reprinted from the "Princeton Repertory"). 8vo. pp. 87. C. Scribner & Co., New York. Paper, 25cts.

The Reunion of the Presbyterian Churches. By Professor H. B. Smith. (Reprinted from the Am. Presb. and Theol. Review). 8vo. pp. 45. W. Sherwood, New York. 25cts.

The Bloody Tenent of Persecution. By Roger Williams. Edited by S. L. Caldwell, (Publications of the Narragansett Club, Vol. IIL) Small 4to. pp. xiv., 425. \$6.

The word of Life, the Law of Missions. A Sermon, before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at their Meeting in Buffalo, New York. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York. 8vo. pp. 31.

The Positive Philosophy. An oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Amherst College, July 9, 1867, and before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of the University of Vermont, August 6, 1867. By A. P. Peabody, D. D., LL. D., Preacher to the University, &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1867. [Professor Peabody's Phi Beta Kappa oration on the Positive Philosophy is very timely and able, and abounds in sentiments, which coming from him will have a most salutary influence.]

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April, 1861, to April, 1865. By Adam Badeau, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp to the General-in-Chief, Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. Army. Vol. I., with portrait and maps. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 683.

Lee and his Lieutenants: the Early Life, Public Services, and Campaigns of Gen. R. E. Lee and his Companions in Arms. By E. A. Pollard. Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 851. E. B. Treat & Co., New York. \$5.

Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion; a History of all Regiments and Batteries the State has sent to the Field, &c. By W. De Loss Love. Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 1144. Goodman & Church, Chicago. \$5.50.

History of the Thirtieth Infantry Regiment of Connecticut Volunteers during the great Rebellion. By H. B. Sprague. 12mo. pp. 353. Case, Lockwood & Co., Hartford. \$2.

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Life and Letters of Elizabeth, last Duchess of Gordon. By Rev. A. Moody Stuart. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1868. 12mo. pp. 422.

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Memorial of the Semi-Centennial Anniversary of the American Colonization Society, celebrated at Washington, Jan. 15, 1868. With documents concerning Liberia. 1867. 8vo. pp. 192.

Greece: her Progress and Present Position. From the French of A. R. Rangabé, Greek Minister at Washington. Translated, with Introduction. By C. K. Tuckerman. 12mo. pp. 102. G. P. Putnam & Son, New York. 75cts.

BELLES LETTRES.

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Speeches, Correspondence, etc., of the late D. S. Dickinson, of New York. Edited, with a Biography, by his Brother, J. R. Dickinson. In two vols. 8vo. pp. xi, 743; xvi, 719. G. P. Putnam & Son, New York.

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A Manual of Anglo-Saxon for beginners; comprising a Grammar, Reader, and Glossary, with explanatory notes. By Samuel M. Shute, Professor in Columbian College, Washington, D. C. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. 12mo. pp. 195.

Histoire d'une Bouchée de Pain; L'Homme. Par Jean Macé. With a French and English Vocabulary, and a list of idiomatic expressions. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 12mo. pp. 260.

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La Littérature Française Contemporaine. Recueil en Prose et en Vers de Morceaux Empruntés aux Ecrivains les plus Renommés de XIX^{me} Siècle. 16mo. pp. 310. Leypoldt & Holt, New York. \$1.75.

The Mysteries of the Neapolitan Conventa. With a Sketch of the Early Life of the Authoress. By Enrichetta Caracciolo. From the Fourth Italian edition. Translated by J. S. Redfield. Introduction by Rev. John Dowling. 12mo. pp. 484. A. S. Hale & Co., Hartford. \$2.50.

Esthetics in Collegiate Education. By George F. Comfort, A. M. (Reprinted from the Methodist Quarterly Review, Oct. 1867).

A Discourse on the State and Tendency of Society, delivered before the Literary Societies of the College of New Jersey, at Princeton, June 25, 1867. By Edward D. Mansfield, LL.D. 1867. 8vo. pp. 42.

Our National Schools of Science. By Daniel C. Gilman, Professor in the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale College. (Reprinted from the North American Review for October, 1867). 8vo. pp. 28.

Mrs. Putnam's Receipt-Book, and Young Housekeeper's Assistant. New and enlarged edition. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 322.

Love in Letters; Illustrated in the Correspondence of Eminent Persons. With Biographical Sketches of the Writers, by Allan Grant. 12mo. pp. 336. G. W. Carlton & Co., New York. \$2.

Cornell's Intermediate Geography; forming Part Second of a Systematic Series of School Geographies. By S. S. Cornell. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867.

The American PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, For 1868.

The Presbyterian Quarterly Review, published in Philadelphia from 1852, and *The American Theological Review*, published in New York from 1859, were united in January, 1863, under the title: *The American Presbyterian and Theological Review*. Its present editors are Professor Henry B. Smith, of the Union Theological Seminary, and Rev. J. M. Sharwood, aided by Rev. Albert Barnes, of Philadelphia, and Professors R. D. Hitchcock, and J. B. Condit. The Rev. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D., of Scotland, is engaged as a Special Contributor. Two or more articles from him will appear in the current volume; one in the January number.

This *Review* was recommended by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, 1863, in the following terms:

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ERRATUM.—Page 397, line 2, for "It may," read, "The book may."

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T H E

NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CIII.

A P R I L, 1868.

ARTICLE I.—THE PRESENT STATE OF PHILOSOPHY.

“Not to despair of philosophy,” said Sir William Hamilton, with one of his apt quotations, “is a last infirmity of noble minds.” And certainly if ever a noble mind succeeded in conquering that infirmity, it was his own. No philosopher in modern times has striven so hard to set bounds to the cognitive instinct, or brought to the task such transcendent powers. Other thinkers may have had their moments of skepticism or misgiving as to the attainment of absolute truth, and some may even have abandoned the pursuit, after long research, as hopeless; but what was in him, from the first, a constitutional tendency had become also a philosophical theory, and at length a religious creed. The discipline which he inculcated was that of a “prudent nescience;” . . . his goal for the intellectual career would be a “learned ignorance;” and over the very portal of revelation he wrote, as a flaming menace, the inscription, “To the unknown God.” Even from Philosophy herself he sought to wring stultifying “testimonies,”

displaying the chance confessions of her disciples, in learned array, as but so many faggots for her funeral pyre. If nothing is left her but to die, it must be confessed that in these charming disquisitions she can find what Coleridge terms "her euthanasy and apotheosis."

But let us not be misunderstood. We yield to none in a just appreciation of the great Edinburgh philosopher. As a psychological thinker and scholar, we believe him to be without peer or rival in England or any other country. He might be well styled the modern Aristotle, were it not that he comes to us enriched with the spoils of all later schools of philosophy. Such keen, analytic power, such sustained abstraction, such grasp of logic upon the reins of fancy, and such absolute mastery of details and principles, combined with such captivating stores of learning, and expressed in a style at once so lucid, nervous, and elegant, never before met in one person; and if our hopes of the future of philosophy depended upon a recurrence of precisely the same combination of powers and attainments, we might look for it in vain in any living author.

Nor do we forget the noble use which was made of these endowments. No one now thinks of denying that the "Philosophy of the Conditioned," viewed as a check upon the "Philosophy of the Absolute," has had, and is still having, a most wholesome influence. It was the protest of robust, Scottish common sense against the vagaries of German transcendentalism, and the dazzling generalizations of French eclecticism. Appearing at a time when philosophy seemed in a fair way to degenerate into mere speculative cosmogony, it served to dissipate the brilliant world-bubbles with which grave thinkers were amusing themselves, and has already restored a more healthy and masculine tone to all modern thinking. The result is, that the philosopher no longer seeks, spider-like, to spin the whole phenomenal universe as a mere gossamer of abstractions out of his own subjectivity, mistaking the flimsy logic of man for the essential process of nature; but is content to explore cautiously the region of facts and principles, recognizing, at every step, the limitations, as well as the capacities, of his own mental constitution. To have thus checked the speculative propensity in the midst of a wide

spreading hallucination, and brought it back to the paths of reason and common sense, is a service which cannot be too gratefully felt, and will place the name of Hamilton among the brightest in the annals of philosophy.

We make these preliminary admissions, not merely because we have no sympathy with that invidious spirit of criticism which seeks to drag a great man from his well-earned niche of fame, as lately manifested in some quarters, but also because a discriminating praise is the best tribute to his real merits, and to that cause of sound philosophy which he espoused. If we distinguish between Hamilton as a logician and psychologist, and Hamilton as a metaphysician and ontologist, questioning his preëminence in the latter characters, while we hold to it in the former, we shall only be estimating him as he chose himself to be estimated, and not quarrel with Nature that she could not give him an insight that would have misled his understanding, but must needs have made him less the thinker and sage that he might be all the more the reasoner and scholar.

Nor will we, in the least, undervalue the polemical uses of his logic against false philosophy, by insisting upon its entire want of positive fruit and constructive power, when it is remembered that he did not himself pretend to build up anything in place of the systems he had destroyed, but rather strove to demonstrate that we have neither foundation nor material for absolute science or knowledge of things as they are, and that all efforts after such knowledge must, in the nature of the case, be abortive.

It is in fact not so much with the master as with the disciples that we join issue. We believe them to have made a use of his doctrine of nescience which, however naturally it may have followed, he did not foresee, and could not have approved. What was perhaps meant to serve as a mere logical discipline and safeguard, has been hastily applied by one party to questions of religion, and by another to questions of philosophy, in a manner suited to bring them both into contempt. As a consequence, we behold at the feet of the same teacher a school of Christian apologists resolving the material of faith into sheer contradiction, and a school of skeptical scientists re-

solving the material of knowledge into pure mystery. Scarcely has Mr. Mansel, from the extreme right, brought forward his theory of a regulative revelation which shall accommodate the truth to our faculties, when Mr. Spencer, from the extreme left, rejoins with a homily on the "impiety"—"the transcendent audacity which claims to penetrate the secrets of the Power manifested to us through all existence—nay, even to stand behind that power and note the conditions to its action." Thus the very cant of divines is becoming the creed of thinkers, at the same time that the speculations of thinkers are made the dogmas of divines; and we are ready to fancy ourselves looking at a sort of philosophical masquerade, in which orthodoxy itself strives to be wise above that which is written, while even infidelity affects to be meek and lowly.

There is of course somewhat of good as well as evil in these extraordinary interactions. They illustrate that beneficent law of progress by which extremists are sometimes driven to exchange positions before they settle into a just agreement; and we cite them, not merely in proof that the mission of the Hamiltonian metaphysics is drawing to a close, but also as signs of a better day which we may hope it is heralding. Everything, indeed, in the present state of philosophy, betokens a crisis already passed, and a commencing return to the normal use of reason. The genius of modern research, after a long course of speculation, in which it has been hurried to the wildest extremes, by turns accepting and rejecting the most opposite premises, now denying what it would be next to madness to doubt, anon admitting what it would be almost idiocy to believe, seems at length to have run the entire round of theories and exhausted the utmost capacity of thought; and that very apathy which its excesses have engendered, amounting in some minds to a cynical unbelief, and tinged at times the most serious themes with satire, may prove to be but the wholesome disgust with which it is going back to the ways of simplicity and truth. One might almost liken its present posture to that of heathen philosophy at the dawn of Christianity, when, after having pursued from dire necessity, rather than perverse choice, the same fruitless

career, it sat among decaying superstitions and errors, as in the melancholy twilight yearning for the day-spring.

We have accorded to Hamilton the merit of this great reaction; but we cannot abide in the mere reaction itself as a finality. His theory of absolute ignorance, salutary as it has proved for a time, appears to us as little likely to exhaust the function of philosophy as to bring about "a peace among philosophers themselves." While we may join him in repudiating the vain dogma of an immediate omniscience, we must still question if the only alternative be that of simple nescience. It would seem to be as irrational to assume that man can know nothing as to presume that he can know everything. And the Conditionist has, in fact, proved to be quite as one-sided and reckless a thinker as the much abused Absolutist. If we accept as true of him, in the words of Hamilton, what Virgil says of *Æneas*, contemplating in the prophetic sculpture of his shield the future glories of Rome,

"Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet;"

yet, we must add, at the risk of marring so classic a figure, that he is but like the rash knight in the fable, pronouncing upon an escutcheon which is viewed by his antagonist from the opposite side; and now that each has at length fought his way to the other's position, it only remains that both should generously lose sight of their several errors in the recognition of their common truth.

Such a candid comparison of the two great phases of modern thought has indeed come to be the first duty of the philosopher. And it is fortunate that his task is at length so simple and obvious. A little reflection will show that but one course is now open to the speculative mind. It would be folly to reject either of its present tendencies, merely because of their extreme development, and it would be impossible to hold to both in their existing antagonism. Accepting each as alike with the other legitimate and irrepressible, we must find for them, in their rebound, some middle region of belief or theory which they can hold in common, and some healthy interaction by means of which their dissolving contrasts shall

vanish in the unity of truth, the harmony of knowledge, and the perfection of reason.

In other words, the problem which is now to be met is that of *a logical conciliation of the Absolute Philosophy and the Positive Philosophy, in some one final philosophy which shall be their sequel and complement.*

And to this great problem the foremost thinkers of the age would seem to be already addressing themselves; more or less consciously it may be, but not without hopefulness. The very exigency out of which it arises has brought with it a spirit favorable to the inquiry. That failure of the speculative faculty, in any single direction to find for itself a complete theory of knowledge, while it may have driven some minds into skepticism, and others into mysticism, has but served in the more moderate class, to foster those philosophic virtues of caution, humility, patience, candor, and catholicity, which are most needed in a work of conciliation and reconstruction, and now only wait to be led into action. At least we very much mistake the tone of some later speculations if this is not a common and growing feeling; and it is in the hope of expressing it that we propose to state the question which we have represented as emerging, and to indicate, as far as may be, the probable course of philosophical opinion respecting it.

It is often said that there are, as there could be, and have been, but two distinct aims or tendencies of the philosophic mind. Old as the rival schools of Plato and Aristotle, we behold them reappearing with extraordinary vigor in modern Europe; the one mainly pursued by a line of German thinkers, extending from Kant to Hegel, and the other by a line of English thinkers, extending from Bacon to Hamilton; while, by the constructive genius of the French, they have been respectively systematized in the Absolutism of Cousin, and the Positivism of Comte. We assign such positions to the two last named thinkers, because they are in fact the most consistent and consequent representatives of the schools to which they severally belong. Cousin was proud to acknowledge himself a pupil of Hegel, and, better than any other philosopher out of Germany, succeeded in mastering the

doctrine of the Absolute, and bringing it to completeness;* and although Comte was indeed a stranger to Hamilton in everything but his premises, and differed from him in all other respects as widely as one philosopher could differ from another, yet there is no writer, either in or out of England, who has so vigorously carried out the doctrine of the conditioned in the domain of science, or so completely filled up the hiatus which it leaves in that of religion; neither Mr. Spencer, with his reverence for the unknowable, nor Mr. Mansel, with his anthropomorphic revelation, being half so philosophical as the founder of the new "Religion of Humanity," who at least knew what he professed to worship, while they profess to worship they know not what.

We need hardly say that in thus classing together different thinkers as absolutists or positivists, we mean only to impute to them what they held in common, even though it may have been without concert, and to find for ourselves concise terms to indicate the two great parties into which the philosophical world has become divided in respect to the validity and extent of our knowledge, which is the great paramount problem to be considered. However much such writers as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, Ferrier, and Calderwood may disagree upon minor questions, yet they are all easily recognized as advocates of that solution of the problem known as the Philosophy of the Absolute; in the same manner that Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, Lewes, Stuart Mill, and Comte, though but ill assorted in many respects, must be ranked together as defenders of an opposite solution of it, termed the Positive Philosophy or the Philosophy of the Conditioned.

It is to be regretted, indeed, that better terms could not be found for expressing such important distinctions; but the wide currency which these have obtained, the recognized

* The absolutism of this acute thinker and brilliant writer may be distinguished from his so-called eclecticism, which might rather be termed a splendid piece of philosophical syncretism, inasmuch as the four systems figuring in his analysis, sensualism, idealism, skepticism, and mysticism, instead of being wrought into any resultant body of doctrine, seem only to be represented as vague, speculative movements, ever succeeding and destroying one another in the history of philosophy, almost without any content of positive knowledge or issue of substantial truth, or even promise of intelligible result.

sense which is attached to them, and the difficulty, at the present stage of inquiry, of inventing others, more precise and yet as comprehensive, seem to leave us no alternative but to use them with such explanations as may serve to fix and guard their meaning.*

Let it then be premised that the words *Absolute* and *Positive* will here be employed only in their strictest etymological sense and most philosophical application, as correlate adjectives; the former meaning that which is *absolved* or loosed from any necessary relation; what it is as existing by itself, in its own interior essence, disconnected from our minds and neither conditioned nor modified by our cognitive faculties; and the latter meaning that which is *posited* or fixed in some contingent relation; what it appears as manifested to us, under its phenomenal character, in connection with our minds, and either conditioned or modified by our cognitive faculties. According to these definitions, it will be found that that which is positive must also be *finite*, embracing only manifested existence, while that which is absolute may also be *Infinite*, embracing all real existence; and also, that both taken together, in a religious sense, will imply each other as the coexisting creation and Creator.† The two ideas, however, will come out

* The terms *Idealism* and *Realism*, *Spiritualism* and *Materialism*, are also in general use, but they are hardly precise enough for the present purpose; while *Empiricism* and *Transcendentalism*, though sufficiently precise, are wanting in comprehensiveness, as both of them obviously refer to the mere process of knowledge rather than to its content or measure. But *Positivism* and *Absolutism*, besides being free from that somewhat opprobrious sense which the other terms have acquired as popular epithets, will respectively express the material and the spiritual, the ideal and the real departments of knowledge, at the same time that they characterize the two great systems of knowledge with which we are familiar as the extreme results of the empirical and transcendental methods. It will be found, however, that in most cases in this Article, where these terms have been used, either of the other sets of terms might be substituted.

† It will be seen that the words *Absolute* and *Infinite* are here employed in that sense in which Sir William Hamilton himself (*Discussions*, Art. I.) admits them to be perfectly consistent, and in which alone, as Mr. Mill has conclusively shown (*Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, Vol. I., pp. 50-74), they can be treated as other than the merest abstractions. If strictly speaking, it be difficult to conceive of any finite reality, in the world of matter or mind, as absolute, yet the conception of the one supreme reality, God, as an Absolute and In-

more clearly as we proceed to distinguish the antagonistic philosophies which are founded upon them.

We first inquire, What is Positivism?

The Positivist may in general be said to deal with things only as they positively appear; with facts and the laws of facts; or, as it is more technically expressed, with the uniformities of succession and coëxistence, which obtain among phenomena. These he takes to be the sole material of exact knowledge, and restricts the philosopher to the task of investigating and classifying them. The method he pursues is *a posteriori*, empirical, that of induction, or the ascent from particulars to generals, from facts to principles; the faculty upon which he relies is the sensuous understanding; and the outward means which he employs are such as observation, comparison, and experiment. He is in his temperament practical, logical, and exact; a man of facts, who scoffs at ideas as but the mere chaff of things, and is not to be reasoned out of his senses.

We next inquire, What is Absolutism?

The Absolutist may in general be said to deal with things as they absolutely are; with realities and causes; or with what are technically termed substances, essences, noumena, occult powers and principles. These he holds to be the only objects of real knowledge, and calls upon the philosopher to boldly seize them, and thence unfold the sum of truth. The method which he pursues, is *a priori*, transcendental, that of deduction, or the descent from generals to particulars, from principles to facts; the faculty upon which he relies is the pure reason; and the inward processes to which he yields himself are those of insight, conjecture, and speculation. He is in his habit of mind contemplative, abstract, and theoretical; a man of ideas, who eschews facts as but the mere husks of truth, and is not to be hoodwinked by his senses.

finite Person, so far from involving any of Mr. Mansel's negations and contradictions, is in fact the most positive and congruous conception of which the human mind is capable, since only by means of it can we construct the totality of phenomena as a scientific unity, an *ensemble* of facts and laws with their First and Final Cause.

We are ready now to distinguish the two philosophies, or philosophical tendencies, from each other.

As opposed to the Absolutist, the Positivist holds a doctrine of human nescience. Howsoever it may be with God or other beings, man, he maintains, is so limited by his cognitive faculties that he neither knows, nor can know, aught of things as they absolutely are in themselves, but only as they appear to him, or are represented to him in the modifying process of his own intelligence. Conversant with these mere appearances or phenomena, he must utterly ignore their accompanying noumena or substances as realities which he may indeed believe, but can no more conceive than the blind can fancy colors or the deaf imagine sounds, and which in fact, for anything he knows, as they appear to the inhabitants of Saturn and Jupiter would be to him as inconceivable as colors of sounds, or sounds of colors. And to this deficiency in the mode of our knowledge, he would add a necessary limitation as to its extent. Finite minds cannot hope to take in the boundless unknown, under all its manifold aspects. As related to man, the universe, of which he forms a part, is like a polygon with but one of its infinitesimal sides adjusted to his capacity, and every attempt to embrace, even in thought, the Infinite and Absolute Reality can only recoil upon him in mere negation and contradiction.* That philosopher in fact who dreams of actually transcending the finite understanding and soaring to some extra-human height of speculation, whence he may survey all existence in its essences, origins, and tendencies, is simply out of his senses. Is it not, therefore, the better part of wisdom and common sense to take the world as we find it, without vainly seeking to revise or comprehend it?

As opposed to the Positivist, the Absolutist holds a doctrine of human omniscience. Real knowledge, he insists, must be the same in man as in God and all cognitive beings, and so far from being restricted to mere phenomena, it may, and often does, involve an apprehension of things as in reality the very opposite of their appearance. We know, for example, in spite of the misrepresentations of our senses, that the earth moves

* Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, Lecture VIII.

around the sun, and though both sun and earth should appear to the inhabitants of Saturn or Jupiter to be moving around them, yet their science or actual knowledge of the facts could not possibly differ in kind from ours, or even from Omniscience itself. Nor is it necessary, in his view, to set any bounds to such knowledge. Finite as man may be, he is nevertheless the microcosm which reflects the whole macrocosm of the universe, as the dewdrop reflects the cope of heaven, and may embrace the Infinite and Absolute Reality in his very consciousness, or seize it in one swift intuition of his intellect, or unerringly recapitulate it in his logic. That philosopher, indeed, who forfeits these god-like powers of vision and apprehension, to burrow after his five senses among a few facts, has but fallen from his humanity, and lost his reason. Is it not therefore the nobler part of the creature to enter into the wisdom of the Creator, and find out that ideal of the creation which is becoming actual?

Let us next trace the two philosophies to their final results, in the more practical spheres where they issue.

On the one side, the extreme Positivist becomes at length a skeptic in religion as well as in science. Having ignored the Absolute, or resolved it into contradictions, he cannot long retain as credible that which he has proved to be both incognizable and inconceivable; he cannot believe in that which he can neither think nor know. He is therefore left without God in the world. And the universe remains to him but as a museum of dry facts; life as but a struggle against death; and nature as but the splendid tomb of man. Or, if he recoil from this gulf of atheism, it is only to frame for himself, out of the remaining social phenomena with which he has to deal, a kind of scientific religion, with Humanity for his God, savans for his priests, industry for his worship, fame for his immortality, and a civilized earth as his heaven.

On the other side, the extreme absolutist becomes at length a mystic in science as well as in religion. Having transcended all positive phenomena, or absorbed them in the process of reason, he claims that to be fully comprehensible which he has proved to be conceivable; he believes he can know whatsoever he can think. Both the world therefore and God are lost in

himself; and the universe becomes to him but as a passing vision of phenomena; time but as a mere shadow of eternity; and man but as a gilded bubble on the stream of nature. And not dizzied at this height of pantheism, he even dreams of a kind of intuitive omniscience, by which both experience and revelation are to be superseded, facts resolved into ideas, creation reduced to logic, and the whole dissolving universe revised from its genesis to its apocalypse.

The eye may now assist the mind, if we view the opposite terms of the two philosophies in parallel columns. They will exhibit their contrasts under several heads:—

(1.) *As to the material of cognition.*

Appearances.....	<i>versus</i>	Realities.
Phenomena	"	Noumena.
Quantities	"	Essences.
Accidents	"	Substances.
Facts	"	Ideas.
Laws	"	Reasons.
Effects	"	Causes.
Instances	"	Axioms.
The Contingent	"	The Necessary.
The Particular	"	The Universal.
The Multiple	"	The Total.
The Finite	"	The Infinite.
The Conditioned	"	The Unconditioned.

(2.) *As to the faculties of Cognition.*

The Understanding.....	<i>versus</i>	The Reason.
Sensation	"	Reflection.
Perception.....	"	Intuition.
Observation	"	Insight.
Experiment	"	Conjecture.
<i>A posteriori</i> process.....	"	<i>A priori</i> process.
Induction	"	Deduction.
Analysis	"	Synthesis.
Generalization	"	Hypothesis.
Common Sense.....	"	Genius.
Discovery	"	Revelation.

(3.) *As to consequences or tendencies.*

Sensationalism	<i>versus</i>	Idealism.
Skepticism	"	Mysticism.
Empiricism	"	Transcendentalism.
Materialism.....	"	Spiritualism.
Atheism	"	Pantheism.

Other terms, of like import, might be added to each category, but these may suffice as familiar specimens.

To sum up the results of the whole comparison in a few words: The absolutist, trusting solely to his reason, would penetrate behind or beyond phenomena in search of their essence or cause, and endeavor by mere logical process from assumed principles to revise and reconstruct the existing universe; while the positivist, trusting solely to his senses, would abandon realities for their appearances or phenomena, and endeavor by mere empirical process from admitted facts to investigate and modify the existing universe. And while the former would erect the sciences into a system of philosophic omniscience, and so abruptly consummate the task of philosophy, the other would as abruptly leave it incomplete, by erecting them into a system of philosophic nescience. Thus the pyramid might serve as a symbol of the one and the obelisk of the other. And if, adopting Sir W. Hamilton's quotations, to the one we apply the maxim of Abelard, "*Intellige, ut credas,*" to the other might be applied that of Anselm, "*Crede, ut intelligas.*"

Such are the two philosophies to be reconciled. And we ask, if to merely state them with any fairness is not to find them already somewhat accordant? Why should we be in haste to reject one more than the other, or to maintain one against the other? Who would be so bold as to ignore either category of cognizable material: phenomena or noumena? or so rash as to obliterate either class of cognitive faculties; the empirical or the rational? or so vain as to dream of swallowing up the cognitive capacity, either in infinite knowledge or in absolute ignorance? Which of the two philosophies alone, without the other, could develop our whole power of knowing, or exhaust the entire sum of the knowable? May they not both be essential to the completion of philosophy? And must we not begin to look for the grounds and means of their conciliation?

Our first argument for this view is, that both philosophies are deeply rooted in the human mind and have grown and spread for centuries in history, until now they have become interwoven with the most precious interests of civilization.

There is no sound mental constitution in which the germs of both are not to be found, or from which they can be wholly

extirpated. In every community of scholars, in every circle of thinkers, their respective representatives will appear. Every man may be said to be characterized by one or the other. Some are such intense positivists, they will confine themselves to the few facts within reach of their senses, pronouncing all beyond these a region of pure faith or mere conjecture; some are such thorough absolutists, they will almost question facts themselves until they have gone behind them in search of their causes and reasons; still others would seem to be absolutists as to one set of facts and positivists as to another, or absolutists and positivists by turns as to the same facts, according to their prejudices or circumstances. The skeptic in religion will be a mystic in science and become the dupe of any vulgar imposture; or the mystic in religion will be a skeptic in science and dogmatize against mathematical certainty itself; or the most exact scientist, alike with the most devout religionist, will be found culling texts or facts to suit some wild hypothesis. But he who is wholly without one or the other of these philosophical elements, or possessing one denies or suppresses the other, can only serve as an example of an undeveloped or abnormal intellect.

And what is thus patent in the very constitution of the human intellect has been conspicuous throughout history. Everywhere, and in all ages, these two original tendencies have appeared, acting and reacting upon each other, and by turns predominating in the whole existing civilization. If we go back to the primitive world, we shall behold them upon a grand scale, diverging eastward and westward on opposite sides of the globe, until they have reached their extreme development as literal antipodes of thought, in that Asiatic absolutism which would lose the finite in the infinite as but a dream of Brahm; and that European positivism which would lose the infinite in the finite under even a bit of consecrated bread. Or, if we view them upon a smaller scale, as developed in that part of the world with which we are most familiar, we have but to think of such representative names as Plato and Aristotle in Greek philosophy, Anselm and Abelard in scholastic philosophy, Bacon and Descartes in modern philo-

sophy, and Hegel and Comte in existing philosophy, in order to see that he must simply strike out one page of history, who would ignore either of the two tendencies.

It is true that attempts have been made to write the history of philosophy, in the interest of one to the exclusion of the other, or at least to press the evidence of one in a partisan spirit, against that of the other. The "Philosophical Testimonies," adduced by Hamilton, bear marks of that erudition for which he was so distinguished, and yet, regarded as a strict historic induction, they are open to at least three serious objections: 1st. They consist mainly of a mere crude aggregate of names, authorities, maxims, extracts, culled with a foregone purpose, and without anything in the nature of an exhaustive survey, of all the intellectual phenomena of the periods to which they severally belong. 2d. Many of them, especially those pertaining to the scholastic age, are simply religious confessions of the weakness and depravity of the carnal understanding, rather than philosophical definitions of the normal limits and capacities of the intellect. 3d. Such of them as are strictly philosophical can easily be balanced if not outweighed, by numerous and powerful testimonies to the opposite doctrine. Place in the scale with this treatise the equally learned and sagacious work of Cousin on the History of Philosophy, and it will be seen, that History refuses to commit herself to one tendency more than the other, but claims both as alike ineradicable and universal.

And as a consequence of their deep roots and long growth in the past life of the race, they have sent forth and interwoven their branches through all modern society. In their wake have followed portentous systems of science, politics, and religion, which as simple monuments of speculative energy are suited to fill the mind with wonder, while in their practical bearings upon the most vital interests, they are already formidable for good as well as for evil.

This is certainly true of the supreme interest of religion. It were idle to maintain, that either of the two philosophical tendencies is essentially depraved or depraving, when we behold them flowing along together, where the stream of history is most open and pure, in the very channels of the church, and

under the full blaze of the Christian revelation. From the first chapter of the Gospel of St. John to the last chapter of the most recent theological treatise, Christianity has in fact been striving after a philosophical statement, and vindication of her peculiar facts and truths, through the formulas of one or the other of these two rival schools of speculation. The inevitable task of adjusting the human intellect to the divine intellect, and accounting to reason for the contents of revelation, has involved the one as much as the other. And we have only to survey the present state of religious parties with regard to them, to see how impossible it would be to draw the lines between them, so as to drive either beyond the pale of orthodoxy. If the Hegelian absolutism, at one extreme, became evaporated into a mere Christian mythology, yet at the other extreme, it aspired after nothing less than a true Christian theology ; * and although the Hamiltonian positivism, as we have seen, has been driven on the one side toward the abyss of a scientific atheism, yet on the other, it has been hailed as a new bulwark of the most orthodox faith. Extravagant as such opposite results may appear, yet there is too much truth as well as error involved in their sources, for the Christian divine to think of either despising or disparaging them, and he who idly strikes a blow at them has need to beware lest he be found aiming at the vitals of Christianity itself.

And the same is not less true of the great interest of science. If we are tempted to regard the two philosophical tendencies as mere speculative efforts, recurring from age to age without aim or issue, we have only to trace their historical connection, with the various bodies of real knowledge, which they have respectively nourished, and which they still involve after centuries of growth in a state of intellectual schism and anarchy.

* "Thus arose from the Hegelian philosophy two very different theological schools; a positive and a negative; a churchly and an anti-christian. They are related to one another as the Alexandrian fathers, Clement and Origen, who brought the Hellenistic, particularly the Platonic philosophy into the service of Christianity, were related to the Gnostics, who by the same philosophy caricatured the Christian religion, and to the Neo-Platonists, who arrayed themselves directly against it." *Dr. Schaff's History of the Apostolic Church. Vol. I., p. 108.*

From Enclid to Newton, the scientific propensity has been pursuing both methods of inquiry, albeit unconsciously, in every field of research. The unavoidable process of observing and explaining facts by means of theories, and of testing and perfecting theories by means of facts, has called for the one as much as the other.* And it is only when either has been exclusively followed that it has run into flagrant error. If the positivism represented by Bacon has been driven by Comte to the extreme of the baldest materialism in the domain of metaphysics, yet has not the absolutism, initiated by Descartes, been carried by Schelling to the sheerest idealism in the domain of physics? Leaving out of view such mere vagaries of the two procedures, and surveying only their positive contents or results, the mechanical, chemical, and organical sciences issuing from the one, and the mental, moral, and social sciences issuing from the other, it will be seen that to ignore either of them would be to paralyze an entire half of the body of knowledge, as well as to imperil some of the most catholic and lasting interests of humanity itself.

But we are now ready for our next argument, which is, that the two philosophies, if logically adjusted and combined, would so check and complete each other, as to yield the one final philosophy of the future. And this, whatever view we take of the mission of philosophy, whether it concern the method, or the theory, or the system of perfect knowledge.

Is it primarily her mission to prescribe a method of perfect knowledge, to train the cognitive faculty to precise action, and equip the social intellect with all possible means and modes of research? Then it is not in either of the antagonistic methods, now separately pursued, that such symmetrical discipline can be found. Both are alike needed as mutual correctives and, so long as followed apart, must become erroneous and pernicious. As a sound absolutism will be the only cure for the materialism, skepticism, and atheism of the extreme positivist, so a sound positivism will be the only cure for the idealism, mysticism, and pantheism of the extreme absolutist. Let the

* See Whewell's *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, chap. ii., On the Fundamental Antithesis of Philosophy.

deductive process of the one be pressed in ignorance of the laws of facts, and our science cannot but be vague and visionary; let the inductive process of the other be pressed in ignorance of the causes of facts, and our science cannot but be partial and schismatic; but let both processes be conjoined as complementary factors of knowledge; the deductive with the inductive, the rational with the empirical, intuition with experience, conjecture with observation, revelation with discovery, and then we may hope for that *Ultimatum Organum*, or last unerring logic, by which philosophy is to mount towards perfect knowledge.

But is it furthermore her mission to provide a theory of such perfect knowledge, to discern the grounds, limits, and goal of real science, and frame for its wrangling votaries a doctrine which shall ensure their spontaneous concurrence and coöperation? Then it is not in either of the rival schools, now contending for the mastery, that the elements of that one catholic creed of reason must be sought. Only by rejecting their incidental errors and combining their residual truths, can we secure rational agreement. If we concede to the positivist that our knowledge is both finite and of the finite, and that faith is complementary to it, in practically apprehending the infinite, we may still maintain, with the absolutist, that the sphere of our knowledge is ever encroaching upon the sphere of our faith, and that therefore the two are ideally or ultimately coincident; in other words, that positive science is indefinitely extensible towards absolute science. Or if we concede to the absolutist that our knowledge is hypothetically infinite, and may even be imagined as at length swallowing up faith in intuition, or surmounting it with logic, we might still maintain with the positivist, that the goal of our knowledge is but an ideal of our faith, and as such, though ever to be approached, is never to be attained; in other words, that absolute science is perfectible only through positive science. And when we have thus embraced in one view both provinces of cognition, the phenomenal together with the noumenal, the laws of facts together with their causes, the finite together with the infinite, the discoverable together with the revealable, we shall have that *Omne Scibile*, or exhaustive theory of the knowable, by

which philosophy can survey the very infinitude of reality as her domain and anticipate a progressive science thereof as her career.

And will it finally be her mission to organize a system of such perfect knowledge, to exhibit the evergrowing sciences in their logical relations, according to their normal order, and deduce the axioms which determine their evolution and perfection? Then in vain shall we look exclusively to either of the two extreme systems, now dividing the empire of knowledge into hostile factions. Not only are both alike incomplete, but we cannot even suppose the one complete without the other, or triumphing at the expense of the other. Take by itself the absolutism of Hegel, the most logical ideal of the universe ever conceived by man, and what is it, with all its brilliant categories of thought, but a mere airy speculation, the toy-world of a creature vainly mimicking the Creator? Or, take by itself the positivism of Comte, the most rigorous construction of phenomena ever devised by man, and what is it with all its imposing masses of fact, but a mere baseless generalization, no better than the myth of the world upholding elephant standing upon nothing? But imagine now a system in which both of these systems shall have been thoroughly sifted, and blended by a positivism empirically correcting and perfecting the ideas of the absolutist, and an absolutism rationally explaining and harmonizing the phenomena of the positivist, the former ever ascending inductively from facts towards the same principles from which the latter is ever deductively descending towards the same facts; and then think of the physical sciences issuing from the one, as complemented by the metaphysical sciences issuing from the other, and of both as proceeding together, in their respective provinces of research, under ascertained laws, with ceaseless accessions throughout the universe of reality, towards the very fulness of absolute truth,—and we shall have that *Scientia Scientiarum*, or vision of ever-expanding knowledge in which philosophy may find her noblest function discharged, and her highest mission accomplished.

It appears, therefore, that the two philosophies are true in what they affirm, and false only in what they deny, or that they

become erroneous simply by being pursued against, or without each other; and that in proportion as they could be combined in theory and practice, they would but exhibit to us complementary aspects of the same reality, related truths of the same facts, and together tend towards perfect knowledge itself, like mathematical lines which we know must ever approach, even if they never meet.

Our last argument is, that this reconciliation, besides being thus desirable and conceivable, would seem at length to be already imminent and practicable. It could not have been effected hitherto, and may be effected now.

If it be asked why it could not have been effected hitherto, or why, with both tendencies in action for ages, there should have been such a recurrence of the same speculative errors, we reply, that this may have been necessary in order to expose conclusively their separate weakness and absolute need of each other; or, howsoever that may be, that it is at least a fact, that never before have they been driven to those wild extremes, those last conceivable limits, into which they have at length diverged; nor consequently have they ever before developed so favorable an exigency for precipitating their own mutual recoil and coalition. As it was reserved for Hegel to carry an exclusive absolutism to the very climax of absurdity, by confounding thoughts with things, identifying creation with logic, and converting deity into humanity, so it only remained for Comte to drive an exclusive positivism to a like pitch of folly, by ignoring realities for phenomena, evaporating causes into fictions, and substituting humanity in place of deity. Any farther in either direction, it is not possible for errant philosophy to go; and the only alternatives left to her are, either to relapse into her old antagonisms, or start forward under their resultant impulse, in a new career of ever-unfolding knowledge.

And that the great reconciliation is already practicable, actually within the capacity of the human intellect, cannot be doubted by any one who will thoughtfully survey the philosophical world at the present moment. Not only is that theory of perfect knowledge, here indeed but too feebly indicated, an ideal toward which many minds from different points are

groping, with more or less intelligent aspiration ; not only is it such an ideal as can alone satisfy the cognitive instinct, else to be forever baffled or bewildered ; and not only is its fulfillment logically required by the whole previous development and present exigency of reason, but the very means and materials, as well as motives, for its fulfillment are at hand, in that mass of accumulating sciences and arts, which now offers itself for logical organization, in that spirit of catholic research which is spreading through all the sects of school, church, and state, and in that unprecedented interchange of thought, which is rallying advanced thinkers from different lands and of diverse creeds, to the final problems of philosophy.

It is true that such an intellectual palingenesia, whensoever and howsoever effected, could not burst upon the world, as in an ordinary crisis, with any of the suddenness or amazement which mark a great religious reformation or political revolution. Rather must it proceed in secrecy and silence, remote from general observation and without popular applause, like those grand hidden forces of nature, the very thought of which awes the lonely student into worship, while the common mind, engrossed with mere appearance, scarcely suspects their existence, or only derides them as wordy abstractions, until it finds itself in presence of their surprising results.

It is true, too, that no single mind, or people, or even generation, occupied with this great work of organizing science and art, can hope alone to accomplish it, or claim the whole glory of the achievement. In an age when

“ The individual withers, and the world is more and more,”

we must expect great themes to multiply great thinkers, and not imagine that, even in the region of reflection, we can escape that division of labor which, in the lower plane of discovery and invention, retains the most distant strangers as co-workers, and often brings them from their simultaneous researches, as rival claimants to the feet of science.

And it is true, still further, that this final philosophy, as now projected in any minds, can be scarcely more than a vague ideal, while to some minds it may appear to be as visionary as it is vague, until it shall have been actually reduced to a

system, expressed in definite propositions, and applied to the practical interests of life. In this it is but like every other ideal, whether of philanthropy or of religion. And yet even prior to a full realization of it, and in advance of any tentative efforts towards it, there is enough of certainty and grandeur in it to enkindle all minds with hope and exultation. We can at least forecast its prevailing spirit and its general results.

As to its spirit, we know that it will be at an equal remove from the extreme methods hitherto pursued. It will be, what the very word philosophy itself expresses, the wooing of wisdom as distinguished alike from the conceit which arrogates it, and from the folly which despises it. It will aim at conscious knowledge in contrast both with "learned ignorance" and with "intellectual intuition;" and it will proclaim the doctrine of a progressive science, in opposition at once to a "prudent nescience," and to a fanciful omniscience. It will neither affect to know nothing, nor assume to know everything; but only seek to know more and more. It will be the philosophy of undying hope, as separated not less from presumption than from despair, and of rational faith as superior alike to credulity and to unbelief. It may take for its watchword not merely, "*Crede ut intelligas*," nor solely, "*Intellige ut credas*," but simply both maxims in one, "*Fides quærens Intellectum: Intellectus quærens Fidem*." And it might find its symbol not in the Egyptian obelisk towering with hieroglyphic secrets towards the Infinite, nor yet in the Greek pediment, cowering with its sculptured gods in the Finite; but rather in that resultant expression of both Finite and Infinite, blending and rising together in the Christian spire.

And as to its results it will consolidate vital interests hitherto at variance. It will harmonize knowledge with knowledge, abstract science with concrete, physical with metaphysical, and thus evolve a unity of truths in correspondence with the unity of things. It will harmonize knowledge with practice, the sciences with their issuing arts; and thus organize social skill, and wealth, and power. And, above all, it will harmonize knowledge with faith, science with revelation, civilization with Christianity; and thus enter into that beneficent Providence, which is steadily subjecting nature to man, and man to God.

ARTICLE II.—A MUSEUM OF CHRISTIAN ART.

Die Königlichen Museen von Berlin. Von Dr. Max Schasler, Redacteur der deutschen Kunstzeitung *Die Dioskuren*. Berlin 1866.

Königliche Museen, Verzeichniss der Sammlung der Abgüsse. Von Carl Boetticher.

Christi Geburt, Tod und Auferstehung, nach den ältesten christlichen Kunstdenkmälern. Von Dr. Ferd. Piper.

Das christliche Museum der Universität zu Berlin. Von Dr. F. Piper; *Evangelisches Jahrbuch* für 1857.

Einleitung in die monumentale Theologie, von Prof. Dr. F. Piper; Gotha 1868.

OF all the public museums of Europe, the best appointed for the purposes of the student in the history of art, is the Royal Museum at Berlin. Less rich in pictures by the great masters than the galleries of Dresden and Madrid; or in antique sculptures than the Uffizi at Florence, the Vatican at Rome, the Louvre, or the British Museum; or in gems and vases than the Louvre, or the Hermitage at St. Petersburg; this museum, nevertheless, excels them all in materials for the study of art, and in the classification and arrangement of these for the uses of the student. It was intended not merely for a place of exhibition and entertainment for the public, but a place of instruction for the artist and the scholar. The ruling idea of the museum is the historical arrangement of each department. The pictures are distributed and classified in subordinate divisions of the gallery, according to schools and epochs of art. In the first section are arranged the Italian schools in five classes. The first of these embraces painters chiefly of the fifteenth century,—the formative period of art in Italy; and these are subdivided into the Venetian, the Lombard, the Tuscan, the School of Bologna and the Romagna, and the Un-

brian. The second class comprises the Italian schools from A. D. 1500 to 1550, when art was in its apogee, and these again are subdivided into the schools of Venice, Lombardy, Tuscany, Rome, Bologna, and Ferrara. The third class, from the height of Italian art to the commencement of its decline (1550-90), is represented mainly by Paul Veronese, Bassano, and Tintoretto, artists of the Venetian school, though other schools have a subordinate place. The fourth class, the period of later splendor and of decadence, from 1590 to 1770, includes the Italian naturalists and eclectics, the Spanish school, and the successors of various Italian schools. The fifth class is the French school, chiefly the Academicians and their contemporaries.

The second section is devoted to the schools of Germany and the Netherlands, and this is subdivided into three epochs; the first, from 1420 to 1550, the second, the period of transition and imitation, from 1510 to 1670, the third, the genre and landscape styles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The third section contains sundry curiosities of art, especially Byzantine and the schools of central Italy. These also are arranged in three classes. Thus the student of painting has before him the whole history of his art, with specimens of each epoch, and the characteristics of every school. And not only is the gallery accessible to any properly certified person who wishes to make copies, but it is used for purposes of instruction and illustration by Professors in the departments of the Fine Arts and of mediæval history.

A similar arrangement is found in the galleries of sculpture. There is a Greek hall, a Roman hall, a hall to represent the plastic art in the middle ages, another of modern art, and still another assigned to German art alone; and these halls have various subdivisions and classifications according to subjects or epochs. Indeed, a principal object in the erection of the "New Museum,"—the name given to that portion of the building which was added by Frederick William IV.,—was to provide a complete historical survey of the art of sculpture, by means of characteristic models. Hence the term *Abguss-Sammlung*, used in the catalogues, has a special significance; for there is not elsewhere, in all Europe, so complete a collec-

tion of casts reproducing the *chefs d'œuvre* of sculpture. The best originals in all the galleries of Europe are here found represented in gypsum; and as one runs the eye over the catalogue and reads, "Original at Athens," or Naples, or Rome, Florence, Vienna, Dresden, Munich, Paris, London, Stockholm, he feels that the whole world of art has been levied upon to furnish copies of its choicest subjects, and that the student has before him an encyclopedia of the plastic art, such as no single collection of originals could possibly furnish. The Elgin marbles for instance are reproduced in their every fragment, as they stand in the British Museum; the Laocoon and Apollo of the Vatican, the Farnesian Bull, the Niobe of the Uffizi at Florence, are here to be seen in fac simile. And these halls of sculpture, like the galleries of painting, are used for the instruction of classes in history and art. A curious department of the Museum is that appropriated to German archæology, or rather the antiquities of Northern Europe, and the illustration of ethnography. Here are disposed in cases domestic utensils, field implements, weapons of war, objects of worship, vases and ornaments, wrought in stone, bronze, iron, the precious metals, found chiefly in ancient tombs of Germany and Scandinavia. These are arranged according to the hypothetical "ages" of stone, bronze, and iron. In harmony with the collection, the walls are decorated with subjects from northern mythology,—Thor, Titania, Odin and Frigga, an Elfin dance, the Walhalla, battle scenes, and ceremonies of religion.

The Egyptian Museum, in its general construction and arrangements, and in its wall decorations, presents a picture of the architecture, the history, the religion, the arts and manners of ancient Egypt, as vivid and accurate as that to be seen in the valley of the Nile. The pictorial decorations of temples and tombs are here transcribed with such admirable fidelity, that one feels himself to be in the atmosphere of old Egyptian life. The spoils of Egypt, gathered so profusely by Professor Lepsius, are arranged in these halls with scientific order, and artistic effect, so that one may here study Egyptian antiquities to even better advantage, than among the scattered ruins of *Saggarah*, *Karnak*, *Luxor*, and *Abu-Simbel*. And the Museum was provided for this very purpose, as a school of Egyptology.

Dr. Lepsius convenes his pupils at his lecture room and the museum alternately; in the one giving the literature and history of his subject, and in the other an illustrative discourse corresponding to a clinical lecture in schools of medicine.

Professor Piper pursues the same method in the department of Christian art. The illustrations of this branch, in the general museum, pertain chiefly to the middle ages, and consist of copies of altars, tombs, church doors, fonts, cathedral ornaments, church utensils, copper and lithographic engravings of the oldest works of Christian art at Rome and Ravenna, casts and drawings of the more important monuments of Christian antiquity, miniatures from manuscripts, casts of ivory images, gems, and coins. The walls of this museum are decorated in harmony with its design, with subjects drawn from the history of the Christian faith; such as Constantine the Great embracing Christianity, the baptism of Wittekind, the entrance of Theodoric the Great into Ravenna, the dedication of the Church of St. Sophia at Constantinople by Justinian. This collection was begun in 1849, and has been constituted upon the same principle of historical development, which marks other departments of the Royal Museum.

But in addition to the department of mediæval art in the general museum, Professor Piper has collected within the walls of the University a special *Christian Museum*, to illustrate at once the historical development of Christian art, and the relations of art to theology. This museum is the lecture room in which the enthusiastic Professor, with a nervous rapidity that magnetizes his pupils, pours forth his rich, minute, and varied learning, upon the speciality which he has done so much to illustrate, and to elevate to the dignity of a University study. The museum is formed upon the eclectic principle, and the Professor compares its specimens to the preparations used in a Museum of Anatomy or Pharmacy.

The *Museum Sacrum* begun at Rome in the Vatican, by Benedict XIV., the *Museum Christianum* established in the Lateran palace by Pius IX. in 1854, the collections of early mediæval Christian monuments brought together at Marseilles, Arles, Nismes, Narbonne, Aix, Dijon, and the Hotel Cluny at Paris; these all are primarily for the preservation of original

monuments, and as a rule without any principle of selection. Yet since everything, of that early time, even the unsightly and fragmentary, has value, and contributes to the furtherance of knowledge, all such local collections are to be prized, though they may cover only a limited period, and are without scientific order.

The Museum of the Lateran is already the most complete and systematic collection of originals in the whole range of primitive Christian art, and must eventually absorb all the minor collections of Italy in this department. It is particularly rich in sarcophagi of an early date, whose bas-reliefs, often in excellent preservation, are precious symbols of the faith and life of the primitive church. Some scriptural mosaics illustrate the dawning influence of Byzantine art upon Rome. These are supplemented with copies of the earliest paintings of the catacombs. At the head of the hall stands the fine statue of Hippolytus in his episcopal chair, which long adorned the library of the Vatican, and is perhaps "the most ancient Christian portrait of a historical person."

The Christian Museum of the Berlin University, however, is even more valuable to the general student, from the principle of systematic selection and historical arrangement. This contains few originals. The monuments of the primitive Christian faith and life are to be found mainly in Italy, and in the seats of early Christian colonization in southern France, and are too much valued in their several localities to be purchasable even by royal museums. But a school of art does not need to possess originals in order to fulfill its function of training scholars and artists for their work. One who has gained a knowledge of the history and principles of art may resort with advantage to Rome, Florence, Munich, Dresden, or Madrid, there to feel the inspiration of the great masters in presence of their chief works, and improve himself in details by copying directly from the originals; but in his preliminary training, he can learn more from a systematic collection of copies and models, so disposed as to offer an intelligent and discriminating survey of the whole field of art. The Christian Museum of the Berlin University, arranged upon this principle of systematic selection, contains copies of celebrated pictures, models of architectural

works, plaster copies of statues, not taken up at random, nor carelessly duplicated from examples already in the market, but procured by its Director after a patient inspection of all the galleries of Europe, with a view to illustrate whatever is characteristic of each period of art.

It is the theory of Prof. Piper—whose description of the Museum we reproduce, for substance, in this Article—that while a general Museum should represent Art, a Christian Museum should primarily consult the *Christian idea* which is represented in Art, and therefore should consist chiefly of Christian subjects, and of monumental inscriptions which serve to illustrate the Christian spirit. For the earliest antiquity the latter are in some important respects the only witnesses. The Art-historical point of view coincides mainly with the theological; hence a Christian Museum can be made a help to instruction in historical theology and ecclesiastical antiquities.* A brief description of Prof. Piper's collection will serve to illustrate his theory of a Christian Museum. Upon an upper floor of the University-building, in the left wing, two contiguous rooms of moderate dimensions are appropriated to this purpose. In the first, or ante-chamber, are arranged upon the right hand wall certain memorials of pagan art, which indicate the preparation of the Greco Roman world for the advent of Christianity—a lifting of thoughtful minds above the heathen level of polytheism toward the conception of monotheism, prophetic of the revelation of one living God. Among these are the celebrated Olympic Jupiter, and the Fortuna from Pompeii; busts, coins, gems—such as the ideal of Eternity; also inscriptions from Rome and Verona, containing a dedication “to the highest God,” and “to the great eternal God.” Then follow some of the more important Christian inscriptions of the earliest date, in paper impressions, taken directly from tombs, or in fac simile. Upon the opposite wall of this room are examples of early Christian architecture and church utensils; ground-plans and elevations of the Church of St. Sophia at Constantinople, St. Mark's at Venice, and the more noteworthy specimens of the

* The reader is referred especially to Professor Piper's *Einleitung in die monumentale Theologie*, for a full discussion of the Theology of Art.

Gothic style; also casts and drawings of fonts and sacramental vessels.

Passing into the principal room, one sees displayed at the head of the hall the sepulchral monuments of the primitive Christians, paper-impressions of inscriptions and bas-reliefs, copies in gypsum of notable sarcophagi, and fac-similes of paintings and drawings in the catacombs. Here, too, arranged in drawers and cases, are casts of the most ancient Christian gems and coins. Around the hall, in systematic order, are memorials of Christian art from the period of the catacombs down to the fourteenth century, next of the fifteenth century, again of the sixteenth century, especially in Italy, and finally illustrations of Protestant art from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth.

Since the topic we have prescribed to this Article is not the history nor the criticism of Christian art, but simply a Christian-Art-Museum, we shall speak only of the relations of such a Museum to the study of theology and church history, and its reciprocal influence upon the Christian life. Christian art being the embodiment of Christian thought and feeling, it serves as an exponent of the prevalent tone of faith and practice in successive ages of the church, and sometimes interprets to us characteristics of the primitive Christians concerning which history is silent. In particular, the unvailing of the catacombs, and the transfer of their principal monuments to the Museums of the Vatican and the Lateran, has set before us a commentary upon the doctrinal belief of the first centuries more graphic and impressive than can be collated from the writings of the Fathers. Here in mural decorations and inscriptions, and in the more elaborate bas-reliefs of altars and tombs, are the rude beginnings of that Christian art which, in the middle ages, rivaled even the remains of classical antiquity with the magnificence of its painting and sculpture.

"Tombs were the first altars, and mausoleums the first churches of Christendom. While the mortal remains of the vulgar were deposited in niches scooped out of the walls of the long winding passages—the streets or thoroughfares of the subterranean city—and secured by flat slabs of marble; to the confessors and martyrs, the heroes and heroines of the faith—to bishops, and in general to those of higher mark and renown, more distinguished resting-places were allotted. A space broader and more regular than the usual passages, and ending

in a blank wall, was in such cases selected or excavated; recesses surmounted by semicircular *concha* or shells were hollowed out at the extremity and in the two sides of the square; within these recesses were placed sarcophagi, their sides covered with the symbols and devices of Christianity; the roof was scooped into the resemblance of a dome or cupola—which was usually painted, as well as the shells of the recesses—and the whole, thus completed, formed a chamber bearing some faint resemblance to the Greek cross; and well suited, by its comparative space, for the congregation of the faithful, and the services of religion, the sarcophagus at the upper end of the cell serving as a communion-table, or altar.*

There is historical evidence that, after the enthronement of Christianity in the Empire, these hiding-places of the persecuted saints, and burial-places of the martyrs, were held in special veneration; that the Saint's-days were observed with proper solemnities at these subterranean altars, and that new effigies were added to the decorations of the wall. This last fact should be had in mind in estimating the testimony of the Catacombs upon some disputed points of Roman faith.

The Catacombs, however, represent not a new Art struggling into existence, but a Faith speaking to the eye through symbols, and assisting affection and memory in the memorials of the dead. A survey of these monuments shows that a cardinal point of the early Christian theology was an implicit faith in the supernatural events of Bible history. The mythical school had not then arisen; no Strauss, no Baur, not even a Colenso.

In walking through the Christian Museum of the Lateran palace at Rome, one is struck at first view with the bald literalism of the early Christians in the artistic representations of their faith. Noah thrusting his head through the top of a box or tub scarce bigger than his body, and reaching out his hands for the dove; Abraham lifting a huge cleaver to slay Isaac, who kneels very submissively to receive the blow,—a hand, the symbol of the Almighty, seizing the blade in a way that would be perilous to human fingers, a lamb looking up as if to invite the arrested stroke; Moses tapping a conical hill, a little taller than himself; Jonah, stripped naked, and being thrust into the jaws of a dragon by a sailor, who clasps him by the heels, and again ejected from the dragon's mouth

* Lord Lindsay, *Sketches of the History of Christian Art*, Vol. I., p. 6.

with such force that he is suspended longitudinally in the air, his hands clutching at a rock, his feet still in the monster's jaws; Daniel naked and erect in the den, with a lion couching upon each side of him, much after the manner of the lion-tamer in Van Amburgh's menagerie; Shadrach, Meshech, and Abednego in the fiery furnace; Christ feeding the multitude with loaves and fishes, or pointing to baskets piled with bread; Christ touching with his wand the head of Lazarus, who appears in the doorway of a tomb, swathed like a diminutive mummy; the healed paralytic staggering home under a huge mattress or cot; these and like crude representations of the miraculous incidents of Biblical history recur upon almost every monument. The sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, who died in the middle of the fourth century—found in the crypt of the old St. Peter's at Rome—exhibits several of these scenes in a fine state of preservation. This has also a representation of Christ's entry into Jerusalem, of Pilate washing his hands, and of Christ enthroned in glory; but the scenes of the passion and the crucifixion are wanting. Indeed, it is noteworthy how few scenes of the Saviour's life are directly represented in the sacred art of the first centuries. The Nativity, the Adoration of the Magi, the Good Shepherd, Christ on the Mount of Paradise or seated in glory, are frequent subjects; while the Annunciation, the Flight into Egypt, the Baptism, the Transfiguration, the Passion, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection and Ascension, subjects in which later art achieved its highest triumphs, scarcely appear in the catacombs.

But a closer inspection of the miraculous subjects from the Old Testament shows that these were selected for their symbolic reference to the life of Christ, so that were all the literary remains of the early Fathers, and the dogmatic decisions of the most ancient Councils to perish, one might reconstruct the creed of the primitive Christians from the paintings and inscriptions of the catacombs.

The art of the catacombs was "a system of Typical Parallelism, veiling the great incidents of redemption, and the sufferings, faith, and hopes of the Church under the parallel and typical events of the patriarchal and Jewish dispensation,

admitting no direct representations from gospel history, but such as illustrate the kingly office of the Saviour, and the miracles by which he prefigured the illumination of the spirit and the resurrection of the body.”* The great work of Perret reproduces, with a vividness that borders upon exaggeration, the principal subjects of the catacombs.† Those of most frequent recurrence are Adam and Eve in the garden; Noah in the ark; Abraham offering Isaac; Moses, putting off his shoes before the burning-bush, receiving the Law, and smiting the rock; Job healed of his diseases and restored to society, as by a resurrection; Jonah seized or ejected by the dragon, or lying under the shade of the gourd; Daniel in the lion’s den; the three Hebrews in the fiery furnace; the translation of Elijah; Orpheus taming the beasts with his lyre; the Nativity; the Adoration; the principal miracles of Christ—especially the healing of the paralytic and the raising of Lazarus.

Various reasons have been assigned for the absence of the scenes of the passion of our Lord from these earliest representations of Christian art. The cross, which the vision of Constantine exalted into a symbol of victory, was as yet the instrument of shame; and the conception of Christ as “the divine type of all sorrow and suffering” could not well be “placed in competition with the representatives of the pagan gods”‡ Perhaps the truth is more nearly expressed by Mr. Charles J. Hemans, that this reserve “was imposed by reverential tenderness or the fear of betraying to scorn the great object of faith respecting that supreme sacrifice accomplished on Calvary.”§

A more general consideration must here be noted, however, as affecting the whole style and subject-matter of Christian Art. Pagan art had become sensuous in form, and in spirit

* Lindsay, I., p. 47.

† *Catacombes de Rome*, par Louis Perret; ouvrage publié par ordre et aux frais du Gouvernement sous la direction d’une Commission composée de M. M. Ampère, Ingres, Mesnier, Vitet, membres de L’Institut Paris, Gide et J. Baudry, Editeurs. 1851.

‡ Kügler; *Schools of Painting in Italy*, I., 3.

§ Article on “the Church in the Catacombs,” in the *Contemporary Review* for 1866.

was thoroughly associated with idolatry. Hence Christianity, as a purely spiritual religion, addressing itself not to sense but to faith, and commending an inner life of piety above all forms of devotion, repudiated the existing art as profane and demoralizing. All imitative art, all personal or historical representation, was considered a violation of the second commandment and of the spirit of Christ's Sermon on the Mount. No artist could be admitted to baptism without first renouncing his profession, and if, after joining the church, he took up again the pencil or the chisel, he was excommunicated for what Tertullian denounces as "his iniquitous occupation." But while thus "forbidden by the purely spiritual tendency of the age to indulge in any direct visible expression of sacred objects, the early Christians could nevertheless have recourse to those symbolic representations which intimated the tenor of the new doctrines, without wounding the feelings by any attempt to embody sacred things."*

The most obvious and common symbols were the Lamb and the Vine as emblems of Christ; the Dove, a symbol of the Holy Ghost; the Ship or Ark, of the Church; the Anchor, of Hope; the Lyre, of Praise; the Palm, of Victory. The greatest favorite, however, was the Fish, which symbolized the element of water, and consequently baptism; and the letters of its name were the initials of a sentence which declares the divine mission of Jesus for the redemption of mankind—*Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Σωτὴρ*.

These symbols, as well as the familiar monogram of Christ, X P, were engraved upon rings, gems, and other minor objects of art; and they are enumerated in an epistle of Clement of Alexandria (d. 216) as proper to be worn by Christians. A fine collection of such gems is represented in Perret's work, chiefly from the sacred museum of the Vatican. In times of persecution such symbols served as Masonic signs, for the mutual recognition of believers; and it was enjoined upon Christians never to betray their meaning to a heathen. The resort to pagan mythology for occasional types of Christ, as, for example, Orpheus with his Lyre, representing peace

* Kugler, I., p. 7.

and harmony restored to nature by the Advent, shows the lingering power of old beliefs to influence new and truer convictions.

The earliest remains of Christian art exhibit the supereminence of Christ in the faith of primitive believers. Many of his miracles are portrayed in token of his divine power. Some of the symbols already enumerated point to his supremacy over the physical creation. Upon the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, he appears enthroned above the earth, with the firmament stretched over him as a canopy. Many of the inscriptions of the catacombs, especially the epitaphs of departed believers, expressly declare the divinity of Christ by the formula "*in Christo Deo*," denoting the peaceful rest of the soul in its divine Saviour.* In grouping the disciples or other characters of the Gospels, the place of preëminence is always given to Christ, sometimes with special attributes of power and glory, as where he is crowning the martyred. The *nimbus*, however, is regarded by some writers upon Art as fixing the date of a picture at the fourth century or later.

Among the many heads of Christ which are delineated upon the walls of the Catacombs, two are commonly selected as typical. One of these, upon a ceiling in the Catacomb of St. Calixtus, presents the following characteristics: "The face is oval, with a straight nose, arched eyebrows, and a smooth and rather high forehead; the expression serious and mild; the hair parted on the forehead in the center, and flowing in curls on the shoulders; the beard not thick, but short and divided. The appearance that of a man between thirty and forty years of age."† The other, dimly traced upon a wall of the Catacomb of St. Panziano, is more rigid in style but somewhat more youthful in expression; the beard is less full, but the hair is long and flowing, and parted in the middle. These portraits are of special interest because the absence of the *nimbus* gives them presumptively an early date. But are they portraits of Christ?

Mrs. Jameson demurs at this point, inasmuch as "investi-

* See in Perret, Vols. V., VI.

† Kùgler, *Italian Painters*, p. 16.

gation shows both these pictures to be surrounded with too much obscurity, as to intention and period, to be taken as any safe data."*

In the cemetery of Saints Hermes and Basil, on the Salarian way, is a head of Christ, life-size, with the hair parted in the middle and flowing, a light beard, large eyes, and heavy brows. In the catacomb of St. Pretextat, on the Appian way, is a picture of Christ seated with hands uplifted in the act of benediction; this has both the nimbus and the monogram XP;—and in the cemetery of St. Agnes, on the Nomentane way, is a very feminine head of Christ, in the midst of his disciples, and also a fine head of the classic type, giving him the appearance of a young man, whose beard is scarcely grown. A youth of gentle mien is quite common as the symbolic representation of the Good Shepherd, ordinarily with a lamb upon his shoulders, and two other lambs nestling at his feet; sometimes with a flock of sheep about him, which he guides with his staff or calls with his pipe; all this the commentary of a humble, loving piety upon our Lord's discourse in John x., showing how simply the early Christians lived in his words. Christ was the center and crown of their faith. It is impossible to doubt that article of their theology, after surveying the decorations of the catacombs and deciphering their inscriptions.

The youthful type of countenance was by no means restricted to Christ in these early attempts at Biblical culture. In the catacombs, Noah, Moses, Job, Daniel, Jonah, are sometimes painted with a boyish and even a girlish expression. It is curious also to note the absence of the Jewish type in pictures of the Hebrew race; indeed, this is observable in pictures of Christ and the Virgin through the whole history of art.

Equally significant with the preëminence of our Lord in early Christian art, is the subordinate place assigned for a long period to the Virgin Mary. In some of the oldest known representations of the Nativity she does not appear at all; as, for instance, in the bas-relief of the sarcophagus of S. Celsus at

* *History of our Lord*, Vol. I., p. 16.

Milan, which dates from the fourth century, the infant Jesus is seen lying in the manger under a rude shed—a feature which shows that the tradition of a cave as the scene of the Nativity was not in the mind of the artist; the ox and the ass stand upon either side; no human person whatever appears, but above the hut is seen the bust of an angel, who stretches forth one hand in token of benediction, and in the other holds a cross as a prophecy of redemption.

There are two sarcophagi at Rome, of about the same period, upon which the child is represented lying in the manger, with a covering spread over it, the ox and the ass near by, and, what is very significant, though neither Joseph or Mary appear, two shepherds, identified by their crooks, are standing by, having come to seek the child whose birth had been announced by the angel.

In a painting in the catacombs, the infant Jesus appears, not in the lap of the virgin, but seated alone upon a throne. This ascription of royalty to the *infancy* of Christ, with no recognition of his mother as in any way participating in it, is highly instructive.

Upon a sarcophagus in the Lateran is a representation of the adoration of the Magi, in which the Virgin is quite in the background, simply a historical person belonging to the scene, and looking on with affectionate interest, while the babe is the recipient of a royal homage. A female figure upon one of the monuments of the catacombs, long supposed to be the Virgin Mary, is now known to be the effigy of a Christian wife at the hands of her widowed husband. But after the fourth century the Virgin assumes a greater prominence in art, and has accorded to her a more exalted position—a fact which naturally connects itself with the theological term *θεοτόκος*, “Mother of God,” so much in vogue during the Nestorian controversy. In a Byzantine mosaic, ascribed to the fourth century, the Virgin is represented with the child upon her knees, much in the manner of the Egyptian Isis with the infant Horus. A similar figure in the catacomb of St. Priscilla—a mother suckling the infant upon her knees—may be only a symbol of *Maternity*, since the type of *Virginity* is standing by her side. Such allegorical subjects are not unfrequent in the later art of the catacombs.

The *Kunstkammer* at Berlin contains two carvings in ivory, probably of the fourth century, which are of curious value at this point. In one (No. 30) Christ is represented sitting in a throne-chair, his right hand raised in the act of benediction, his left supporting a volume of the Gospels, at his side Peter and Paul, above at each corner an angel with an emblem. In the other (No. 26), the Virgin appears seated in a chair exactly like the first, supporting in her lap the infant Jesus, who is making with one hand the sign of benediction, while the other holds a book; an angel stands on either side of the Virgin, and in the upper corners are two angels corresponding with those of the first scene. The accessories of ornament are the same in both. Here there is a beginning of the exaltation of Mary, but as yet only in connection with the child Jesus, and with no indication of homage to herself. In the cemetery of St. Hermes and Basil, the Virgin, St. Catharine, and other female saints and martyrs, are all alike surrounded with the nimbus; in groups of holy women in the catacombs, Mary is usually painted somewhat larger than the others, as a sign of precedence, though not of adoration. Indeed, she often stands simply as one among several *orantes*; and Saint Agnes equally with Mary is sometimes pictured in a place of honor, between the apostles Peter and Paul. In one of these groups the Virgin appears holding up the infant Jesus, that he may receive the homage of her companions; but though she holds the central place, the honor is not rendered to her but to the child. In an ancient mosaic in the Church of Mary at Constantinople, the child appears not in the lap of his mother, but on a throne alone. In the subterranean Basilica of St. Clement at Rome, the "niche of the Madonna" contains a picture of the Virgin with the child sitting in her lap holding a scroll in his left hand, while his right is raised in the attitude of blessing. The throne is highly ornamented, and the Virgin wears a jeweled head-dress. It is not pretended, however, that this picture is older than the seventh century; while the so-called "Assumption of the Virgin," in the same Basilica, is certainly as late as the pontificate of Leo IV. In a word, Christian art affords no example of the veneration of Mary prior to the fourth century, and there is no trace of Mariolatry in the catacombs.

It would exceed the limits of this Article, to sketch the history of the Madonna in the later Christian Art, although this would furnish an almost continuous commentary upon phases of theological belief and devotional feeling. The Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, for instance, was the favorite subject of Murillo, because the Franciscan order, in whose service he was, were in his time the zealous champions of this dogma.

The primacy of Peter finds little countenance from the church of the Catacombs. Commonly Peter and Paul appear together, sharing the same dignity—as, for instance, where both are crowned together by our Lord. But after the fourth century, as the Roman usurpation became more audacious in history, the supremacy of Peter begins to appear in art.

It is difficult to mark with precision the period when the Trinity began to be represented in art. Upon a sarcophagus in the Lateran Museum, ascribed to the fourth century, is represented the creation of Eve by Christ the Son, who is identified by well-known symbols; the father seated upon a throne is blessing the woman, and behind the throne is another figure which is assumed to represent the third person of the Trinity. We do not, however, regard the testimony of this representation as decisive. One of the earliest pictorial representations of the Trinity dates from about the ninth century; in this is seen an old man crowned, holding in his outstretched arms a cross upon which the Son is suspended, and over which hovers the Holy Dove. But the several persons of the Trinity appear at a much earlier date, in their distinctive characteristics and offices—the Father commonly represented as an aged man, sometimes in the various acts of creation, sometimes symbolized by a hand in the upper corner of the picture; the Son in his offices of love and works of power upon earth, or enthroned in heavenly majesty; and the Holy Spirit as breathing upon the face of the waters, or descending in the form of a dove at the baptism of Christ, or in the flaming tongues of the Pentacost. In the Church of St. Bassede at Rome, upon the arch of the Tribune, is a Mosaic of the ninth century, which represents the adoration of the Lamb by the heavenly host, and below this, in a second picture, is Christ surrounded by saints, above his head a Hand holding a wreath, and representing the Father

crowning him, and at his side, upon a palm tree, a Phoenix with the sacred halo around its head. Of a somewhat later date, perhaps of the eleventh century, are the Mosaics of St. Mark's at Venice, which represent Christ as the Creator, dividing the light from the darkness, blessing the seventh day, &c., and in each picture he holds a large cross in his right hand. Such pictures are a valuable contribution to the Christology of that period. Farther back, probably of the sixth century, we have an ivory diptych, upon one leaf of which is God the Father, holding before him a scroll inscribed with the words, "I am that I am," and on the other leaf is Christ, a scroll in his left hand, the right raised in the act of benediction. The significance of the hand, as a symbol of the Almighty, is seen in a series of the creation, of an early date, in the museum of the Vatican. In the first two scenes, the creation of the heavenly bodies, and of the trees of Life and Knowledge, the Father appears in full form as a man of mature years; in the third scene, the creation of Adam, only the bust is shown, with the right arm stretched forth over the body just brought into life; and in the next scene, to make room for Eve, who is just emerging from Adam's side, the Creator is withdrawn entirely, with the exception of his hand, which appears in the upper corner of the picture. By grouping together a number of such representations, one may shape an outline of early Christian theology.

The negative lessons of this are hardly less instructive than the positive. We have seen that the worship of the Virgin Mary has no precedent in the pictures of the catacombs. Neither do we find there the sacrifice of the Mass, nor priestly offices of intercession between the soul and God. No trace of purgatory is found upon those walls consecrated to Christian faith and hope. The departed sleep in Jesus, they are "in peace with Christ." Indeed the cheerful, hopeful love of these pictures, the avoidance of the gloomy and painful, and especially of those martyr scenes which were a prominent subject of later art, is in wonderful accord with the spirit of the Gospel.

We have spoken of the absence of scenes of our Lord's passion from this oldest gallery of Christian art. The sacrament of the supper is an occasional subject, but the Love

Feast is more frequent. Possibly the Eucharist was concealed from the view of the pagan world, as too sacred and awful a mystery; but as early as the second century it was symbolized by the bread and the fish, so common upon the monuments. In the Platonian catacomb is almost the solitary representation which the catacombs furnish of the crucifixion; a Christ-head with outstretched arms nailed to the cross, an impressive painting, probably among the later works of that primitive art. But scenes of the resurrection, and pictures and inscriptions declaring the beatific state of the departed, are very common. It has been beautifully said, that "not one expression of bitter or vindictive feeling, not one utterance of the sorrow that is without hope, can be read upon these monumental pages; the utmost sign of grief is the occasional *dolens*, in an epitaph." In contrast with Cicero's vague and unsatisfactory consolations upon the death of his daughter, and his uncertain hopes of immortality, as expressed in the essay on old age, the positive and cheerful faith of the humble, unlettered Christians who buried their dead in the subterranean caverns of Rome, is like that voice of God for which Plato longed, breaking the silence of the hereafter. Cicero burned the body of his friend Cato, with a loving tender care for his ashes, and longed to follow his soul to "the divine company and assemblage of spirits;" but the Christian believer reverently kept the body in hope of the resurrection of the dead, and regarded the soul as already with Christ in his glory. Thus upon one tomb in the catacombs, we see the anchor, the dove, and the olive branch, together with the monogram of Christ; on another, Daniel unhurt in the lion's den, the three youths walking through the fiery furnace, and the resurrection of Lazarus. Here we read, "Dionysus in Pace," there "Teudora in Pace," and her effigy is painted with a face of rapture, the veil thrown back, the eyes uplifted in the expression of prayer;—everywhere the symbols and mottoes of a triumphant faith. "It is indeed, in the aggregate, a grand and affecting ideal of primitive Christianity, that this monumental series, painted, sculptured, and chiseled, presents to us—a moral picture of purity and peace, earnestness without fanaticism—mystic ordinances undegraded by superstition, true devotion manifest in the supreme sacrifice

of the heart, the mind, and life. The varied and mystic illustration of sacraments, the select representation of such miracles as convey lessons of divine goodness and love, or confirm belief in immortal life, may be said to revolve around one subject, that dominates like a star whose hallowed light illuminates the entire sphere—namely, the Personal Office of the Redeemer, towards whom all hope and faith tend, from whom proceed all power, all strengthening and consoling virtue.”*

Such a testimony to the early power of the Gospel, to the simple, earnest faith and piety of its primitive confessors, to its cardinal truth of the Incarnation, and its glorious hope through the resurrection of the dead, should be made familiar to students in our colleges, not as a curious fragment of the history of Beliefs, but as a preliminary chapter in the history of modern civilization. While the old world was slowly sinking to decay, there were deposited in the tombs of the saints, under the soil of ancient Rome, seeds of thought, of faith, of life, which in after ages germinated in a civilization that made all art and philosophy, all civil and social life, subservient to the visible expression of Christianity.

For these purposes of illustration, a Museum, like that of Professor Piper at Berlin, might be established, for instance, in the Art Building of Yale College, at no extravagant cost. The valuable collection of Mediæval art in the Jarves Gallery, already deposited there, is a foundation for a Christian Museum, such as exists nowhere else in this country, and could hardly be provided in any capital of Europe.

Most fortunate is Yale College in having become the possessor of a treasure, whose value will increase with the centuries. If this shall now be supplemented by works illustrating the earlier times of Christian Art, the “STREET School of Fine Arts” will fulfill in this department the noble intention of its founder, both as a practical School of Art, and through the educational power of Art, in History and in Faith.

* Mr. C. J. Hemans in the “Contemporary Review.”

ARTICLE III.—REVIEW OF ROBERT COLLYER'S SERMONS ON NATURE AND LIFE.

Nature and Life. Sermons by ROBERT COLLYER, Pastor of Unity Church, Chicago. Fifth edition. Boston: Horace B. Fuller. Chicago: John R. Walsh. 1867. (This book is "dedicated to NOAH AUGUSTUS STAPLES, now in Heaven—as a token of undying love").

AND who is Robert Collyer, many will be inclined to ask, as they read the caption of this Article; although some claim that he has already and deservedly acquired a national reputation. The volume before us was first issued in May, 1867, and within six months reached its fifth edition. Mr. Collyer excels most Unitarian preachers and authors so much, in earnestness and practical adaptedness of effort, as to have become almost at once a man of mark in his own denomination; and many of quite other views are, in their ignorance of his, too much disposed to think of him with a degree not only of tolerance, but even of favor, entirely unwarranted by any just Scriptural measurement of his style of preaching.

He was born in England, of Methodist parentage, some forty years ago or more; where, as he says, "he sat in a simple country church on every Sunday morning, joining in the old liturgies, that in one form or another had been said and sung ever since the Saxon embraced the Christian faith," (p. 221). But a few years since he was a blacksmith at Chelton Hills, near Philadelphia, and a Methodist lay-preacher of ability and zeal. Under the influence of Lucretia Mott, it is said, and of Rev. Dr. Furness, he ere long embraced rationalistic sentiments, and is now the chief pulpit-orator of the Unitarian Church, at any rate out of New England and New York. He has a mind full of poetic sensibility and fire, and is tenderly touched by points of domestic interest and scenes of natural beauty. He abounds also in patriotism, and in large human sympathies of whatever sort, in reference especially to the

visible griefs and troubles of mankind. He is a man of well developed physique and has all the momentum in him of vigorous health and strength; and is withal a man of pleasing address as a speaker. He talks right out of his experience, such as it is, and is quite communicative of all sorts of facts in his personal history,—his youthful home, his parents, his early struggles in life, his travels, his sight-seeing, his literary reading, and his conversations here, there, and everywhere. The topics that he selects, while often quaintly couched in form, are yet for substance well adapted to the every-day experiences of his hearers. No wonder then that his more cold and classical compeers in the East should hail with gladness the appearance of this new flaming star of rationalism in the West! And what a sad commentary is it upon the yet unsanctified mass of literary readers, that a little or rather a strong spice of skeptical speculation or surmise gives, in their view, such a fancied value to works of Literature, Science, and Philosophy, as to add greatly at once to their popularity! At what a discount, except with a select few, do writings transfused with evangelical sentiment stand in the market, not merely of the world, but also of the best parts of even Christian America.

Who, then, and what is Robert Collyer? By his words let him be justified, or by his words let him be condemned. A true critic is, and is only, both theoretically and etymologically a true judge. Mere fault-finding, in whatever elegance of language it may be expressed, is as pitiful in its subject as it is mean towards its object. The truth is good enough when it is good, and bad enough when it is bad, to need no extraneous additions to its substance. With naught of malice but much regret we write what we do concerning Mr. Collyer—because, with such tripping ruthlessness, he invades the great immortal interests of our common humanity.

To do him justice, and the community of readers before whom he appears for favor, he must be looked at,

I. In a literary way,

II. In a moral, theological, and pastoral way.

I. That Robert Collyer has been well endowed by his Maker cannot be doubted. He not only has a strong relish for the

beautiful, and a quick perception of its presence and its charms, in his walks through "nature and life," but he knows well how to communicate what he sees and feels to others. Poetry and literature form indeed a much larger and more significant part of the woof of his discourses, than Scriptural words or truths themselves; and those discourses are rather literary essays in their style of construction than sermons.

He uses often obsolete, provincial, cant, and even slang words. "The heaviest proportion of *shard* and refuse," (p. 3 and p. 7): "He giveth snow like wool to *hap* the shivering seed," (p. 54): "Foremost of all shadows, of a greater *bale* or blessing," (p. 220): "A figure *carven* in stone," (p. 221): "Born of the mere *spume* of the tempest," (p. 51): "The cube or the *superfice*," (p. 36): "To *spume out* his temper," (p. 228): "*Bereaven* of my children," (p. 63): "The Greeks, the most inquisitive and *newwy* race on the earth," (p. 4): "I come to assure you afresh of the *immanence* of Heaven," (p. 51): "A gem of exquisite outline and *inline*," (p. 50): "Isaiah has a noble image of the truth *fruitening* the heart," (p. 47): "His light *goldenened* all the way," (p. 18):—these are specimens of "the free and easy" way with which he handles "the king's English." Specimens of uncount and slang words and phrases are such as these: "I have got hold of a *lop-sided* truth, when I make earth nought," &c., (p. 301): the fact that "I am not to be *hustled* through my life," (p. 304): "The atheist shall *gulp* down his sneer," (p. 13): "*Sloppy* days," (p. 44): "Job could not *deadened down* to the level of his misery," (p. 63): "His estimate was as much *out of true* as the man was," (p. 95): "All he need do is just to *leave-go* of the stroke-oar," (p. 122): "Moses *headed* the great Exodus," (p. 236): "Now Job, what is the use of your whining: you know that you are an old pewter Pecksniff, with not one grain of real silver about you," (p. 64): "Jolting and rocking for days on the back of a *grunting* camel," (p. 299): "Whose children had all *been down* with Scarlet Fever," (p. 230): "The common *run* of men," (p. 188): "The young man must see life or be a *spoon*," (p. 195): "It *uncentres* a man," (p. 189): "When a life has *trued* itself," (p. 166): "Death when the Sin is done—death, *right along*;" "You can beg

enough corn to *put you through* the Winter," (p. 188): "Religious men who let their affairs *lie round loose*," (p. 298).

Rhetorical rules are sacrificed in the following instances, and in some of them grammatical. "We shall never cease to hear the voice of God in *the clang* of the sea *booming* among the rocks," (p. 272): "On some high day of the soul, *he fills* with a great sense of his relation to God; and *the one spark* has lighted up," &c., (p. 270): "All *afire* with the beauty and *salt* of truth," (p. 268): "They believed heaven was only *a little ways* out through the blue," (p. 248): "What they see is not me," (p. 5): "In that one small thing is hidden both angels," (p. 172): "Certainty reaching through change, and the flutter of a fledgling's heart *welded* fast to immutable law," (p. 121).

In his discourse on "The Hither Side," he uses the word "glory" thirty-three times, and the phrase "glow and glory" twice, and once the phrase "the glory shone most gloriously." This cannot certainly be called the highest style of literary effort.

II. But let us look at Robert Collyer, as he shows himself to us, in a moral, theological, and pastoral way, in his writings. A man may reveal himself as a religious thinker, as much by what he does not say, as by what he does, in certain places inviting and demanding the full and earnest presentation of God's uttered will. Silence is sometimes indeed golden; and sometimes it is fearfully ominous of evil. Not to speak God's word, when consenting or assuming to be his ambassador to mankind—his whole word, without fear or favor—is as treacherous to both heaven and earth, as to open one's mouth and speak one's own will, instead of God's. In either case the false prophet tampers with the authority of his Maker, and the eternal interests of his fellow-men. Unitarianism is in the hands of Robert Collyer the same system of denials, and of purposed silences, as everywhere else. What God declares he either repeats not at all, or, if he echoes it to his hearers, it is in such an altered shape as justifies his silence elsewhere, and as that silence itself demands. Not to the conscience of the sinner, or, his deep, inward sense of moral hurt and of moral want, comes he with the sword of gospel truth, or with true

gospel balm. His appeal is made simply to the good sense, and the kind feelings, and the correct taste, and the tender sensibilities of his audience. It is worldly wisdom that he brings them, his own, seasoned with that of scores of others, whom he loves to quote—to make them the more successful in their business, the more happy in their homes, and the more fond of books, and flowers, and friends. No one could by any possibility ever be awakened under such false preaching to any anxiety concerning his moral condition and his eternal state; and if any one, whose moral instincts and convictions had been aroused elsewhere against his past life, should come to him with the question,—“Sir, what shall I do to be saved?” he would be told, with much soft speech, that “good people always go to heaven, and that he need not be concerned: he was good enough as he was, to go there.”

“He is no gospel-minister,” he says (p. 26), “who will willfully discourse of discouragement. We do not come to church to be told that we are withered leaves and crawling worms, but to be assured that we are men, made only a little lower than the angels and heirs of the everlasting life. We come to the preacher, to hear what will help us sing,—to realize what there is beside and better than fading and falling. There is not a man of us that does not encounter quite enough on week-days, to dishearten him in being compelled to listen to ‘Thus saith the world,’ without being discouraged on a Sunday by ‘Thus saith the Lord.’” The key-note of all his preaching is expressed in the following verses, which, with six others like them, are to be found (p. 82) at the end of his sermon on “Light on a hidden way.”

“I say to thee, do thou repeat
To the first man that thou shalt meet,
In lane, highway, or open street—

That he and we and all men move,
Under a canopy of love,
As broad as the blue sky above;

And we, on diverse shores now cast,
Shall meet, when this dark storm is past,
Safe in our Father's home at last.”

The one great doctrine of God's fatherhood, beautiful in all its relations to all other truths, but not out of those relations or with one of them impaired, is the one only doctrine of his religious creed—not only absorbing every other, but destroying its sense, and scope, and life.

His writings justify and require the following charges against him :

I. He sets up, whether directly or indirectly, false, practical standards and tests of character.

While appearing as a Christian preacher, or as a preacher—to think of him as he thinks of himself—of Christianity in its most improved and “liberal” form, he nowhere takes the attitude of a message-bearer from God to man. The spirit of duty is not presented anywhere, as the heart's chosen tie of affection to its Maker. That God has any laws for his creatures, any moral laws, as high as heaven and as deep as hell in their claims and sanctions, no one would ever guess, who received the truth from his lips.

Behold how he not merely spreads the veil of forgetfulness over the sins of an erring brother man, but exalts him to the highest praise—although utterly oblivious of all God's claims upon his service in his daily life. “There is nothing more touching to me in all literature,” he says (pp. 11-2), “than those poems and letters of Burns, that reveal to us the great fact of adverse influences perfecting the Divine purpose. We hear eminent critics deplore the fact that Burns wasted his powers. They say, he ought to have written an epic. Friends, Burns did write an epic; and the subject was, the battle of a soul with its physical, social, and spiritual adversaries; and it trembles all over with this truth, of a life found in the losing and lost in the finding. Born in the worst period and place of a fossilized Calvinism, he drew from that very fossil the richest nurture for a broad and catholic trust in the Infinite Love. More selfish than most sinners, he was more unselfish than almost any saint. And well he might have cried out, let no man look at me who wants to see me; or try to find the result of my life by the measure of what he sees! I shall die broken down by poverty, and sorrow, and sin; but I shall

rise again and 'lead captivity* captive and receive gifts for men.'"

So, in speaking of Walter Scott (pp. 308-9) he says: "His poems were but the forerunners of his best novels; and these novels are the crown of glory on his life. If, instead of driving and draining his genius like a slave, he had waited reverently for its welling; then, when the sweet waters ran freely, had turned them into the golden channels of great books, for the blessing of the world, he ought to have written his last books, as he wrote his first—as *he was moved by the Holy Ghost.*"

To how many will such language seem to border on blasphemy? Compare with such a strange estimate, to say the least, of the divine inspiration of Scott, in writing his novels, Carlyle's honest and decided condemnation of the moral tone and influence of his writings. "Station in society," he says, "solid power over the good things of this world, was Scott's avowed object; towards which the precept of precepts is that of Iago—'*put money in thy purse.*'" Perhaps no literary man of any generation has less value than Scott, for the immaterial part of his mission in any sense—for the spiritual purport of his work, whether it tended hitherward or thitherward, or had any tendency whatever; in this nineteenth century our highest literary man, who immeasurably, beyond all others, commanded the world's ear, had, as it were, no message to deliver to the world; wished not the world to elevate itself, to amend itself, to do this or to do that, except simply pay him for the books that he kept writing." Such is the man, that the popular haranguer at Chicago audaciously declares to have written his novels, *as he was moved by the Holy Ghost*—lowering the idea of inspiration to the level of Scott's aimless ardor of thought, or exalting his weak material conceptions of life to the superhuman plane of thoughts and feelings breathed into the heart from above.

How easily can such a man speak of that fear which Christ bids every man to have, when he says, "Fear him, who after

* In this application of words, appropriate only to the Saviour in his high official work, to a mere mortal, and one conspicuous for his sins, Mr. Collyer, as in several like instances shows, conclusively the nature of his feelings with regard to the Scriptures and their author.

he hath destroyed the body, hath power to cast into hell,"—as a "low, coarse, hell-fire fear, (p. 183)—the fear described in a quotation that every preacher of this school can repeat to you, as readily as he can repeat the beatitudes; and which is sure to find a place in the revival season, which indeed would be incomplete without it."

All Mr. Collyer's dead are sent also with an easy dash of the pen, to heaven. Young and old, soldiers and civilians, all go at once "where angels gather immortality by life's fair stream, fast by the throne of God." (See pp. 291, 279, and 215). "God's finger touched a soldier at Fort Donelson—and he slept: and

" The great intelligencers, fair,
That range above our mortal state,
In circle round the blessed gate,
Received and gave him welcome there."

This is quite in the style of our vaporizing orators, on the Fourth of July, who send with a whiff of eloquence any of the heroes of the Revolution whose names they mention, and Jefferson with them, unto "the abode of the blessed." How easy is it for such a preacher, with such weak views of the moral differences of human character and conduct, to call "the pleasantness of sweeping through the snow (p. 58) in sleighs and good company *a means of grace by no means to be despised.*" No wonder that he can talk with such tripping lightness of feeling to his people from his pulpit, which ought to be at times a throne of thunder to them as at others of light and beauty; but never "the seat of the scorner" or a stage for the trifler. In speaking (p. 228) of "a tired, irritable man, returning to his home at the end of the day, carrying his dark face into the parlor, snapping his wife, pushing aside his children," &c., he says: "He eats a moody dinner, takes a cigar—*bitter I hope, and serves him right*—takes a book, too, —*not Charles Lamb or Charles Dickens, I warrant you,*"—&c. * * * * The Bible pictures human nature and human society as altogether wanting in themselves in divine elements of character, before God. "They are all gone out of the way: there is none that doeth good: no not one," But to Mr. Collyer's eye "the shadows of healing (p. 229) are

far more and better than the shadows that hurt." "I am not here," he says, "to cramp life and nature, and to tell you it is harder to cast a shadow of blessing than of bane. The nature of the shadow springs from the nature of the tree; and in this world the upas and the poison-vine are only here and there; while the oak and the apple stand by every cottage door. Into the vast majority of homes, all over the earth, the husband and father comes when the day is done, like the inpouring of a new life. The wise men who came only in the shadow of a star, did well to bring gold and frankincense and myrrh, to insure their welcome where the child lay; but the shepherds who bore with them the shadow and song of the angels needed no other gift." If such is a true gospel view of "the vast majority of homes, all over the earth," how could Paul ever rightly say: "For many walk of whom I have told you often, and now tell you even weeping, that they are the enemies of the cross of Christ; whose end is destruction, whose God is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame; who mind earthly things."—Phil. iii. 18.

2. He directly disparages Christ, while yet professing to preach him and his gospel. In his sermon entitled "Root and Flower" (p. 5) he says, putting these words as if into Christ's own mouth, "The root is not the flower. This common foot-sore man, with this poor brown face, so thin and worn that men think I may be nearly fifty, while I am still but thirty—What can I be to men whose ideal is Apollo? I cannot sing with Homer; I cannot speculate with Plato; I cannot unloose the seals with Euclid; or bear men on the mighty tides of eloquence with Demosthenes. Phidias made the marble speak; Apelles made the canvas glow; I made ploughs, and carts, and ox-yokes, and stools." This is the first introduction of Christ to us in his pages, that "most celestial soul," as he calls him (p. 7) in the same connection. Farther on (pp. 96-7) he speaks of him in the same style, saying: "He had no royal training, no waiting sceptre, no kingly palace, but the tender nurture of a noble mother, and from the first, a wonderful nearness to God—and that was all." On p. 159 he describes Christ's first miracle at Cana of Galilee, and it is in this wise: "He sits apart from the merry-

making, there is not much that he cares for: but at last there is one thing—the bridegroom, an old friend, probably, is about to be ashamed and humiliated to the whole country-side. He saves him from that shame and humiliation. I care not a pin about whether it was water or wine they had; but here, at the opening of a gospel, is the story of one, who, for “Auld lang Syne,” will not let his friend hang his head ashamed. It is the first spark to be detected of the greatest fire that ever burned in a soul. Once started it caught,—here a cripple; there a blind man; here a widow, there a madman; leaping from one to another, growing white and full, deep and intense with what it fed on, until it burnt through the very asbestos of the grave.” On p. 203 he calls him “the most noble and tender of all souls.” In his sermon on “Root and Flower,” cited above, he gives four specimens in one connected view of a poor dry root ending in a bright precious flower. And what a combination of names and ideas to be brought together into one category of praise! Who can write or repeat them, without shuddering at the desecration of the kingly name and authority of the Redeemer of the world? They are these: Jesus Christ, whose imaginary speech about his own inability to equal the celebrated heathen of his and elder days, has been already quoted (pp. 4–16); and Charlotte Brontë. “out on the Yorkshire moors;” “dear, quaint, loving Charles Lamb;” and Robert Burns, over whose moral life and its benefits to himself and others, such mock parade is made by him, as shown already. In summing up the lesson taught by these examples he says (p. 16): “I know of nothing more fatal in all outward seeming than Jewry to Christ and Ayrshire to Burns, and Fleet Street to Lamb, and Haworth to Charlotte Brontë. If God in every one of these instances had revealed to me the conditional as the root of the resulting life, I think I should have besought him every time to alter the decision and *not plant such holy and noble natures* in such a dismal soil.” Is the Christ of whom he prates such gibberish, as he “stands in the porch between the living and the dead,” and should sometimes at least stand “weeping there,”—that “Brightness of the Father’s glory and express image of his Person,” that “Light which lighteneth every man that cometh

into the world ;" "before whom every knee shall one day bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father," of whom not only the precepts and prayers, and praises of prophets and apostles, but all history also and heaven and earth themselves are full? He who can mingle the names of Jesus Christ and Robert Burns in the same breath of praise has no message from above to bring to his fellow-men worth the hearing. While standing up boldly in the name of Christ before his fellows, as if coming to them with his will, his whole will and nothing but his will, he founds what he has to say, or fortifies and adorns it much more with what he obtains from Coleridge, Burns, Gray, James Hogg, John Foster, Milton, Samuel Johnson, Dr. Reid, Charles Lamb, Thackeray, Leigh Hunt, Hazlitt, Sydney Smith, Dickens, Ruskin, Prescott, Channing, Goethe, and Richter, than with the plain quickening and decisive words of the Divine Master whose servant he professes to be.

3. He disparages the Bible—at times the whole of it, and at others, various parts of it in particular

In speaking of the imprecatory Psalms of David—of which, including all parts of the Scripture with them, as they were gathered together in one in Christ's day, and as they are still preserved to us, the Saviour says: "I came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfill them," &c. and of which Paul said: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God," &c.; he says, "You have every right (p. 266) to try to explain them away; but it is like biting a file, at once useless and destructive of a precious gift of God. Your trouble rises out of your claim of entire inspiration of the divine holy spirit* through the whole book. We have no such trouble, because we make no such claim. We claim, the holy spirit inspired what is holy and pure, and tender, and true, beautiful, and good, and manly and womanly; but if there is a part of the book, hard, unmerciful, vindictive, or ungodly, on the plain

* The words, "holy spirit," "scripture," &c. are printed here, as in Mr. Collyer's text, in small letters. Burns and Dickens are in capitals, but not the Holy Spirit. "The Cottor's Saturday Night" is full of capitals, but Scripture is a word that runs low with this clerical rationalist. Even "straws show which way the wind blows."

wholesome interpretation of those terms, as we live by them, then, the holy spirit did not inspire that but the unholy spirit; and if you want scripture I repeat for you those words of the disciple: 'Beloved, believe not every Spirit, but try the Spirits whether they be of God.' So (p. 273) he says again, "the vindictive Psalms will die out; we shall put them aside; they are nothing to us, or we to them; we could do better without them to-day." He concludes however that "none of these things can trouble us, when we come with a sweet, wholesome, frankness to this great book, and enter into the spirit and power of its utterances, *wherever they chord with the longings and aspirations of the soul*;" just as in the same way and to the same degree, we might get advantage from the best parts of Shakespeare. He is roaming about in this passage, as in many kindred ones in his book, in that hazy atmosphere of which he speaks in a discourse on "Hope" (p. 135), "affirming"—which he claims as a special matter of "credit to the *liberal* faith,"—"that there is an infinite truth over and above the Bible, into which all men are welcome to penetrate, who will or can—so opening the vista of a blessed and boundless hope to the always unsatisfied mind and soul.

In "A talk to Mothers" (p. 211) he quotes, "A good and great man, whose children are remarkable for nobility and beauty," as "saying to him once in a letter, I count a great part of the grace in my children, from a new reading of the old commandment. I read it always, 'Parents obey your children in the Lord, for this is right.'" Then adds Mr. Collyer, "That I conceive to be especially the true reading for you, mothers." And why not, if Bible truth has but a nose of wax on its face! Why not turn it one way or another, as you list, to suit anybody's whim, or to amuse any one with a joke. In speaking of different forms of the fear of God (p. 183) he says: "The first and lowest form is a fear of him as a jailer and executioner, who stands and waits until that sure detective, Death, shall hunt the criminal down, and bring him into court (where by the way, there is no jury—*a thing that certainly would not be omitted if these Western nations had written the Bible.*") Does not every drop of Puritan blood in a man's veins run cold, at the reading of such awful trifling

with the Word of God, by one who offers to be its formal expounder to as many as will come to hear it at his mouth; and many deluded ones does he draw away from the sincere milk and strong meat of the true word of God!

Behold what he says of Job (p. 72): "I cannot be satisfied with the last words which some later hand has added to the book that holds this sad history." Where does God anywhere say he will pause in his works or word, for any man to become satisfied! Is not the truth always what it is, without our endorsement or reception of it? A pantheistic essayist of our day, remarkable for his many apothegmatic sayings, is said to have remarked that "he accepted the universe as it is." What would the universe have done, if he had happened, in his great wisdom, to reject it? Mr. Collyer goes on to say: "They tell us how Job has all his property doubled, to the last ass and camel; has seven sons again, and three daughters; has entire satisfaction of all his accusers; lives a hundred and forty years; sees four generations of his life; and then dies satisfied. Need I say that this *solution will not stand the test of life*; that if life on the average came out so from its most trying ordeal, there would be little need for sermons like this." Here is his great hermeneutical appliance for knowing what to receive and what to reject, that demands his reverential and obedient regard as the word of God. Not his very Maker can come with a command before him, or, if he can bring it about, before anybody else, except through the narrow door, whose key he himself holds, of "*the test of life*." Of scientific exegesis he has none, nor does he seem to feel the need of any. Of such as he has, which is of the most flexible and accommodating character, the two poles are such *poetical conceptions of any text, or associations with it*, as shall serve to give it sparkle and flavor, and the application to any unpleasant sense of any passage of "*the test of life*."

Of the Book of Ecclesiastes, he says (p. 89): "If you take this book as it stands, and undertake to believe it, the result is very sad. It chills all piety, paralyzes all effort, hushes all prayer." "In the deepest meaning of the truth and the life, this assertion that all is vanity is utterly untrue. It is no matter to me that the man who wrote it is sometimes called

'the wisest man;' that he was in deadly earnest about it; that it was his own woful experience; and if you could add to this that an angel had come from heaven to reaffirm it. All this is gossamer *before the conviction of every wholesome and healthy mind*, that in this universe there is an infinitely different meaning." "Love, says Solomon, is strong as death (p. 146); but the instant we read that, we say, Solomon does not reach the mark in his definition, any more than he did in his life; for, in the history of humanity, millions of proofs have been given, that love is stronger than death."

Of the Psalms he says (p. 257): "St. Athanasius has preserved the tradition, that the present collection of 150 was made out of 3000 Psalms, that were at that time getting themselves said and sung in old Jewry; from which we may infer, that bad verse and pretended inspiration is by no means the result of modern degeneracy. It is a selection of sacred poems from a great mass (p. 260) containing marks of carelessness that would ruin the reputation of any editor in our own time; with no particular certainty about the authorship, or when the book was collected, or who did it, or when men pronounced it of such divine authority, or who authorized them to do so, and whether some of the best among the 2850 rejected Psalms ought not to have been retained, at any rate in preference to those that are twice printed." The proof that those which we have are inspired, he bases entirely on the two facts of their "*perennial life and universal adaptation*;" which would prove as well the inspiration of any of the great poems of every age and nation. No wonder that on such a sliding scale of ideas, obedient to the power, at any moment, of any passing whim or sudden theological want, whether for offense or defense, the power to work miracles of healing, delegated to the apostles, can be put in a grotesque light, as in the following passage (p. 216): "They had done very great wonders, under the pressure of that power, for which we use the word miracle; though it is about as indefinite, as the Indian term 'big medicine.'"

4. He disparages and ridicules the great leading doctrines of the Bible. Like his denominational confederates, generally,

he deals but little in direct doctrinal statements; like them he is fond of uttering slants against the positive views of Bible-truth, declared by those of evangelical faith.

He thus speaks of the fall of our first parents (p. 48): "John Foster, great man as he was, lived in the belief, that this fair world was wrecked and ruined in the biting of an apple; that a man and woman, as inexperienced as two babies, were placed in a position to do a mischief, for which I am at a loss to find a comparison. I thought of myself as placing my five-year-old boy on the locomotive of a great train, and giving him the lever with a strong temptation to turn it, and a strict command to let it alone; then leaving him to his own devices, and the passengers to their doom. He (John Foster) could permit his soul to be bolted fast in a prison, so dark that the very stars in heaven were no better to him than a great penitentiary and graveyard." "I am led to wonder," he says also, "sometimes (p. 223) whether it was not the best thing after all, for those first parents to plunge in as they did, and get done with their Paradise, if they must; rather than keep the word of promise to the ear, and break it to the sense."

Of the final and eternal perdition of the ungodly, his utterances are such as these: "If you can bring a man to believe (p. 184) that God is to this dreadful penalty what the soul is to the body, what the burning is to the fire—the very life of the eternal torture—replying 'never! never! never!' to every cry out of the pit, of 'Oh, when will this agony be over?' then you have a fear of God in that man, beside which the fear of a slave toward a cruel driver is a pleasant, frisky thing; and such a fear can have but one of two results; it places him in a bitter, hopeless, blasphemous atheism, or it forces him into a slavish, crouching abject submission; where every free and noble aspiration is lost in the one great hunger, to be on good terms with such a dreadful master. The pagan on this plane of belief is wiser than the Christian. He says boldly, that the doer of this is the *evil* spirit; and so he tries to be on good terms with him. But wherever such a fear has a real place in the soul of man or woman, African, Indian, or Saxon, in that soul the love of God, or even a true fear of God, is utterly out of the question.

It destroys every fair blossom of the soul: it leaves nothing to ripen, nothing beautiful even to live." But who will "flee from the wrath to come," if he does not first thoroughly believe in the existence of its terrors? Who will appreciate or even accept God's mercy, but he who has previously felt how just God is in all the requirements and sanctions of his law, and how glorious in his justice?

Again he says (p. 297): "'It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God;' it would be unspeakably more fearful not to fall into his hands. I have heard preachers often try to make sin fearful, by proclaiming a torture of fire for it; but the most fearful fire I ever heard of was one in which there was no torture; where a man had lain down on a lime-kiln, and the vapor had come up and destroyed all feeling, and then the fire; and when morning came, what the fire had touched was charred bone, and the man never knew it—never knew it, or he would have been saved." "It is a horrible thing to teach (pp. 168-9) that the Almighty made even the fiends only to torment us, to lead us wrong and lure us down; and then at last to listen while they send up yells of fierce laughter over our hapless misery. What I do I must stand by; no doubt of that, if I will not take refuge in the infinite pity and pardon. The wages of sin is death—death when the sin is done, death right along: the deadening and darkening of all I might have been, had I done right, right on. But when the angels above me are powerless: when my mother's love, and my father's faith, and wife and children and friends, all fail: when all the great influences from heaven fail, and I *will* rush on and down,—then the angels come from below, in terrible shapes, perhaps, and armed with dire torments; *but they come to save me and mean to save me.*"

And what says this ungodly dreamer of the Atonement? Much, sadly much, in every way. "I do not wonder," he says (p. 186), "that Paul, standing where he did, should be so filled with enthusiasm by it, and should run all over the world to tell it, with strong crying and tears. To Paul, educated in the belief that a sacrifice was imperative, this was a wonderful revelation—the awful debt paid—paid by the son

in the gift of his life. Yet (p. 187)* when we come to question the system, it will not stand. The moment you open the idea with the master-key of the fatherhood of God, you begin to see that it cannot be true. It is the father punishing the brother who is innocent, for the brother who is guilty." Yes! we admit it, if the brother punished is only the brother of the one thereby absolved, and no more; and if he is punished involuntarily on his part. "You cannot help seeing," he adds, "that, however willing the brother may be to bear, it is against the nature of true greatness in the father to inflict the penalty. It is no more *right* to do so, than it was right to punish the French page for the fault of the French prince. If it was right that Christ should bear your sins in his own body on the tree, it will be right for you to punish the elder child in your home, the next time the younger breaks into some mad freak of temper. Besides, this doing wrong with the sure conviction that some one must suffer for it, and then crouching down behind another while he bears the blow; this running into a debt, that you are sure another will have to pay; this lying on the shady side of the barn, all through the summer, because you know you can beg enough corn, to put you through the winter, from the man who toils all day in the hot sun, and who loves you so well—good merciful man that he is—that you are sure he will not let you starve;—does not appear to me to be the best way, to promote a stout, deep, steady, personal manliness." Was ever the great and precious doctrine of justification, by faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, more grossly travestied? and that by one claiming to be, with others like him in his opinions, altogether in advance of the great mass of the Christian Church in all ages hitherto? The atonement of Christ has such a representative value, in the eye of the great Law-giver of heaven and earth, and is such a manifestation of regard for his law, by both the Father and the Son—the one offering and the other receiving it—that God can by accepting it, in lieu of the repentant sinner's deserved

* Here he applies the negative pole of his exegesis, such as it is, to the matter in hand—or, "*the test of life*." And what an all-revealing touchstone it seems to be—to himself!

and otherwise needful punishment, remit the penalty of his broken law, and yet sustain that law, which has in it the life of his moral universe, unimpaired.

5. He makes, in effect, a complete burlesque of the great, divinely ordained duties of life, on the right or wrong performance of which the balances of human destiny are hung.

He undertakes to present in three separate discourses, those three "abiding" or immortal and soul-saving elements of character—"faith, hope, and charity"—in which lies the very marrow of the gospel, in respect to what man, each and every man, is to do and to have, in order to be acceptable to God. "Faith, which works by love and purifies the heart," contains in it all that there is of subjective Christianity. To lead each hearer to the voluntary and earnest procurement of this heart treasure is the end of all preaching, as to obtain and augment it in the soul is the end of all hearing of the word. "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" "He who hath this hope purifieth himself, even as he is pure."

What now saith Mr. Collyer of that faith, "without which" Paul tells us that "it is impossible to please God;" and concerning which, he also says, that they who have it "declare plainly that they seek a better country, that is, a heavenly; wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God; for he hath prepared for them a city." Taking Abraham as an example of true faith, he says (p. 102): "He was possessed by two great ideas: one was to make a new home; the other, to fill that home with children and so become the founder of a family." No! Abraham had but one idea in life and that was to obey God in all things; and everything else, including Isaac, family, and home, were of no account, relatively, in his sight. And what was the faith which he had? Repose, sweet, complete repose of heart in the character, will, and word, and work of God. So say we! but what says the "liberal" voice at Chicago. It was "faith," he says, "in the future" (p. 104): "he endured everything and did everything with *this faith in his heart—that there was sure to be success at the end.*" "What a mighty thing as a motive power this faith must be! If a man is possessed by it, that something can be done, in

some sure sense it is done, already, and only waits its time to come into visible existence, in the best way it can" (p. 105). This is faith in "time and tide;" faith in "the progress of events;" faith in "pluck;"—such faith as Daguerre had, in developing the idea and the fact of photography; Goodyear in vulcanizing india rubber and working it thereby into shape at his will; Cyrus W. Field, in persisting in the effort to unite the two hemispheres with chords of light, and life under the deep. But has such faith, however heroic, any converting power upon the heart of its possessor? He distinguishes faith from fancy and fatalism. The former he illustrates by the example of a lad who should say in the dawn of his life (p. 107): "I am going to be a merchant prince, or a metropolitan preacher, and then should crib his lessons, shirk his duties, and conduct himself, generally, as a loafer; or, should purpose a plan of his life at thirty, on the theory that this world, with all its treasures, is a sort of big sweet orange he can suck with an endless gusto; and then give Lazarus the skin." That he does not call "*a faith in the world and life.*" The latter, fatalism, is such as they have (p. 109) "who glance at the world and life, through the night-glass of Mr. Buckle. When a hard pinch comes, they smoke their pipe and refer it to Allah; or cover their face and refer it to Allah; but never fight it out inch by inch, in *the sure faith, that things will be very much, after all, what they make them,*—that the Father worketh hitherto and they work." And "yet fancy and fatalism are the strong handmaids of faith" (p. 110); but "faith when divested of the unreal wonders the worship of ages has gathered about it, can be made clear." And here it is and the instance is that of Abraham again, and this is all that there is of his faith. "A young man (p. 111) feels in his heart the conviction, that there is waiting for him in the future a great destiny. Yet that destiny depends on his courage, and that courage on his constancy; and it is only when each has opened into the other, that the three become that "evidence of things not seen, on which he can die, with his soul satisfied." "Hope expects (p. 121); faith inspects; while hope is like Mary, looking upward, faith is like Martha, looking at-ward. Hope leaps out toward what will be; faith holds on to what

is." Are such absurd statements founded on either sense or Scripture? Is such the faith which John intends, when he says: "He that believeth on the Son, hath life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." Is this what is meant, when it is declared: "Acknowledge Him in all thy ways, and He will direct thy steps?" No! a thousand times No! True faith in God and in Jesus Christ exalts the soul above the power of self; the heart's trust is not in man, or time, or one's own wit or will, but in "The Everlasting Father," and in "The Prince of Peace." "Through Christ who strengtheneth me," the happy believer sings to himself in the face of earth's fiercest storms and trials, "I can do all things; and I will glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." "With him to live is Christ."

What now saith the popular Chicago preacher of "*love*," or "*charity*?" The Bible saith of it, that whatever else I may have, if I have not this, I am but "sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." One quarter of his sermon is devoted to showing what it is (pp. 139-46); and this is it,—Life, (p. 146). The Bible declares that "*this* is the love of, God—to keep his commandments." Why does not he say so? Again saith God's holy word: "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us; and his love is perfected in us." We can and must practise love, to be like God and to dwell with him for ever. But who can practise life. And why, when the Bible is so plain and specific in its directions, should one darken counsel, concerning the way to heaven, with his weak or wicked words?

The forms of love or "*life*," as he terms it, are (1) the true love of money, of which Peabody and Peter Cooper are shining examples (p. 147), "solid men doing solid things;" and "he wishes to heaven he could put some noble Chicago man into the catalogue." (2) The love between man and woman. And here the gospel that he teaches is—that "the man is the first volume, good enough as far it goes—demanding not a supplement but a complement. The man is as good as the Lord can make him, but then there is nothing for even the Divine Worker to do, but to put him to sleep, until he makes a woman." (3) The love of a country, or of a land and a

cause (p. 152). Such a "love piles great stores of life into one's heart." "This," he says, "is the truth about our life, in *whatever way we test it*;—the love which is life, alone can make life all it must be, *whatever we may be and do beside*." One half page out of twenty-one pages in the discourse (p. 158) is devoted to considering the love of God—the love of all loves, without which no other love worthy of the name can exist for a moment; for "he that loveth is born of God." "The very love of God is only one," he says, "of the loves in our loving. *It is not the object*, but the life of which I am to make sure; and then as Richter says, "the heart in this heaven, like the wandering sun, sees nothing from a dewdrop to an ocean, but a mirror it warms and fills." But then in the love of God, the object is "all and in all"—the great God himself—without whom, as as object of affection and service, no life that has the essence of immortality in it can be kindled, or kept, in the soul. And why does not this flippant religionist sometimes quote what his great Maker and Redeemer says about love—who has said so much for his guidance and ours—instead of telling us what Richter and Ruskin say about it. But to Mr. Collyer again, painful as it is to hear such frothy words about the greatest theme in the universe. "So loving," he continues, "was St. Francis, says Ruskin, that he claimed a brotherhood with the wolf. So loving was St. Francis, says another, that he remembered those that God had seemingly forgotten."

In his introduction he says: "I want to speak to you of this greatest thing now: to try and tell you, what it is, what it can do, and so, what we are if we possess it;" and lo! at the end of so much elaborate and polished nonsense—and *so wicked as a substitute for the pure word of God*, which he might easily have furnished in its stead, and which God and man with mingled earnestness demand that he should have furnished—lo! what directions he gives to one enquiring the way to obtain this great treasure of love or life! "Do you say," he says (p. 158), "Oh tell me how to get this love? I tell you, you *have* the first white spark of it, *if you really love at all*; *if you love a dog*, you have that in your heart which may grow to be as mighty as the love of the first archangel.

If I can love that I do love with the love which is life—with a true heart fervently—as I open my heart to this grace and goodness of loving, the breath of heaven will draw through and fan the flame, kindling this way and that, until the whole soul is on fire with a love that warms and energizes whatever it touches, like the pure sun. It is a divine life; but its kindling is in a human love." In his "Talk to Mothers" (pp. 198–215), he first gives them his theory of child-nature, as set forth, in his view, in the parable of the kingdom of God, as like a field sown with good seed, into which while its owner slept, the enemy came and sowed tares. "The good seed is sown first; good principles and powers are the first to be set down in the fresh, young heart; while *even the tares themselves are not utterly worthless weeds, but degenerate wheat, a poorer grain, but never utterly useless or worthless*; for the better kinds of it can be made into a rather bitter bread, while even the worst can be burnt up and be made to enrich the ground, for another harvest of the nobler grain. The good is primary and purely good; the bad is secondary and not totally bad."

The drift of his sermon is expressed in these words—his text being 1 Sam. ii. 18,—“Every little child ministers before the Lord, and every mother makes his garments from year to year.” His first direction to mothers is “not to make the spiritual garments of their children black” (p. 207). Some mothers he says “talk with unction of who is dead and how young they were, and how many are sick, and what grief is abroad altogether on the earth. Mothers, your children have no part or lot in that matter; death has no dominion over them, and will not have for this many a day to come; and it is foolish and wrong for you, to lead them with you into its dark valley and shadow.” These are children that can be talked with and can talk themselves. How does this statement that “death has no dominion over them” agree with the testimony of the bills of mortality, so often quoted, that “more than half of the race die under five years of age.” Does it at all resemble the exhortation of the Scriptures: “Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth, while the evil days come not, nor the years draw nigh when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them.” But he proceeds: “If one of these little ones should be taken

from you, it will be to him only as if he lay down to sleep. In the kingdom of heaven to which he now belongs, there is no death; his life is hid with Christ in God." Whence obtains this bold dreamer all this knowledge so positively stated, and yet so different from any communications in the Bible on the subject. "To the law and to the testimony," saith Isaiah, "if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them."

His next direction to mothers is, "not to make the garment of their spiritual influence of the nature of a straight jacket." "Has your boy," he says, "a heavy foot, a loud voice, a great appetite, a defiant way, and a burly presence altogether? then thank God for it more than if your husband had a farm, where corn grows twelve feet high; your child has in him the making of a great and good man. It is a sad mistake to suppose that this sturdy daring must be bad; first the wheat, then the tares." Dr. Kane is his choice specimen of the value of this "boisterous energy in childhood," getting for himself "the name of being the worst boy in Branchtown; but time revealed *the divinity* of this rough life, when he bearded the ice-king in his own domain, and made himself a name in Arctic exploration, second to none."

His third direction to mothers is "to answer all the questions of their children" (p. 211). So may they "clothe the spirit of their child in the fresh garments that will make him all beautiful, as he stands before the Lord." And what is the last direction given by this would-be ambassador of Christ to his fellow-men, respecting the right spiritual education of children by their mothers. Are we not now at least, to hear something that will remind us that they are candidates for eternity; that every day they are forming characters which will be as enduring as the very throne of God, and in which their weal or woe will be unchangeably enfolded for ever. Is he not about now, at last, to begin to speak God's wisdom, instead of his own. No! no! we are to be everywhere disappointed, if we look for any utterances of one's moral privileges or moral duties at all above the level of personal convenience or personal agreeableness, in one who possesses individual refine-

ment and social position. He closes his brief summary of rules for maternal guidance, in "fashioning the spiritual garments of their children," with the counsel to "give them ever new and larger confidences, remembering that their child is ever becoming less a child." In this discourse, he has applied his principles of faith, or rather of *un-faith*, to the noble and dear work, if rightly performed, and to the dreadful one if misdirected, of training one's precious offspring for their fortune and their fate, at their own hands and at God's; and how vapid are they and what a mockery of all gospel earnestness of sentiment and feeling! These all-sufficient prescriptions, as he deems them, for the highest and holiest work done on earth, would be regarded by any thoughtful mind, if rightly presented, and as incidental hints in connection with and subordinate to earnest moral instruction in the case, and in combination with prayer—as of considerable value and not to be forgotten by any Christian mother who would be a skillful artist in her educational labor. But when thought of in the light in which they are used by the flippant thinker at Chicago, as a complete "vade mecum" for a mother who would hopefully make her children all "nurslings of heaven," while here on earth—as he says in conclusion that, by following the rules which he gives, they will succeed in doing—could anything seem more pitiful, in the eyes of one who has "set his affections on things above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God!"

Such, sadly such, is the man towards whose preaching, as the papers tell us, a strong and eager current of listeners sets every sabbath in Chicago. Woe worth the day, will every lover of Christ and his cause say, when he turned from his humble but useful employment, as a blacksmith, to the fearful work of perverting the life-giving gospel of the Saviour of the world, into those draughts of deadly poison to the soul, which he gives with such a high hand and haughty heart to crowds of young men in the West! All the invitations and promises of the New Testament are hung by him who made them, and by his own visible hand, between two pillars of wrath, turned towards false teachers. "Whosoever," saith Christ in his

opening ministry, "shall break *one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so*, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven;" and, in the book of Revelation, he finishes the word of prophecy which he gives, with this terrific anathema: "If any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." If men make little of differences in moral opinions, Christ surely does not. "Life and death are in the power of the tongue," to the speaker, as well as to the hearer of his word, as it is borne rightly or wrongly from his lips to mankind. Let a man keep silence or speak the word of God, just as he bids it to be spoken.

Does not the abundance of skeptical philosophy, and its boldness, in much of our magazine literature, and in many of our popular essayists, lecturers, and "liberal" preachers—not to speak of strong traces of it in a good many young men, in the evangelical ranks of the land—demand a general and earnest return in the orthodox pulpits of the country, to the vigorous preaching of the great doctrines of the Bible. In them is all the power of saving truth, the light of the world and the life of the Church. What evangelism needs in our day, is, what it has needed in every other age—vigorous self-assertion, everywhere, and a spirit of earnest propagandism.

If this false declaimer about "the religion of the cross," and others like him, shall serve to arouse those who love "the truth as it is in Jesus,"—in a spirit of zealous reaction against the evil that they sow, broadcast, with so much wicked pleasure, over all the land—to preach the real word of God, in its length and breadth, all the more mightily, there will come a good to the age, that they thought not of, beyond and against all their wishes. Many rejoice that the old days of theological dispute have passed away, and fondly hope, that the spirit of controversy will never return to the church again. So do we! May the Spirit of Truth and Peace so fill and fire the hearts of all real brethren of Christ, that they shall see henceforth and for ever, all the great essential truths of the Bible with one eye! But, if peace in the Church is to be obtained, only

by dulness of intellectual vision, and deadness of moral feeling, concerning the great doctrines which God has given to man for his spiritual enlightenment, regeneration, and sanctification, then let war, and strife, and division abound, even among the hosts of God's elect on earth! Let us have life and action in the church, and in the age, at whatever cost; and not desolation and death, even though they bring a reign of peace with them, that cannot be broken.

ARTICLE IV.—THE "PRINCETON REVIEW" ON THE
THEOLOGY OF DR. N. W. TAYLOR.*

By George Park Fisher.

The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, January,
1868. Article III.—Presbyterian Reunion.

PHILIP MELANOTHON, a few days before he died, wrote on a loose sheet of paper a memorandum of reasons why death should be less unwelcome to him. Among them was the prospect of escaping "from the fury of theologians."† The outcry against him, that began before Luther's death, increased afterwards; and men who copied in excess the faults of Luther, without a grain of his nobleness, were barking and howling round the great scholar—the Preceptor of Germany, the St. John of the Reformation—for presuming to deviate in some particulars from Luther's doctrine. He could not help agreeing with Calvin on the Lord's Supper; he could not admit the slavery of the will as Luther had proclaimed it; he would go, perhaps, too far in retaining old forms of worship for the sake of peace. For these conscientious opinions, the author of the Augsburg Confession was pursued with unrelenting hostility; so that a half century after he died, the leading Professor of theology at Wittenberg was so enraged at hearing him referred to by a student as an authority for some doctrinal statement, that, before the eyes of all, he tore his portrait from the wall and trampled on it.

There is such a thing, then, as *rabies theologorum*. Of course we do not mean to imply that Dr. Taylor was ever in the

* The late Articles in the *Princeton Review* on Presbyterian Reunion being, as we believe, the acknowledged productions of Dr. Hodge, we shall be able, without any breach of courtesy, to refer to him by name as their Author.

† The whole memorandum is pathetic:—"Discedes a peccatis; liberaberis ab ærumnis et a rabie theologorum; venies in lucem; intueberis Filium Dei; disces illa mira arcana, quæ in hac vita intelligere non potuisti,—cur sic simul conditi, qualis sit copulatio duarum naturarum in Christo."

same degree the object of it. Yet, it was well that even he was made of sterner stuff than poor Melancthon. He never complained of a manly, courteous opposition to his opinions. He who brings forward new ideas has no right to claim exemption from unfavorable criticism. But he did feel that there was far more effort to make him out heretical, to rob him of his good name among orthodox Christians, and to stir up prejudice against him, than to judge fairly, or even to hear candidly, his teaching. It did not diminish his sense of wrong that in some cases the stabs upon his reputation were inflicted with a bland and unctuous manner, with professions of personal regard, and under the guise of a holy zeal for the truth. Dr. Taylor was himself an honest, magnanimous, open-hearted man; and he knew well who, among his opponents, were moved by a conscientious dissent from his opinions, and who of them were instigated by self-interest or by resentment for imagined slights.

Dr. Taylor was a metaphysician; he was a philosopher, who has had no equal in this department, on our side of the ocean, since President Edwards. It was in some respects a misfortune that his philosophical views and reasonings were brought forward in the form of theological discussions. In this country, not only every minister, but most laymen, suppose themselves to be adepts in the science of theology. They expect that everything shall be made perfectly easy of comprehension to everybody. Hence, so clear, common-sense a thinker as Dr. Taylor, who hated all mysticism, was constantly complained of as too "metaphysical," as obscure and unintelligible. Itinerant preachers, who had no training in mental science, and little capacity for receiving one, felt that there must be something dreadful under that clond which their eyes could not penetrate. They felt sure that it was not "the simplicity of the Gospel." So President Edwards, in his day, frequently alludes to the reproach that was cast upon him because he reasoned metaphysically. Moreover, bringing forward his philosophical opinions exclusively in their bearing on theological questions of present interest, Dr. Taylor would be liable to excite the opposition of existing theological parties. Calm discussion would be interrupted by ecclesiastical interference.

Had he brought the results of his thinking into the forum of philosophy, where they might be examined, as are the tenets of Leibnitz, or Locke, or Dugald Stewart, who supposes that all of those who actually took up arms against him would have deemed themselves qualified by nature or education for this work of assault?

Whatever there was of a strictly personal opposition to Dr. Taylor—and that there was somewhat of this, there is sufficient proof—has mostly passed by. Yet it is found impossible to let him alone. We have always considered it a striking evidence of the power of John Calvin, that he can be forgotten by those who are hostile, no more than by those who are friendly, to his system. The Unitarian newspapers to-day speak of him as if he still lived, or as if their editors had just come from hearing one of his sermons on the "decretum horribile." We may say the same thing of Dr. Taylor. It is a tribute to his power, that when the preliminaries of Presbyterian reunion are concocted, and all is as merry as a marriage bell, he rises—like "the majesty of buried Denmark"—to disturb the feast. Or rather, as in *Macbeth*, we find the man at the head of the table, seized with a trembling at the apparition of an uninvited guest in the vacant chair; and he wonders how his fellow negotiators

" Can behold such sights,
And keep the natural ruby of their cheeks."

But we must not give our space to these introductory topics. We have been induced to take up the theology of Dr. Taylor, by the unfair representation of it which Dr. Hodge has made in the last number of the *Princeton Review*. We may remark once for all, that we are not so uncourteous as to say, nor so uncharitable as to think, that Dr. Hodge has meant to make an unfair representation; we simply assert, and expect to prove, that it is unfair. Up to the time of the late Conference in Philadelphia, he had strenuously resisted the project of reuniting the Old-school and New-school branches of the Presbyterian Church. His great argument against it, in the Article before us, is the fact that New-school ministers are, or may be, believers in Dr. Taylor's system of theology; and

the additional fact that his system is an intolerable heresy. He cannot consent that students from Andover and New Haven should be admitted to the ministry of a Presbyterian Church to which he belongs. It would appear then, that these ecclesiastical compromisers, like their political exemplars before the war, think of settling their differences by leaving New England out in the cold. Since we, being then in the loins of our ancestors, were long ago left out in the cold on Plymouth rock, and have thriven ever since, we can hear of this new measure without a shiver. There is one characteristic of Dr. Hodge's Article, however, on which we must drop a word of comment, before we proceed to graver matters. It is not peculiar to this Article, but belongs to many other polemical productions in the *Princeton Review*. They abound in appeals to Church authority. In fact, except among Papists and High Anglicans, we hear nowhere so frequent appeals of this sort, as from these Princeton Reviewers. Belonging to a sect of a sect, they still take on an ecclesiastical air, which is easily recognized by the historical student as a tolerable imitation of the supercilious tone prevalent among Roman Catholic theologians. We can easily suppose that some persons who have not been toughened by familiarity with the manifestoes of genuine popes and patriarchs may have their nerves startled by this mimic thunder. Now the Princeton writers found this kind of assumption on two things. One is the mistake of regarding their system—especially on the great point of original sin—as coincident with that of the Augustinian theology and of the creeds of the seventeenth century. On the contrary, as we may take an early opportunity to prove, it is, in its foundation, wholly diverse from the one and from the other. And the second occasion of this ecclesiastical self-complacency is the fact that theology since the seventeenth century is almost completely ignored by them. If the recent evangelical theology of Germany and the great names that come up to our recollection at the mention of it—Neander, Tholuck, Nitzsch, Lücke, Ullmann, Julius Müller, Dorner, and a score besides; if the evangelical theology of France, with its Vinet, Pressensé, Godet and the rest; if the modern theology of Churchmen and Dissenters in England, not to speak of

other Protestant nations, were all brought into view, it would be found that these Princeton appeals to the Church universal have little ground to rest upon. But, granting that the creeds of the seventeenth century deserve respect and embody the great truths of Protestant Christianity, did all progress stop then? Has nothing been learned since? Is it reasonable for men to boast that they have gained nothing as to the interpretation of Scripture or the statement of Christian doctrine, from the labors of two hundred years? Why do they choose *that* date for arresting progress, rather than two, or four, or fourteen centuries earlier? In our judgment, it is a grand merit of our New England theologians, that while holding the past in due reverence, they have not bowed down before it, but have expected progress. They have seen that the denial of the hope of progress in theology—that is, in the understanding and expression of the truths of the Bible—would have shut out the Protestant Reformation, as well as every other access of light since theology began to be a science. Smalley, while engaged in combating theories of Emmons which he earnestly rejected, is careful to add:

"It has doubtless been perceived by every attentive reader, that the sentiments remarked upon, are not objected against merely, if at all, because of their being innovations; there may be danger no doubt, of holding over tenaciously the traditions of the elders, as well as of departing too hastily from the long received opinions of our ancestors. There have been many innovations in Christian theology, which were doubtless real improvements. Calvin himself was a great innovator in his day; and it cannot reasonably be supposed, that either he, or any of the other first reformers, just emerging from the darkness of popery, had all the light that was ever to come into the world."*

To our mind there is something noble in this willing, hopeful spirit of progress and emancipation from slavish deference to human authority. They mark a truly scientific, as well as a truly Christian temper. There is no contempt for the past; there is no rash and flighty desertion of received doctrine; but there is a readiness to learn, to modify traditional tenets at the coming of new light, and a disposition to confront the errors of good men by dispassionate argument instead of Church anathemas. How much better is New England to-day,

* Smalley, Works, II., 421.

and the Christianity of the country too, for the line of theologians from Edwards to Taylor—not to speak of the living—who, whatever may have been their eccentricities or mistakes, have dared to think for themselves and have endeavored to present the truths of the Gospel in more reasonable as well as defensible forms of statement. This freedom is an invaluable possession. Wherever it may be lightly esteemed, let it be still cherished in New England!

The present seems a favorable opportunity for setting forth the theological system of Dr. Taylor, in itself and in its historical relations. This we undertake more as an expositor than a critic, and shall therefore in this place abstain, generally speaking, from either vindicating or opposing his distinctive tenets.

Everybody who is much acquainted with New England theology knows that the elder Edwards set out to clear the Calvinistic system of difficulties and objections that were felt both by its advocates and opponents; an attempt which was continued by subsequent theologians. "The Calvinists," writes the younger Edwards, describing the state of things when his father commenced his work, "themselves began to be ashamed of their own cause, and to give it up, so far at least as relates to liberty and necessity. This was true, especially of Drs. Watts and Doddridge, who in their day were accounted leaders of the Calvinists."* The full justice of this remark will be evident to any one who will examine the theological writings of these two eminent men. We know not where to look for more striking specimens of weak and inconsequent reasoning than they present; and this impression is heightened in the case of Doddridge, by the *quasi* mathematical form in which his Lectures are cast. The sum of the charge brought against the Calvinists was that "the sense in which they interpreted the sacred writings was inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency, accountableness, praise, and blame." "How absurd, it was urged, that a man totally dead should be called upon to arise and perform the duties of the living and sound—that we should need a divine influence to give us a new heart, and yet be commanded to make a new heart and a right spirit—that

* Works, I., 482.

a man has no power to come to Christ, and yet be commanded to come to him on pain of damnation!"*

The fundamental points in the indictment preferred by the Arminian writers, Edwards took up in his two treatises, that on the Will and that on Original Sin. It had been the Augustinian, mediæval, and Old Protestant doctrine, that the posterity of Adam are answerable for Adam's sin, and therefore both sinful and condemned at birth, because they really participated in it. They are condemned and punished for their own deed in Adam. After the notion of a covenant with Adam—the so-called Federal theology, which is now maintained at Princeton—was superimposed, in the course of the seventeenth century, on the realistic conception, still theologians, when they were pressed by objections, fell back on the old idea of a true and real participation on the part of mankind in their progenitor's act. But the inconsistency of this doctrine with other accepted beliefs—for example, with Creationism, or the doctrine that each soul is created by itself, in opposition to the Traducian theory, and more than all the Lockian philosophy, in which philosophical realism found no countenance, broke down this prop. Participation in Adam's sin did not cohere with nominalism. The opponents of Calvinism now demanded with one voice some explanation of the imputation of a sin to the descendants of Adam, which it was confessed they had no agency in committing. They inquired how the infliction of an infinite penalty upon them, for an act that was done by an individual long before they were created, is consistent with those intuitive principles of justice which are written on the heart and sanctioned, directly or indirectly, everywhere in the Bible.

In the latter part of his treatise on Original Sin, President Edwards endeavors to meet "that great objection," as he styles it, "against the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same."† His whole tone implies that he considers this a grave and formidable objection, and his great powers are tasked to the utmost in meeting it.

* Works, p. 482.

† Chap. III., Dwight's Ed., p. 342.

He meets it by denying the fact which it assumes, that Adam and his posterity *are* distinct agents. The guilt of a man at his birth is declared to be "the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God."* "The sin of apostasy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to them."† His curious speculations upon the nature of identity are to demonstrate that the sin of the posterity of Adam is one and the same—identically, numerically the same—with his. The first rising of a sinful inclination in any and every individual since Adam is that consent to the first sin which they really gave in him, and which, in the individualization of the species, appears in the soul of every person at birth. In short, he answers the objection that we did not commit the first sin, by affirming that we did.

The second great objection of the Arminians, that according to Calvinism men are required to do what they are said to have no power to do—that the freedom of the will is denied, and fatalism substituted for it—Edwards particularly considers in the treatise on the Will. He endeavors to confute them on this point by his doctrine of natural ability coupled with moral inability. The germs of this treatise are in Locke's chapter on "Power."‡ Locke there maintains that "freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or non-existence, of any action upon our volition of it;"§ that liberty relates to events consecutive to volition. Given the volition, will the thing chosen follow in accordance with it? If so, we are to that extent free. This is the proper, and the only proper, use of the terms freedom and liberty in their application to personal agents. Hence, Locke declares that the "question whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases," is absurd; for this, he adds, is to ask "whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on *in infinitum*."|| Here is

* Chap. III., Dwight's Ed., II., p. 548.

† Chap. XXI.

§ "Univ. Ed.," p. 159.

‡ Ibid, p. 559.

| p. 158.

Edwards's refutation of the Arminian objections, in a nutshell. He defines one's liberty to be freedom "from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills."* Necessity, constraint, coercion, and all similar terms are inapplicable to the will, for the reason that they all presuppose an opposition of the will, which in the case of a choice is by the supposition excluded.† That only is necessary which choice cannot prevent.‡

Casting out these terms, he then, by a remorseless application of the maxim—every event must have a cause—to the *specification* of choice—to the choice of one thing *rather* than another—established his doctrine of determinism, and drove the Arminians to the wall. There was full liberty, there was no necessity, and yet there was an absolute certainty given by the antecedents; and on this foreordained certainty, the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination might have a sure foundation.

What did Edwards mean, then, by his "natural ability"? He meant that nothing but a right choice or inclination is needed by a wicked man in order to repent and turn from his ways. "There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and everything else sufficient; nothing is wanting but a will."§ But coexisting with this natural ability, is a moral inability, by which is meant a fixed and habitual inclination such as renders a perseverance in evil—a perseverance of the will in its evil choice—perfectly certain.

It is, therefore, according to Edwards, an impropriety of speech to say that a sinner cannot repent and be holy. We say that a man *cannot* accomplish an event, when the event will not take place in consequence of, or on the supposition of, his choice. But here the event is itself a choice; it is a case where doing is choosing.¶ For a like reason, Edwards contin-

* II., 38

† II., 26, et passim.

‡ II., 84.

§ II., 38.

¶ It is nothing new for Necessitarians to deny the propriety of applying the terms "necessity," "coaction," "inability," and the like, to acts of the will. Their argument on this point is concisely put by Thomas Aquinas. "Illud quod movetur ab altero, dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio, quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi." "Sic igitur Deus movendo voluntatem non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei ejus

nally treats the question whether a man *can* choose otherwise than he does, as absurd. For what does it signify? It signifies, when reduced to a proposition, *either* that if he chooses in a particular way, he chooses in that way—an identical proposition *or* that he will choose in a particular way, if he chooses to choose in that way—which leads to an infinite series. Thus he rules out the question of the power of contrary choice, in the ordinary understanding of the phrase, by his definitions. To ask if a man can repent, or if he can repent if he choose, or if he can repent if he will, is either mere tautology, or involves the blunder of supposing an infinite series of choices. He silences the objector by depriving him of the power to put his question, or by pronouncing that question an absurdity. Man is responsible because he is naturally able; he is helpless because he is morally unable.*

Unquestionably the statements of President Edwards on this subject are verbally at variance with the Calvinistic symbols and standard writers. The old form of doctrine was that men

propriam inclinationem." "Sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei, quod movetur ab alio." P. I. Qu. 105, Art. 4.

There is great similarity between the definitions and arguments of Edwards and those of Hobbes and Collins. He says that he had not read Hobbes, and although Dugald Stewart implies that he had read Collins, this is not at all probable. Sir William Hamilton once made a remark to us, which implied that he considered Edwards a borrower from Collins. On repeating Hamilton's observation to Dr. Taylor, he said that probably Edwards had never seen a copy of Collins.

* Sometimes Edwards appears to leave the beaten track, and really to take up the question of the power of contrary choice. One instance is in Part III., § iv., (II., 160), where he says that "the inclination," in the case of the original determination or act of the will, "is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself." But the context shows that the *unable* is only a moral inability, or certainty; and the reason alleged is still the incompatibility of opposite choices (or inclinations) at the same time. "Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise: for that would be *at present* to choose something diverse from what is *at present* chosen." The italics belong to Edwards.

The nearest approach to a perfectly distinct and unequivocal assertion of properly necessitarian doctrine, which we remember in Edwards, is in the remark that the difference between natural and moral necessity "does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection*, as in the two terms *connected*;" the cause and effect in the case of moral necessity being of a moral kind. P. I., §4.

since the fall are free to sin, but have no other freedom. But the frequent assertion of Edwards is that men *now* have all the liberty that ever existed or that could ever possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. This, however, is a verbal incongruity, due to his peculiar use of terms. Yet his theory of the will differs from that of the old Calvinists, if we except the high supra-lapsarian view, in that they, like Augustine, explicitly gave to Adam in his act of apostasy the power of contrary choice. And that "mutability" of will that was ascribed to him prior to transgression can find no place in President Edwards's notion of liberty.†

The solution which Edwards offered of the problem of Original Sin failed to satisfy his successors. Hopkins, in certain passages, seems to adopt the realistic propositions of his teacher. Of Adam it is said that "being by divine constitution the natural head and father of the whole race, they were all *included and created* in him as one whole which could not be separated; and, therefore, he is treated as the whole in this transaction."§ But looking at all that he says on the subject, we find his doctrine to be that men are sinners from birth through a divine constitution establishing an infallible connection between Adam's sin and their sin. If he sins, it is certain that they will begin their existence as sinners. But all sin consists in exercise or act. And "the children of Adam are not guilty of

* Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland. II.

† Comp. West. Confession, Chap. IX., iii. Man "hath wholly lost *all ability* of will to any spiritual good," &c.

‡ It is remarkable that the Jansenists, in striving to make a distinction between their doctrine and that of Calvin, use phraseology very similar to that of Edwards. Men can resist grace *if they will*. Calvin is quite wrong, says Pascal, in the seventeenth of the Provincial Letters, in holding that the sinner *cannot* resist grace—even "*la grâce efficace et victorieuse*." "*Ce n'est pas qu'il ne puisse toujours s'en éloigner, et qu'il ne s'en éloignât effectivement, s'il le voulait*." But what does he mean by *can*—by *power*? It is the Augustinian *potestas si vult*, as Mozley has pointed out in his *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 427. Calvin would have admitted all that Pascal says, for he did not hold, as was represented by the Jansenists, that the will is moved like an inanimate thing. See (e. g.) Inst. II., iii., 14. The Dominicans endeavored to distinguish their doctrine from that of the Jansenists, as the latter professed to reject the doctrine of Calvin. But the difference in both cases was merely verbal.

§ Works, (Boston Ed., 1852), I., 199.

his sin, are not punished, and do not suffer for that, any further than they implicitly or expressly approve of his transgression by sinning as he did; their total moral corruption and sinfulness is as much their own sin, as it could be if it were not in consequence of the sin of the first father of the human race, or if Adam had not first sinned.”* It is explicitly held that men do not become sinners as a penalty of the law for Adam’s sin. Their sin is at once a consequence or effect of Adam’s sin by the divine constitution, and their own free act. Yet they begin to sin at the beginning of their existence. “As soon as children are capable of the least motion and exercise of the heart which is contrary to the law of God, such motions and exercises are sin in them, though they are ignorant of it.” “Persons may be moral agents, and sin without knowing what the law of God is, of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness that they are wrong.”

Hopkins brought in the doctrine of divine efficiency in the production of sin. He considered this a legitimate deduction from the teachings of Edwards. It had been held that sinful choices, not less than holy, result with infallible certainty from causes which God had set in operation. He is, then, the first cause to whose power the effect must be attributed. The efficiency that issues in the origination of a sinful choice emanates from Him.† His agency is universal.

In Emmons, Hopkinsianism is seen in full flower. All men become sinners by Adam. He did not make them sinners by causing them to commit his first offense. “We could no more eat of the forbidden fruit before we were born, than Adam could have eaten of it before he was created.” Nor did he make men sinners by transferring to them the guilt of his first transgression. “The guilt of any action can no more be transferred from the agent to another person, than the action itself.” Nor did Adam make men sinners by conveying to them a morally corrupted nature. “There is no morally corrupt nature distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises.” Adam had no such nature. Supposing that he had such a nature, he could not convey it to his descendants; for “the soul is not trans-

* L, 235.

† L, 232.

mitted from father to son by natural generation.* The soul is spiritual; and what is spiritual is indivisible; and what is indivisible is incapable of propagation." Adam's sin caused our sin only as God determined that in case Adam should sin, we should be brought into existence morally depraved.

"Accordingly, in consequence of Adam's first transgression, God now brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants, he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them as he does in other men, both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists. Moral depravity can take place nowhere but in moral agents; and moral agents can never act but only as they are acted on by a divine operation. It is just as easy, therefore, to account for moral depravity in infancy, as in any other period of life."†

The objection that God is made the author of sin, is answered by the assertion that sin pertains to the nature of actions and not to their cause. He who creates the poison of rattlesnakes has not in himself the quality to which he gives existence. Edwards had suggested this answer in his doctrine that "the essence of the virtue and vice of the dispositions of the heart and acts of will, lies not in their cause, but their nature."‡

On one point in the doctrine as to the conditions of responsible agency, Emmons went a step beyond Hopkins. Emmons maintains that a knowledge or perception of law is a prerequisite of moral, accountable action. He contends that infants have this consciousness of duty. Without it, he says, they would be mere agents, but not moral agents; and if mere agents he maintains that they never would become moral agents.*

The question was, how are men responsible for sin which they could not have prevented, and for continuing to sin when they cannot stop? Theology, in the Hopkinsian line, had reached the propositions that no individual is accountable for any sin which he does not personally commit by violating known law; that sin begins with the personal life of each man in this world, and is not the penalty of the offense of

* Works, IV. Sermon, xxxv.

† IV. Sermon, xxvi., (p. 357.)

‡ Edwards, II., 186 seq.

§ IV. Sermon, xi.

Adam, but only consequent upon it in the divine plan and appointment. But with these doctrines there was coupled a more bald determinism than Christian theology had ever tolerated. A divine efficiency was made the cause of sinful choices, and sin, not less than holiness, was declared to be the product of divine agency.

Among the adversaries of the Hopkinsian peculiarities is Dr. Smalley. He discards the notion of a Federal representation in Adam, one individual acting for the rest, and compares it to "a draught in a lottery."* He rejects likewise Edwards's theory of our identity with Adam, which, he says, is "diving into metaphysics below the bottom of things or quite beyond the fathom of common sense."† Denying all imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, he holds that his sin *occasions* our sin from our birth; but this sin *is* ours and not his, and *as* ours it is condemned. So far he coincides with Emmons. But he differs in holding to a sinful propensity or "disposition back of exercises,"—"prior to knowledge and prior to actual sin."‡ How shall he escape from the conclusion that God is the author of sin, as being the creator of the soul? "Perhaps," he replies, the creation of sin by God "need not be supposed. Perhaps the depravity of a sinner may consist, primarily, in mere privation, or in the want of holy principles, and if so, it need not be created."§ In this last hypothesis of the privative character of sin, whether he knew it or not, he followed a long line of thinkers, including Augustine and Aquinas, who struggled to avoid an inference to which their logic appeared irresistibly to carry them. He combats the theory of divine efficiency in the production of sin and in the hardening of men's hearts. He holds, too, that regeneration is the imparting of a new taste, relish, or disposition anterior to holy volitions, to which it gives rise. It is obvious that, on Smalley's own premises, this privation, which constitutes sin, is due to the make of the soul and occurs by necessary consequence from the act of the Creator. It is difficult to see the advantage of his theory, in this aspect of it, over that of Emmons.

* Works, (Hartford, 1808) I., 180, (Serm. xi.)

† Ibid., p. 180.

‡ Ibid., p. 188.

§ Ibid., p. 189.

In more direct relation to Dr. Taylor's system is the theology of Dr. Dwight. Dwight rejects imputation. "Moral actions are not, so far as I can see, transferable from one being to another. The personal act of any agent is, in its very nature, the act of that agent solely; and incapable of being participated by any other agent. Of course, the guilt of such a personal act is equally incapable of being transferred or participated. The guilt is inherent in the action; and is attributable, therefore, to the agent only.*" "Nor are the descendants of Adam punished for his transgression."† The Bible explicitly affirms that no man shall be punished for the sin of another. We become sinners in consequence of Adam's sin, but how we cannot explain. Inability is disinclination. "The words *can* and *cannot* are used in the Scriptures, just as they are used in the common intercourse of mankind, to express willingness or unwillingness."‡ The general expressions of Dwight on the nature of moral agency would lead one to conclude that he must hold all sin to consist in the willful transgression of known law. In the course of his sermon on the Temptation and Fall, he comes to the question, Why did God permit Adam to sin? He observes of this question that it affects not the sin of Adam only, but *all sin*. He then states the distinction between the permission of sin, which he accepts, and the creating of it. "*In the former case man is the actor of his own sin*. His sin, therefore, is wholly his own; chargeable only to himself; chosen by him unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise; avoidable by him; and of course guilty and righteously punishable."§ He declares that "sin, universally, is no other than selfishness, or a preference of one's self to all other beings, and of one's private interests and gratifications to the well-being of the universe, of God, and the intelligent creation."|| "This," he says in another place, "is sin and all that in the Scriptures is meant by sin."¶ In his sermon on the Benevolence of God, he speaks of sin, the opposite principle, as "that disposition in us, which God by the dictates of his infinite benevolence is in a sense com-

* Works, Sermon xxxii. (II., 2.)

† Ibid., p. 4.

‡ Sermon cxxxiii. (IV., 467.)

§ Sermon xxvii. (VI., 460.)

|| Sermon c. (III., 464.)

¶ Sermon lxxx. (III., 162.)

pelled to hate and punish, because it is a *voluntary opposition to his own perfect character*, and a fixed enmity to the well-being of his creatures."* How zealously Dr. Dwight controverts the theory of Divine Efficiency, as making God the author of sin, all of his readers are aware. In his sermon to prove that the soul is not a series of ideas and exercises, he says: "a finite agent has been supposed to exist, possessed of understanding to perceive, and ability to choose, that which was good or evil; that which was conformed, or not conformed to the law under which he was placed. Whenever he was unpossessed of such an ability, it has been further supposed, that he was incapable of either virtue or vice. *According to this view of common sense*, the scheme of the Scriptures seems everywhere to be formed."† But in his discourse on the Derivation of Human Depravity from Adam, he argues that death must be considered an indubitable proof of the existence of depravity in every moral being who is subject to death. That infants "are contaminated in their moral nature, and born in the likeness of apostate Adam" he holds to be a fact "inevitably proved, so far as the most unexceptionable analogy can prove anything, by the depraved moral conduct of every infant who lives so long as to be capable of moral action."‡ In interpreting Dr. Dwight, it is important to ascertain in what sense he used the terms taste, relish, disposition, propensity, principle. He speaks of these words as descriptive of an unknown and inexplicable cause of holy or sinful volitions.

"I do not deny," he says, "on the contrary I readily admit that there is a cause of moral action in intelligent beings, frequently indicated by the words *Principle, Affections, Habits, Nature, Tendency, Propensity*, and several others. In this case, however, as well as in many others, it is carefully to be observed, that these terms indicate a cause which to us is wholly unknown; except that its existence is proved by its effects." "When we use these kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason really exists, although undefinable and unintelligible by ourselves, why one mind will, either usually or uniformly, be the subject of holy volitions and another of sinful ones." "We mean to indicate a state of mind, generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones in another." "This state is the cause, which I have mentioned; a cause the existence of which must be admitted, unless we acknowledge it to be a perfect casualty, that any volition is sinful rather than

* Sermon. ix. (I. 157.)

† Sermon. xxiv. (I. 406.)

‡ Sermon. xxxii. (II. 13.)

holy." "This cause is what is so often mentioned in the Scriptures under the name of *the heart*." "I have already remarked, that this cause is unknown except by its effects." "It is not so powerful, nor so unchangeable, as to incline the mind in which it exists, so strongly to holiness, as to prevent it absolutely from sinning, nor so strongly to sin, as to prevent it absolutely from acting in a holy manner." To account for sin in a holy being, we have to suppose "that a temptation, actually presented to the mind, is disproportioned in its power to the inclination of that mind towards resistance."^{*}

Now what is really meant by this unknown, mysterious disposition? Regeneration is defined to be the communication by God of a relish for spiritual objects, which leads to holy choices,—such a relish as He communicated to Adam prior to his holy acts. Dr. Taylor considered himself justified in interpreting these ambiguous terms in conformity with the expressions of Dr. Dwight relative to the nature of sin and of agency, which have been cited; that is, as implying voluntary action. By volitions, Dr. Dwight undoubtedly means imperative acts of will. He styles the "new disposition" in regenerated souls, "disinterestedness, love, *good-will*, benevolence."[†] He says that "the influence which God exerts on them by His Spirit, is of such a nature, that their *wills*, instead of attempting any resistance to it, coincide with it readily and cheerfully, without any force or constraint on his part, or any opposition on their own."[‡] But if a "disposition is voluntary, then Dr. Dwight must have held with Hopkins and Emmons that infants are voluntary transgressors of law from their birth. Moreover, he sometimes speaks of holy love as one of the *fruits* or *consequences* of the new relish, instead of strictly identifying the two. And why does he speak of this "disposition" as of something so mysterious and inexplicable, as when he says: "of the metaphysical nature of this cause, I am ignorant?"[§]

In interpreting a philosophical or theological writer, we are not at liberty to say that he *must* have meant this or that, because otherwise we cannot make him consistent with himself. Rather is it true that out of what is left obscure or self-contradictory in a writer, comes the spur to further investiga-

^{*} Sermon. xxvii. (I. 456). See, also, Sermon. lxxiv. (III. 68.)

[†] Sermon. lxxxix. (III. 280.) [‡] Sermon. lxxii. (III. 40.) [§] Sermon. lxxiv. (III. 68.)

tion and progress on the part of those who follow. In this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Dwight had not arrived at a clear view of the nature of the holy or sinful "disposition" at the root of special or imperative volitions, or brought this element into a consistent relation to other features of his doctrinal system.

One of the most industrious and influential of the adversaries of Dr. Taylor was Dr. Leonard Woods, Professor at Andover. He had expounded his opinions respecting the doctrine of sin in his *Letters to Unitarians*, and in his controversy with Dr. Ware. He had expressed himself in accordance with the Hopkinsian views. He rejects imputation, and refuses unqualified assent to the statements of the Westminster Assembly in regard to Original Sin.

"In Scripture," he said, "the word *impute*, when used in its proper sense, certainly in relation to sin, uniformly signifies charging or reckoning to a man that which is his own attribute or act. Every attempt which has been made to prove that God ever imputes to man any sinful disposition or act which is not strictly *his own*, has failed of success. As it is one object of these Letters to make you acquainted with the real opinions of the Orthodox in New England, I would here say, with the utmost frankness, that we are not entirely satisfied with the language used on this subject in the Assembly's Catechism. Though we hold that Catechism, taken as a whole, in the highest estimation, we could not with a good conscience subscribe to every expression it contains, in relation to the doctrine of original sin. Hence it is common for us, when we declare our assent to the Catechism, to do it with an express or implied restriction. We receive the Catechism *generally* as containing a summary of the principles of Christianity. We are not accountable for Adam's sin, but our personal sinfulness is in consequence of his sin."^{*}

He had defined moral agency as involving a knowledge of duty and a natural power of performing it. "*As accountable beings, we have a conscience and a power of knowing and performing our duty.* Our zeal in defense of this principle has been such, as to occasion no small umbrage to some, who are attached to every feature and every phraseology of Calvinism. On this subject there is, in fact, a well known difference between our views, and those of some modern, as well as more

* *Letters, &c.* (Boston, 1822.) p. 32. We quote from the *Controversial Papers* of Dr. Woods in the original editions, and not in the altered form in which they appear in his collected works.

ancient divines, who rank high on the side of Orthodoxy."* All sin consists in the *exercise* of a disposition contrary to what the law requires."† "Sin in its highest sense is sin in the heart, that is wrong affection, corrupt inclination."‡ As to the time when sin begins, Dr. Woods remarks:

"I make it no part of my object in this discussion to determine precisely the time when moral agency begins. There are difficulties in the way of such a determination, which I feel myself wholly unable to surmount. My position is, that as soon as men are moral agents, they are sinners." "It seems to me as unreasonable and absurd to say, that human beings are really sinners before they are moral agents, as to say that birds or fishes are sinners."§

But, notwithstanding his caution in defining the date of incipient moral agency, he labors to disprove the negative position that sin cannot begin with the beginning of the soul's life. There is no difficulty in supposing them to sin from birth, and such he plainly indicates to be his opinion. |

In 1835, Dr. Woods published an Essay on Native Depravity. Through a considerable part of this Essay, he advocates the opinions which have just been described. He argues that infants may be capable of "moral emotions" of a sinful character from the start, inasmuch as the *divine law is written on the heart* and therefore no instruction from without is requisite to render them accountable agents.¶ He explains that he means by their having the law written on their hearts, that they have "moral faculties and moral perceptions."*** They have from the first "some feeble degree of moral affection"—some degree of "personal depravity."†† "Children are in some small degree moral agents from the first."‡‡

Having pursued this line of argument, he makes one of the most remarkable transitions which we have ever met with in the course of our theological reading. He proposes a different hypothesis which he at first suggests as plausible and entitled to consideration, but which he proceeds to defend and avow as his own belief. Stated in his own words, it is that the depravity of man "consists originally in a *wrong disposition* or a *corrupt nature*, which is antecedent to any sinful emotions,

* *Letters*, &c. (Boston, 1822,) p. 95.

§ P. 183.

†† P. 155.

| P. 305 et passim.

† Ibid, p. 141.

¶ Essay, p. 147.

‡‡ P. 154.

‡ P. 305.

** P. 150.

and from which, as an inward source, all sinful emotions and actions proceed."* There is an inclination, disposition, propensity, or tendency to sin, existing prior to all sinful *feelings* even, and out of that hidden fountain all such feelings, and all sinful choices and actions flow. This propensity to sin is itself sinful,—the very *fons et origo malorum*. Dr. Woods quietly ignores his doctrine as to the nature of moral agency, and the nature of sin, and assumes the existence, back of all exercises, of a constitutional, innate, inherited, and propagated propensity of which sin is the object.

Turning back now to his controversy with Ware, we find this same doctrine less plainly suggested, and standing side by side with the Hopkinsian propositions which have been already noticed as making up the main part of that earlier discussion. There are passages in which he traces sin to what is "original or native in our *moral constitution*,"† "a uniformly operating cause or law of nature," passing from father to son like "the serpent's bite, the lion's fierceness," or "intelligence, gratitude, sympathy, or kindness" in the human soul."‡ This propensity is something distinct from the "natural appetites, affections, and passions," and is "itself sinful; yea, it is what every one must consider as the very essence of sin."§

In his Essay, after advocating both these diverse forms of doctrine, in the manner stated above, he makes an attempt to unite them; but it is unnecessary to trace his path in this unsuccessful enterprise.

Besides the questions which have been specially noticed above, there is another great topic which could not escape the attention of the New England divines. We refer to the permission of sin and the kindred questions which belong to the theodicy. This subject, as all know, was debated in the ancient heathen schools. It was elaborately handled by the scholastic writers, and by Thomas Aquinas in particular. Differing from Scotus, who, like Anselm and Abelard, held that the present is the best possible system, Aquinas maintained, though in doubtful consistency with some of his own

* P. 158.

† Letters and Reply, p. 159.

‡ Pp. 158, 162.

§ Pp. 334, 335.

principles,* that we can conceive of the present system of things as amplified and extended, whence, indeed, a system in this sense better would result; but within the present system we can conceive of no change that would not be an evil. Sin, in itself considered, is an evil, but, as related to the whole order of things in which it has a place, this is not the fact. Sin is not the *direct* means of the greatest good; its proper tendencies are not good, but evil; yet, indirectly, as an indispensable condition, it is the necessary means of the greatest good. It follows from the perfections of God, from his omnipotence and benevolence, that it is good that evil exists. If sin did not exist when and where it does, the system would be damaged in other respects. Sometimes the schoolmen appealed to the principle of *variety*, and argued that virtue is set off advantageously by the contrast of moral evil, or that sin is useful as a test and purifier of the good, or that, without sin, forms of excellence—patience, for example—could never exist. Commonly they supported their denial of the divine authorship of sin by the fallacious position which was borrowed from Augustine, that sin is a mere defect—is *nihil*. But their real doctrine is that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. The old Protestant theology came to a like conclusion. It is the conviction of Calvin that because sin exists under the divine administration, in the system of which God is the author, we must suppose it preferable that sin should exist rather than not. It is this conviction in great part that leads him to deny that sin is barely permitted, and to maintain a volitive permission, and, in this sense, an ordination of sin on the part of God. Hence he has often been thought a supralapsarian, as if he held even the first sin to be an object of an efficient decree. But this is not his doctrine, as a careful study of the *Consensus Genevensis*, as well as of his writings generally, will demonstrate. He constantly falls back on the statement of Augustine, who is acknowledged to be supralapsarian, that God not only permits, but wills to permit, sin; and he puts his whole theory into this sentence. Calvin's

* See, on the relation of this doctrine to the system of Aquinas, Ritter, *Ges. d. Christ. Phil.* IV., 283.

principles respecting the divine justice as underlying all decrees and providential action clash with the supra-lapsarian scheme. He labors to repel the imputation that he holds God to be the author of moral evil; yet, as we have said, he could not escape, as he thought, from the doctrine that it is good that evil exists.* This doctrine that the existence of sin is to be preferred to its non-existence—that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, passed into the New England theology. Hopkins is full of it. Bellamy advocates it in an elaborate treatise. He holds that this is the best of all possible systems; it will be more holy and happy than if sin and misery had never entered it; God could have kept all his creatures holy without infringing on their free agency, but the result would have involved a greater loss than gain.† Sin, “in itself and in all its natural tendencies,” is “infinitely evil;”‡ yet every sin is overruled “to a greater good on the whole.” He says, and quotes Augustine to the same effect, that it is good that evil should exist.

Dr. Woods in his controversy with Ware, had argued in a similar strain; maintaining that the system is better than it would be if sin were not in it.

When Dr. Taylor began his investigations, New England theology asserted a doctrine of natural ability, as the condition of responsible agency; it rejected imputation in every form; but outside of the Hopkinsian school, it associated with this denial a vague theory of an hereditary sinful taint, or a sinful

* Not a few distinguished scholars, and among them, Gieseler, Julius Müller, Neander and Baur, have supposed Calvin to go beyond Augustine in connecting the first sin with divine agency. Strong expressions seeming to favor this view, are in the *Inst.* III., xxiii., 6, 8, and in the *Respons. ad Calum. Neb.* (Works, Amst. Ed. Tom. VIII., p. 634). But this last tract is the work of Beza, for which Calvin is not responsible. Judging by the passages in the *Institutes*, without reference to other expressions of Calvin, we should unhesitatingly agree with the interpreters above named. But, in other writings, as we have said, he plants himself on the Augustinian formula. His doctrine is that of a volitive permission. See, for example, *Cons. Genev.* (Niemeyer's Ed.) p. 230. That justice lies back of all acts of the divine will, is emphatically asserted. See Tom. VIII., p. 638. He says: “Quamquam mihi Dei voluntas summa est causa, ubique tamen doceo, ubi in ejus consiliis vel operibus causa non apparet; apud eum esse absconditam, et nihil nisi juste et sapienter decreverit.” “Clare affirmo nihil decernere sine optima causa: quæ si hodie nobis incognita est, ultimo die patefiet.”

† Works, II., p. 61, seq.

‡ Ibid., p. 145.

propensity to sin, propagated with the race—what Dr. Taylor termed "physical depravity;"—and it vindicated the introduction, or permission, of sin, by affirming that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and that the system of things is better with sin than without it.

The aim of Dr. Taylor was to relieve New England theology of remaining difficulties on the side of human responsibility. He could not regard the prevailing theology as consistent with itself or as successful in solving the problems which it professed to solve.*

The fundamental question was that of liberty and necessity. There must be, on the one hand, a firm foundation for the doctrine of decrees, and universal providential government, and for the exercise of resignation, submission, and confidence on the part of men in view of all events; otherwise, the Calvinistic system is given up. There must be, on the other hand, a full power in men to avoid sin and perform their duty; otherwise, the foundation of accountability is gone, and the commands and entreaties of the Bible are a mockery.

The true solution of the problem, in Dr. Taylor's view, is in the union of the doctrine of the previous certainty of every act of the will—a certainty given by its antecedents, collectively taken—with the power of contrary choice. Freedom is exemption from something; it is exemption from the constraining operation of that law of cause and effect which brings events to pass in the material world. If the antecedents of choice produce the consequent according to that law, without qualification, there is no liberty. Yet Dr. Taylor did not hold to the liberty of indifference or of contingency, which had been charged upon the Arminians, and had been denied by his predecessors. He held to a connection between choice and its antecedents, of such a character as to give in every case a previous certainty that the former will be what it actually is. The ground, or reason of this certainty lies in the constitution of the agent and the motives under which he acts; that is to

* See the letter of Dr. Taylor to Dr. Beecher (Jan. 14th, 1819), written before Dr. Taylor became Professor, and describing what was needed in theology.—*Life of Beecher*, I, 384.

say, in the antecedents taken together. The infallible connection of these with the consequent, the divine mind perceives; though we may not dogmatize on the exact *mode* of His perception. The precise nature of the connection between the antecedents and consequent, Dr. Taylor did not profess to explain; but he held that the same antecedents *will* uniformly be followed by the same consequent. In short, he asserted that choice is a phenomenon *sui generis*, not taking place after the analogy of physical events, but involving the power to the contrary. There is another species of causation, another category of causes, besides that with which we are made acquainted in the realm of physical phenomena. There are causes which do not necessitate their effect, but simply and solely give the certainty of it. Now, all admit that every event is previously certain. It is a true proposition that what is to occur to-morrow, *will* thus occur. No matter, then, what may be the ground of this certainty; as long as the events in question are not necessitated, there is no interference with moral liberty.

Augustinians and Calvinists, except the supra-lapsarians, had admitted the power of contrary choice in the case of the first sin, as well as in the case of the previous moral actions of Adam.* They erred, according to Dr. Taylor, in assuming that this power was lost, and that the continuance of it is incompatible with the actual permanence of character. Rather, as he believed, is this power involved in the consciousness of freedom, and recognized as real in the Scriptures, as well as by the common sense of mankind.

The leading principles of Dr. Taylor's system may now be stated in an intelligible manner.

* It is plain that Augustinians are cut off from the use of three very common arguments against Dr. Taylor. The first is that the supposition of a power of contrary choice admits the possibility of an event without a cause. But they themselves make this supposition in the case of Adam. The second is that a choice, in case there is a power to the contrary, cannot be foreseen. The third is that the supposition of such a power would make holiness self-originated, or the product of creaturely activity. But is not this inference equally necessary in the case of Adam?

It will be understood that we are not engaged in expounding views of our own, but in explaining those of Dr. Taylor.

1. All sin is the voluntary action of the sinner, in disobedience to a known law. The doctrine of a "physical," or hereditary, sin, which had lingered in the New England theology, though inconsistent with its principles, and was defended by Dr. Woods and Dr. Tyler, was discarded by Dr. Taylor. In his doctrine of the voluntariness of all moral action, he agreed with the Hopkinsians. This, in truth, is the ancient, orthodox opinion, coming down from the days of Augustine. On this point we shall speak in another part of this Article.

2. Sin, however, is a permanent principle, or state of the will, a governing purpose, underlying all subordinate volitions and acts. Stated in theological language, it is the elective preference of the world to God, as the soul's chief good. It may be resolved into selfishness. An avaricious man makes money the object of his abiding preference. He acts perpetually under the influence of this active, voluntary, continuous, principle. He lays plans, undertakes enterprises, encounters hazard and toil, under its silent dictation. A like thing is true of an ambitious man, a voluptuary, and of every other sinner. Each shapes his conduct in conformity with the dictates of an immanent, deep-lying, yet voluntary or elective preference—choice—of some form of earthly good. In its generic form, sin is supreme love to the world, or the preference of the world to God. It is a single principle, however varied its expressions, and is totally evil. It is the "evil treasure of the heart." It excludes moral excellence, since no man can serve two masters.

This profound conception of the nature of character is in its spirit Augustinian. Dr. Taylor held that character is simple in its essence. It is a principle, seated in the will, existing and continuing, by the will's consent, knowingly cherished, yet a fountain of action so deep that it rarely comes into the foreground of consciousness. Only in an hour of earnest reflection, is a man's attention turned back to this governing purpose of his life.

We regard this feature of Dr. Taylor's system as an important contribution to theological science. That "disposition," "propensity," "inclination," which had so puzzled his pre-

decessors in New England, he defined accurately, and in accordance with the conceptions of moral agency which they had themselves laid down.

3. Though sin belongs to the individual and consists in sinning, yet the fact that every man sins from the beginning of responsible agency is in consequence of the sin of Adam. It is certain that every man will sin from the moment when he is capable of moral action, and will continue to be sinful, until he is regenerated; and this certainty, which is absolute though it is no necessity and co-exists with power to the opposite action, is somehow due to Adam's sin. In this sense, Adam was placed on trial for the whole human race.* On the relation of the sinfulness of men to the sin of Adam, Dr. Taylor agreed with the New England divines generally after the first Edwards. As to when responsible agency, as a matter of fact, begins, Dr. Taylor did not profess to state. He was not concerned to combat the doctrine of a sin from birth, though he did not hold it: if sin was correctly defined and the right doctrine as to the conditions of responsibility was held fast, he was satisfied.

There is in men, according to Dr. Taylor, a bias, or tendency, —sometimes called a propensity, or disposition—to sin; but this is not *itself* sinful; it is the cause or occasion of sin. Nor is it to be conceived of as a separate desire of the soul, having respect to *sin* as an object. Such a propensity as this does not exist in human nature. But this bias results from the condition of our propensities to natural good, as related to the higher powers of the soul and to the circumstances in which we are placed. As a *consequence* of this tendency or bias, there is a *sinful* disposition, or the wrong governing purpose before described, which is the cause of all *other* sins, *itself* excepted.†

It is proper to say that men are sinners by nature, since, in all the appropriate circumstances of their being, they sin from the first. If a change of circumstances, as by transferring them from one place on the earth to another, or from one set of circumstances to a more favorable one, would alter the fact

* *Revealed Theology*, p. 259.† *Ibid.* p. 194.

and render them, or any of them, holy from the start, then their sin might properly be attributed to circumstances and not to nature. The certainty of their sin as soon as they are capable of sinning is the consequence of two factors, the constitution and condition of the soul (subjective), and the situation (objective). These together constitute nature in the statement, "we are sinners by nature."

4. Man is the proximate efficient cause of all his voluntary states and actions. The Hopkinsian theory of divine efficiency is rejected. No man is necessitated to choose as he does. There is ever a power to the contrary. A sinner can cease to love the world supremely and choose God for his portion. He not only *can* if he will; but Dr. Taylor uttered his protest against what he considered a necessitarian evasion, by affirming that "*he can if he won't.*" He did not admit that the possible meanings of the question, Can a man choose otherwise than he does, are exhausted in the senseless tautology and the infinite series, into one or the other of which Edwards and his followers insisted on resolving it. He did not admit that a man could properly be called free and responsible, merely because he wills to sin, provided it is assumed that his will is determined in its action by laws like those which govern the association of ideas, or by a positive exertion of divine efficiency.

5. Inseparable from the foregoing assertion of a power to the contrary choice, however, is the doctrine of a moral inability on the part of the sinner to repent and convert himself. He *can*, but it is certain he *will* not. His repentance without the help of the Spirit is therefore just as hopeless as if it were completely out of his power. To expect him to repent by his own unaided powers is not less vain, and *so far* not less irrational, than if he were destitute of these powers. "Certainty with power to the contrary" is a condensed statement of the truth on both sides. Thus the sinner is both responsible and dependent—perfectly responsible, yet absolutely dependent. It is just to require him to repent; it is just to punish his impenitence; yet his only hope is in the merciful and gracious help of God.

6. Natural ability being a real power and not an incapable faculty, there must be something in a sinner's mind to which right motives can appeal—some point of attachment for the influences of the law and the Gospel. Hence, the importance of the distinction between the sensibility and will, or of the threefold classification of mental powers, which Dr. Taylor was among the first to introduce. The writers before him had commonly followed the old division of the mind into understanding and will. By failing to distinguish carefully the involuntary part of our nature from the will proper—the elective faculty—they had often fallen into a confusing ambiguity. It is doubtful whether the doctrine of divine efficiency, or of a creation of sinful as well as holy volitions, would have come in, if the threefold classification had been sharply made. Such terms as inclination, disposition, propensity, are used now of a choice and now of an impulse or tendency anterior to choice. But a sinful man can be made to feel the force of truth, and this, too, without supposing him to be thereby in any degree holy; for there is a neutral part of his nature which truth can move. Hence, too, when he is commanded in the Bible to consider his ways, he does not of necessity sin in doing so. This neutral part is the region of the sensibilities.*

What is the particular feeling which may thus be addressed? According to Dr. Taylor, it is the love of happiness, or self-love.

We are thus brought to the consideration of what has been deemed one of the most obnoxious features in his system,—“the self-love theory.” It has been so often misunderstood that we shall give some space to explaining it.

Dr. Taylor never held that love to God, or benevolence, or moral excellence, however it may be designated, is a subordinate or executive volition dictated by the predominant choice of one's own happiness. He never held that a man is *first* to choose his own highest happiness, and *then* choose the highest happiness of the universe subordinately.

* The existence of a neutral part of our nature, to which motives can appeal, is admitted by opponents of Dr. Taylor, in the case of holy Adam. See Dr. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, p. 287.

In the first place, Dr. Taylor believed, with a great company of philosophers, from Aristotle to the present time, that the involuntary love or desire of personal happiness is the subjective, psychological spring of all choices.* Says Locke:—

"That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is some present uneasiness; which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it; because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness; but every good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness; for all that we desire is only to be happy." "All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it: other things acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without."

He develops and defends this view at length, in his chapter on "Power," from which the preceding passages are quoted. President Edwards adopts the doctrine that the "will is as the greatest apparent good." "Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or perceived *as good*; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such." "To appear *good* to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to *appear agreeable*, or *seem pleasing* to the mind." Explicitly and many times, in connection with these passages, he uses "pleasure," "enjoyment," "happiness," as synonyms of "good."† Even Bishop Butler says:—

* Says Augustine: "omnes istæ et aliæ tales voluntates suos proprios fines habent, qui referuntur ad finem illius voluntatis qua volumus beate vivere, et ad eam pervenire vitam quæ non referitur ad aliud, sed amanti per se ipsam sufficiat." De Trin. xi. 6. See also, De Lib. Arbit. I. xiii. (Conf. X. xxi.) etc. It is the scholastic maxim, "quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni." But the doctrine is older than Augustine. It is the groundwork of Aristotle's Ethical discussion. See Nic. Eth. I. vii., and the whole first Book of this treatise. Calvin calls it the common doctrine of philosophers, to which he gives his assent. Inst. II. ii. 26.

† "In some sense, the most benevolent, generous person in the world, seeks his *own* happiness in doing good to others; because he places his happiness in their good." Edwards's "God's Chief End in Creation," (III. 88.) He expounds this view more fully and emphatically in his *Charity and its Fruits*, pp. 232, 233.

"There are two kinds of original good; enjoyment and deliverance from

"Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbor, is as really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure, as the pleasure self-love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence, would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way of speaking, no creature can possibly act but merely from self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into this one principle." "All particular affections, resentment, benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification, i. e. the gratification of ourselves; and the gratification of each gives delight. So far then it is manifest they have all the same respect to private interest."

In claiming that choice universally proceeds from a constitutional love of happiness, Dr. Taylor considered himself in agreement with writers on mental science generally, and he regarded the outcry against him on account of this doctrine as mostly the offspring of ignorance.

Dr. Taylor held that the object of choice is either happiness of some kind or degree, or the means of happiness. In the language of President Edwards, "volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which *causes it to appear* most agreeable." But a broad distinction is to be made between the direct and the indirect means of happiness. That which is chosen as the *direct* means of happiness to the subject of the choice, is chosen for its own sake. If I love knowledge and pursue it, in order to gain money or distinction, I do not love knowledge for its own sake; that is, I am after the happiness derived from wealth or fame, and not after the happiness *directly* imparted by knowledge and by the pursuit of it. I love knowledge for its own sake, when it yields me delight immediately and independently of any relation of it to an ulterior end.

Universal happiness or the highest happiness of the universe

suffering; or as the case may be, from the danger of suffering. These two are the only objects of desire to percipient beings; and to intelligent beings, as truly as any others. When virtue itself is desired, it is desired only for the enjoyment it furnishes. Were there no such things in the universe there would be no such thing as desire; and consequently no such thing as volition, or action." "A moral government is entirely founded on motives. All motives are included in the two kinds of good, mentioned above." Dwight, Sermon. lxxx. (III. 166.)

is one mode of stating the object of a holy or benevolent choice. Now the highest happiness of every individual is indissolubly linked with the choice of this object and the pursuit of it as the chief end of living. That is to say, in the exercise of this choice there is a joy superior to that derived from anything else. From the object itself and the choice of it, as an immanent, voluntary preference, comes the highest happiness of which the soul is capable. Benevolence is the choice of the highest good of the universe, in preference to everything that can come into competition with it. But one's own highest happiness can never thus come into competition with it. Rather are the two,—one's own highest happiness and that of the universe,—in the nature of things inseparably connected. So that in the choice of the highest good of the whole, the choice of one's own highest happiness is blended. Virtuous self-love and virtuous benevolence denote one and the same complex state; and one or the other term is employed, as the speaker has in view one or the other of its relations, viz., to one's own highest happiness as depending on the highest happiness of the universe, or to the highest happiness of the universe as producing his own highest happiness.

We are not vindicating Dr. Taylor's position, we are simply explaining it; and without doubt a great part of the reproach heaped on him for his theory on this subject is due to the mistaken supposition that he considered benevolence, or love to God, a subordinate choice.*

We may add that Dr. Taylor's unfortunate choice of the term "self-love," as an expression of his doctrine, was partly owing to a like use of this term in Dugald Stewart's *Active and Moral Powers*. Hopkins's doctrine of Disinterested Benevolence, also, had led Dwight and other Anti-Hopkinsians to distinguish between *uninterested* and *disinterested*, and to call the innocent love of happiness *self-love*, in distinction from selfishness.

* It is needless to add that Dr. Taylor considered the moral excellence of virtue—or the *virtuousness* of Benevolence—to consist in its tendency to promote the highest happiness of the universe. In this he agreed with the younger Edwards, (II., 541,) and with Dwight, (Serm. xcix., III., 489.)

It may serve to illustrate the comparative impunity from theological odium which is enjoyed by writers on philosophy, if we call attention to the doctrine, on the topic before us, contained in the recent able work on Moral Science by President Hopkins, of Williams College. This doctrine is the same as that of Dr. Taylor. Dr. Hopkins holds that the desire of happiness has the same relation to the other desires as "that of consciousness to the several specific faculties of cognition."

"In this way it is that a desire of good enters into every specific form of desire, and that, as consciousness is the generic form of cognition, so the desire of good or of happiness is the generic form of all the desires."* "A third peculiarity of moral good is that in seeking it for ourselves we necessarily promote the good of others." "By some it has been held that all virtue has its origin in a regard to the good of others. The true system is found in the coincidence of the two; and that becomes possible only from the peculiarity of moral good now mentioned."† "It has already been seen to be the characteristic of a rational being to act with reference to an end. But an end can be sought rationally only as there is in it an apprehended good."‡ But what is meant by a *good*? "As there is, then, no good without consciousness, which involves activity, it would seem that the good must be found in the activity itself, or in its results.

But activity in itself cannot be a good. If it had no results, it would be good for nothing, and those results may be evil and wretchedness, as well as blessing.

We turn then, in this search, to the results, in consciousness, of activity. We are so constituted that any form of normal activity, physical or mental, produces satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness, according to the faculties that act. Of these the conception is simple and indefinable, except by synonymous terms." "We say then that in the satisfaction attached by God to the normal activity of our powers, we find a *good*, an end that is wholly for its own sake. We say, too, that it is only in and from such activity that we can have the notion of any satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness, either for ourselves or others; and that that form and proportion of activity which would result in our perfect blessedness would be right."§

This doctrine is identical with that of Dr. Taylor. This agreement does not extend to all points in the ethical theory of the latter; but on "self-love" and its relation to benevolence and selfishness, there is a perfect agreement.

We may add that on the nature of moral agency, President Hopkins expresses himself in entire harmony with the familiar principles of Dr. Taylor. The former says:

* P. 95.

† P. 188.

‡ P. 199.

§ Pp. 51, 52. See, also, pp. 131, 190, 191.

"Man is responsible for his preferences, his choices, the acts of his will generally,—for these and their results,—and for nothing else." Responsibility cannot attach to spontaneous affections, but only to the choice of an end. "There is a broad distinction between what is called, sometimes an immanent preference, sometimes a governing purpose, sometimes an ultimate intention, and those volitions which are merely executive, and prescribe specific acts under such a purpose." * "Character is as the governing preference or purpose—it consists in an original and thorough determination by a man of himself with reference to some end chosen by himself as supreme." † "The choice of a supreme end is generic. It is made once, in a sense only once. In a sense, too, it is made always, constantly repeated, since it is only under this that other choices are made. It is like the light of consciousness, and would naturally be the last thing investigated. Indeed, as consciousness is the generic form of intelligence, and the desire of happiness that of the desires, and love that of affections, so the choice of a supreme end is the generic form of volition. It enters into all others; they are made in its light and partake of its character." ‡

These are familiar propositions in Dr. Taylor's system. In pointing out this coincidence, however, we do not mean to detract in the slightest degree from the reputation of Dr. Hopkins as a fresh and independent thinker.

7. The exposition of Dr. Taylor's conception of the elements of moral agency renders it easy to set forth his view of Regeneration. The author of Regeneration is the Holy Spirit. The change that takes place in the soul is due to His influence so exerted as to effect that change in the sense of rendering it infallibly certain. It is a change of character. It is the production of love to God as the supreme object of choice, in the room of love to the world. But the change takes place within the soul; and it is the man himself who repents and believes, and chooses God for his portion. Hence, it takes place in the use of his natural powers, and in conformity with the laws of the mind. As a psychological change, it can be analyzed and described. To do this was a part of Dr. Taylor's design in his noted Review of Spring on the Means of Regeneration. § He held that the attention of a sinner might be excited and directed to his duty, that the motives of the Gospel appeal to the instinctive desire of happiness, which underlies all choosing, that impelled by this movement of a part of his nature which is neither holy or sinful, but simply constitutional, a

* P. 170.

† Pp. 168, 169.

‡ P. 218.

§ *Christian Spectator*, 1829.

sinner could suspend the choice of the world as his chief good, which forms the essence of sinful character, and could give his heart to God. Dr. Taylor thus draws out analytically the steps of a mental change, giving them in the order of nature rather than that of chronological succession. Now a sinner is *naturally* able to make this revolution in the ruling principle of his life. There is adequate power, and there is no absurdity in supposing that power exerted. But there is a moral inability, which constitutes practically an insuperable obstacle; and this is overcome only by the agency of the Spirit who moves upon the powers of the soul, and induces, without coercing, them to comply with the requirements of the Gospel.

8. Dr. Taylor's doctrine on the relation of the introduction of sin and its continuance to the divine administration, accords with the general spirit of his theology. Theologians from Calvin to Bellamy had discussed the question as if there were only this alternative, the existence of sin or the prevention of it by *the power of God*. Holding that God was able to exclude sin from the system, and knowing that he has not done so, they proceeded to the inference that the system is better for having sin in it—that the existence of sin, wherever it is found, is better, all things considered, than its non-existence would be—that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

In the first place, Dr. Taylor held that we are not shut up to the alternative just stated. There is a third way in which sin might have been prevented, and that is by the free act of the beings who commit it. To say that it was better for them to commit than to avoid sin, is, in Dr. Taylor's judgment, an unwarranted and false proposition. To say that it is better for them to be permitted to sin, as they do, rather than for them to be prevented from sinning by such a positive exertion of divine power as would be requisite to effect this result, is another and quite a different proposition, which carries with it no dangerous consequences. It is not true, then, that sin is ever better than holiness in its stead would be, or that sin, all things considered, is a good thing. But it may be true that the non-prevention of sin by the act of God is in certain cases better than its forcible prevention by his act.

It is a question as old, as philosophy, Why did not God prevent the occurrence of moral evil? Hume revived the argument of Epicurus: Either God can prevent it and will not, in which case he is not omnipotent; or he will and cannot, in which case he is not benevolent; or he neither can nor will, in which case he is neither omnipotent nor benevolent. The New England theologians and other Calvinistic theologians had assumed that He can prevent sin, and had sought to vindicate his benevolence by assuming that it is good that evil exists. Dr. Taylor took up the question in answering skeptical objections to the benevolence of the Creator. The ground that he took in reply was this, that it may be impossible for sin to be excluded by the act of God from the best possible system. He did not deem it necessary to his purpose, which was to ward off an objection, to affirm that it *is* thus impossible; but he modestly said that it *may be*. He did not say that it may be that God cannot exclude sin from *every* moral system, but only from the best,—from that which will secure the largest amount of good on the whole. He did not say that it may be impossible for sin to be excluded from such a system; for he held that free agents might exclude it by abstaining from sin. He only said that for aught that can be shown, it may be inconsistent with the nature of things for God by his intervention to exclude sin from that system which of all possible systems is the most eligible for the good that it will secure. The system would be better without sin, if this result were secured by the free action of the creatures comprising it, with no other alteration of its characteristics. It might not be so good, if the same result were reached by divine intervention. We are too little acquainted with the relations of divine power to free agency to declare confidently to what extent the exertion of such power is beneficial, when the universal system is taken into view. It is wiser and more modest to judge of what is best by what we actually see done.

Dr. Taylor was warmly censured for abridging the divine power; and this by theologians who affirmed that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that is, that the Divine being is *shut up* to this means of attaining the ends of His benevolence!

The student of philosophy will be at once reminded of the theodicy of Leibnitz. This great writer advocates a scheme of optimism. Out of all ideal systems present to the omniscient mind of God, He chooses the best possible; that is, the best that can be realized by Him, consistently with the nature of things. This theory, as Leibnitz abundantly shows, involves no limitation of God's power.* Sin is not chosen by Him as an end or a direct means to an end, but as a *conditio sine qua non* of the best system. Interference of God to prevent sin would derange the system, and thus produce more evil than good. He *can* thus interfere, but not wisely or benevolently; and power in God is never dissociated from wisdom and benevolence. So far, there is accord between the system of Dr. Taylor and that of Leibnitz. But we have not found in Leibnitz any consideration of the hypothesis of sin being excluded from the existing system by *the free choice of the creature*, nor any discussion of the question whether, supposing this hypothesis realized, the system would not be better for the change. And in assigning the reasons why divine interference to exclude sin would be unwise, Leibnitz mingles two very diverse grounds. He connects the possibility of sin with the large spiritual endowments of moral creatures; but he also speaks of sin as affording a beneficial contrast with virtue, and thus indirectly contributing to the beauty and harmony of the whole system. He compares moral evil in the system to the shading in a picture, which is essential to its proper effect and highest beauty. This is the old principle of the need of *variety*, to which the schoolmen appealed. In passages, he even verges on the theory of the *necessity* of sin, as well as of its possibility, in consequence of the metaphysical imperfection, or finite constitution of the beings who fall into sin. But this last doctrine is at war with his prevailing view. It would seem, therefore, that the New Haven divines carried the general theory on which the masterly work of Leibnitz is con-

* "Adsentior principio Baelii, quod etiam meum est, omne, quod contradictionem non implicat, esse possibile." 224. He says that his theory no more abridges the divine power than does the assertion that God cannot draw a shorter than a straight line between two points. Among numerous passages to the same effect, see 180, 158, 165, 216, (ed. Dutens.)

structed, a single step, but a very important step, beyond him. Their discussions, however, were not at all connected with his speculations, but were a growth upon the preceding New England discussions of the same high themes.*

9. Dr. Taylor's conception of election is conformed to his doctrine respecting the divine permission of sin. Regeneration is the act of God. Since the renewal of the soul is his work, he must have purposed beforehand to do it. He has determined to exert such a degree of influence upon a certain part of the race who are sinful by their own act, and justly condemned, as will result with infallible certainty in their conversion. He is not bound to give such influence in equal measure to all. Rather does he establish a system of influence which his omniscient mind foresees to be most productive of holiness in his kingdom as a whole. It is not the act or merit of individuals that earns or procures this effectual influence, but that large expediency which has respect to the entire kingdom and the holiness to be produced within it.

Election is a part of a vast and complex system of administration, extending over a universe of intelligent beings. The *material*, so to speak, to be dealt with in this moral kingdom, is free agency; just as *matter* is the material in the outward kingdom of nature. To what extent it is desirable to exert power to control the actions of free agents at any given time or place, only the omniscient mind, who surveys the whole system and knows its laws, can judge. When, where, and to

* A theory respecting the permission of sin, identical with that of the New Haven divines, is suggested in one or two passages of Thomas Aquinas, but is not consistently carried out. He says: "Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit, ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia sed etiam corruptibilia: ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quedam quæ bonitate deficere possint, ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere." "Ipsam autem totum quod est universitas creaturarum melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quedam quæ a bono deficere possunt; quæ interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediens." Summa, I. ii., xlviii., A. ii. But Aquinas goes on immediately to argue that much good would be lost, if it were not for sin; for example, that there would be no vindictive justice and no patience, if there were no sin. He takes refuge in the doctrine that sin is merely privative, like blindness in the eye, and so, being *nothing*, has not God for its author! Another passage, still more plainly suggesting the main idea of the New Haven theory, has been cited from Aquinas's Com. in Pet. Lomb. (I. I. Dist. 39, Q. 2. A. 2.) But this work we have not now at hand.

what extent, it is desirable to exert the extraordinary influence of His Spirit to regenerate and sanctify souls, He alone can determine. He organizes a plan, not in an arbitrary way, but in order to secure the best results that are attainable consistently with the wise and benevolent laws that underlie His whole administration. Under the operation of this plan, the Gospel call goes to one *land* sooner than another. Antioch hears the good news at once; other cities and countries must wait for ages. Not that God loves Antioch better than the cities of Eastern Asia; but His beneficent plan involves this selection of Antioch. So of individuals. The system of influence is adapted to sweep into the kingdom of heaven a certain number, and those alone; not from any partiality to them, not because they deserve more than others, but because the system that secures their salvation is the wisest and most beneficent. The effectual call is addressed, for example, to Paul, not because he has claims superior to those of his associates in travel, but because the same benevolent plan involved his conversion. His conversion was purposed, as the certain futurity of the event was secured by the plan.

Dr. Taylor believed that his doctrines, on the points considered under this and the preceding head, must be admitted in order to give their full, natural sense to the numerous passages of Scripture in which the unwillingness of God that sinners should continue impenitent, and his earnest desire that they should turn to him and be saved, are emphatically expressed. Theology was embarrassed by the supposition of two contrary wills in the divine Being, both having respect to the same object, namely, the repentance of the sinner. There was a difficulty in reconciling the merciful declarations and invitations of the Bible, with an unwillingness, all things considered, on the part of their Author that the latter should be complied with. Can He sincerely say that He prefers all men to abandon sin, if, on the whole, he prefers that they should not? The old Protestant theologians adopted the distinction of the revealed and secret will of God, which had come down from the Schoolmen,—the *voluntas signi* and the *voluntas beneplaciti*. Calvin was too fair-minded an exegete not to betray his perplexity in the presence of some of the passages to

which we have referred. Thus, in his comment on Matthew xxiii. 27 (the Saviour's lament over Jerusalem), he says of the will of Jesus to gather its inhabitants to Himself, that it is the will of God *ex verbi natura*,—that is, the revealed will. Yet, he adds, the will of God is one and simple, and the representation of it as two-fold is anthropopathic. He admits that God wills to gather all. Standing face to face with the "*I would*," "*but ye would not*," he says: "*est autem inter velle Dei et ipsorum nolle emphatica oppositio.*" The *secret* will of God is to him an ineffable, unfathomable mystery. On this subject he says that nothing is better than a learned ignorance.

Dr. Taylor considered that all this perplexity is removed, and full credit given to the universal offers of grace and invitations of mercy, if it is only understood that while God prefers that every one should repent *under the recovering influences* to which he is subject, He at the same time cannot wisely alter this system of influences; and *rather* than do this, he prefers that the sinner should perish.* In itself considered, and all things considered, He prefers his repentance to his continued and fatal impenitence; but He prefers the latter—that is, He

* In harmony with Dr. Taylor's ideas on this subject is the letter (to Boyle) of John Howe, the great Puritan divine, on *the Reconcilableness of God's Providence of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of His counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever means He uses to prevent them*. Howe dislikes the contrasted terms *secret will* and *revealed will*. "The truth is," he says, "that God doth really and complacently will (and therefore doth with most unexceptionable sincerity declare himself to will) that to be done and enjoyed by many men, which he doth not, universally, will to make them do, or irresistibly procure that they shall enjoy." "Methinks it should not be difficult for us to acknowledge that God doth truly, and with complacency, will whatsoever is the holy, righteous matter of his own laws." That he does not actually procure the obedience of all, "is upon so much more valuable reasons, as that, not to do it was more eligible, with the higher complacency of a determinative will." Although He foresees that many will not be moved by his exhortations, promises, and threats, but persist in sin, "He at the same time sees that they might do otherwise, and that if they would comply with his methods, things would otherwise issue with them." "For they do it not because He foreknew it, but He only foreknew it because they would do so." That He does not reclaim them from sin "proceeds not from the imperfection of His power, but from the concurrence of all other perfections in Him." "His wisdom doth as much limit the exercise of his power, as His righteousness or His truth doth." See, also, Howe on *the Redeemer's tears wept over lost souls*, where are sentiments to the same effect.

prefers to permit the latter—sooner than to do more than He is doing (which is all that He wisely can do) for his conversion. Christ most earnestly desired that the inhabitants of Jerusalem should receive Him and be saved. “How often would I * * * * but ye would not.” But he preferred to leave them to that dreadful lot which they were bringing on themselves, rather than to bring a different kind, or an increased amount of influence to recover them. There is no contradiction in His will, for the objects of choice in the two cases are different.*

Under the New Haven theory, there is room not only for the hardening of heart under a law of character, which is *certain* in its operation, but also for the judicial withdrawal of the influences of grace, on which all hope depends.

How earnestly Dr. Taylor upheld the doctrine of Special Grace, and of sovereignty in the bestowal of it, may be learned from the following extracts from his Review of Spring on “the Means of Regeneration” :—

“According to the principle which we have advanced, there is no ground of certainty that the renewing grace, or the grace which secures the performance, *will attend* any call to duty, addressed to any individual sinner. Here, as we shall now attempt to show, lies the practical power of the doctrine of dependence, viz., in the fearful uncertainty, which it imparts to the great question of the sinner’s regeneration.” This doctrine “was taught with great plainness, and pressed in all its pungency, and all its mysteriousness, upon the wondering Nicodemus by the Saviour himself.” “Why is the high and uncontrollable sovereignty of God in the gifts of his grace, so clearly announced and so formally and triumphantly defended against the murmurings of the ungodly!” “Have we no evidence that this is an unwelcome truth, and unwelcome because it is terrible,

* It would seem to be felt by many opponents of Dr. Taylor that the very supposition of a successful withstanding of the Spirit of God by the human will cannot be entertained without impiety. But they must read their New Testaments with little attention, or they would not argue in this strain. “Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost,” says Peter (Acts viii. 13); where the word for *resist* (ἀντιστάτω) in its primary import signifies “to fall upon,”—as an enemy. There is an exertion of the Spirit, a *real* exertion, which yet does not prevail over the will. Only a perfectly sophistical exegesis can shut this fact out of the New Testament. Granted, that in the case of the elect, grace is effectual, unresisted,—is of a kind and degree to secure the futurity of the event. This does not affect the truth stated before. “Grieve not the Spirit,” writes Paul, (Eph. iv. 30); representing the Spirit in the light of a loving friend, who is troubled or hurt by neglect and opposition. How different is this conception of the Spirit’s influence from that which makes it a *mere* exertion of power!

and terrible because it shows man's eternal destiny to depend on the unknown counsels of an offended God!" "What is better fitted to confirm this confidence"—the delusive confidence of the sinner that he shall escape future misery—"than the assurance, or even a high probability, that the grace of God is, and ever will be, ready to renew the heart." "They believe in their dependence on God; but they also believe that the necessary grace is, and will be, ready for their use, when they shall be ready to use it. This is the grand opiate of the adversary by which he holds enthralled multitudes, under the light of salvation, in their guilty sleep of moral death." But "his salvation, by his own perverseness, is forfeited into the hands of a sovereign and offended God. Point then the thoughtless man to God's high counsels, and show him that God will save or destroy, 'as seemeth good in his sight.'" "According to the principles which we have advanced, the gift of renewing grace cannot be inferred from the nature, tendency, or relations of any prior acts of the sinner. It cannot be inferred from any divine promise, but is thrown into fearful uncertainty by the divine threatenings." "Whether, therefore, this blessing be given or withheld in respect to individual sinners, is an inquiry which, according to the views we have maintained in the previous discussion, as well as according to the scriptural doctrine of dependence, must be left with the sovereignty of God, whose secret counsels no eye can penetrate."*

Now, we ask any candid person who knows enough about the subject to form an intelligent judgment, if the system which we have sketched above, is Pelagian. The great aim of Dr. Hodge is to identify Dr. Taylor's system with Pelagianism. This is the whole drift and spirit of his Article, so far as it relates to Dr. Taylor. The Pelagian system is a tolerably coherent one, and is well understood. Underlying Pelagianism, is the assumption that an act of sin has little or no tendency to self-perpetuation. It may be repeated, or may not, but it does not, of course, result in a character,—a permanently sinful state of the will. In fact, there is no character in the sense of a single, central, all-governing principle, at the root of special virtues or special forms of sin. Hence there is rather a gradation from the worst to the best men, than a radical difference between the good and evil. Consistently with this fundamental assumption is the doctrine that Adam's sin did not affect his posterity, except in the way of example,—an example which is not universally followed. There have been sinless men, many of whom can be named. The world grew worse, but this was owing to the multiplying of evil examples

* *Christian Spectator*, 1829, pp. 706, 708, 710.

and the power of education. But the virtues of the heathen are such as to entitle them to reward. The Revealed Law was given as a moral influence to deter men from committing sin; the Gospel was added as an additional influence tending to the same end. Men need grace, but grace in the view of the Pelagian leaders, principally, if not exclusively, consists in the giving of truth, precepts, admonitions, and the like; not in an inward operation of the Spirit. Free-will itself, with the other native powers of the mind, is reckoned under the term grace. There are two states of blessedness, corresponding to the lower and higher type of salvable character, the *vita eterna* and *regnum celorum*. This is in keeping with the legal spirit and quantitative estimate of excellence; that characterize Pelagianism.*

Now, there is not one of these essential tenets of the Pela-

* For the correctness of this statement of the tenets of the Pelagians, we only need refer to the ordinary Histories of Doctrine. We here call special attention to two particulars, viz., the *Pelagian conception of grace, which excludes the operation of the Spirit, and the "atomical view" of character*. 1. After Pelagius was acquitted at Diospolis, Augustine attached no blame to the bishops, but considered that they had been misled by ambiguities; and he expressly says that Pelagius really resolved grace into law and teaching. "Quid manifestius, nihil aliud eum dicere gratiam, qua Deus in nobis operatur velle quod bonum est, quam legem atque doctrinam." *De Grat. Christ. X.* See, also, *De Gest. Pel. X., De Har.* 88. Whether Augustine was altogether right in his interpretation of Pelagius, is for the present purpose immaterial. What was condemned as Pelagianism was the doctrine thus ascribed to him. 2. It is the well-known philosophy of Pelagianism that an act of sin does not result in a sinful character. The act passes by and leaves the will in *equilibrio*. We are aware of what Pelagius says (*Ad. Demetriad. 8*) respecting the "longa consuetudo vitiorum" and its corrupting influence. Niedner infers that he must have differed from Coelestius and Julian on this point, and have been less a Pelagian than they. But "the custom" of sinning is a vague conception in Pelagius. "Pelagius and Julian," says Julius Müller (*Lehre. v., d. Sünde, II., 50*), "content themselves here with a notion which, had they gone deeper into its nature and scope, would have sufficed to disturb their confidence in their doctrine of freedom; but which, as it was taken up by them *unwillingly* and in an *external and superficial way*, was necessarily without any deep influence on their system." "The single act," adds Müller, "is thought of as completely isolated. There is no insight into the law, according to which it must bring forth a moral state," &c. Exactly what Pelagius believed, it may not be easy, on all points, to determine. The question is, what was the *understanding* of his doctrine—what was the Pelagianism which was *condemned*. That the Gospel only renders *less difficult* what was not only possible but *practicable to be accomplished* by human agency without it, was unquestionably the teaching of the Pelagian leaders.

gians which Dr. Taylor does not deny. Vital points of their system, as, for example, their superficial notion of character and of what is morally excellent and acceptable to God, Dr. Taylor was most earnest in opposing. He spared no effort to inculcate a profounder view of the essence of character and to show that so-called virtuous acts or virtuous habits, when they do not emanate from love to God, are destitute of that quality of holiness which alone meets with His approbation. That true excellence consists in a congeries of virtues is a proposition which he continually combated.

In fact, the great aim of Dr. Taylor was to answer Pelagian objections and to maintain the substantial, practical features of Calvinism against them. This he supposed himself able to do by showing that the power of contrary choice which they claimed as an inherent attribute of the will, and a condition of moral responsibility, involves no such conclusions as they drew from it. So far from this, Dr. Taylor insisted that one act of sin carries with it, uniformly and infallibly, an established principle of sin, which nothing but the inward operation of the Spirit of God will ever overcome. The Pelagians, with their power to the contrary, had seized on a half-truth, and thus fallen into gross error. Men may hold that the power to the contrary involves the Pelagian notion of the mutableness of character; but Dr. Taylor does not admit this, and they have no moral right to charge upon him an inference of their own, which he spent half of his life in confuting.

Pelagianism is a superficial philosophy, taking no earnest account of the self-propagating power of sin; acceptable sometimes to acute, but never to deep-thinking minds; making so little of the need of redemption as to threaten the foundations of the Gospel system. Such was not the spirit of the New Haven Theology.

Having stated in general Dr. Hodge's unfair representation of Dr. Taylor's theology, we specify some particulars.

1. Dr. Hodge gives great prominence to Dr. Taylor's doctrine of Natural Ability, but scarcely mentions his doctrine of Moral Inability. An ordinary reader of his Article would hardly be aware that Dr. Taylor held this last doctrine. That it had any importance in his system, such readers would never

dream. In the July number of the "*Princeton Review*,"* Dr. Hodge expressly ascribes to Dr. Taylor the doctrine that "absolute certainty is inconsistent with free agency,"—a proposition which Dr. Taylor constantly denied and incessantly opposed.

In the Article under consideration, Dr. Hodge expatiates (pp. 62, 63, 64) on Dr. Taylor's "Pelagian doctrine" of plenary ability, involving the power of contrary choice, and then dwells on four corollaries from this doctrine, which he also attributes to Dr. Taylor. Under the second of these corollaries, he does admit that Dr. Taylor held to moral inability; but he alludes to this doctrine as if it were of slight consequence in weighing the orthodoxy of Dr. Taylor's system. "It is true," he says, "that Dr. Taylor admits that men are depraved by nature; that is, that such is their nature that they will certainly sin. But this was admitted by Pelagius, except in a case here and there among millions."† We do not know what authority there is for this last statement. But we do know that Pelagius did not hold the doctrine of moral inability as President Edwards, and Dr. Taylor with him, held it. Dr. Hodge speaks of Pelagius and Dr. Taylor as separated on this great point by "a shadowy difference."‡ He can prove the same thing just as well and no better of President Edwards. Dr. Hodge says,§ that Christians, and especially Calvinists, have maintained that "God commands what man *cannot* perform;" "that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;" and he contrasts these propositions with Dr. Taylor's denial of them. But President Edwards denies these same propositions, in what he considers the proper sense of their terms, and holds that men are endowed "with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of." It is President Edwards's doctrine of *moral inability* that saves his essential Calvinism; and on this subject *Dr. Taylor agrees with him*. They both held that the sinner's unwillingness to repent is the

* Pp. 517, 518. As the incorrect statements on these pages are repeated in the later Article, we have no occasion to say more respecting them.

† P. 67.

‡ P. 64.

§ P. 64.

sole obstacle in the way of his salvation, and is such an obstacle that nothing but regenerating grace will ever remove it. President Edwards rested man's need of grace on this certainty alone, and so did Dr. Taylor.

2. Dr. Taylor did not hold, as Dr. Hodge represents that he did, that God "cannot prevent sin, or the present amount of sin, in a moral system." He taught, as we have explained above, that it *may be* (for aught that can be shown to the contrary) that God cannot prevent sin in *the best* moral system. He said in the *Concio ad Clerum* that it cannot be *proved*—that is, proved *a priori*, or demonstrated—that God can prevent sin in a moral system. This was the sense in which he used the term *proved*, as he himself explained. He held that it *can* be proved by probable reasoning that God can prevent sin in *a* moral system. Hence the unqualified proposition that "God cannot effectually control free agents, without destroying their nature," is incorrectly ascribed to the New Haven divines by Dr. Hodge.*

3. Dr. Hodge reiterates the utterly erroneous statement that, according to Dr. Taylor, God "brings all the influence that he can to secure the conversion of every man."† He represents him as holding that "a free agent can, and multitudes do, effectually resist the utmost efforts of the Spirit of God to secure their salvation" (p. 71); "that God does all he can to convert every man, and elects those whom he succeeds in inducing to repent" (p. 74); that "He does all he can to convert every sinner, consistent with his moral agency (p. 76)." Dr. Taylor did *not* hold the doctrine that is here attributed to him. Dr. Taylor says, illustrating the feeling and action of God, by reference to a human father: "it by no means follows that he will, or that he ought to, *do all that he can*, and all that may be necessary, to secure the return of the prodigal."‡ Dr. Hodge himself, in another place, presents Dr. Taylor's real view in a quotation from the *Spectator*, where it is said of God that He "brings all those kinds, and all that degree of moral influence in favor of it [*i. e.* the sinner's compliance with the Gospel invitation], which a system of measures best arranged

* P. 71.

† P. 71.

‡ Revealed Theology, p. 378.

for the success of grace in a world of rebellion allôws." Can Dr. Hodge fail to see the difference between this proposition and the one he imputes to Dr. Taylor? Among the various conjectural reasons which the latter gives why God sanctifies a part and not the whole, one is that those elected "may be more useful than others for promoting his designs."* "The general interest, the public good, may forbid that He should do any more than he does for the lost sinner."† Dr. Taylor states his doctrine in these words: "God does all that He can *wisely* to bring every sinner to repentance."‡ Would Dr. Hodge deny this? Would he say that God does *not* do all that He can wisely to bring every man to repentance?

Dr. Hodge (on p. 78) endeavors to fasten on the New Haven theology the doctrine of *scientia media*, as it was held by Jesuit theologians. "This distinction," he says, "was introduced with the conscious and avowed intention of getting rid of the Augustinian doctrine, held by the Jansenists, of predestination and sovereign election." Molina, who first gave notoriety to this distinction, died in 1600, when Jansenius was only fifteen years old; and his avowed motive in introducing it was to *reconcile* the Augustinian and semi-Pelagian view. But this is unimportant; it is true that the Molinist theory was warmly debated by the Jansenists and their opponents. Dr. Hodge proceeds to define the *scientia media*, in its bearing on election: "God foresees who will, and who will not, submit to the plan of salvation. Those whom he foresees will submit, he elects to eternal life; those whom he foresees will not submit, he predestinates to eternal death. The New Haven divines adopt the same distinction, and apply it to the same purpose." Dr. Hodge then quotes a paragraph from Dr. Fitch, in the *Christian Spectator*, 1831, in which it is said, "it was to *be* believers, and not *as* believers, that he chose them under the guidance of his (*scientia media*) foreknowledge."

Dr. Hodge has mistaken Dr. Fitch's position. Dr. Fitch introduces the term *scientia media* in replying§ to the objection of Dr. Fisk, that the Calvinistic doctrine makes God form his

* Revealed Theology, p. 417.

† Ibid., p. 418.

‡ Ibid., p. 378. See, also, *infra*, p. 323.

§ *Christian Spectator*, 1831, p. 609.

decrees blindly—without knowledge—by an unintelligent act of will. Dr. Fitch replies that God consults his omniscience in forming his decrees. He knows what free agents, under given circumstances, will voluntarily do. But Dr. Fitch holds that in the case of the elect, it is God who by His grace produces their repentance and faith, and that He purposed to do this. There is not only foresight on his part, but a distinct purpose to secure the result, and a providing of means to this end. And there is an inherent efficacy in the means to secure the end. He does not foresee the end independently of the means; yet both end and means are predetermined.

This is a different theory from that of the Molinists and the Arminians. According to both, "sufficient grace" is given to all, and it is called "efficacious" or effectual, in the cases where it is complied with. That is, it is called efficacious, only *ex eventu*. God decrees that all who He foresees will believe shall be saved; but their faith results from no special measures on his part. It is the object of a *purpose*, in no proper sense of the term. God dispenses his gifts of grace universally, and lets the result be what it will; although, of course, being omniscient, he foresees what it will be. The Socinians even denied this foresight; and some of the Arminians came near doing the same. Suarez and the other Jesuit theologians explicitly taught that the difference between *gratia sufficiens* and *gratia efficax* is not in *primo actu*, or in God, but in *secundo actu*, or the deportment of the will.*

* Molina says: "Deus sine ulla intermissione ad ostium cordis nostri stat, paratus semper conatus nostros adjuvare, desideransque ingressum." Of the will in relation to "sufficient grace," his doctrine is:—"Si consentiat et coöperetur ut potest, efficiat illud efficax; si vero non consentiat, neque coöperetur,—redat illud inefficax." Gieseler, K. G. III., 2, 614 n.

The Molinists held, moreover, that God saves or condemns men, according as He foresees that under any and all circumstances they will be holy, or under any and all circumstances resist His grace.

"*Gratia efficax vocatur ex eventu.*" Conf. Rem., 17, 5. "*Sufficiens vocatio, quando per coöperationem liberi arbitrii sortitur suum effectum, vocatur efficax.*" Limborch, 4, 12, 8. This whole distinction between "sufficient" grace and "efficacious" grace, which belongs alike to the Arminians and the Congruists, has no more place in the New Haven system than in that of Calvinists generally.

The New Haven doctrine was essentially dissimilar from this. The New Haven divines did not teach that grace is given in equal measure to all individuals; nor did they teach that the number of the elect is made up of those who were foreseen to be most pliable under recovering influences, and *vice versa*. It is true that they only are saved who it was foreseen would repent and believe. But their repentance and faith are not only foreseen; they result from a peculiar, sovereign distribution of the gifts of grace.* What Dr. Fitch teaches in the Article referred to may be seen from such declarations as the following:—"it is true that God's foreknowledge of what would be the results of his present works of grace, *preceded* in the order of nature the purpose to pursue those works, and presented the grounds of that purpose" (p. 622); but "why do given sinners repent? Is there no ground of certainty, but what lies in their *powers* of agency?" "Does God use no influences and means to induce sinners to come to him with voluntary submission, and accept of life? Are these influences brought to bear alike on all nations and on all individuals?"† Election always includes in it "the *purpose* of God which *secures* the repentance and faith of those particular persons who are saved and adopted."‡

That Dr. Fitch uses the phrase *scientia media*—a phrase

* The *scientia media*, in some proper sense of the term, everybody who believes that God has a plan of providential government, must admit. The *principle* is involved in 1 Sam. xxii. 9-12, Matt. xi. 22, 23. Tyre and Sidon would have repented, had their situation in one respect been like that of Bethsaida and Chorazin. These passages, says Dr. Hodge, are not cases of *scientia media*, they "simply teach that God, knowing all causes, free and necessary, knows how they would act under any proposed condition" (*Outlines of Theology*, p. 114.) What is this but *scientia media*? In fact, Fonseca, who devised the term *scientia media*, divides it into two parts, the second of which (*scientia pure conditionata*) is the knowledge of acts which would have come to pass under certain conditions never actually realized. And he refers to this very case of Tyre and Sidon. (Hamilton's Supplementary Notes on Reid, p. 982.) This form of knowledge some may think best to include in the knowledge of *simple intelligence*; but this is an objection not to the thing, but to the name. Dr. Hodge himself resolves the foreordination of sin into *scientia media*. "God knowing certainly that the man in question would in the given circumstances so act, did place that very man in precisely those circumstances that he should so act." *Outlines, &c.*, p. 170. This agrees entirely with the remark respecting the occurrence of sin, with which Dr. Fitch first connects the term *scientia media*. *Spectator*, 1831, p. 609.

† P. 631.

‡ P. 619.

quite unexceptionable in reference to the foreordination of *sinful* voluntary actions—is of no consequence. The question is whether he regarded the faith of the believer as due to an efficacy residing in the means which God employs for his conversion. He says:—

"Dr. Fisk overlooks the distinction made by Calvinists, between an election to *holiness*, and an election to *salvation*. The latter all admit to be conditional—to have a 'reference to character.' God has elected none to be saved, except on the condition that they voluntarily embrace the gospel, and persevere unto the end. But the question is, How comes any man to comply with this condition—to *have* the character in question? Does not God secure that compliance; does He not elect the individuals, who shall thus voluntarily obey and persevere? Calvinists affirm that He does. The election unto *holiness* is the turning-point of their system. They never speak of an election unto *salvation*, except as founded upon it—as presupposing God's purpose to secure the *condition* of salvation, in the hearts of the elect."

Dr. Fitch does not, indeed, teach that grace is, properly speaking, irresistible; neither does Dr. Hodge. But both agree that it is *unresisted* and effectual.

Dr. Taylor illustrates his idea of election as follows:—"Suppose a father can wisely do more to secure the repentance of one child than he can wisely do to secure the repentance of another; suppose that a higher influence in one case would be safe and even salutary in respect to the conduct of his other children, while in the other case it would in this respect prove fatal; suppose him for these reasons to use the higher influence with a design to secure the obedience of one child, and to use it with success;—is not this election—is not this *making one to differ* from another—is not this *having mercy on whom He will have mercy*—and doing more for one than for another, and with good reason too?" Dr. Taylor declares that the probability of success to be held out to sinners, as an encouragement to present effort and action, "must be lowered down to what the Apostle calls a *per-adventure* that God will give them repentance; and that delay and procrastination are ever lessening this probability." *

In short, the New Haven theologians taught that God does all the good He wisely can; He produces among his fallen

* Reply to Dr. Tyler's Examination, p. 18. *Revealed Theology*, p. 434. See, also, *infra*, p. 323.

creatures the largest amount of holiness in the aggregate which the nature of things, or the essential requisites of the best system, admit of; they did *not* teach that the sole or the principal of the considerations regulating the distribution of his recovering influences among the individuals of the race, is the greater or less degree of obstinacy in sin which they are severally foreseen or perceived to have.

Among Calvinists no one is more emphatic in asserting that God has good and wise reasons for all his decrees, than Calvin himself. He is a sovereign; he takes counsel with no one, and reveals the reasons of his determinations and actions no further than He deems best. But there *are* the best reasons, and one day they will be made known. Dr. Taylor and his associates believed that the reasons why He does not choose to recover all from sin, may lie not in any limitation of his benevolence, or, properly speaking, of his power, but in limitations in the nature of things,—in the essential characteristics of the best system. Omnipotence lays certain restraints upon itself in governing a universe of free agents; just as God, to quote the pithy expression of Lyman Beecher, does not govern the stars by the ten commandments.

The New Haven doctrine, then, did recognize an election and a sovereignty in election, which are not found in the Arminian system. There is no claim, of any sort, on the part of an individual who is elected; but his salvation—his repentance not less than the blessings that follow it—is the certain consequence of the operation of a plan which has in view the highest attainable good; and in effecting his repentance, the determining influence is with God, so that all the glory of the change is due to Him.

At the same time, the New Haven doctrine differed from the old Calvinism in explicitly admitting that the universal recovery of sinners by grace, may be inconsistent with that system in which free agency is to play so essential a part, and which God has freely chosen as being the best.

On the whole it seems fair to describe the New Haven type of doctrine as moderate Calvinism.*

* If the New Haven theology is so objectionable, what is to be thought of the theology of Baxter? He holds that sufficient grace is given to all "to enable them

4. Dr. Hodge gives a very erroneous view of Dr. Taylor's doctrine of Regeneration. Proposing to give the doctrine of "the New Haven divines," the former says: "Regeneration is defined to be not an act of God, but an act of the sinner himself." What reader of this sentence would suppose that Dr. Taylor, when treating, in his published Lectures, of this very subject, uses the following language: "*The Spirit of God is the author of the change in Regeneration.* I cannot suppose it necessary to dwell on this fact in opposition to Pelagian error, or the proud self-sufficiency of the human heart. The *fact* of divine influence in the production of holiness in the heart of man, meets us, as it were, on almost every page of the sacred record;" and Dr. Taylor adds, quoting from the Synod of Dort: "This divine grace of regeneration does not act upon men like stocks and trees, nor take away the properties of the will, or violently compel it while unwilling; but it spiritually vivifies, heals, corrects, and sweetly, and at the same time, powerfully inclines it:" and Dr. Taylor says still further, that "this influence of the Spirit is distinct from the natural influence of the truth; and though not miraculous, is supernatural." He says, indeed, that "the change in Regeneration is the sinner's own act;" because "the thing produced by the power of God is their own act—the act of putting on the new man."* He cites with approbation the sentence of President Edwards respecting this change: "God produces all, and we act all. For that is what he produces, viz., *our own acts.*"

Why not say that President Edwards believes that Regeneration "is not an act of God," because he says that "we act all?"

5. Dr. Hodge in seeking to identify Dr. Taylor's doctrine on the office of Grace in the recovery of the sinner, with that of

to seek salvation, and God will not forsake them until they forsake him;" that "it is the wise design of the Redeemer not to give to men the same degrees of aid; but to vary the degree, sometimes according to the preparation and receptivity of men, and sometimes only according to His good pleasure;" and that the divine working is not such as "takes away the simultaneous power to the contrary (*simultatem potentie ad contrarium.*") Meth. Theol. P. III., c. 25, Cath. Theol. B. II., p. 133. The author of the "Saint's Everlasting Rest" would be excluded from the ministry of the Pan-Presbyterian Church, if Dr. Hodge were to prescribe the tests.

* *Revealed Theology*, pp. 390, 391.

† *Outlines of Theology*, pp. 290, 361.

Pelagius, has made a very misleading statement of the latter's position. Having quoted from Dr. Taylor the remark that "the error of Pelagius is, not that he maintained man's ability without grace, but that man does *actually* obey God without grace," Dr. Hodge observes: "It is a mistake to say that Pelagius held that 'men do actually obey God without grace,' so that this shadowy difference between him and Dr. Taylor on this point vanishes." Does not Dr. Hodge know that Pelagius and Dr. Taylor use the term "grace" in a very different signification? That Dr. Taylor means here by "grace" the inward, supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit? that in this sense Pelagius did hold that men sometimes "actually obey God without grace?" Pelagius, as we have explained before, called the law of the Old Testament, providential dispensations, the precepts of Christ and various other things, by the name "grace," whilst he made little or nothing of the inward operation of the Divine Spirit.*

Let us now sum up Dr. Hodge's charges against Dr. Taylor's system. His generic charge is that plenary ability, or the power of contrary choice, is made to belong inseparably to the will; but he keeps out of sight, as far as practical impression is concerned, Dr. Taylor's associated doctrine of moral inability. In the formula, "certainty with power to the contrary,"—"certainty" is uttered *sotto voce*.

Of the heretical corollaries charged on the system, the first is "that all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known law." That all sin is voluntary is the common assertion of orthodox theology. It is the doctrine of Augustine.†

* Dr. Hodge himself defines the Pelagian Conception of Grace, as excluding the internal operation of the Spirit. (*Outlines of Theology*, p. 335). Pelagians hold, he says, "That the Holy Spirit produces no internal change in the heart of the subject, except as he is the author of the Scriptures, and as the Scriptures present moral truths and motives, which of their own nature exert a moral influence upon the soul."

† The doctrine of Augustine on the nature of sin is frequently misconceived. This is chiefly owing to the fact that he uses the term *voluntas* in so various meanings, and often does this in the same paragraph. His precise conception of the *concupiscentia* with which the descendants of Adam are born, must be ascertained. 1. Concupiscentia, which is inordinate desire for the inferior good—in particular, fleshly desire—belongs to all men from birth, and gives rise to a con-

It is the doctrine of Dr. Hodge himself.* And Dr. Taylor

fict in the soul and to a disordered condition not belonging to man's original nature. 2. In the case of the baptized and regenerated, concupiscence remains as a principle, but brings guilt only so far as its impulses are obeyed. "Quamdiu ergo manet lex concupiscentialiter in membris, manente ipsa reatus ejus solvitur; sed ei solvitur, qui sacramentum regenerationis accepit renovarique jam coepit." (De Pec. Mer. et Remis., II. xxviii.) "Nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia jam non est peccatum in regeneratis, quando illi ad illicita opera non consentitur." (De Nupt. et Conc., I. xiii. The same thing is said in a multitude of other passages. 3. That native *concupiscentia* is sin, is not only implied in the passages above, but is explicitly asserted in many places. It is at once sin and the punishment of sin. "Sed pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati." (Op. Imp. Cont. Jul. I. xlvii.) Dr. Emerson, in a note to his translation of Wiggers on Augustinism and Pelagianism, supposes Augustine to teach that concupiscence is not "really sin;" but he inadvertently applies what Augustine says of the regenerate or baptized, to all. The very passage which Dr. Emerson quotes (p. 128) in proof of his position, speaks of the guilt of concupiscence as *pardoned* in baptism—"cujus jam reatus lavacro regenerationis absumtus est." (Cont. Duas Epist. Pel. I. xiii.)

4. But Augustine regarded concupiscence as voluntary. In the long passage of the Opus Imp. C. Jul. (I. xlv. seq.) where he discusses the question whether native sin is in the will, and in the *Retractiones* (I. cxv.) where he explains the previous statement which he had made in the treatise *De libero Arbitrio*, on this subject, he goes no further than to say that sin is "ex voluntate" and is not "*sine voluntate*,"—i. e. it is consequent on the sin of Adam. In these places, however, he has in mind voluntariness involving power to the contrary; as he elsewhere says:—"cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est, loquimur." (De Lib. Arb. III. xviii.) But that native concupiscence involves the consent of the will, he clearly teaches. "Nam quid est cupiditas et lœtitia, nisi voluntas in eorum consensionem quæ volumus?" "Cum consentimus appetendo ea quæ volumus, cupiditas." "Voluntas est quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt." (De Civ. Dei, XIV. c. vii.) "Si quisquam etiam dicit ipsam cupiditatem nihil aliud esse quam voluntatem, sed vitiosam peccatoque servientem, non resistendum est: nec de verbis, cum res constet, controversia facienda." (Retract., I. c. xv.) "Cupiditas porro improba voluntas est. Ergo improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est. (De Lib. Arbit. III. xvii.) Native sin belongs to the will, but to a will enslaved. *Voluntas* is, also, frequently used by Augustine for the volitive function, by which executive acts of choice are put forth; and in this meaning he frequently speaks of sin as involuntary, or existing against the will. Under this head, he is never tired of referring the Pelagians to Rom. vii. 18.

Thus *Voluntas* is used by Augustine (1) for the free-will in Adam, which included the power to the contrary; (2) for the spontaneous sinful affections consequent on the first sin, in him and his posterity, or the will in servitude; and (3) for the volitional faculty, or the faculty which puts forth imperative choices.

* Outlines of Theology, pp. 223, 234, 257.

does not mean that sin is in volitions merely, or superficial, imperative choices. He would agree with Dr. Shedd, in the following statements:

"It seems to us that by the will is meant a voluntary power that lies at the very centre of the soul, and whose movements consist, not so much in choosing or refusing, in reference to particular circumstances, as in determining the whole man with reference to some great and ultimate end of living. The characteristic of the will proper, as distinguished from the volitional faculty, is determination of the whole being to an ultimate end, rather than selection of means for attaining that end in a particular case." "The will, as thus defined, we affirm to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature. Indeed this sinful nature is nothing more nor less than the state of the will; nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self, as the ultimate end of living."^a

In short, Dr. Taylor held that sin is a profound, immanent, permanent preference of the will, whereby a man lives to self, instead of living to God; a preference at the root of all subordinate action. Dr. Taylor held that this is an elective preference; the soul *sets before it* this end of living; and by this distinction, he removed a great source of ambiguity and confusion from theology. There *are* involuntary, strictly constitutional dispositions, inclinations; but *this* is voluntary, flowing from an elective act, yet central, permanent, and controlling.

But Dr. Taylor holds that sin is the transgression of *known* law. Dr. Hodge, in his definitions of moral agency, says the same thing, though inconsistently with other parts of his own teaching.[†] Dr. Taylor held that consciousness is a thing of degrees; men commonly sin without reflection; there are sins which may be called thoughtless, and there are those which may be called sins of ignorance. The "awakening" of a

^a Essays, pp. 240, 243.

[†] He says that to be morally responsible, "a man must be a free, rational, moral agent." "1st. He must be in present possession of his reason to distinguish truth from falsehood. 2d. He must have in exercise a moral sense to distinguish right from wrong." *Outlines of Theology* p. 221. "Only a moral agent, or one endowed with intelligence, conscience, and free will can sin." *Ibid.*, p. 225. "All sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires, and affections which constitute the depraved state of the will." P. 234. If Dr. Hodge would distinguish *will* from *desire*—that which is purely spontaneous from that which is elective—he would clear his system of one prolific source of confusion.

sinner is the deepening of consciousness or the passing of consciousness into reflection ; the coming of a man to himself.

But let it be granted that while Dr. Hodge holds that during a certain undefined period of infantile existence, sin is committed, or there is sin when there is no knowledge, and no possibility of the knowledge, of law, while Dr. Taylor supposes that during this period there is either no sin, or there is some degree of consciousness of duty. - Shall this difference cast Dr. Taylor beyond the pale of "all organized Churches?" Let it be noticed that Augustinians who hold to sin in infants prior to choice, believe that their guilt is washed away by the easy remedy of baptism ; and at the present day the universal salvation of those who die in infancy is generally held.

And here it would be interesting to ascertain how Dr. Hodge reconciles his own opinion on this last topic with the creeds. We have been led to believe that he holds to the salvation of all persons dying in infancy. The Augustinian system holds to the perdition of unbaptized and non-elect infants. This is the doctrine of Augustine himself. So Jansenius teaches. Moreover, the Westminster Confession declares : "Elect infants dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ, through the Spirit." This plainly implies that non-elect infants are not saved. It is nonsense to speak of *elect* infants as saved, if *all* infants are meant. Besides the added clause, in the same paragraph, about the salvation of "all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word," settles the meaning of the passage ; for, of course, not *all* of the heathen are here declared to be among the saved. Moreover it is immediately declared that "others not elected" "cannot be saved." The framers of the Confession held that *de jure* all infants are lost ; that *de facto* there are two and only two ways in which they can be saved,—through the Abrahamic covenant which saves the baptized among them, and sovereign election which is not limited by the covenant. The Augustinians believed with Dr. Hodge, that new-born infants have in them that sin which is the parent of all sins ; they believed with him that they are hell-deserving ; and they believed that only the baptized and elected ones among them will be saved. Does

Dr. Hodge agree to this last proposition? If not, does he accept the Confession in its fair import?*

One ground of complaint against the New Haven theology is, that it leaves no room for infant regeneration. But it is entirely consistent with Dr. Taylor's system to suppose that even those who die in infancy, need the sanctifying influence of the Spirit to prevent them from beginning their moral life sinfully, and thus that they owe their salvation to Christ.†

In regard to the second of the special errors of the New Haven theology,—the denial of hereditary sin, it is enough to answer that Augustinian theology holds to no hereditary sin which is not also voluntary. Whatever is peculiar to Dr. Taylor on this point results from his disbelief in our legal responsibility for Adam's sin. Men will differ in their estimate of the importance of this opinion. But it must be remembered that Dr. Taylor believed that all men are totally depraved from the beginning of moral agency, and until they are regenerated by the Spirit of God; and that this depravity is connected, as a certain consequence, with the first sin of Adam.

The other points in Dr. Hodge's indictment refer to the power of God in relation to the control of free agents, and rest to a considerable extent, as we have shown, on a misapprehension of Dr. Taylor's teaching.

We may state now in a few words the relation of the New Haven divinity to Old Calvinism.

The peculiarity of the New Haven system is in its view respecting the non-prevention of sin—of sin in its beginning and in its continuance in the non-elect.

Supra-lapsarian Calvinism held that the fall is divinely ordained as a means to an end,—that end being the furnishing of sinful subjects, on whom God could illustrate both his compassion and his punitive justice. The election of the one class and the reprobation of the other, is the decree first in order. This system in reality traces all sin to the efficient

* We are not so ignorant as to suppose that the old Calvinists all believed in the *de facto* perdition of infants. Yet not only supra-lapsarians, but some infra-lapsarians, *did* maintain this dogma; and the *language* of the Westminster Confession, in its fair import, implies it.

† *Christian Spectator*, Vol. V., p. 664.

agency of the First Cause. "The sixteenth century," says Julius Müller, "might carry out such thoughts, and the most energetic Christian piety was compatible with them. To-day, with the clearer consciousness of the premises and consequences of that view, it could not be scientifically developed without leading to Pantheism.*"

The Infra-lapsarian Calvinism made election have respect to the race already fallen. Sin is permitted for inscrutable reasons, and from the race of sinners the elect are chosen. The decree of election follows the decree permitting the introduction of sin.

The Infra-lapsarian system left room for supposing other reasons for the permission of sin than that assigned by the Supra-lapsarians.†

The New Haven divines suggested as a possible explanation, that to the eye of infinite wisdom it may be better for this universe of free agents, to *permit* sin to exist *when and where* it does exist, than to exert the positive influence requisite to prevent it; that such a voluntary limitation, on the part of God, of His agency, alone comports with the characteristics of that moral system which He has chosen to establish, and which is the best. A like limitation for the same general reason takes place in reference to the non-elect.

To the objection that this theory derogates from the divine power, it is replied that every theodicy is a scheme of optimism; that the opposite theory of sin being the indispensable instrument of accomplishing the greatest good, palpably implies a limitation of the divine power. The dogma that God could prevent all sin without detriment to the system, clashes with his benevolence.

These advantages were claimed for the theory suggested by the New Haven divines: (1.) that it silences the infidel objection to the benevolence of God; (2.) renders the denunciation of sin as an unqualified evil, consistent with truth; (3.) vindicates the perfect sincerity of the invitations and entreaties addressed in the Gospel to sinners; (4.) directly connects the dis-

* *Lehre v. d. Sünde*, I. 364.

† So says Alexander Schweizer, *Central-dogmen der Ref. Kirche*.

pensation of the Spirit with the divine benevolence, acting with a view to accomplish the greatest good in the aggregate.

It had been objected to Calvinism that in representing the compassion of God as fastening on particular persons to the exclusion of others, whose case equally appeals to compassion, the very idea of compassion, as a benevolent feeling, is violated. That is to say, it is not from *compassion* that even the elect are saved. It was claimed for the New Haven doctrine that it took from election this arbitrary quality by identifying it with a benevolent plan, in the formation of which, while compassion is felt equally for all, there is no respect of persons, but only an eye to the largest good which impartial love, under the guidance of wisdom, can attain.

In a word, the New Haven theology carried the infra-lapsarian scheme another step, by directly connecting the decrees of God respecting the fall and recovery of man, with His *benevolence*; in such a way, however, as to exclude the idea that sin, either in itself considered or all things considered, is ever preferred by Him to holiness in its stead. God gives mankind a probation under law; foreseeing the fact of universal sin, He provides a salvation which is sufficient for all and is sincerely urged upon the acceptance of all; foreseeing the universal rejection of the Saviour, He adds a peculiar supernatural influence to convert the soul, but this influence is not dispensed indiscriminately, and without stint, but in accordance with a wise plan which will effect the actual conversion of only a part of a race, all of whom are alike guilty.

On the subject of human agency in conversion, there have been, as all students of history know, two generic types of opinion,—two great streams of doctrine, taking their rise far back in the ancient church. According to one of these types of opinion, there belongs to man a coöperative agency in relation to the grace of the Spirit. According to the other, the Spirit is the sole Efficient, and the human will is merely the theatre of His operation. The Greek Church, from the earliest times, has cherished the first form of doctrine. Her great fathers, Origen, Athanasius, the two Gregories, Basil, Chrysostom, and her theologians generally, let them differ on other points as they may, are unanimous in ascribing to man some

remaining power to good. This, too, was the Latin theology down to Augustine. It was the earlier theology of Augustine himself, after his conversion. He at first rejected unconditional election and irresistible grace; and his earlier views unquestionably correspond to the current type of thinking at and before that time. While the Church was fighting Stoics, Gnostics, and Manichæans, stress was laid upon the liberty of the will. Augustine, carrying out half-developed suggestions of Latin theologians before him, brought forward views respecting the power of sin over the will, which induced a revolution in anthropology, and have exerted the most extensive and lasting influence. But before Augustine died, the rise of the Semi-Pelagian party showed how many there were whom his opinions failed to satisfy. Henceforward, in the Roman Catholic Church, the two types of doctrine are found side by side. They are severally represented in the middle ages by the two great schools, the Thomists and the Scotists, coincident with the two great monastic orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans. The Reformers followed Augustine; but soon, on the Lutheran side, Melancthon set up the synergistic doctrine, and among the Lutherans, even where the Philippist view was in form disavowed, the prevailing doctrine has been that of conditional election. In the Reformed branch of the Protestant Church, Arminius was persuaded of the error of the doctrine which he was set to defend, and began a most influential movement, the essential feature of which is the denial of unconditional election and irresistible grace. The Church of England, at first in sympathy with Calvinism, became mostly Arminian. Within that Church, there sprang up the Wesleyan movement, the most zealous, aggressive, and successful religious movement on the Protestant side, since the age of the Reformation,—which had for one of its main characteristics an energetic, not to say passionate, protest against the doctrine of unconditional, personal election. Glancing back to the Catholic Church, we find, in the sixteenth century, the Molinists in conflict with the Dominicans, and the Congregatio de auxiliis adjourning, after years of fruitless effort, without adjusting the dispute; the Council of Trent, unable to harmonize the two great parties, and taking refuge in ambiguities; the Jansenists, in the sixteenth century reviving the Augustinian doctrine, only to

kindle anew the flames of an unending controversy. The marvelous subtlety of the great Catholic theologians from Bellarmine to Perrone, has been exercised in defining the tenets of the various contending schools, on the relation of free-will to grace.

The advocates of each of the two types of doctrine have supposed themselves to be standing in defense of practical truth of the highest consequence. On the one hand, the full responsibility of man is kept prominently in view; on the other, his full dependence on God. On the one hand there is a purpose to take from the sinner every excuse for his rejection of Christ; on the other there is a purpose to ascribe to God all the praise of his conversion. Man's need of redemption, and his capacity of redemption, are both to be saved. A moral government over free and accountable beings, the authors of their own actions, and therefore proper subjects of punishment and reward, and a providential government, laying a foundation for implicit submission, resignation, and confidence under all events, and for unreserved gratitude for the restoration of the soul from sin, must both be recognized in a just and comprehensive system of theology.

Now there have been individuals who, while seeing that the Calvinistic doctrine not only has a place in Scripture, but also in Christian experience, have not felt that the objections which have been brought forward age after age by able and pious men, and by powerful sections of the Church, are the mere offspring of "carnal reason." They have felt that a certain force belongs to these objections; that they embody real difficulties. Under this conviction, they have endeavored to solve them, without parting with the essential principles and practical interests inseparable from the system against which those objections are directed. Such a man, among the English Puritans, was Richard Baxter. Another of the same class was Dr. Taylor. Both were charged with deserting the cause which they wished to defend and to recommend to serious men who regarded it with aversion.

It is a curious fact that men who are loud in their denunciation of Dr. Taylor's system, profess themselves willing to tolerate the extreme Hopkinsians. They are shocked at the assertion of a power of contrary choice, but they can put up with

the doctrine that God is the creator of sin! They can freely tolerate propositions which are not only denounced by all the creeds of Christendom, but, if logically carried out, would banish all religion from the earth. But these, it is said, are errors "in the right direction." In the right direction! That is, in the direction of Spinoza and Hegel—in the direction of an all-devouring Pantheism! Nobody at the present day denies Predestination. Buckle, Mill, *et id omne genus*, outdo Calvin in asserting Predestination. But the truth which is denied in these days is the free and responsible nature of man and the *moral* government of God—a government of law, and of rewards and punishments, over free agents; the truth which Dr. Taylor was so concerned to rescue from all assaults. Theologians, before they cast their anathemas among their brethren, would do well to attend to the times in which they live, and to the peculiar dangers of the present generation.

Notwithstanding Dr. Taylor's alleged rejection of "sovereign election," we have the impression that his preaching involved more of it than the style of preaching in vogue among the old-school Presbyterians. As far as we have had the opportunity personally to observe, and are able to ascertain from others, their preaching to sinners is very apt to be Arminian. They urge upon their hearers the obligation to repent, and they encounter the objection that this is impossible by reminding them that there is "common grace," of which they are all partakers. We have heard such preaching where the impression is left upon the hearers, and is apparently entertained by the preacher himself, that they are endowed with a gracious ability. The exhortation borrows its force, the reply to the objector derives its point, from the understanding, on his part, that by common grace he is fully delivered from his natural inability, and practically has his salvation in his own hand. Sometimes the inability of the sinner is urged upon him as a reason why he should "come to Christ." He can do nothing for himself, it is said, and *therefore* he must come to Christ. Yet if the preacher were questioned in private, he would not admit in form the doctrine which he has really taught. In fact, he has one doctrine for theological uses, such as the examination of applicants

for the ministry and the composition of polemical Articles, and another doctrine for the pulpit. The union of a Calvinistic creed with Arminian preaching is a very frequent occurrence.

The union of the two dissevered branches of the Presbyterian Church will be a good thing or an evil thing, according to its effect in promoting or weakening the intolerant spirit which forced the separation. If it bring with it a catholic temper, and if it do not tend to stifle theological inquiry, it will be a great good. But if it result in building up sectarian walls to greater height and strength and in reinforcing the party of intolerance, it will bring no advantage. The danger is that the fear of exciting discord, mingled with the fear of church censure, will lead to at least a tacit compliance with the wishes of the more exacting section. Division is better than stagnation, and is far less to be dreaded than the tyranny of an illiberal dogmatism. In our age and country, evangelical Christianity is called upon to cling to the fundamental contents of the Gospel, but it must also tolerate differences in non-essential points, and freely concede that measure of freedom of opinion, without which a healthy life and progress are impossible. A church which could not find room in its ministry for men like Moses Stuart, Lyman Beecher, and Albert Barnes, would be, however big in numbers, about the meanest and narrowest sect in America. A sect that would cast Zwingle, the first founder of the Reformed Church, out of its ministry! * It is antici-

* Zwingle, as is well known, denied that native vitiosity is properly sin, though it be the uniform occasion of sin: "*Non enim facinus contra legem. Morbus igitur est proprie et conditio,*" etc. (*Ratio Fidei*, Niemeyer's ed., pp. 20, 21.) It is true that the old Protestant creeds emphatically asserted the opposite doctrine. The question here is not whether they were right or wrong in this. Nor is the question what the feelings of men were in regard to such a difference, in an age when, for differences no greater than those which divided Calvinists from Lutherans, men were ready to bite and devour one another. But the question is whether at the present day, which has the credit of being less swayed by the spirit of exclusion, a man who believes in total and universal depravity, and the truths of redemption is to be cast out for holding an opinion like that of Zwingle. At that time even, and in his case, it formed, as far as we know, no barrier to fellowship with him on the part of those, whether Lutheran or Reformed, who held the contrary doctrine.

Objection had been made to Zwingle's expressions on the subject of Original

pated that the proposed union would break down the dominion of the Princeton theology. If this is to be its result, there will be no cause for regret. We say this, not so much from the feeling that the famous triangle—immediate imputation, natural inability, and limited atonement—deserves to be shattered; but because the wide dominion of any special type of evangelical theology, which has so little toleration for diversities of opinion, is a misfortune. But will this dominion, which is said to be weakened, especially among the younger men of the old-school clergy, be resigned without an energetic struggle? And when a crisis approaches, will not the leaders prefer to make another division rather than to see their system lose its ascendancy, or to tolerate in peace forms of theology in important respects at variance with it? These questions time alone can solve.

The great point to be determined, is the doctrinal basis on which the proposed union shall rest. Both parties profess to receive the Westminster Confession "as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Scriptures." But how much shall be understood to be implied in these terms? It is agreed that all the propositions contained in the creed need not be believed. Dr. Hodge claims that the terms must be taken to involve an assent to each and every doctrine essential to the Calvinistic system. Now, granting that they are to be so understood, it is a notorious fact that many, if not most, of the leaders of the new-school church considered themselves Calvinists, although they adopted the cardinal principles of the new divinity. It is, moreover, a fact now, that not a few of the ministers in the new-school body, including men of ability and prominence, profess and teach the same obnoxious theology, and still denominate themselves Calvinists. Who will venture to charge them with dishonesty? How does Dr. Hodge expect to enforce on such men *his* idea of the essentials of Calvinism? Were not Doctors Cox, Beman, Beecher, Barnes, Skinner,

Sin; and this led him, in 1524, to write his *De Peccato Originali Declaratio*, in the form of a letter, to Rhagius, (Works, T. III.) But, with some inconsistencies, his doctrine is here substantially what it had been before. The Conference at Marburg was in 1529; so that the *Ratio Fidei*, to which we refer above, which was presented at Augsburg in 1530, represents his mature opinions. He died the next year.

Taylor, as honest as the average of ministers; and did not they all consider themselves Calvinists? Let us take an example. If we understand Dr. Hodge, he considers the doctrine that there is no sin prior to consciously wrong choice, to be an *essential* departure from the Calvinistic system. He does not insist on his own special view, though he claims that it is held by the "Church Catholic;" but the doctrine above stated he pronounces inadmissible. Then what shall be said of Stuart's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, and Barnes's Commentary on the same book, which are received as sound and orthodox books by half of the ministers and sabbath-school teachers of the New School Church? If Dr. Hodge's test is adopted, these authors are heretical on the doctrine of Sin. The ministers who adopt their teaching on this subject, break their vows. We have no belief that Dr. Hodge's special interpretation of the terms of subscription can be made to prevail. What is to prevent men from interpreting them as they have done heretofore? How are the essentials of Calvinism to be defined so that all shall agree to the definition?*

Every man who can read the signs of the times must see that the Protestant world is growing tired of sectarian Christianity, and is yearning for a more catholic and fraternal connection

* One of the few leading-points of the New Divinity, which Dr. Hodge pronounces inconsistent with Calvinism, he thus states: "All sin consists in the deliberate violation of known law. Hence there can be no moral character before moral action, and no moral action until there is such a development of reason and conscience, as is the necessary condition of moral agency. If this be so, there can be no hereditary, sinful corruption of nature; and original sin, in the universally accepted meaning of that term, is an impossibility." *Princeton Review*, July 1867. The same thing is reiterated by Dr. Hodge in various places.

Now, in 1833, Dr. Gardiner Spring published a *Dissertation* on the doctrine of Depravity, in which he maintained just these propositions respecting the nature of sin. "It is obvious," said Dr. Spring, "that sin is predicable only of an intelligent being, and that in such a being it consists in the transgression of law." One end he has in view is to prove that infants knowingly and voluntarily transgress law from birth.

If it be a renunciation of Calvinism to give this definition of sin, when Dr. Taylor gives it, was it anything better when Dr. Spring gave it? Did Dr. Spring, in giving this definition, reject an essential part of "the system of doctrine" set forth in the Westminster Confession? If so, why was he not arraigned for heresy? Or was he privileged in this matter, because he held that *actual* sin begins at the moment of birth,—a proposition which Dr. Hodge himself probably considers absurd?

among the disciples of Christ. If the union of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church can be effected on a truly catholic basis, we shall hail it with warm satisfaction. It will be an event in consonance with the prevailing tendency of Christian minds. It will be a blow at that sect-system, which is the scandal of our Protestant Christianity. We shall regret the reunion, only in case it serves to give a little longer respite to that over-dogmatic, intolerant, seventeenth-century tone of Protestantism, which exaggerated minor differences, left an open way for the great Papal reaction, provoked the spirit of skepticism in all Protestant countries, and stands in perpetual contradiction to the precepts and spirit of the Testament.

We have written the foregoing pages, not because we are able to accept all the solutions of the high problems of theology, which the New Haven divines incorporated in their system; for we are not.* But we regard the persistent effort to stigmatize the New Haven system by affixing to it the epithet *Pelagian*, as utterly groundless and unjustifiable. And we hold in high honor the originators of this theological system. Doctors Taylor, Fitch, and Goodrich formed together a corps of theologians of whom it is not too much to say that any university in Christendom might well be proud. The rare and admirable ability which they displayed in the discussion of theological questions was mingled with an untiring zeal in promoting practical religion. In the pulpit or the conference room, as religious teachers or counselors, their labors were abundant, and were attended with unsurpassed success. They investigated theology, not so much to gratify an intellectual curiosity, as to arm themselves for the practical work of persuading men to turn to God. One of this group of eminent men still survives; one in whom philosophical power, rhetorical felicity, and poetic feeling are equally mingled, and whose modest, unambitious character serves to set in stronger relief his almost unrivaled genius as a theologian and preacher.

* At a future time, we may ask the attention of our readers to a renewed examination of the doctrine of Original Sin, when we shall be able to present some views which it is less appropriate in this place to bring forward.

ERRATA.—Page 318, line 4, for “omnipotent,” read benevolent; and in line 5, for “benevolent,” read omnipotent.

ARTICLE V.—THE NATIONAL DEBT, AND THE OBLIGATION TO PAY IT.

THE question as to the character of the obligation which the United States assumed by the bonds issued during the late rebellion, especially those bonds commonly called "Five-Twenties," has assumed grave importance. So long as the attacks upon their credit were confined to such cries as "favored class," "the money they were bought with is good enough to pay with," and similar flings, they did not merit reply; but latterly the opposition has assumed more of the form of argument, and such men as Thomas Ewing, formerly at the head of the Treasury Department, and a lawyer of no small ability, has expressed the opinion that these bonds could be rightfully paid in the irredeemable notes of the Government, and the chairman of the Senate committee on finance lends the weight of his personal character and his official place to the same construction of the obligation assumed by the United States.

We propose to examine the question carefully by a reference to the bonds themselves, and the legislation and other circumstances which may serve to throw light upon it.

By the reading of the bonds, it appears that the United States promises to pay to the holder, twenty years from date, the amount specified in the bond, reserving however the right to pay the amount at any time after five years, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable in coin. There can be no doubt as to the obvious meaning of this promise to pay, for payment can strictly be made in nothing but coin. A man may receive in satisfaction of his debt a note promising to pay it at some future time, he may accept lands or goods in compromise, but payment *ex vi termini* implies the use of gold or silver or its equivalent. There is no difference of opinion on this point among writers on finance. No nation has attempted anything different from this without incurring reproach and dishonor. Until quite recently this has been the

opinion and it has always been the practice in this country. All the bonds which the United States have issued before these, which have reached maturity, have been paid in coin. If these bonds had been issued twenty years ago, they would now have been paid in coin, for the United States is this year paying bonds in coin which were issued in 1848, promising to pay a certain number of dollars in twenty years from their date, in the same form of language as these bonds now in dispute. It cannot be denied that the plain and obvious meaning of the language of the bonds is, as we claim, that the bonds should be paid in coin. Does anything appear, upon a more careful examination of the bonds, to change this meaning? It is argued that because the mode of payment of the interest is especially mentioned, and nothing is said of the mode of payment of the principal, the United States may require the holder of a bond to exchange it for anything they choose to give.

It seems to us, that the presumption would rather be that the option in the mode of payment is with the holder of the obligation, and not with the maker. The obligor, as a matter of course, inserts in his obligation all the favorable conditions of which he chooses to avail himself, and his absolute unconditional promise stands for the benefit of the holder of the obligation. A bond is construed most strongly against the maker. There was moreover a good reason, as any one who can remember six years well knows, why this special mention was made of the mode of paying the interest. The nation was engaged in a struggle which called for the expenditure of millions of dollars daily. The treasury of the nation was almost bankrupt, and the opinion was already prevalent that the war could only be successfully conducted by a resort to paper issues. The same act which authorized the issue of these bonds, authorized the issue of paper currency, of promises to pay which the treasury had no present ability to redeem. The United States believed that in twenty years, perhaps in five, they would have the ability to pay their debt in full; but they assured the world that in the meantime, notwithstanding this issue of paper money, the interest should be paid in coin. The clause was inserted not to take away from the force of the obligation, but to give it strength, by the assurance that, even

in the time of insolvency, this debt, with its incident the semi-annual interest, should be paid.

Another portion of the bond confirms our view of its obligation—that portion providing for the payment of the bonds at the end of twenty years, or at any time after five years, at the pleasure of the United States. Why was this right to pay at any time between five and twenty years reserved? If the intention was to *pay* the bonds, it is easy to understand that the United States might desire to choose the earliest time when they were able to pay, either from accumulated resources, or by borrowing so much money as they might need at a lower rate of interest; but if the design was to give in exchange for the bonds only other promises to pay, and these bearing no interest, with the confession that these substituted promises could not be fulfilled, the clause which gives the United States this option seems to have no meaning. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why the bonds were issued at all. The United States might at once have issued their irredeemable promises on demand without interest, and omitted the idle ceremony of issuing bonds.

We have thus examined the bonds themselves, and are strengthened in the opinion that the United States can rightfully pay them only in the legal currency of the civilized world.

The next point to which we turn our attention is the act of Congress by which the bonds were authorized, and under which they were issued. It bears date February 25, 1862, and is entitled "An Act to authorize the issue of United States notes, and for the funding or redemption thereof, and for funding the floating debt of the United States." The title of the act correctly conveys the meaning of its text. It provides for the issue of \$150,000,000 of demand notes, bearing no interest, which should be receivable for all dues to the United States, except duties on imports, and for all demands against the United States except interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin. The act then authorizes the issue of the bonds now under discussion, to the extent of \$500,000,000, and provides for the funding of the demand notes just mentioned into these bonds. The bill further provides that all duties on imported goods shall be paid in coin, and the coin so paid shall be set apart as a special fund, and applied, 1st, To the payment of in-

terest on the bonds and notes of the United States. 2d, To the purchase or payment of one per cent. of the entire debt of the United States, in each fiscal year, after July 1st, 1862, which amount is to be set apart as a sinking fund. 3d, Any surplus to be paid into the Treasury.

We are told that by this act the United States instituted a new way of paying debts, and proclaimed to the world that all demands against them would hereafter be paid in the irredeemable notes authorized by this act, and that this was a notice to all purchasers that these bonds, whose issue was now authorized, would at maturity be exchanged for the notes which this act made a legal tender. We do not propose to discuss the constitutionality or the expediency of this legal tender provision. It is in itself a confession of insolvency, of inability to pay. Its justification rests not on legal grounds, but if it can be justified at all, on that vital necessity which is above law, the necessity of preserving the life of the nation, which could be preserved in no other way. The government had not the means needed for carrying on the war, which was now reaching colossal proportions, and demanding hundreds of millions of dollars. This legislation was an attempt to meet the emergency. It proposed a loan of \$500,000,000, and provided a means of enabling the people to take the loan by authorizing the issue of the demand notes of the government to furnish a currency for that purpose.

There was no necessity for coupling the two issues in one act, as there was no necessary connection between the two kinds of obligation. The legal tender notes might be circulated without the issue of any bonds; the bonds might be sold, if there was a circulating medium sufficient, without the issue of legal tender notes. Indeed, the fact is indisputable that several millions of bonds were sold before any legal tender notes were issued. There was, however, a reason for embracing these two plans in one act of Congress. What was the reason? It was certainly not to provide means for the redemption of the bonds. The title of the act shows that the intention was that the notes should be redeemed or funded by the bonds. The language of the text expresses the same intention, declaring in express words that the legal tender notes would be exchanged for

bonds. Congress in its wisdom had decided that a resort to paper issues was necessary, and provided for the eventual withdrawal of these issues from circulation, not by their payment, but by exchanging bonds for them, and in the same act directed the issue of the bonds to be offered in exchange. They evidently did not intend that paper should be hereafter the circulating medium of the country. They did not authorize its issue without providing for its retirement. The act itself shows, in its very form and language, that Congress regarded this issue of paper money as having only a transitory character, and as designed only for a temporary purpose. How absurd to claim now that the meaning of the law is just the reverse. That the transitory should become the permanent, the means the result; that the provision for the withdrawal of the paper money by the issue of bonds should be interpreted to allow the withdrawal of the bonds by the reissue of paper money.

Again, the amount of legal tenders, which by the act is expressly limited to \$150,000,000, is utterly inadequate to pay \$500,000,000. A small fund without the power of accumulation cannot pay a fund more than three times as large. A sinking fund might be provided of a small amount, which with its accumulations would in the course of time pay the largest debt. But why provide a non-accumulating fund for the payment of a debt just created, and having twenty years to run before maturity? The reason was widely different. It was a scheme for selling the bonds, not for paying them, as the act expressly provides that these notes may be exchanged for bonds. The scheme of issuing paper money was not original with the Secretary of the Treasury—it was not first devised in this country; the same thing had been done before by other treasury officers in other countries and in other ages. It was the old scheme of raising nominal values by inflating the volume of the circulating medium, and of making the bonds appear more valuable by the superabundance and consequent inferior value of the medium by which they were purchasable. If Congress had stopped with this issue of paper money, all might have been well; but the exigencies of war were great, and paper money was so easily made, that the temptation could not be resisted, and the amount authorized by this act was subsequently doubled, and even trebled. Hence all our woes.

Not only does it not appear to have been the intention of Congress to pay these bonds in paper money, but, on the contrary, the mode of payment of the bonds was expressly provided. Coin only could be received for duties on imported goods, and this coin was specially set aside for the payment of the interest on these bonds, and to establish a sinking fund of one per cent. per annum of the entire debt. If we look then at the act of Congress under which the bonds were issued, is it not evident that their payment in coin was contemplated and provided for. It is true that the act declares that the notes, to be issued under it, should be legal tenders for all debts due from the United States, but it is clear that it was not intended to include these bonds under the general phrase "debt," for a special provision was made for the payment of the bonds in coin by a sinking fund. The legal tender issue was intended and expected to be temporary only, while the bond issue might not be paid for twenty years, when the country would have the ability to pay in coin.

It is sometimes argued as if this act of Congress ignored the distinction between gold and government paper money. The reverse of this has been shown to be the case. The first part of the act provides for the issue of paper which might answer a temporary purpose, the latter part directs the issue of bonds the payment of which in gold was provided for. The distinction between gold and government paper is not confined to this act; it has been repeatedly recognized by Congress. That body indeed has never yet enacted the folly of declaring an irredeemable promise of the government equal to gold and silver. At different times Congress has passed laws at variance with the idea that coin and legal tender notes are of equal value. They have by different enactments declared :

1. "United States notes *shall be received the same as coin, at their par value.*" They are not its equivalent.

2. The Secretary of the Treasury may "*purchase coin at such rates and upon such terms as he may judge most advantageous.*" The value of legal tenders is variable.

3. The Secretary may exchange the second issue of legal tenders for bonds *on such terms as he may deem for the public interest.*

4. The expressions "lawful money," "par value," "face value" are repeated in other laws. The *intrinsic* value of coin is thus implied.

5. On the 17th June, 1864, it was declared unlawful to make any loan of money not in coin to be repaid in coin; or to make any loan in coin to be repaid by currency other than coin.

We may add to the considerations already presented, the repeated declarations of the Secretaries of the Treasury, the statements in Congress of the leading members of the Finance Committees, the positive assurances of the government agents through whom the bonds were negotiated, and the entire absence of any claim at the time these bonds were negotiated that they could be paid in anything else than coin. All these form part of the *res gestæ* and enter into the consideration of the proper construction of the obligation of the United States.

In fourteen years the first issue of these bonds must be paid. Does any one suppose that without gross mismanagement the present paper issues of the Government will continue to take the place of gold and silver for so long a time? Why then is this question of the medium of payment fourteen years hence raised at the present time? It can be for no honest purpose; it is the charlatantry of demagogues, the trick of politicians,—let it be frowned upon and rebuked with the indignation of all reflecting and candid men.

Has the United States the ability to pay this debt?

That the interest can be paid has been shown by the experience of several years. Notwithstanding the imperfections and unequal working of the revenue laws, more than sufficient has been received by the United States to meet the accruing interest, and it is clearly shown by Commissioner Wells, in his able report on the subject, that these laws may be so amended as to relieve industry, and still yield sufficient revenue for all purposes. It is manifest by his showing that, without oppressing the business of the country, a sinking fund also can be established, which will slowly but surely liquidate the debt. We will not reproduce his statements and arguments. But considering the present ability of the country to pay the interest established, we shall adduce a few facts which show the great

increase in material wealth in the Northern States, tending to prove that the ability to pay this debt is rapidly increasing, and must be sufficient.

No census of the wealth of the nation has been taken since 1860, so that we cannot compare the statistics of production of that year with later years. Such miscellaneous statistics as have been hastily gathered from the large mass which might be collected, only are given. We are not able always to compare the same years, but the evidence is sufficiently strong.

THE PRODUCTION OF GRAIN.

In 1860 there were forwarded from Chicago, 81,108,759 bushels of grain.

" 1863	"	"	"	54,741,639	"
" 1860	"	"	Milwaukee,	16,710,580	"
" 1863	"	"	"	16,992,335	"
" 1860	"	"	Green Bay,	350,032	"
" 1863	"	"	"	1,288,790	"
" 1860	"	"	Toledo,	14,350,861	"
" 1863	"	"	"	21,567,963	"
" 1860	"	"	Buffalo,	37,089,461	"
" 1863	"	"	"	64,735,510	"

The same general fact is true of Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and other centres of the grain trade. The increase in the production of beef, pork, petroleum, coal, and ore, is even in greater ratio than that of grain. The product of the Lake Superior mines has increased more than tenfold since 1860.

The number of tons of freight transported on the leading railways of the country affords an indication of the increased production of the country. We annex some statistics of this class.

In 1860 on the Erie Railway were transported 1,139,554 tons freight.

" 1865	"	"	"	"	2,234,349	"
" 1860 on the New York Canals,	"	"	"	"	4,650,214	"
" 1865	"	"	"	"	5,775,220	"
" 1860 on the New York Central R. R.,	"	"	"	"	1,028,183	"
" 1865	"	"	"	"	1,275,299	"
" 1860 on the Hudson R. R. Railroad,	"	"	"	"	370,098	"
" 1865	"	"	"	"	491,850	"
" 1860 on the N. Y. & N. Haven R.R.	"	"	"	"	78,691	"
" 1865	"	"	"	"	107,818	"
" 1860 on the Penn. Central R. Road,	"	"	"	"	1,346,525	"
" 1865	"	"	"	"	2,798,810	"

In 1860 on the Western (Mass.) R. R. were transported 506,547 tons freight.

" 1865	"	"	"	963,754	"
" 1861-2	on the Mich. Southern R. R.,	"	"	453,708	"
" 1865-6	"	"	"	569,340	"
" 1860	on the Central R. R. of New Jersey, (Coal omitted),	"	"	306,733	"
" 1865	"	"	"	392,650	"
" 1860	on the Illinois Central R. Road,	"	"	590,343	"
" 1865	"	"	"	1,054,946	"
" 1862	on the Michigan Central R. R.	"	"	1,559,061	"
" 1866	"	"	"	2,308,593	"

The value of domestic productions exported from the port of New York in 1862, was \$149,179,591; in 1867, it was \$178,210,409. These values represent the surplus products which were sold to foreign countries. The aggregate of the domestic exports from all the Northern ports is larger than the domestic exports of the whole country, including cotton, before the rebellion. It is not unreasonable to believe, that with the Southern States restored to a condition of prosperity, and yielding their fair proportion to the wealth of the nation, our ability to pay will be so much increased, that the debt may be liquidated without oppressive taxation.

Another question remains to be briefly considered. In what way can specie payments be restored? The United States is in the situation of a man who has engaged in an enterprise which, he believes, will in the end be profitable, but which requires a long time for this result. The payment of his debt is pressing upon him now, and he has not the present ability to pay. A large portion of his property is unproductive or yields only a partial return, and is not saleable. He has only one course to pursue, namely, to obtain the consent of his creditors to postpone the payment of his indebtedness to such a time as he may expect to earn money to pay it; and then by the practice of rigid economy, and by strenuous efforts to render his property productive, he will in time succeed in acquiring the means of extinguishing his indebtedness. The United States engaged in the great enterprise of subduing the rebellion, an enterprise of great prospective profit, but the profit can be fully secured only in future years, through the increased peace and happiness and prosperity of the whole country.

The first step to be taken is to relieve the pressure of the indebtedness which is presently payable, but which there are not sufficient present means to pay. This indebtedness consists of the "seven-thirty" notes, the compound interest notes, the three per cent. certificates, the demand notes, amounting in the aggregate to about \$700,000,000, now due or presently to become due. This amount cannot be at once paid. This debt did not originate in any transaction by which the United States received any immediate available means with which to make payment. It represents rather what it has lost than what it has gained, as in the case of a merchant who has given his notes for goods which have been destroyed by fire. It must then be funded in bonds having a period of years before payment can be demanded. Then by economy in all departments of the government, and by a judicious development of the resources of the country, the nation may in a few years be in a position to pay all its indebtedness. To exchange an indebtedness which is not yet payable, into that which requires immediate payment, without the means to pay it, is suicidal. The circulating medium of the country is already too large, and the issue of \$2,000,000,000 more of government notes to enter into the currency of the nation would be disastrous in the extreme. If the government cannot pay \$700,000,000 how can it pay \$2,700,000,000?

While we insist that relief must be obtained by funding the pressing indebtedness of the government, we are not unmindful of the fact, that a large part of this debt enters into the circulating medium of the country, which ought not to be unreasonably disturbed. The considerations which have been adduced in a previous part of this Article, to show the increased traffic of the country, seem also to indicate that a larger amount of circulating medium is now needed than was required by the traffic of the year 1860. It cannot be possible, however, that the business of the country requires three times as much as it did then. Grant that high prices require larger capital and larger profits on the investment of capital, and that the business of the country has increased fifty or even one hundred per cent., the amount of paper now in use is much too large. As an evidence of this look at the price of unskilled

labor, perhaps as good a standard as any of the condition of an irredeemable circulating medium, because as it represents the actual cost of living to a common laboring man, it is the resultant of the price of the necessities of life. Look at the enormous combinations for speculation in everything that can be bought and sold, the ease with which money is borrowed to monopolize the markets even in the necessities of life, and no doubt can remain that there is vastly more paper money in the United States, than is needed in a healthful state of things.

Let the floating debt be funded and let the government begin to prepare for the payment of what it owes, by strict economy and by so adjusting the imports and taxes as to relieve those branches of industry which are now overburdened with taxation, and increase the productiveness of the country by encouraging the various branches of industry. In this way only can the amount of the debt be earned, and it must be earned, if it is to be paid. That this young and vigorous nation can and will, in a comparatively few years, with its rapidly increasing population and productive ability, pay the indebtedness which seems so large, cannot be doubted by any one who examines the facts.

ARTICLE VI.—IMPEACHMENT AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

THE City of Washington presents at this time the extraordinary spectacle of two trials, both of them of the greatest importance to the citizens of the United States. In one, the grand inquest of the nation, the House of Representatives, in behalf of the people, has brought the President of the United States, who during the term of his office has greater power and influence than the Queen of England, before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Senate of the United States, constituting the most august Tribunal authorized by the Constitution, on the charge that he has been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. In the other, counsel of the highest reputation and ability are arguing before the Supreme Court of the United States the question, whether the act of Congress, establishing a military government in the States which engaged in the rebellion, is constitutional or not. So the President and Congress are both on trial. The result will be looked for with eager eyes, by the people both of this and of foreign nations. One great benefit may be safely anticipated. It will be proved beyond question that a republican is the most permanent form of government. It contains within itself the elements of change, with self-preservation; while, in despotic monarchies, the superincumbent weight of a vast combination of privileged orders, compacted into a solid mass by the growth of time and the force of prejudice, will almost surely compress in the great mass below the smothered fires of a conscious sense of wrong and injustice, till they will finally burst the bonds of society with volcanic force, and scatter the whole in broken fragments. In such a republic as ours there is a safety valve, which will allow the vital parts of the body politic to act and react with fearful energy, and yet, the extremities will scarcely feel a pulsation.

The chief interest, at present, centers upon the impeachment trial. The high standing of the accused, the known ability and persevering energy of the accusers, the high dignity and

character of the court, and the sweeping change in every department of the government which will be sure to follow a conviction of the accused, naturally absorb the attention not only of politicians at Washington, but of the freemen of the whole country.

It is difficult to conceive how the President can hope for an acquittal, even on the supposition that the minds of the Senators are, as it is to be hoped they will be, free from party prejudice, and from the influence of previous action upon the questions involved.

Most of the acts with which he is charged will doubtless be admitted by his counsel. The rest they must know can be established by overwhelming proof. The questions really to be decided therefore are solely questions of constitutional law.

The President has purposely refused to execute or be governed by the provisions of a law of Congress, which in terms explicitly enacts that such acts shall be high crimes and misdemeanors. The flimsy pretext, that there is a distinction between an appointment by the President himself, and the recognition of an appointment made by his predecessor, is unworthy of a refutation. If it should be objected that Congress cannot, by mere enactment, make an act a high crime and misdemeanor which is not in its nature a crime, this is undoubtedly true, otherwise it would be in the power of Congress, by declaring innocent acts crimes, to deprive the President of all his powers. On the other hand, it is equally true, that Congress can provide for the punishment of acts against the General Government which are intrinsically wrong, although previously not punishable.

On this impeachment no difficulty can arise from this source. Maladministration of an officer has always been regarded as an impeachable offense, whether indictable as a crime or not. It is, of all acts, the one which especially requires for its remedy impeachment. A President may be guilty of many indictable offenses, such as affrays and other breaches of the peace, without destroying public confidence in him as an executive officer. On the other hand, imbecility, inaction, or gross party spirit, though not indictable, would in him be highly detrimental, if not fatal to the welfare of the nation.

According to the views of those who hold that it is necessary to impeachment, that the accused should be guilty of an indictable offense, the head of the nation may be a blockhead, a dotard, a debauchee, a knave, or even a traitor in feeling, and the people have no remedy, until his four years have expired. We have been accustomed to regard the authors of the constitution with reverence, but according to this doctrine, they were the veriest imbeciles, unable to comprehend one of the necessary requisites of a good constitution. Such a doctrine has no support from precedents or authority. Blackstone, speaking of the High Court of Parliament, says, "It may happen that a subject intrusted with the administration of public affairs *may infringe the rights of the people*, and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrate either does not or *cannot punish*,"* clearly implying that an officer may be impeached for an act which is not indictable. Again, when treating of misprisions, he says: "II. Misprisions, which are merely positive, are generally denominated contempts or high misdemeanors, of which the first and principal is the *maladministration* of such *high* officers as are in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment, wherein such penalties, short of death, are inflicted as to the wisdom of the House of Peers shall deem proper; consisting usually of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability."† This is a direct authority that, at *common law*, *maladministration* of an office may be a high misdemeanor, although the punishment need only be perpetual disability. Impeachments have made charges of this kind for centuries, showing what has been the general sentiment on the subject. How it was possible for Judge Wilson of Iowa, in the face of these authorities, and of the concurring views of Kent, Story, Rawle, Curtis, and other authors, to adhere with such tenacity to such a narrow, illiberal, technical, and impracticable doctrine as he advocates, is one of the mysterious incongruities which are sometimes seen in men otherwise able.

It has been suggested that the President can shield himself

* 4 Bl. Comm., 260.

† 4 Bl. Comm., 121.

on the ground that his views, though erroneous, were honest. This fact, if true, will not protect him. The law will not tolerate the absurdity, that an illegal act may be done from a lawful motive. Men are bound not only to know but to understand the Constitution. A father cannot kill his child and then defend himself on the ground that it was an act of mercy, and done therefore in kindness; neither can he plead successfully that he supposed the old Roman law, giving to a father the power of life and death over his children, is the law of our land.

The inquiry is sometimes made, Has not the President the right to judge for himself as to the constitutionality of a law? Certainly he has, and so has every one else. But every man must do it on his own responsibility, and take the consequences of a mistake.

The President will find on the trial that it is of no consequence what he thinks of the constitutionality of the law on which he is tried. What he has now a particular interest in is what the opinion of the Court of Impeachment will be; and if they decide that the law is constitutional, it will make no difference what his opinion is, or whether it is right or wrong.

It has been urged again that the decision of the Supreme Court ought to be taken. The Supreme Court cannot possibly be applied to, to decide what is a high crime or misdemeanor on an impeachment. Besides, the Court of Impeachment is the Supreme Court on this question, and if either should follow the decision of the other, the Supreme Court ought to be governed by the decision of the Court of Impeachment.

There can be no doubt that the deposition of the President, at the present juncture, whether constitutional or not, ought to be hailed with joy. The country has for two years experienced the bitter fruits of having the President and Congress antagonistic to each other. Harmony between these two departments of the government would undoubtedly restore confidence, peace, and prosperity.

The question which is now pending before the Supreme Court, in the *McArdle* case, occupies less of the public attention, but the decision may involve much more momentous

consequences than that in the impeachment case. The latter would probably hold the reconstruction of the rebel States in the same uncertain and disastrous condition in which it has been for the last year. The former may strike a death-blow to everything that has been done to restore those States, and render the officers and their agents, who have attempted to carry into effect the laws of Congress, liable to be sued for hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The question involved is, whether the military governments established by the law of Congress in the rebel States are constitutional or not. The claims against their constitutionality are probably presented in as distinct and forcible a manner in the argument lately addressed to the Supreme Court by Hon. D. D. Field, of New York, in the *McArdle* case, as by any one else.*

In examining this argument, we are struck with surprise that an advocate will hazard his reputation, even in behalf of a client, by so many palpably untenable propositions. We shall notice, first, although not in the order in which he advanced his propositions, the claim that the question ought to be regarded as settled in the *Milligan* case. It would be sufficient to reply, that the question involved in this case was not necessarily at issue in that case, and that it would have been prudent if the majority of the Court had taken warning from the just indignation of the public, occasioned in the *Dred Scott* case, by the folly of the Court in going out of their way to express an opinion on an exciting political question. But it is too late to claim that even the Supreme Court is infallible, especially where the judges are nearly equally divided in opinion. It is wholesome sometimes to exhibit to parents their offspring as naked as when born, to see whether they belong to the human race or are mere monsters.

In the *Milligan* case, the Judge who gives the opinion of the Court assumes and asserts that Indiana was at the time in a state of peace, and that it enjoyed all the privileges of the administration of justice. Now we believe that it was a notorious fact that this assertion was false; that the lives and prop-

* Reported in *N. Y. Herald*, March 14.

erty of loyal citizens were not protected by the administration of the laws ; and that disloyal citizens, however guilty, escaped with impunity. If these facts were not offered in evidence in the case, the majority of the Court may be excused from acting on a false basis ; but if they were in evidence, or if the Court decided that they could not be given in evidence, the decision will go down to posterity with a blacker seal of condemnation upon it, than even that in the Dred Scott case. It is precisely at this point, that the two parties separate on all the great questions of the day. The majority in Congress have boldly taken the ground that they will not be controlled by shams ; by forms of government without the reality : and that they have a right and are bound to look through and beneath external appearances to the true condition of things. The President and his abettors have taken the ground that such enquiries cannot be made ; that if in a State there are courts, and sheriffs, and jurors, who go through the ceremony of doing business, it is enough, although the judges, and sheriffs, and jurors, are only a gang of conspirators, bound to hang all honest loyal citizens, and screen from justice all villains and rebels. Now one thing is evident, that if such a state of things exists, there must be and will be either military law or Lynch law. Brave men never will quietly submit to be hung by ruffians, although under the forms of law. If there is any state of society in which military law is both demanded and justified, it is such a condition, and no musty authorities or jesuitical reasoning will ever satisfy the plain common sense of the masses, or the enlightened reason of sound-minded jurists to the contrary.

It is equally clear, that if in a portion of the territory of any nation there are no civil institutions, military law is justifiable. Mr. Field says, " that Congress cannot pass a law making the people of Alaska subject to military government." How can he hazard such an assertion when he must know that the government which has first existed in all our territories has been a military government. Suppose a military post should be established in a territory hundreds of miles beyond the line of any State or territorial government, and twenty or thirty desperadoes, who are, notwithstanding, citizens of the United

States, should locate themselves in the vicinity of the fort, and should carry on a wholesale business of stealing the provisions of the garrison, and occasionally murdering the soldiers, we would ask Mr. Field, whether the military officers would not and could not hang the murderers and lock up the thieves in the guard house? And if he thinks not, we would ask him, what would or could be done?

Mr. Field does not adopt the execrable doctrine of Mr. Buchanan and his Attorney General Black, that the General Government cannot constitutionally suppress a rebellion. They took the ground that although a natural person has, by implication, the right of self-preservation, yet that an artificial person, like the General Government, has no such right. That although the nation manufactured the constitution, to shield itself like a cloak from the storm, yet that if it clasped the neck so tight as to threaten strangulation, it could not be helped. It could not be thrown off or loosened, even to preserve life, for which purpose alone it was made. Mr. Field, following the lead of Senators Doolittle and Dixon, admits that the rebellion could be quelled, but claims it cannot be crushed out. A man who has a tumor in a limb can open it, but he cannot extirpate it, although life would be the sure result of its excision, and death of the neglect to do it.

A favorite idea of Mr. Field's appears to be, that if there is any sort of government in a State, no matter how it originated, the General Government must treat it as the legal, valid government of the State. Whereas, the true view is that if the government in a State, whether legally established or not, is so disloyal in its principles and so destructive to the lives and property of the loyal inhabitants of the State, that the safety of the Union is greatly imperiled by it, the General Government not only may, but ought to treat it as a nullity, and establish a temporary military government, until the people of the State themselves organize a safe government, which shall be approved by Congress. Any other doctrine would leave the Union in constant peril. This rule commends itself to the sound judgment of all whose minds are not under the influence of long-seated prejudice, or party spirit. But it is not necessary to go as far as this. For even President John-

son admits that there were no State governments in the rebel states, which he could recognize till he originated new ones.

Mr. Dixon, in his late speech, has industriously and anxiously produced a number of extracts from the writings and speeches of Mr. Lincoln, to show that his policy was the same as President Johnson's policy. Whereas these and all other sayings of Mr. Lincoln, fairly construed, prove only, that so far as he had a policy, it was merely this: to enable the people of the rebel States to initiate and present to the Congress of the United States a form of government for that body to decide upon, and not as President Johnson claims for the President to sanction. It was also his policy to aid, as far as he could, by his influence, the approbation, by Congress, of such forms of government so presented, as he himself approved. Nobody could reasonably object to such a policy, if policy it can be called.

It is passing strange that Mr. Dixon did not see that every sentence which he quoted from Senator Wade, is in direct antagonism to his own doctrine. The utmost that he can claim, is, that Senator Wade did not agree with Mr. Lincoln as to some of the forms of state government which satisfied Mr. Lincoln. But Mr. Wade takes the ground from beginning to end, that Congress alone can make the new State governments of the rebel States constitutional.

Mr. Field brings forward the generally acknowledged fact, that the rebel States are, and always have been, in the Union, and seems to think that it is conclusive against the right of Congress to establish a military government. This stale claim has been urged hundreds of times by men who have not, like Mr. Field, the discernment to see that it is a complete *non sequitur*. A citizen of Connecticut is convicted of forgery. He is just as much a citizen of Connecticut as before. He has not taken himself out from under the government of the State. Yet he has disfranchised himself. The State, however, has lost no rights by his crime, but the convict has lost one of his most important privileges. So the citizens of a State can gain nothing by secession. But they may forfeit all their rights as citizens of the United States.

Mr. Field argues again with an air of triumph, as though he thought the claim was unanswerable, that all the departments of the government have recognized the fact that the war is ended. A man's house takes fire, the fire department come and throw water upon it, and he, supposing that the fire is extinguished, informs his friends that the danger is over, and dismisses the fire department. Soon after the fire breaks out anew. No matter, says Mr. Field, the owner must not raise another alarm of fire. He has proclaimed that it was put out. He is estopped from claiming that it is on fire. All he can do now is to wait and let it burn up. President Lincoln supposed that the war was at an end; that the rebels had submitted, and he treated the matter accordingly. But afterwards proof was accumulated on proof, so that all but the willfully blind could see it, that the South continued just as full of the rebel spirit, and of the rebel determination to ruin all loyalists and all freedmen, as during the worst days of the rebellion. Why then should the government "cry peace, peace, when there was no peace"? Why should not military power be resorted to, when the Union was again in danger of being destroyed?

But the cant words which are repeated and reëchoed till they tire the ear and sicken the heart, are the words of the bill of rights, in the amendments to the Constitution, regarding freedom from arrest and trial by jury. Will any one pretend that a rebel, while he is a rebel, can claim the rights secured by the Constitution? Can he repudiate the Constitution and still claim under it? Can a man abandon his country as often as he pleases, and then come back again, from time to time, and the nation have nothing to say on the subject? Can a rebellious son come back and demand admittance into his father's house again, without even saying that he is sorry he left?

It may do for rebels and semi-rebels to give an affirmative answer, but that will never be the response of sound-minded statesmen, or true-hearted patriots.

ARTICLE VII.—PROFESSOR JOHN A. PORTER'S TRANSLATION OF THE "KALEVALA."

Selections from the Kalevala, Translated from a German Version, by JOHN A. PORTER, M. D., late Professor in Yale College. With an Introduction and Analysis of the Poem. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 12mo. pp. 148.

In Memoriam. JOHN ADDISON PORTER. Cambridge: Printed at the Riverside Press. 1867. 8vo. pp. 90.

Kalevala, das National Epos der Finnen, nach der zweiten Ausgabe ins Deutsche übertragen, von ANTON SCHIEFNER. Helsingfors, 1852.

Ueber die neueste Redaction der Kalevala-runen; von Dr. M. ALEXANDER CASTREN. Bulletin de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint-Petersbourg. Tome VII., No. 20, 21. *M. Alexander Castrén's Vorlesungen über die Finnische Mythologie.* Aus dem Schwedischen übertragen von A. SCHIEFNER. St. Petersburg, 1853.

La Finlande, son Histoire primitive, sa Mythologie, sa Poésie épique, avec la Traduction complète de sa grande Épopée le Kalevala. Par LEOUZON LE DUC. Paris, 1845.

IN most of the countries of the North, especially those inhabited by Celtic or Anglo-Saxon races, there has been at some period a class of wandering minstrels, whose occupation was to rehearse in rhyme the subjects which most excited the imagination, or occupied the thoughts of men. Their songs, whether improvised, or made familiar by constant repetition, were chanted, with a musical accompaniment played upon the harp or similar instrument, and were the favorite entertainment of the people; and in early times, or in countries without literature, they were also an important means of instruction. They narrated alike the origin of the world, the acts of gods and heroes, and the deeds of brave men. In the absence of written records, they were almost the only art preservative.

The Eddas and Sagas of Iceland and Scandinavia, the Nibelungen Lied of Germany, as well as the verses of Homer, and the great national poems of India, all belong more or less strictly to this kind of literature. So too Scotland had her minstrels; Wales had her bards; and Ireland was not without them; while the English ballad literature marks the existence in former times of a popular taste for the performance of similar rhyming chroniclers. In all these poems there is a general similarity, both as to matter and to form. The constant recurrence of particular phrases, the prevalence of special epithets, the frequent repetition of whole lines or even passages of considerable length, as introductions or forming the refrain, characterize them all. Those of the North, however, have peculiarities which are not found in their Southern analogues, and by which they are clearly distinguished from them.

It had long been known that in Finland there existed not only a remarkable poetic spirit among the people, but also a considerable body of poems. They were not however collected, nor even reduced to writing, and fixed in a permanent form, until a very recent period. They were recited by the people, and sung by minstrels who made it their profession to rehearse them for the entertainment of their auditors, and in this way gained their livelihood. These minstrels formed a sort of sacred order, held in great reverence. Their songs were transmitted from father to son, from old men to such young singers as were privileged to enter the brotherhood of minstrelsy. Fragmentary specimens of Finnish poetry had been published in Germany at a comparatively early period, nearly two hundred years ago in fact, but they were neither sufficient to represent it adequately, nor to awaken the interest of scholars. A small collection was made by Dr. Zacharias Topelius, and published in five parts during the interval between 1822 and 1836. This was the first collection of importance, though in a Finnish journal published at Abo, Prof. R. von Becker had printed, in 1820, several songs relating to Wainamoinen, and had endeavored to unite them into a single poem. Other collections of Finnish poems were also made by various persons; but it is chiefly to Dr. Elias Lönnrot that the world is indebted for something like a complete and satisfactory edition of them.

He made several journeys to Finland, and also to those portions of the government of Archangel inhabited by Finnish people, taking down the songs from the lips of the peasants, or recording them as they were recited by the minstrels. Perceiving that the songs had a certain relationship to each other, he undertook to arrange them in such a manner as to bring out this connection, and to unite them into a poem of epic proportions and continuity. In this he was measurably successful. The first edition published by him appeared in 1835, under the title of *Kalevala*. It contained about twelve thousand verses in thirty-two runes or cantos. This was a remarkable result of his labors; and it was very gratifying to the national pride of the Finlanders, whose enthusiasm rose to the highest pitch. In other countries also it attracted much attention. It seemed a miracle that a work like this could have come into existence under such circumstances; that out of Finland, the land of fens, whose northern extremity touched the Arctic circle, bordering on the land of gloom, there should thus be brought to the eyes of men a poesy, beautiful as a flower, and rich as a full vintage. The scholars of Europe at once gave it their earnest attention, and many publications followed its appearance. Alexander Castrén, to whom the world is especially indebted for his labors in Finnish literature and mythology, as well as in the general science of philology, published, in 1841, a translation of it in Swedish, which is spoken of by Schiefner as highly successful. But the Swedish language did not bring it before a large body of readers. To the world at large it was still inaccessible, until Le Duc in 1845 published, as a part of his work *La Finlande*, another translation, which is in prose, most emphatically so. But though the matter and general scope of the poem may be sufficiently learned from this translation, the reader will get no idea of its spirit or its beauty. Divorced from its peculiar poetic form, it has lost its better half, and the residue often degenerates into silliness. Le Duc's volume however, besides the translation of the *Kalevala*, contains a large amount of information respecting Finland and its people, its history, mythology, and poetry, which is valuable, and written in a very agreeable style.

But as an authority, especially in doubtful points of scholarship, he is not to be implicitly trusted.

For several years after Dr. Lönnrot's first edition was published, the Finnish Society of Literature, at Helsingfors, undertook the labor of completing the great work, as far as their limited means would allow, and of rescuing from oblivion still more of the songs which were rapidly being forgotten. The task was committed in a large degree to young men, mostly students at the university, who entered upon it with great zeal, and made many excursions through the country. The collections thus made were placed in the hands of Dr. Lönnrot to be reduced to order and published. The result was a new edition which appeared in 1849, containing nearly twenty-three thousand verses, in fifty runes. While this edition was passing through the press, Mr. Anton Schiefner was preparing a translation of it into German. His work was revised by the Society at Helsingfors before publication, and Castrén himself lent much assistance to the enterprise. This translation of Schiefner was employed by Prof. Porter in preparing the English version. It is the work of a scholar, and represents the original very faithfully, the meter and all the lyrical peculiarities of it being reproduced, so far as a different language would allow, with very gratifying success.

The literary world certainly owes Sir Walter Scott a great debt of gratitude for his labors in collecting and preserving so many of the old songs of the Border Minstrels; and to Dr. Lönnrot its obligation is even greater; for the minstrels are fast passing away from Finland, in fact are nearly extinct already, and the prosaic spirit of commerce, with the distracting influences of a busy civilization, would soon make the people forget their songs. Mr. A. F. Soldan, the Finnish gentleman by whose suggestion and encouragement Prof. Porter was induced to undertake the translation of the *Kalevala*, writing to his friend in 1864, says, "I have not heard lately, but some few years ago, I know for certain, there were yet three or four of those old genuine minstrels living, improvisators with a *Kantele*, so called, *Runoniekka* or *Runnoseppä* (rune-smith); two of them would sit, each on his side of the table, or rather each on his bench (the end of a long bench),

the *kantele* on his knee, the thumb of the left hand within the thumb of the other smith's left hand, and now alternately pouring forth an incessant flow of song in runo-meter like that of *Kalevala*, in the same old and uniform melody or tune like that of *Kalevala*, and what undoubtedly is the strangest of all, in that same strain of wonderful beauty and primitive purity. I have no doubt there are still some few of them left in Sawolaks (Eastern Finland)." In a few years more the most of this beautiful literature would have been irrecoverably lost. In the "Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border" there is perhaps more of Scott than of the original minstrel; besides, as is well known, some of the songs which have been attributed to the ancient bards, were the work of modern rhymers; but the runes of *Kalevala* were recorded by Dr. Lönnrot with scrupulous fidelity, and are of unquestioned genuineness.

Prof. Max Müller, in his "Lectures on the Science of Language," speaking of the Finns, says: "Their literature and, above all, their popular poetry bear witness to a high intellectual development in times which we may call mythical, and in places more favorable to the glow of poetic feelings than their present abode, the last refuge Europe could afford them. The epic songs still live among the poorest, recorded by oral tradition alone, and preserving all the features of a perfect meter, and of a more ancient language. A national feeling has lately arisen amongst the Finns, despite of Russian supremacy, and the labors of Sjögern, Lönnrot, Castrén, and Kellgren, receiving hence a powerful impulse, have produced results truly surprising. From the mouths of the aged an epic poem has been collected equalling the Iliad in length and completeness, nay, if we can forget for a moment all that *we* in our youth learned to call beautiful, not less beautiful. A Finn is not a Greek, and Wainamoinen was not a Homer. But if the poet may take his colors from that nature by which he was surrounded, if he may depict the man with whom he lives, "*Kalevala*" possesses merits not dissimilar from those of the Iliad, and will claim its place as the fifth national epic of the world, side by side with the Ionian songs, with the *Mahábhārata*, the *Shanámeh*, and the *Nibelunge*." Certainly no one at all acquainted with the *Kalevala* will be disposed to find fault with

Prof. Müller for high praise of its literary beauty; but the passage quoted gives a somewhat inadequate and incorrect impression, so far as the comparison with the *Iliad* of Homer is concerned. There is a singular oversight in making Wainamoinen, the most important *hero* of the *Kalevala*, stand in the same relation to the poem, as does Homer, whom the world acknowledges as the *author* of the *Iliad*, to his magnificent work.

But still more important is it to observe that the *Kalevala* has not the unity, either of subject or plan, that is so evident in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. It may be true of the latter, as some distinguished scholars believe, that they were once but disjointed narratives, repeated in popular song, and chanted by wandering bards, and that Homer, a minstrel more highly gifted than the rest, wrought them to such form and harmony that they seemed the product of a single master mind, as Shakespeare's transmuting touch converted the hackneyed themes of old familiar dramas from baser metal to gold, and made them only Shakespeare's henceforth; yet the events they describe are, in the main, referable to a definite period of comparatively limited extent, and succeed one another with a continuity, sometimes indeed disturbed by episodes, but never entirely dissevered. But not even Dr. Lönnrot claimed any such oneness for the *Kalevala*; and Castrén shows that it has several distinct leading themes, with others subordinate, episodic, or fragmentary. Its unity is simply that of poetic structure and spirit; but this it could hardly fail of having, born as it was from the poetic inspiration of a whole people, whose characteristics are as strongly marked as they are peculiar. Considering the poem as a whole, its events have not a consistent and orderly succession, but only acquire a certain homology as they cluster about the shadowy personages, whose existence, exempt from the limitations of human life, stretches through unrecorded ages. Thus we have a number of runes relating to Wainamoinen forming a series or cycle by themselves; a series but slightly related to the former, concerning Ilmarinen; a third devoted to the restless, adventurous Lemminkainen; and another cycle quite independent of the others, narrating the exploits of the evil-minded Kullervo; while

there are separate runes, or fragmentary portions, which describe the creation of the world, or the deeds of some of the less important heroes. Besides it is to be remembered that out of the songs collected for Dr. Lönnrot's editions, there were many which had no relation to the subjects of the *Kalevala*, and could not be included in it. These were published by themselves under the title of *Kanteletar*, that is, songs of the harp.

When we look at the literary character of the two great poems, we find a still wider difference between them,—a difference as great as that of the two peoples with whom they originated, and similar in kind. The Greeks were highly civilized, even in the early times described by the *Iliad*. Their language too had followed their own enlightenment, and was vastly more finished than that of Finland. The reasoning faculty was highly developed among them, and exercised a controlling influence in the process of artistic creation. The poet, not always consciously perhaps, but as it were by instinct, carefully avoided anything that might seem to violate the unity of a picture, or create an inconsistency. A fine instance of this unconscious self-criticism is seen in Homer's apology for, or rather justification of, a simile apparently exaggerated, when, speaking of the wound Menelaus had received, he says, as translated by Chapman :—

"Yet forth the blood flowed, which did much his royal person grace,
And showed upon his ivory skin, as doth a purple dye
Laid, by a dame of Caira, or lovely Mæony,
On ivory, wrought in ornaments to deck the cheeks of horse;
Which in her marriage room must lie; whose beauties have such force
That they are wished of many knights, but are such precious things,
That they are kept for horse that draw the chariots of kings,
Which horse, so decked, the charioteer esteems a grace to him;
Like these, in grace, the blood upon thy solid thighs did swim,
O Menelaus, down thy calves and ankles to the ground.
For nothing decks a soldier so, as doth an honored wound."

The Finns were a peasant people for the most part, and their poets lacked the fine insight which is necessary to an unerring critical judgment. In the *Kalevala* the singer not unfrequently makes the step from the sublime to the ridiculous with apparent unconsciousness, and without the slightest shock to his

artistic sense. As an example of this may be mentioned the passage in the first rune, at the close of the introduction to the poem, where, after an animated description of the origin of the songs and their tradition from father to son, from singer to singer, the minstrel hints, not very covertly, that, if his auditors would hear his most beautiful songs, the beer must be forthcoming.

The beauty of the Greek poem is that of nature perfected by art, or rather with artificial grace superadded; the northern poem, on the other hand, has the charm of unsophisticated nature in all her spontaneity. The *Iliad* has a tone of martial grandeur; its heroes move with the stateliness born of courts and of regal dignities. It borrows little of its splendor from the objects or the phenomena of external nature, except as they reveal the presence and power of the Gods. The language of tenderness and sentiment holds in it no very prominent place. Dwelling under a benignant climate, man moves with something of the freedom and exultation of a conqueror. But in the northern realm of cold and gloom, he is to a greater extent dominated by the sternness of his habitat, and becomes subdued and meditative. In his privation the treasures he does possess become all the dearer from their fewness. The glory of the forest, and of the plants, leaf, branch, and flower, the balmy air of spring-time, the summer sky and cloud, the clear streams, the songs of birds, the sun, the stars, all hold large place in his affection and in his songs. In *Kalevala* the voices of nature are constantly heard, and their suggestions are often of ineffable sweetness and beauty.

The *Kalevala*, then, cannot be properly classed with the *Iliad* and similar poems, except on the general ground of its being popular poetry. It has neither the unity, the martial strain, nor the reference to definite events and times, that usually and properly characterize the true epic. But, on the other hand, it belongs to the class of the *Eddas* and *Sagas*. Its septentrional character is strongly marked. The name *Kalevala*, which means home of heroes or mighty ones, and which, occurring in the songs both as *locale* of the events they describe, and as the poetical designation of Finland, was appropriated by Dr. Lönnrot as the title of the collection, is

equivalent in signification to Asgardr of the Scandinavian mythology as described in the Elder or poetic Edda. It is remarkable too, that the separate songs of this Edda were collected in Iceland, about the middle of the twelfth century, by Sæmund Sigfusson, and gathered into a single work, in a manner very similar to that of Dr. Lönnrot in Finland. The heroes of *Kalevala* are shown to us as in constant conflict with the inhabitants of Pohjola, a land lying to the northward, a region of darkness and cold, and tenanted by powerful and hostile personages. In like manner the inhabitants of Asgardr carry on a continual contest with Jötunheim, the name of which means home of the giants, the latter being a class of evil-disposed semi-deities, in perpetual enmity with Asgardr. This warfare is doubtless the poetical representation of the strife between light and darkness in an arctic clime, or between the mildness of the short-lived summer and the severity of the long dreary winter. It is one of the most common themes in the mythical literature of the extreme north, and is a predominant idea in the *Kalevala*. In this long struggle the heroes of *Kalevala* as well as those of Asgardr are ultimately victorious.

The three principal personages in the Finnish poem are Wainamoinen who holds the chief place in importance, Ilmarinen, and Lemminkainen. Each one of them finds his fellow in the Scandinavian mythology. Wainamoinen is but the counterpart of Odin. Both alike possess irresistible power; both excel in magical arts, which enable them to accomplish the most extravagant exploits; and both have in a wonderful degree the gift of music, and exercise their skill with a potency that nothing can withstand. Ilmarinen corresponds to the Thor of the Eddas, and like him is depicted as bearing a hammer. He is a smith, worker in metals, the controller of thunder and lightning, and god of the air. He is said, in the *Kalevala*, to have forged the sky, the roof of the atmosphere, and to have wrought it with such surpassing skill, that no dint of hammer-stroke, nor any mark of other tool, was visible. Lemminkainen answers to Tyr chiefly, though the resemblance is not so complete as in the cases just mentioned, for his career in some respects reminds us of Baldur, the sun-god of the Edda. Numerous other striking analogies might be

pointed out, were it material to do so, and the space sufficient.

The *Kalevala* derives much of its charm from its peculiar versification, which is very different from that of the Eddaic poems, and far more beautiful. It consists of trochaic verses of four feet or eight syllables. The light and rapid movement of this simple meter render it a very appropriate vehicle for narrative poetry, where a complicated metrical structure necessarily interferes with the freedom of the story, and makes it move heavily. But the two most characteristic features of the Finnish poetry are the alliteration and the verbal repetition. Alliteration is common enough it is true, and is one of the familiar traits of almost all popular poetry. In early English poetry, for instance, it was very frequent, and was often reduced to a system, of which perhaps Piers Ploughman's Vision affords the best illustration. But in the *Kalevala* it is carried to a very great extent, chiefly as a matter of taste, but partly from necessity, since, from the smaller number of letters in the Finnic alphabet, the recurrence of particular sounds is proportionately more frequent. The following from the second rune will serve as a specimen.

Kylvi maita kyyhatteli,
Kylvi maita, kylvi soita,
Kylvi auhtoja ahoja,
Panettavi paasikoita.

This example affords a good illustration also of the peculiar repetition of single words, of verses or half verses, which occurs constantly. The Finnish vocabulary is eminently rich in synonymous words, which allow of almost infinite variety of expression; and we often find, especially at the beginning or end of a passage, three, four, or even more different phrases for the same thing or person, arranged not at haphazard, but with structural relations to each other, and with a distinct view to oral harmony. Prof. Longfellow's beautiful poem, *Hianvatha*, affords an excellent illustration of the structure of the *Kalevala*, so far as it could be done in English. The correspondence in all these most peculiar traits, and even in some of the incidents described, is so close, and the whole plan and spirit of the poem so like those of *Kalevala*, that it is very difficult to resist the conviction that the latter served

as suggestion, if not in some sort as model, for the other. If so, the discovery of the *Kalevala* brought a double boon to the reading world.

The lyrical and structural peculiarities that have just been described, render a translation of the *Kalevala* into a different language a work of no inconsiderable difficulty. Prof. Porter however, in his selections, has succeeded admirably, not only in fairly reproducing the essential characteristics, but what is more, in preserving the life and spirit, of the original. His version, which is from Schiefner's German translation, has the same rapid movement, the same racy, animated description, the same fresh odor of the flowers and fields. It is a portion of the Wainamöinen cycle of runes, and though but a fragment of the whole work, it has no want of completeness in itself. It includes a small part of the first rune, a larger portion of the second, and the third and fourth runes entire. The volume contains an interesting introduction by Mr. Schuyler, and an analysis which is a translation of the summary or table of contents prefixed to Schiefner's edition.

The first selection, being the part from the first and second runes, is the story of Wainamöinen's sowing. It tells how, after the birth of the latter, the plants and the forests grew, and

" All things fair and lovely flourished,
All things save the one most precious
Fruit of fruits, the golden barley."

Wainamöinen finds among the pebbles on the sea-shore six grains of barley which he sows, ending his labor with an invocation, of which the following is a portion.

" Rise, O Earth! from out thy slumbers,
Bid the soil unlock her treasures,
Bid the blade arise in beauty,
Bid the stalk grow strong and stately;
On a thousand stems uplifted
Let the yellow harvest ripen,
Let it cover all my cornfields
Hundred-fold for seed I planted.
Ukko mighty! God above us,
Gracious Ukko! Father in Heaven,
Thou who all the sky commandest,
For the fleecy clouds appointing
Every morn their course and pathway,

In thine airy realm consulting,
 In thy kingdom taking counsel,
 Send us clouds from East and North-East,
 From the South and from the Sun-Set;
 Let them scatter drops refreshing;
 Bid them all their sweetness sprinkle
 That the ear may lift its treasure
 And the corn make haste to ripen."

The remainder of the volume forms one continuous story, and describes the musical contest between Wainamoinen and Youkahainen, the minstrel of Pohjola, with the results that followed it. The fame of Wainamoinen had spread far and wide until it reached the ears of Youkahainen, in whom it excited inordinate envy, and a wrathful desire to challenge him to immediate combat. He sets out for Kalevala, which he reaches in three days. Coming up with Wainamoinen, who is peacefully riding for pastime in the meadows, he assails him very rudely.

"Forward comes the fiery stripling
 Urging still his hot blood stallion,
 Dashing down upon the minstrel,
 Till they meet in fierce collision.
 Dripping hames are dashed together,
 Steaming thills are tightly tangled,
 Traces rattle upon traces,
 Collar upon collar clatters,
 So perforce they come to stand still,
 So perforce a moment ponder,
 Then the minstrel boldly cries out:
 'Say who art thou? stupid fellow
 Coming dashing down the highway,
 Crazily thy stallion urging,
 Striking me in fierce encounter.
 Lo, my stallion's hame is shattered,
 See his collar torn to atoms,
 And my golden sledge demolished,
 And its frame work all in fitters.
 Let me know, thou stupid fellow,
 Who thou art and whence thou comest.'"

Youkahainen makes himself known, and wishes to enter upon a trial of skill with him at once.

"Then made answer Wainamoinen,
 Wainamoinen old and truthful:
 'I shall do no deed for wonder,

Marvel am I not in singing,
All my peaceful life has glided
Down a dim and desert region,
All the song my ears have gathered
Is the cuckoo's simple measure.
'Yet as you will have it, stripling,
Come now tell me, golden stripling,
Tell me straight your store of wisdom,
What you know more than another.'

Youkahainen then begins with some frivolous stuff, which the old man ridicules, challenging him to explain the mysteries of creation, and to discourse of the countless creatures in the world. This he attempts to do, assigning himself an important share in the origin of the universe. In answer to this, Wainamoinen calls him a liar and a mere pretender, which so enrages the youthful braggart, that he tries to decide the contest by an appeal to the sword, and failing in this, threatens to enchant the old man by his singing, and transform him into a swine. The consequences of this boast are disastrous.

"Bravely sang the ancient minstrel,
Till the flinty rocks and ledges
Heard the trumpet tone and trembled,
And the copper-bearing mountains
Shook along their deep foundations,
Flinty rocks flew straight asunder,
Falling cliffs afar were scattered,
All the solid earth resounded
And the ocean billows answered.
And, alas! for Youkahainen,
Lo, his sledge so fairly fashioned
Floats a waif upon the ocean,
Lo, his pearl enameled birch-rod
Lies a weed upon the margin,
Lo, his steed of shining forehead
Stands a statue in the torrent,
And his hame is but a fir bough,
And his collar nought but corn-straw.
Still the minstrel sings unceasing,
And, alas! for Youkahainen,
Sings his sword from out his scabbard,
Hangs it in the sky before him
As it were a gleam of lightning,
Sings his bow so gayly blazoned
Into drift-wood on the ocean,
Sings his finely feathered arrows

Into swift and screaming eagles,
 Sings his dog with crooked muzzle
 Into stone dog squatting near him,
 Into sea-flowers sings his gauntlets,
 And his visor into vapor,
 And himself the sorry fellow
 Ever deeper in his torture
 In the quicksand to his shoulder,
 To his hip in mud and water.

Now, alas! poor Youkahainen,
 Sorry stripling, comprehended
 All too plainly what the end was
 Of the voyage he had ventured,
 Of this road his feet had traveled,
 For the joy of wordy battle
 With the ancient Wainamoinen."

Finding himself in this sorry plight and at the mercy of his angry antagonist, the youth begs for release, offering one by one the choicest of his treasures. These all being contemptuously rejected, at last in despair he offers the hand of his beautiful sister Aino. This is effectual.

"Glad of heart is Wainamoinen,
 Full of joy the ancient minstrel,
 That he thus has fought and won him
 For his age a lovely maiden,
 Sister of this Youkahainen.
 So he seeks a place befitting,
 Where to publish forth his pleasure,
 Steps upon the rock of joysaunce,
 On the stone of music seats him,
 Sings a moment, sings and ceases,
 Sings a second, then a third time,
 So to turn away the magic,
 So the potent spell to banish.

Now at last comes Youkahainen
 Crawling from his oozy prison,
 Lifts his knees from out the water,
 Beard from out the bog and litter;
 From the rock starts forth his stallion,
 From the bramble glides his snow-sledge,
 And from out the sedge his birch-rod."

Thus set free, Youkahainen hastens homeward in great dejection, not so much on account of his disgraceful defeat, as for the sorrow the pledge he has given will bring to his father's household. His mother, however, is delighted at the tidings,

for she has in secret long hoped for the famous minstrel as her son-in-law. His sister receives the unwelcome news less cheerfully.

“ Then the mother rose up gayly,
Clapped her hands in joy together.
‘ Weep not,’ said she, ‘ son beloved,
Cause is none therein for weeping,
Ever I this hope have cherished,
All the years my soul possessing,
That one day the mighty minstrel,
He, the valiant Wainamoinen,
Spouse should be for lovely Aino,
Son-in-law for me her mother.’

But the beauteous maiden Aino
Fell at once in bitter weeping,
Tearful lingered at the threshold,
Wept that day and all the night through,
Wept because a mighty sorrow,
Bitter sorrow filled her bosom.
Then her mother gently chiding :

‘ Wherefore weep’st thou, gentle Aino !
Lordly wooer thou hast won thee,
Wide the door-way thou wilt enter,
There to while thee at the window,
There the oaken bench to scour.’

‘ Dearest mother, thou that bore me,’
Gentle Aino spake in answer,
‘ Cause is mine indeed for weeping,
Cause for bitter tears and sorrows ;
Well may Aino mourn, O mother,
Golden hair she took delight in,
Sunny softness of her tresses,
Trinkets wherewithal she decked them,
Shining braids she wove each morning,
All to be as nought hereafter,
Buried neath the linen bounet
That the wife must wear forever :
Weep forever, childhood vanished,
Gentle moonlight, golden sunshine,
Joy and hope of all my lifetime
Now forever left behind me ;
Sadder yet the fate before me,
Soon, alas ! to be forgotten
In my father’s humble cottage,
At the work-bench of my brother.’ ”

Wainamoinen shortly after meets the maiden as she is returning from the forest, and eagerly urges his suit. She flees

from him, and hastening homeward falls to weeping, bitterly lamenting her hard fate. The mother endeavoring to console her, tells her of a storehouse filled with splendid raiment, and bids her go and array herself in the best of it.

“ But the maiden, scarcely hearing,
 Less the cheerful counsel heeding,
 Hurried from the cabin threshold,
 Hastened to the empty court yard,
 There alone long time she lingered,
 These the plaintive words she uttered:

‘ Unto what thing shall I liken
 Joys of fortune, favored mortals !
 I will liken them to water,
 Unto water flowing yonder,
 Water bright in yonder basin.
 Unto what the bitter sorrow
 Of the wretched fate neglected ?
 Water in the well imprisoned,
 Ice in cruel winter.

‘ Ah ! for me ’twere so much better
 Had I never seen the daylight,
 Or if born had never thriven,
 Never grown to be a maiden,
 In these days so sad and evil,
 Underneath a sky so joyless ;
 If when seven short days had vanished
 I had died upon the eighth day,
 I was then so low of stature,
 I had needed little linen,
 And of food the smallest measure.
 Mother mine had mourned a little,
 And my father too a trifle,
 Brother too perhaps a moment,
 So had all been past and over.’

So the maiden pined the day through,
 So she pined the eve and morrow,
 Then again her mother asked her :

‘ Why art weeping, lovely Aino !
 Why art pining, dearest daughter !’

And the maiden then made answer :
 ‘ Therefore I must weep and sorrow,
 Wretched maiden pine forever,
 For that thou thy child hast promised,
 Sold away thy little daughter
 To a graybeard old and limpsy,
 Joy to be unto his dotage,
 Comfort to his years declining,

Out of doors a staff to stay him,
In the house a shield around him.' ”

Finding that there is no other escape for her, Aino resolves to flee. She finds the storehouse as she was bidden, and decking herself with the fairest of the rich attire, turns her steps toward the ocean, which she reaches on the third day. As she is walking along the shore she sees three sea maidens sporting in the waves, and immediately resolves to join them.

“ Then the little maid disrobing,
Hangs her short frock on the alders,
On the earth lets fall her stockings,
On the rock her tiny sandals,
In the sand her shining necklace,
And her rings among the pebbles,
Then upon a patch of verdure
Lightly drops her snow-white linen.

In the sea a little distance
Stood a stone of many colors,
Gleaming in the sunlight golden ;
Toward it leaped the little maiden,
Thither swam the luckless Aino,
Up the shining stone had clambered,
There a moment fain to linger,
When upon a sudden swaying
Seaward, then a moment sinking
Down upon the slimy bottom,
Far beneath the wave of ocean
Fell the stone of many colors.

With it fell the luckless maiden,
Clinging to its rocky bosom,
With it sank the maiden Aino
Down beneath the bed of Ocean,
So the little maiden vanished,
So the luckless Aino perished,
Singing as the stone fell seaward,
Chanting still as she descended :

‘ Once to swim I sought the sea-side,
In the foamy waves to frolic ;
Woe is me, I fell in headlong,
Like a little bird I perished.
Never come a-fishing hither,
Never to the shore of ocean,
Never in thy lifetime, father,
As thou lovedst little Aino.

‘ Mother, dear, I sought the sea-side
In the foamy waves to frolic ;
Woe is me, I fell in headlong,
Like a little birdling perished.

Never mix thy bread, O mother,
With the water of this ocean,
Never in thy lifetime, mother,
As thou lovedst little Aino."

The sad news is borne to the home of Aino. A lively description of the grief of her mother, who is inconsolable at her loss, occupies the few remaining pages of the volume.

The passages which Prof. Porter translated are perhaps the finest portion of the *Kalevala*; yet there are many others that are scarcely less beautiful, and we can but sincerely regret that the hand which prepared this English version had proceeded no farther when it was arrested for ever. The circumstances under which the work grew to its present form and extent, give it additional interest, especially to those who knew its author personally. Prof. Porter had always, even from his youth, a strong passion for literary pursuits. Even after he chose science as the field of his professional labors, he did not forsake his early studies. His leisure hours were often occupied with the perusal of the works of favorite authors, or in poetical composition. The memorial volume published a few months after his death contains a number of poems on a diversity of subjects, which give evidence of poetical gifts of a high order. So marked indeed was his success in and enthusiasm for literature, that his intimate friends felt that it was the appropriate field for his intellectual activity, and were assured that he would find in it congenial employment for his best powers. The translation of the *Kalevala* had been urged upon him by his friend, as has already been mentioned, some time before it was actually undertaken. It was finally begun, partly that it might serve to occupy the weary hours of a lingering illness; and even when disease had brought pain and feebleness to his body, and gave no respite or hope of recovery, his interest in the work continued undiminished, and that love of literature, especially of poetry, which he had cherished throughout life still endured, and enabled him to carry on his favorite work until it was ready for the press. The suspension of a labor so successfully begun, must add one more to the keen regrets of his friends; but he will receive the sincere gratitude of those who through his translation know and enjoy the beauties of *Kalevala*.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

RIPLEY'S NOTES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.*—This work is a brief Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, corresponding, in its form and general character, with the other volumes, which have been already published by the author on other portions of the New Testament. The annotations, which are printed on the same page with the English text, seem to us to be very successfully presented in a concise form, and to convey what will be very useful to those who examine them. In so small a volume no full and extended discussion is profitable, but the author has happily compressed a large amount of matter into a few pages, and with so clear a style that no obscurity arises from the briefness of the notes. Dr. Ripley seems to agree with those writers who regard Paul as, in a certain sense, but only a limited one, the author of the Epistle, the actual writer being another person who reflected the Apostle's views and had the Apostle's sanction for his work. He divides the Epistle into five main parts;—which is satisfactory enough, perhaps, if we are not seeking to present the most careful analysis and the most accurate subordination of the subsections to the main ones. We cannot, however, agree with him, if he means anything more than this. The Epistle, as it appears to us, is one whole—not subdivided into five subordinate parts, but into two main divisions, each of which has, again, two subordinate divisions. The object of the author is to set forth the superiority of the New Testament system to the Old Testament system. This he does by showing, first, that the former is superior to the latter, in that the mediator, or person through whose instrumentality it was introduced, is exalted above the persons holding the same position in the older dispensation;—and, secondly, by showing that the person through whom, as a

* *The Epistle to the Hebrews, with Explanatory Notes*; to which are added a condensed view of the Priesthood of Christ, and a Translation of the Epistle, prepared for this work. By HENRY J. RIPLEY, Late Professor in Newton Theological Institution, and Author of "Notes on the Gospels," "Epistle to the Romans," &c., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1868. 12mo. pp. 218.

High Priest, the former is, so to speak, carried forward, holds a loftier place—has a higher priesthood—than those priests of the older system, by whom it was carried forward. These are the two leading divisions. The proposition of the first one is established by proving two things—namely, that Christ, the Mediator of the New, is superior to the angels, the mediators of the Old Testament on the heavenly side, if we may so describe it, and that he is, also, superior to Moses, the mediator of the Old Testament on the earthly side. The proposition of the second leading division is, in a similar way, established by proving two things—namely, that Christ, the Priest of the New, is superior to the Levitical Priesthood, the Priests of the Old Testament, in that he is after the order of Melchisedek, while they are after the order of Aaron, and, also, in that he is the priest of a higher (heavenly) sanctuary, connected with a better covenant. The more we examine this Epistle, also, the more are we led to feel, that the passage extending from Chapter x, verse 19 to the end, is not an independent practical portion of the Epistle, as, for example, the latter part of the Epistle to the Romans, and as it is generally held to be, but that, as far as the end of the twelfth chapter, it is a hortatory section, growing out of and dependent on the second main division respecting the priesthood of Christ, just as the first verses of the second chapter, or the latter part of the third and the whole of the fourth chapters, are hortatory sections, growing out of and dependent on the more argumentative sections immediately preceding them. If we are right in this view, this Epistle is not divided, like the more doctrinal ones, among the Epistles of Paul, into two coördinate sections—a doctrinal and a practical one—but it is a straightforward development of a given subject from the beginning of the first to the end of the twelfth chapter (with some inserted exhortations, indeed, at the end of the different subsections, but of a wholly subordinate character), and then a few closing, practical, hortatory suggestions, of an entirely general nature, at the end, making up the thirteenth chapter. The Epistle, thus, differs, in its form, from all the Pauline Epistles which can be compared with it, and (so far as we may judge, from Paul's ordinary habit in his more doctrinal writings, what his universal course would be in every such work) we may draw from this fact an argument of more or less weight, to show that that Apostle was not the author of the Epistle before us. But, perhaps, as we have already suggested, Dr. Ripley does not mean to present an

analysis of this character. In some of the passages, where the author's course of thought is so involved as to be very obscure, Dr. Ripley seems to us to have quite successfully set forth the true view of his meaning. His own translation of the Epistle, at the end of the volume, and his discussion of the subject of the Priesthood of Christ, will, doubtless, be regarded as giving additional value to his work. The reputation of the author will certainly not be diminished by this his most recently published volume.

SUGGESTIVE COMMENTARY ON ST. LUKE.—These volumes are the first of a proposed series of commentaries on various books of both the Old and the New Testaments, which are to be prepared by different persons associated with the present author. The peculiarity of the work before us, and, as we suppose, of the whole series, is set forth in the first word of the title given above. They are designed to be suggestive;—not so much entering into discussions and extended annotations, as throwing out brief hints, which may awaken thought in regard to the passages referred to, or may tend to give the reader a more full understanding of the text. The notes are arranged, mainly,—the suggestive notes, altogether,—in a sort of tabular form, almost never passing the limits of a single line. Of course, there is a constraint imposed upon the author by the adoption of such a rule, and we question whether the supposed advantages of such a system of annotation compensate for its manifest disadvantages. After the suggestive notes upon each verse, brief remarks are added in regard to certain of the Greek words, and the translations given by various prominent commentators are inserted. The book is intended for the use of teachers of Bible classes, and of clergymen in their preparation for evening lectures and prayer meetings—for that class of persons, in a word, whose special want is the want of hints and suggestions; and the author has certainly succeeded in compressing, for their benefit, a large amount of matter into a small space.

* *A Suggestive Commentary on St. Luke: with Critical and Homiletical Notes.* By Rev. W. H. VAN DOREN. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1868. 16mo. 2 vols. pp. 520-558. New Haven: Judd & White.

BARNES ON THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.*—The Lectures on the Ely Foundation, by Dr. Albert Barnes, are characteristic of the venerable and laborious author. They are eminently honest and candid in their spirit. The author aims to look every difficulty in the face—to be not only just but even generous to the inquirer and sceptic. He takes no unfair advantages, but comes squarely up to the line of his antagonist and endeavors fairly to silence his batteries by open fighting. Moreover, as the title of his lectures intimates, he endeavors to discuss the question of the origin of Christianity, as it presents itself in the 19th century to both friends and foes.

As the result of studies conducted in this spirit, and with these aims, Dr. Barnes has produced ten lectures and an appendix on the following topics: The limitations of the Human Mind on the subject of Religion. Historical Evidences as affected by time (two lectures). The evidence of Christianity from its Propagation. Miracles: the evidence in the nineteenth century that they were propagated in the first. The Argument for the truth of Christianity, in the nineteenth century, from Prophecy. Inspiration of the Scriptures, with reference to the objections made in the nineteenth century. The evidence of the divine origin of Christianity from the Personal character and Incarnation of Christ. The Christian Religion as adapted to the wants of man, as illustrated in these eighteen hundred years. The relation of Christianity to the world's progress in Science, Civilization, and the Arts in the nineteenth century.

These topics open a very wide and a very interesting field for discussion, suggesting as they do the most momentous questions which are now agitating the minds of multitudes in Christendom. These topics are all handled with ability, though we cannot say that in all cases they are handled with equal success. The first, on the limitations of the mind on the subject of religion, does not satisfy us, nor will it satisfy the minds that are vexed with this question. The author seems to have looked at this subject from the outside rather than to be fully possessed with the real difficulties in the case which profoundly interest many speculative minds.

* *Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity in the Nineteenth Century.* Delivered in the Mercer Street Church, New York, January 21st to February 21st, 1867, on the "Ely Foundation" of the Union Theological Seminary. By ALBERT BARNES. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1868.

Not fully appreciating the difficulties, he could not be expected to furnish a satisfactory solution of them. His remarks on a book revelation are singularly *mal apropos* to the objections against the possibility of such a communication to man. The subject of miracles, though treated with far greater thoroughness, labors in the hands of the author under similar defects, arising from some incapacity of sympathy with the views of those who regard the supernatural as impossible. Though the author attempts to do justice to their position he does not completely comprehend it. His answers to these objections are more unsatisfactory than his statement of them. Not that every one of them is not pertinent and just, but that he fails to urge two most important points, first, the inquiry by way of challenge, what is the ground of our confidence in the fixedness of the laws of nature; and second, the moral necessities of man which justify a deviation from these laws. Both these points need not only to be made but to be urged, if supernaturalism is to be successfully defended, and the story of the Christian miracles is to be fully accredited.

But while we notice these *lacunæ* or oversights, we commend the lectures as containing not a few ingenious and important lines of argument, in the defense and support of the Christian Revelation; all of which are urged with the charming candor and the copious treatment which are so characteristic of the eminent and respected author.

THE LIBRARY OF ANTE-NICENE FATHERS.—Mr. Scribner has received two additional volumes of the new translation of the Early Fathers. They consist of a first volume of Hippolytus, and a first volume of Irenæus. Both of these ancient writers are of great importance in connection with the subject of the New Testament canon. From these pages there can be drawn an impregnable argument in favor of the early date of the Gospels; in particular, in favor of the genuineness of John. They are, also, the principal authorities in respect to the Gnostic sects. The old Latin translation of Irenæus is often blind, so that the labor of the translator is an arduous one. He appears, however, to have succeeded well in surmounting the difficulties of his task.

MALCOM'S THEOLOGICAL INDEX.*—This volume, by the Rev. Howard Malcom, late President of Lewisburg University in Pennsylvania, is an attempt to furnish students and others with a careful list of the various books which treat of the many different subjects of theological learning. The subjects are arranged in alphabetical order, to the number of about two thousand, and, under each head, the books in foreign languages are presented first, and those in our own language, whether original or translations, afterwards. In this way, nearly seventy thousand references and citations are made. The author tells us, in his preface, that the work was commenced more than forty years ago, for his own benefit alone. He had purchased, under the guidance of his revered instructors in theology at Princeton, a library of some two thousand volumes, when he entered upon his active life, but, finding himself unacquainted with their contents, he was often as helpless as if he had not possessed the means of knowledge. He determined, therefore, to discover what his own library contained, and to classify his books according to the topics which they discussed either in whole or in part. As new volumes were added to his own possessions, or were examined elsewhere, the catalogue continually was enlarged, until the thought at length came to his mind, that what had been so useful to himself, for so long a time, might be equally useful to others engaged in the pursuit of the same branch of learning. Accordingly, at this late period of life, he gives his work to the public without laying claim to any great measure of applause or commendation, but with the hope of being able to guide those who follow him into a knowledge of the bibliography of this science. The mere preparation of such a volume,—even if it be very imperfect, as indeed, it must be, almost from the necessity of the case,—is a work both deserving of and sure to receive the thanks of multitudes, especially of those who are beginning their studies and investigations, and we cannot doubt that the author will find the clearest evidence of the public appreciation of his labors. He has, to use his own language, provided a "labor-saving apparatus," which will be used by so many, that he cannot fail to know that they have been aided, and that they acknowledge their obligations. Dr. Mal-

* *Theological Index.* References to the Principal Works in every department of Religious Literature. By HOWARD MALCOM, D. D., LL. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1868. 8vo. pp. 487.

oom almost sets aside the possibility of pointing out his faults, by the assurance that he knows that they will be presented by every class of fault finders, and by challenging, as it were, the critic to make a better book. We tremble at the thought of doing the latter, if it is to take forty years to accomplish it, while as for the former, we hardly like to be classed with any of those whom he describes—either those who find fault for the mere sake of seeming to know more than the author does, or those who do so for the mere love of it, or those who, lacking reflection or as the result of ignorance, are ready to condemn real excellences, or those, finally, who judge by a standard which cannot be attained. We cannot but think, however, that the omission of such works as De Wette's Commentary and Bleek's Introduction to the Old and New Testament, and a number of other almost equally prominent and valuable works in other departments, is quite remarkable in a book whose preparation has been going forward so slowly. We think the author makes a great mistake, also, in not placing under each head all those works which would most naturally appear there—as in the case of Commentaries, for example, why insert Jowett under the head of Thessalonians, and again under that of Galatians, and yet omit him altogether under that of Romans, or why arrange the references on such a principle, that one must examine all the side-and-secondary points before one can be sure that a work like De Wette's, above mentioned, is not to be found in the volume. The references to leading Reviews seem to us far less full than they might have been,—certainly where, as in the case of the *New Englander*, a complete Index was easily accessible. As for the "observations on the comparative value of books," we like the author's remarks respecting them in his preface and his "sparing" use of them;—we think a few, even, of those which he has introduced might equally well have been spared, as, for instance, his remark on Robert Haldane's Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, that it is "a treasure of sound theology and able criticism," or his distinguishing Bloomfield's Greek Testament as exceedingly valuable in a philological point of view. Indeed, we can hardly escape the impression, from our brief review of the volume, that the author ceased to be thoroughly acquainted with the interior contents of books which he records, and that he ended his careful and earnest studies, some time before the forty years of which he speaks were finished, and that the later publications are mainly unknown to him except by name.

But these things are small things, it may be said, in comparison with the great value of the book, and we gladly add our word of commendation to the many which the author is hearing now from every side, while we look away from what he has not done to what he has done. Dr. Malcom's motto on his title page is very appropriate—*Scire ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars eruditionis est.*" His Index will point out to many a student, doubtless, where to find a great many things, and thus will lead those who faithfully use it, into much that they might not otherwise so easily have learned.

THE AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL ALMANAC.—Under this title, Professor A. J. Schem, a learned and accurate statistician, has brought together much information in relation to the state of religion in the world. After the Astronomical introduction, he takes up, under various heads, such as "the Evangelical Alliance," the "Pan Anglican Synod"—matters of historical interest which belong to the history of the last year. Then follows a record of the books, religious and ecclesiastical, which appeared in 1867. The "Denominational Record" is the next subject; and this is followed by full and accurate statistical information, pertaining not only to this country but also to all other portions of the earth. The whole forms a little pamphlet of great value. It may be obtained of the publisher, Frederic Gerhard, 15 Dey street, (Post-Box, 4001).

BARNUM'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE. PARTS 12, 13, 14.—In the last Number of the New Englander we noticed at some length this excellent work, which is mainly an abridgment of Dr. William Smith's large Bible Dictionary. The parts now issued carry the work on as far as the letter M, and, in their general characteristics, are similar to the earlier portions, which have been already referred to. Mr. Barnum has added a number of short articles upon subjects which are omitted in the English work, and on the word "Man" he has greatly extended the investigation, presenting the reader with a brief and concise statement and discussion of the arguments respecting the unity of the human race. He has, in many instances, altered the arrangement of words in relation to pronunciation, in order to make the division and accentuation conform to the best standard. Additions have, also, been made to the pictorial illustrations—the

Greek equivalents for English words have been inserted—and other improvements introduced, rendering the work more valuable. We are glad to see the parts coming out so rapidly, and hope we shall soon be able to record the completion of the whole.

DR. POND'S "PASTORAL THEOLOGY."*—This book is a revision and reprint of lectures published twenty years ago. It will interest those who are expecting to become pastors, and will impress upon them a sense of the vast importance of pastoral duties, and of the great unfaithfulness of those who neglect them. It discusses many disputed practical questions, such as how soon a young minister should seek a settlement—what may be regarded as a satisfactory call to settle—whether he should become a member of the church over which he is settled—what kinds of pastoral visits he should make—how he should treat different characters, *e. g.*, the sick, opposers of evangelical religion, the awakened and inquiring, the desponding; what may and may not be said at funerals; to what extent meetings should be multiplied, and how conducted; whether evangelists should be employed, or agents of benevolent societies, where there are settled pastors; whether politics should be introduced into the pulpit; whether ministers should withdraw from the ministry, &c. It contends that the right of ordination is with *ministers*, and not with the church.

It describes the pastor's duties to himself, to his family (insisting that he should *have* a family), to his brethren in the ministry, and to Christians of other denominations as well as to his own people. It warns him against those immoralities and indiscretions by which his standing and influence may be injured even more than by any neglect of professional duty. It concludes that the faithful pastor may expect to secure, if not riches and honors, the most abundant and palpable fruits of his labors.

The following passages deserve to be noted:—

"It may be thought that so much visiting will leave the pastor time for almost nothing else. His studies, his sermons, must of necessity be neglected. But experience has proved that such need not be the result. On the contrary, I have no doubt that the minister who is faithful to visit his people, and makes himself acquainted with them, will not only preach better sermons,—better adapted, more appropriate and effective,—but ordinarily, the labor of preparing them will be less." p. 78.

* *Lectures on Pastoral Theology.* By Enoch POND, D. D., Prof. in the Theo. Seminary, Bangor.

"The minister should be specially faithful in his duties to his children, and more particularly to his sons, because he is not in the most favorable circumstances for the discharge of these duties. This is a consideration not sufficiently pondered, I fear, either by ministers or others. The farmer can take his sons with him to the field, and, so, in most cases, may the mechanic to the shop, and keep them under his own eye, while engaged in the daily business of life. But not so with the minister of Christ. He cannot take his sons with him into the study, nor in his parochial visits from house to house. The consequence is, that . . . they are comparatively exempt from parental inspection at a period when they require its most vigilant exercise." p. 321.

"The ministry suffers in the estimation of the public, when those connected with it desert it without any obvious necessity, and are too easily seduced into other employments. If they appear to think lightly of the ministry, are unsatisfied in it, and ready to embrace the first opportunity to desert it—choosing rather to become politicians, jurists, popular lectures, literary adventurers, anything that promises a better living and more fame; obviously they cast reproach upon the sacred office, and contribute their share to bring it into contempt." p. 347.

"If ministers at the age of fifty-six to sixty are disposed to neglect study, to preach over their old sermons, to lay themselves up and live at ease, they will soon become rusty and inefficient, . . . the world will go ahead of them, . . . their people will begin to talk of a dismissal or a colleague." p. 356.

"I would not do *my people's* business and neglect my own. I would not turn farmer, or teacher, or trader, or author, with a view to obtain the means of living, —a living which, by the supposition, my people were bound to furnish,—and neglect those holy, spiritual duties which I had covenanted with my Master, and with them to perform." p. 373.

But think of a young pastor's being told that "noisy mirth" and "ludicrous song-singing or story-telling," as well as "evil speaking are unchristian!" Think of his being recommended "to keep a private journal of his visits," noting not only the times, but the character of them—"what was said, what done, how particular individuals appeared?" Think of his being taught how to behave at weddings—to be "happy and sociable" without being "boisterous and mirthful!" Think of his being told that in the choice of his wife, "the question should be one of judgment more than of fancy," since the Scriptures say nothing "in favor of beauty, wit, and brilliant personal accomplishments," since "a very ordinary minister" is often made respectable and useful to a people "chiefly through the energy and influence of his wife," while "a minister must have more than the ordinary measure of talents and learning, piety and gifts, not to be utterly broken down and spoiled through the influence of a weak, wasteful, meddlesome, and imprudent companion." We submit that all this is quite too piously proper. It would reduce to rule what may better be

left to the freedom of an affectionate, earnest, and prayerful spirit, and what must, after all, depend on circumstances. It may, however, be read with advantage by those who are good preachers, but *bad* pastors.

ZINCKE'S DUTY AND DISCIPLINE OF EXTEMPORARY PREACHING.*

—The author takes pains to say *extemporany*, which is even a harder word for use than *extemporaneous*, if not quite so long, following the preference of Johnson and Campbell, who complain of the modern use of *extempore* as an adjective because it was before used as an adverb, which however is an objection that need not prevail here, as certainly it does not in many other cases. The latter and shorter word is given as an adjective by Webster and Worcester, with the authority of Dryden and Addison, and is certainly easier of utterance. The book itself, besides being the more noticeable as coming from a clergyman of the English Church, is a new and peculiar treatment of the subject. It takes stronger ground than most other treatises in favor of *preaching* as distinguished from *reading* sermons; dispensing with all notes, even a brief, in the pulpit; at first writing fully beforehand, but not committing to memory, and gradually depending less on such preparation, till a scanty outline on paper is found to be enough, and that not to be taken into the pulpit. The author gives first his own motives and reasons for preaching 'extempore, and considers certain objections, some of the latter relating however chiefly to his position in England; then exhibits his method of acquiring the power of preaching in this manner; in the third and fourth chapters treats of the composition of sermons, and their aims and subjects; and, in the last, notes the place assigned to preaching in the word of God and in the service of the English Church. By way of illustration he adds "Notes for Six Sermons," with comments, and "Six Short Studies for Sermons"—the notes being full enough to be readable as they stand. From his zeal for freedom in the pulpit, the reader might expect to find his sermons hortatory or fervent, but from these specimens they would appear to be as calm and discriminating as if elaborated with the

* *The Duty and the Discipline of Extemporary Preaching.* By F. BARHAM ZINCKE, Vicar of Wherstead, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. First American from the second London edition. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867.

pen. Nor can they be said to be distinctively evangelical, though they show his thoughtful study of the Scriptures. His position among the ecclesiastical strata of these times we take to be "broad church." On the subject of future punishment he avows the latitude of a restorationist, in the last two paragraphs of the sermon on "the return of the unclean spirit." The chief interest of the volume, however, is derived from his experience as a preacher, the occasion he found for speaking extempore, and his method of acquiring the art. His example may be the more serviceable to ministers who like him have begun with reading written sermons, from the fact that his change of method was not attempted till middle life, and also from his persistent industry in carrying it out. And among the good things he has said on the composition of sermons, one in particular might claim to be hung up as an illuminated text in theological seminaries:—"The first and most essential principle is, that a sermon must be a vertebrate composition."

THE CLERGY AND THE PULPIT.*—This book is recommended in the "Preface to the American Edition," by a Romanist of course, and to Romanists, as "a live book" that "has gained an unwonted popularity in France," of which "no less than twenty thousand copies are said to be in the hands of as many ecclesiastics." Certainly it is well for the French priests to have it, and it will be better for them to heed it. Indeed, in the main, with here and there slight exceptions, its statements and lessons would not come amiss to Protestant ministers. Without being original or profound, or systematic, it is perspicuous and lively, and evidently intended, and in a good degree fitted, to awaken the interest and encourage the efforts of the priests in behalf of the common people of France. The need of loving the people in order to address them successfully, and particularly the chief qualifications in the composition and delivery of sermons, are the themes of the twelve successive chapters, with here and there instructive and interesting incidents employed as illustrations. It is a *Frenchy*

* *The Clergy and the Pulpit in their relations to the People.* By M. L' Abbé ISIDORE MULLOIS, Chaplain to the Emperor Napoleon III. and Missionary Apostolic. Translated by GEORGE PERCY BADGER, Late Chaplain in the Diocese of Bombay, Author of "the Nestorians and their Rituals," etc. First American Edition. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, Lawrence Kehoe, General Agent, 126 Nassau Street. 1867. 12mo. pp. 308.

treatment of the whole subject, as being practical and vivacious, if also sometimes superficial, ever having an eye to *effect*, and glorifying the nationality of that people. In reading it we have been impressed with the fact, that an earnest preacher of the Romish Church, trying to benefit the masses in that country at this day, is not so far removed from an earnest Protestant preacher as some might imagine, in the difficulties encountered, the methods used, and the results sought. The mechanical execution of the volume is attractive.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.*—"The Rise of the Dutch Republic"—the work which first gained for Mr. Motley a reputation as an historian—closed with the assassination of William of Orange in 1584. The "History of the United Netherlands" took up the thread of the story at that point, and, in the two volumes which were published, we had the continuation of the struggle of the United Provinces for independence from 1584 to 1590, when the Republic had become thoroughly organized. These were six years which will be forever memorable in the history of the world, by reason of the Spanish *Armada*, and the great conspiracy of Spain and Rome, in the interest of superstition and despotism, to subjugate England as well as to reconquer the Netherlands. Now, in two new volumes, the history has been brought down still further, to 1609, the period of the virtual acknowledgment by Spain of Dutch independence through the truce which was concluded for twelve years.

In these last two volumes, Mr. Motley has more than sustained the reputation he had before gained. He has won fresh laurels. While the events which he recounts are scarcely less important than those which gave such an absorbing interest to the earlier volumes, there is far greater variety in the scenes depicted. Mr. Motley has warmed, too, with his theme. There is manifested a larger freedom in his whole method of treating his subject. Everywhere in the volume, in his analysis of the characters of the great personages who now come upon the scene, in his descriptions of sieges and battles, in his unraveling of the intricacies of the

* *History of the United Netherlands*. From the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years Truce—1609. By JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, D. C. L. Vols. III. and IV. 8vo. New York: Harper & Brothers. New Haven: Judd & White.

Machiavellian policy of Spain, and France, and England, there is the evidence of the hand of a master.

It is impossible to trace, within the limits of such a notice as we have space for, the progress of the great events which crowd these nineteen years. The most that we propose to do is to call the attention of those who read these two volumes to the triumphant refutation which they undesignedly furnish of some of the carping criticisms which have been made of the earlier volumes by interested partisans in Holland, and which have to some extent been reëchoed here. Unfortunately, we understand, only too well, from our own experience since the slaveholders' rebellion was put down, how the services of true patriots can be misrepresented, and how their mistakes and their misfortunes can be magnified and distorted, so as to take away from them all credit, and make them appear even odious. Two hundred and fifty years hence there will without doubt still be found men in the United States—and we can even now predict what their family names will be—who will feel no satisfaction when the history of this country's deliverance from the curse of slavery is referred to. What wonder is it then that there should be found those in Holland to-day to whom the story of the struggle of the United Netherlands in the sixteenth century to throw off the yoke of Spain and the Inquisition has no charm! What wonder is it if some descendant of the men who then played false should say with an appearance of what to a stranger might seem extraordinary candor, Mr. Motley is not a writer of history. Mr. Motley is a poet; he is an enthusiast. His picture is an ideal picture. The Dutch to be sure fought well. They endured hardships which it must be confessed were very great, but—they had no proper conception of nationality! Every province was jealous of every other province. Each fought for itself and what it conceived to be its own interest. But suppose all this to be true, most cautious and candid Dutchman! Is it admissible to judge the people of the United Netherlands in the sixteenth century by the standard of the views respecting nationality which are held in Europe in the year 1868? One has but to read in these volumes of the scarcely credible state of things in France at this very time, when the League was triumphant in Paris, or even afterwards, when Henry the Béarnese had established himself on the throne, to see that there was certainly full as much comprehension in Holland of what is involved in nationality as there was in France, where every one worth being bought was the paid vassal of Philip,

and ready to see his native country devoured by Spain and rent to atoms, if he only could himself preserve his Spanish pension, and his own estates. Mr. Motley does not hide the fact that the Netherlands committed grave errors; but his simple story shows that if ever a people manifested true patriotism, the people of Holland did in those long years, when they fought so fiercely with Spain hand to hand.

Another sneer that comes very appropriately from this class of men is, that there was nothing grand about the Dutch. They were merchants—traders! Their views were low and sordid. This assertion, which we met with, soon after the publication of the first two volumes of the History, finds its answer on every page: but we are glad to find it noticed by Mr. Motley himself in the following passage:

“It was sometimes complained of in those days—and the thought has even prolonged itself until later times—that those republicans of the United Netherlands had done and could do great things; but that, after all, there was no grandeur about them. Certainly they had done great things. It was something to fight the Ocean for ages, and patiently and firmly to shut him out from his own domain. It was something to extinguish the Spanish Inquisition—a still more cruel and devouring enemy than the sea. It was something that the fugitive spirit of civil and religious liberty had found at last its most substantial and steadfast home upon these storm-washed shoals and shifting sand-banks. It was something to come to the rescue of England in her great agony and help to save her from invasion. It was something to do more than any nation but England, and as much as she, to assist Henry the Huguenot to the throne of his ancestors, and to preserve the national unity of France which its own great ones had imperiled. It was something to found two magnificent universities, cherished abodes of science and of antique lore, in the midst of civil commotions and of resistance to foreign oppression. It was something, at the same period, to lay the foundation of a system of common schools—so cheap as to be nearly free—for rich and poor alike, which, in the words of one of the greatest benefactors to the young republic, ‘would be worth all the soldiers, arsenals, armories, munitions, and alliances in the world.’ It was something to make a revolution, as humane as it was effective, in military affairs, and to create an army whose camps were European academies. It was something to organize, at the same critical period, on the most skillful and liberal scale, and to carry out with unexampled daring, sagacity, and fortitude, great voyages of discovery to the polar regions, and to open new highways for commerce, new treasures for science. Many things of this nature had been done by the new commonwealth; but, alas! she did not drape herself melodramatically, nor stalk about with heroic wreath and cothurn. She was altogether without grandeur.”

With regard to another very vague criticism that has been made respecting want of faithfulness in the study of the Roman Catho-

lic historians of the period, it is enough to say, till we have a more specific charge, that Mr. Motley has received very gratifying testimonials from the highest literary authorities in Holland of the laborious care with which he has pursued his studies among the original authorities. His work is not a mere compilation from the works of the historians who have preceded him—Protestant or Catholic. These all had and could have no access to material which has been spread open freely before him. Not to speak of other abundant sources of original documentary information which might be specified, he has had the advantage of the perusal of the whole correspondence between Philip II. and his ministers and governors relating to the affairs of the Netherlands down to that monarch's death. Why should he revise what he was able to write with such documents before him by the guesses of men who wrote in the dark! The most cursory reader of the history, and especially of these last two volumes, must be impressed by the fact that Mr. Motley has drawn his information from first hands.

SMILES'S "HUGUENOTS."*—Mr. Smiles's "Huguenots" is a compilation of almost encyclopedic fullness and variety in its facts and incidents. Such collections of facts and statistics are usually dry and uninteresting for ordinary and continuous reading, however valuable they may be for occasional reference. This book, however, is an exception to the general rule. It has all the interest of the most exciting romance. We should say, rather, of many romances, for each separate story is in its turn as exciting as the one which went before. These recitals of the exposures, the escapes, the sufferings, and the final deliverance of many of the noblest men and women of their time, or of any time, excite alternately one's detestation of the system which dictated, and the government which executed, these infernal persecutions at intervals, for more than a century;—to the ruin of France and the upbuilding of Protestant Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, in arts, in arms, in political freedom, and in the ascendancy of the Protestant interest. To the separate topics suggested by all these particulars, the author of this volume does ample justice, and, in the several chapters which treat of these several points, he

* *The Huguenots: their settlements, churches, and industries in England and Ireland.* By SAMUEL SMILES, author of "Self-help," &c. With an Appendix relating to the Huguenots in America. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1868.

has contributed valuable information concerning the progress of European civilization in the 16th and 17th centuries. We know no book better fitted than this to awaken a decided Protestant feeling in the mind of the scholar, or to confirm an intelligent Protestant zeal in the hearts of the people. That there is an amiable side in the lives and characters of many of the ecclesiastics of the Romish church, we do not deny. But that there is a diabolical side in its persecuting spirit and its political intrigues, ought never to be forgotten. We sympathize with the trusting devotion and the delightful weakness of *Mademoiselle de Guérin*. We excuse the devoted piety of *Madame Swetchine*, and are almost ready to conclude that Catholicism is the system which is especially suited for the French. But the horrors which attended the exodus of the Huguenots take the very breath out of our sympathy, and abate the warmth of our admiration. No intelligent Protestant can ever see or hear of the church of St. Germain d' Auxerrois, without a thrill of horror. Even the constrained urbanity and the courteous civility of the well schooled conductors of the *Catholic World* cannot eradicate the memories and associations of St. Bartholomew's.

One interesting fact is noticed in this book which throws a flood of light upon the relations of the Church of England to the reformed Churches of the continent in the days of Queen Elizabeth, as contrasted with the new doctrines upon this subject which were broached in the days of the Stuarts, and which are so industriously and arrogantly propagated not only by the Stubbs and Boggs of our time, but are countenanced, we are sorry to say, to a certain extent, by the elder Dr. Tyng. In 1564, a portion of the crypt of the Cathedral church in Canterbury, was granted by the Archbishop, with the sanction of the Queen, to the Huguenot refugees as a place of worship, and it has been occupied by their descendants till the present day. This "undercroft," or crypt is directly beneath the high altar and the choir of the Cathedral. That Presbyterian worship has been regularly maintained for more than three hundred years, directly under the throne of the Primate of England, is a fact that cannot be denied. We commend it to the consideration of all parties who may be sufficiently enlightened to draw from it the appropriate inferences.

GOLDWIN SMITH'S "THREE ENGLISH STATESMEN."*—Mr. Goldwin Smith's "Lectures on the Political History of England" are lively with hits at parties and persons now extant in that country, as well as with allusions to recent events in the United States. Nothing is more evident to the reader moderately well informed concerning the British politics of to-day, than that the author, however diligent or enthusiastic in his exploration of the past, lives in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Irish question, the extension of the electoral franchise, Gov. Eyre and martial law, the relation of the British empire to its colonies and outlying possessions, ritualism, Anglicanism, the aristocracy, non-intervention—just about everything that has any political significance or interest with Englishmen to-day, is touched upon, or gets some incidental illustration in the progress of these four lectures on three English statesmen whose names belong to other ages, and of whom the latest died more than sixty years ago.

John Pym, the great parliamentary leader, "King of the Commons" at the beginning of the conflict with Charles I.—Oliver Cromwell, the ablest ruler that ever held the government over England,—William Pitt, in one lecture a moderately liberal and reforming minister, in the other a tory of the tories,—these are the statesmen whose lives and characters are brought under inspection and subjected to analysis in the lectures before us. The revolutionary age of Pym and Cromwell, and the reactionary age of Pitt, when Toryism had its own way, seem equally rich in practical lessons for the inheritors of English liberty.

Considered as political essays, these lectures are an effective illustration of the utility of historical studies to the science of politics or statesmanship. History is a grand *induction* of political facts in their relations and sequences. The analysis of those facts, and the *deduction* of the principles by which they are explained and classified, gives us the only science of statesmanship. For instance, the history of English government in Ireland, or of British domination in India, is not worth the writing or the reading, unless it teaches how to govern a conquered people—how to convert hostility into loyalty—how to overcome antipathies—how to make the conquered remember the date of the conquest, not bitterly but thankfully, as introducing a

* *Three English Statesmen: A Course of Lectures on the Political History of England.* By GOLDWIN SMITH. New York: Harper & Brothers.

new era of prosperity and progress. Philosophic historians are beginning to make old records luminous with lessons of political wisdom. We could almost wish that Professor Goldwin Smith might give lectures on history in the Smithsonian Institute, if only the two Houses of Congress could be compelled to hear him and to learn something from the blunders and the successes of statesmanship in other countries and in other ages.

In another respect these lectures are a noteworthy phenomenon. They are a suggestive specimen of what is to come from the old universities of England in the new era now beginning. Mr. Goldwin Smith is, or has been, an Oxford professor. He has had all the training and culture of Oxford scholarship. Of course, he is not a Jacobin, nor an incendiary agitator, plotting bloody revolutions. He has an English brain and an English heart, with a healthy dislike of the French. The key-note of his first lecture is, "Let us never glorify revolution. Statesmanship is the art of avoiding it, and of making progress at once continuous and calm." Yet his theory of government is government for the people by the people. He is frankly a philosophical republican. This book is abundant in expressions of opinion, for which the author sixty years ago would have been found guilty of sedition, and sentenced to the gallows or, at least, to fourteen years of Botany Bay. Surely the world moves; the England which Pitt governed was not the England which D'Israeli governs to-day. Where are we when an Oxford scholar, of the highest rank in the republic of letters, dares to say of Cromwell: "Among the Chancellors of the University of Oxford, the name of Oliver stands a startling reality in a line of stately buckram."

We welcome Goldwin Smith to his proposed residence in our country.

MEMOIR OF REV. DR. BETHUNE.*—This memoir of Dr. Bethune is the life of a very uncommon Reformed Dutchman, by a rather commonplace Reformed Dutchman, or rather "Reformed" clergyman. It is written in a commonplace way, and scarcely does justice in a single point to the various and exuberant genius of the subject. Dr. Bethune was certainly a man of extraordinary gifts, as he was also a man of extraordinary liberality and very extraordinary

* *Memoir of Rev. Geo. W. Bethune, D. D.* By Rev. A. R. VAN NEEZ, D. D. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1867.

narrowness, of large hearted generosity and of small minded prejudices. Regarded in some aspects he was an affable and accomplished man of society, and a man of affairs. Viewed from another side he would make the impression of extraordinary saintliness and fervor. Seen from another he would appear to be an earnest scholar. Seen from another he would seem narrow, positive, and supercilious, with generous culture and refined tastes. Judged by still other manifestations he would pass for a man of pleasure and bonhomie. With all these characteristics there was always manifest the cockneyism of a town born and town bred New Yorker, who never would or never could see anything good in New England, neither in its politics, its reforms, or its theology. Though he was born and bred a gentleman, he had not wholly laid aside that arrogance and self-assertion, which the truest gentleman never shows, however much he may feel them.

On the other hand he was in heart so earnest and fervent a Christian, so simple in his faith, so tender in his affection, so devout in his spirit, and so faithful in the assertion of his profession, and in the defense of his Master, that he won the respect and subdued the prejudices of many who could not but oppose his principles and reject his dogmatism. There was a hearty open manliness about him, which gained honor for the Christian faith and the clerical profession in the circles of fashion and wealth in which he moved, and there was a spirit of active service for Christ which never tired till he put off the life of earth, and entered the perfected existence where all Christ's redeemed ones forget their prejudices and forget themselves in the absorbing love and wonder which Christ receives from all who are made one in him.

TRAVELS.

THE TURK AND THE GREEK.*—The author of this little volume introduces it with a half-apology, by saying that he would not have ventured "to invite attention to another work on the East, if the public sympathy were not already somewhat aroused about the Cretan Insurrection and the critical condition of the Ottoman Empire." The fact to which he thus alludes will, very probably, attract the attention of numbers of readers to his book, and will

* *The Turk and the Greek, or Creeds, Races, Society, and Scenery in Turkey, Greece, and the Isles of Greece.* By S. G. W. BENJAMIN. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. 16mo. pp. 268.

give it a favorable reception. It is entirely unpretending in its character, and it is written as if it had been designed for friends, who followed the traveler in his wanderings through those historic countries, and waited with interest for his letters which should tell the story of what he saw and experienced. And those persons in whose way it falls, and who read it with a similar feeling, will find themselves easily carried along from page to page, and entering, for the time at least, into something of the author's pleasure in what he describes. Most of the volume is taken up with the account of a journey among the Turkish towns and villages, and of a visit to some of the Greek islands—places known to him in earlier life, in a greater or less degree. His testimony respecting the character and condition of the people, from his observation of their life, corresponds with that of other intelligent travelers, while, at the same time, he has the hopes which every true lover of Græce must cherish for its future progress. The closing chapter presents a very brief sketch of the history of Crete and its past struggles, and, in view of this sketch, he says, "It is not for what they are, that the Cretans inspire us with interest in their cause, but for what they are capable of becoming in future ages, when possessed of civil and religious liberty, which can alone give an enduring form to the results of their present exertions. That these exertions will result in the immediate emancipation of Crete from the Turkish yoke, is naturally a matter of uncertainty; but they will, at least, have the effect of weakening the power of the oppressor, and of ameliorating the condition of the oppressed, and render the ultimate union of Crete with the Kingdom of Greece a problem destined to be happily solved before many years have elapsed." That such a union will be accomplished, and that the Grecian Kingdom will be purified and exalted, as the reward bestowed by Divine Providence on the heroic struggles of the past and the present, we cannot help believing with a firm faith, for, as Mr. Hilary Skinner says, in his recently published volume on Crete, "there is in such a people that which will redeem many short comings, and win them a place among the nations which most zealously study the example of long departed Greeks."

HOWELLS'S ITALIAN JOURNEYS.*—In these "Italian Journeys," Mr. Howells gives us another collection of those sprightly, sketchy letters, which made his "Venetian Life" so attractive. The reader travels pleasantly with him from Venice to Rome—stopping at Ferrara to visit its quaint old cathedral, and to recall the memory of Ariosto and Tasso, winding with him through the labyrinthine streets of Genoa, catching glimpses of modern life in Naples, in the streets, and theatres, and cafés, and then drifting back into the dead past, through the ruins of the buried cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, and so on till he reaches the Imperial City, and mourns over the ugliness of Modern Rome, which almost overshadows its ancient greatness. That one adds little to one's former stock of information about these places, already described by so many tourists in letters, good, bad, and indifferent, is quite true; but Mr. Howells has a pleasant, graphic style which carries one agreeably through his journeys, and gives one a sympathetic interest in his experiences. There is more of novelty in his visit to the Cimbri, and his pilgrimage to the house of Petrarch, and some of the minor journeys recorded in this volume. Mr. Howells seems to us to be more in sympathy with the modern than the ancient life of these old Italian cities, but the growth which has sprung out of the ruins of the past has an interest of its own, heightened by its contrast with the buried civilization of other days,—and the facile pen of the author gives us pleasant pictures of Italian travel, with lights and shadows both from the present and the past.

THE GREAT EXHIBITION, AND CONTINENTAL SKETCHES.†—The commendatory notice of this work, which appears in the volume itself, declares that "we" have perused the volume with interest, and can conscientiously commend it to "our" readers;—also, that it is written in a polished style, and is pervaded by a vein of humor; also, that there is much in it which "our" readers will

* *Italian Journeys*. By W. D. HOWELLS, Author of "Venetian Life." New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. 16mo. pp. 320.

† *The Great Exhibition: with Continental Sketches, Practical and Humorous*. By HOWARD PAYSON ARNOLD, Author of "*European Mosaic*."

"Johnson, 'Make a large book—a folio.'

Boswell, 'But of what use will it be, Sir?'

Johnson, 'Never mind the use; do it.'

New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1868. 16mo. pp. 486.

find of lasting profit; also, that the style is as refined and scholarly as that of the earlier work of the author, entitled "European Mosaic," and the wit even more entertaining. Who the "we" are, who thus give hearty approval to Mr. Arnold's book of travels, we are not informed, but the praise, from whatever source it comes, is quite unmeasured, and we hope is satisfactory to the author. Not having read Mr. Arnold's earlier work, we feel disposed to take as favorable a view of the present one, in comparison with it, as possible, and, until we have examined it, we are willing to admit so much of the anonymous critic's statement, as is involved in his last remark, and to assure our readers that the style of the volume before us is very probably as refined and scholarly, and the wit as entertaining, as that to be found in "European Mosaic." We think it even possible that, in every respect, the volume may be in advance of its predecessor. And we may add, that in our judgment, it is equally possible, and even more so, that his next book may be, both in style and value, an advance upon the present one. If praise could thus be given relatively, and we could move only within the circle of his own writings in what we say, we should hope to be able to be as commendatory as the writer from whom we have quoted. But, when we come into the more positive region and are called upon to express what we really think, we are constrained to say—in the language of our unknown critic again—"the time is past when men were satisfied with the hasty journals, odds and ends of letters, and desultory jottings of European tourists," and, in regard to all such books, we can hardly help feeling that, for once, Boswell's question, cited on the author's title page, was wiser than Johnson's answer. Mr. Arnold seems to us to have given to the public just such a hasty journal, and just such jottings and odds and ends, as his commendatory friend assures us we have outgrown the need of,—and while they were well enough, as addressed in letters to his friends, or possibly even as printed in the foreign correspondence of a daily journal, they hardly rise to the position of a very "entertaining and profitable" book. A great many things of a humorous character may be said in a passing private conversation, or may be read with the morning news, which are well enough, because they are only for the moment and are then forgotten, and yet, when published in a volume, they seem too empty and foolish to be read at all, or may even show that the author who wrote them, or the reader who is amused by them, has no real appreciation of

what is the truest humor. And in nothing do men more widely misapprehend their own powers, than in this very point. If Mr. Arnold, and all writers of his level in this regard, had really possessed that on which they sometimes, perchance, pride themselves, and which persons like themselves are ready to commend, they would never suffer such attempts at wit and humor to go into a printed volume. And yet the writer whose words we have introduced entertains a view directly opposite to ours, and the sale of the volume may show that there are many readers who agree with him. To our mind the style is not properly characterized as scholarly or the anecdotes as exceedingly amusing. On the other hand, the style is that of the off-hand newspaper writer, and the anecdotes might be better described by omitting the adverb, if not the adjective. Every book of European travels, however, has, from the very necessity of the case, certain points of interest, and imparts some information to its readers, and Mr. Arnold's book has an additional advantage, beyond many similar gossipy books of travel of the present day, in that he has a good deal to say of the Paris Exhibition, which all, who did not have the privilege of seeing it, are glad to have described for their entertainment. Indeed, it is but justice to the author to say, that, in this part of his volume, there is considerable that will repay the reader for the time spent in perusing it. As much as one-fourth of the book is devoted to this subject. Dr. Malcom, in the preface to his lately published Theological Index, remarks on the little reliance which can be placed on the observations of different writers concerning the merit and value of books, and, in illustration of his views, cites the criticisms of a widely-known work by two such distinguished personages as Southey and Macaulay, the former of whom pronounces it the production of a decided partisan, and both unjust and ill-tempered, while the latter describes it as calm, eminently judicial, and even the most impartial book he ever read. If Mr. Arnold should place our brief notice of his volume by the side of the one which accompanies his work, perhaps he might be inclined to make the comparison a starting point for some reflections on the worthlessness of criticism, and the reading public, by measuring the one against the other, might form its own estimate of his book. If so, we should not complain, only we should be disposed, for the benefit of the public and, perhaps, of Mr. Arnold himself, to desire that notices from both sides should go forth together, rather than that one alone should be given which indulges in the freest use of the

words "scholarly" and "humorous," or which conscientiously commends the volume, and declares it to be a work of lasting value. There is a difference between sweet versification and poetry manufactured to order, though the literary writer of one of our leading journals has lately spoken of a collection of the latter as if it were the former; and if some one is found to say so, perhaps the average of criticism is better than it would be otherwise.

BELLES LETTRES.

NORWOOD.*—At last the editor of the *Ledger* has given permission to Mr. Scribner to publish *Norwood* in a volume! This unexpected favor will be greeted by the expectant public with a pean of grateful thanksgiving, and tens of thousands of copies will doubtless be sold. Have not scores of thousands of persons already read it in the columns of the *Ledger*? Will not other myriads who do not take the *Ledger*, but who have heard of it, or even heard of Mr. Beecher, also be constrained to buy it? Mr. Beecher and *The New York Ledger* are fixed facts. The man who does not do justice to these potent elements of American society, does not know the Great American Republic as it is to-day.

We do not advertise in the *Ledger*, but we find that we have advertised the *Ledger* and *Norwood* also, and we trust that Mr. Bonner and Mr. Beecher will be satisfied.

But what of *Norwood*, in sober earnestness and with critical honesty? Has Mr. Beecher written a good novel? We can say with truth that he has written an interesting book. Parts of it are tedious and long winded, as Judge Bacon describes Dr. Wentworth's conversational lectures; but there are many choice passages; and we were going to say many fine characters; but we correct ourselves by saying many fine descriptions of characters. One of the chief defects of the book, as a tale, is that there is so little individualization of character. The characters are too heavily Beechered to be allowed much individuality of their own. They are skillfully draped and masked, but through all the dominoes one sees the glistening of Mr. Beecher's eyes, and hears the tones of Mr. Beecher's voice. Barton Cathcart, Rose Wentworth, and even Hiram Beers and Tommy Taft, are all Mr.

* *Norwood: or Village Life in New England.* By HENRY WARD BEECHER. [From the *New York Ledger*]. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

Beecher in various moods and guises. All their conversations, saving the occasional swearing, remind us of parts of Mr. Beecher's sermons and lectures. We do not doubt that Mr. Beecher, in drawing each of these characters, had some living person in mind. We think we have heard from him before of the person who sat for Hiram Beers. But he has failed, because he has projected so much of himself into their being, instead of transfusing their being into himself. He preaches too much through all his characters, though the preaching is much of it very good, and quite to our mind. But, notwithstanding all this, one cannot help being interested in these varied personifications—perhaps, in part, because he sees so much of Mr. Beecher in them all.

The tale purports to give us village life in New England. But does it give this life as it is, or as it ever was? We wish we could truly answer this question in the affirmative. Life in New England would be far better than it is in fact, were this picture to be accepted as a just, even though an idealized, portraiture. We do not doubt that Mr. Beecher desired to set off what he deems its peculiar features to the best advantage, but we cannot accept his realizations even as bright reflections of sober truth. This life is in some respects far better, and in others far worse than he has rendered it. Its cultivated people are not so stilted and soaring, and its common people are not so uncouth and rude as he would make them to be. Its theologians are not so unpractical, nor are its old maids quite so stiff as Dr. Buel and Agate Bissel. Solid good sense, practical insight into men and things, faith in God and love to man, as exemplified by deeds rather than evanesced in sentiment, these are the prominent characteristics of its people. Exaggeration is Mr. Beecher's besetting sin, and when he attempts to idealize, he gives too often an extravaganza. But with all its defects and overdoings, *Norwood* will be read, and will, in the main, leave a good impression of New England life, as well as an elevating impression of the purposes and aims of human existence.

SALOME.*—Mr. Heyword's "*Salome*" is a dramatic Poem, the scene of which is laid in Jerusalem at the time of its fall. It is powerful in many passages—and sometimes runs to the height of genuine poetry. Many of the characters are boldly conceived,

* *Salome*. A Dramatic Poem. By J. C. HEYWORD. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

and the incidents are skillfully woven together. But the theme is too sublimely grand to promise success to any but the most eminently, and, we might almost say, superhumanly gifted, and hence, "Salome" cannot be called a great Poem, in part because of the difficulty of the theme.

IN THE YEAR '13.*—Messrs. Leypoldt & Holt have given to the public another translation, in one of the daintiest possible of volumes. The page is exquisite, and the binding befits it. The tale is of the year '13, just before the great rising in Germany against Napoleon, in what is still called the war of liberation—the war which gave Germany a new national and religious life, and which, as we would fain believe, is still to bear nobler fruits in the united Protestant Germany that is to be. The scene is in Mecklenburg, in one of the lowliest of its villages, lying far away from the track of travel, where the simplicity of peasant life is still retained. The dialect, in which the tale is written, is still spoken among peasants and children in all of North Germany, and it has an expressible charm for all who can use it. The story is full of humor, intermingled with strains of heroism and pathos, and sustained all the while by a noble moral of duty to man and trust in God. Of all the queer German tales which we have read, this is one of the queerest, and not one of the least interesting.

MISCELLANEOUS.

FICHTE'S "SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.†"—This translation of the *Wissenschafts-Lehre* of the elder Fichte has been very carefully prepared and is very elegantly printed. It is, we believe, the first translation into English of any of the speculative treatises of the author, and it will be welcomed by many who cannot read the German original. The execution of the work is unexceptionable. We do not see how any translation of such a treatise could be better than this. It will, however, be likely somewhat to disappoint those who hope to gain from it a clear and vivid impression

* *In the year '13: A Tale of Mecklenburg Life.* By FRITZ REUTER. Translated from the Platt-Deutch. By CHARLES LEE LEWIS. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868.

† *The Science of Knowledge.* By J. G. FICHTE. Translated from the German, by A. E. KROGER. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1868.

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* *Salome*. A Dramatic Poem. By J. C. HEYWORD. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

cient interest to reward the labor bestowed upon it, if it should fail to fulfill all the wishes and hopes which he expresses in the Preface; viz., that it will lead to the true science of knowledge, and put a stop to all "those stale and unprofitable metaphysical speculations, by indulging in which mankind has wasted time and energies enough to advance true culture beyond the most daring dreams."

THE ELEMENTS OF PHYSIOLOGY AND HYGIENE.*—This volume is the product of the joint labors of the writers whose names appear on the title-page. Mr. Huxley, well known if not somewhat notorious as a physiologist, contributes all the Physiology—225 pages—and Dr. Youmans of the State Normal School, Winona, Minn., contributes the Introductory Chapter on the relations of Physiology to the other sciences, and the chapters on Elementary Hygiene—139 pages. The Physiological portion by Huxley is admirably done. It is condensed, clear, ingeniously and forcibly illustrated, with no weaknesses or dilutions, such as are often found in elementary treatises. The cuts, also, are abundant, and well suited for the purpose for which they are designed.

The chapters on Hygiene are less skillfully prepared. Had the writer adhered more closely to the excellent model furnished by Dr. Huxley, he would have done far better. Portions of his matter are written in the manner of his master, and are well suited to the uses of an elementary text-book. Other portions are written diffusely, and are incumbered with the recital of cases appropriate to an extended treatise, as well as with long extracts from writers of authority, which are entirely out of proportion to the size and objects of the work. We are glad to record to the honor of Mr. Huxley, that he has not introduced a single doubtful doctrine, or taken occasion to advance or suggest a single inference which would be offensive to a spiritual or Christian Philosophy. He has studiously and successfully abstained from obtruding any one of the objectionable opinions which he holds in respect to the nature of the soul or its relations to the Supreme Being and its final destiny.

Dr. Youmans has also endeavored to be on his guard, but it is easy to see that he has not been entirely successful, either in his

* *The Elements of Physiology and Hygiene*: A text-book for Educational Institutions. By Messrs. H. HUXLEY, LL. D. F. R. S., and WM. JAY YOUNG, M. D. With numerous Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1868.

of the distinctive principles of Fichte's theoretical system. This disappointment ought not, however, to be referred either to Fichte himself or to his translator. Fichte, himself, is not in fault, so far as the diction in which he writes is concerned, or the manner in which he expounds his doctrines. His translator has rendered his treatise into good and intelligible English. Where, then, lies the difficulty? It will be found, we think, chiefly in the following particulars: First, the technical terms by which Fichte must be translated, though not unknown to the English language, and not entirely strange to English philosophers, are not sufficiently naturalized and familiar to convey to the mind that exactness and fullness of import which they have in the German. The English scholar who reads Fichte in the original is forced to study out the signification of the German originals of these terms, as he does the meaning of the terms less technical, and, if he succeeds in making out the import of anything in his writer, he will be likely to have mastered the import of the terms which are technical. Second, the diction, whether of the English or the German, supposes a special discipline in logical and metaphysical studies to which very few English scholars have the patience to submit themselves before they essay to read German philosophy either in the original or in translations. Too many are in the situation of persons who should attempt to read an advanced treatise in chemistry or law without the preliminary mastery of the nomenclature of these sciences. To such readers the treatise must of necessity be blind and uninteresting. At best, they can be only imperfectly understood. Third, Fichte presupposes a knowledge of Kant, not merely a general acquaintance with the principles of his system, but a familiarity with the questions which he raised, and the conclusions which he reached, as well as the problems which he left unsolved. It was to Kant that Fichte attached himself, beginning his speculations where Kant left off. It was to the public, who had been as it were saturated with Kant, that he addressed himself. The familiar knowledge of Kant which he so constantly presupposes, his translator may not expect to find among English readers.

We congratulate the knot of philosophical students in St. Louis, among whom the translator is conspicuous, for the zeal with which they prosecute metaphysical researches, and the earnestness with which they labor to excite an interest in speculative questions. We hope that this work may be read with suffi-

nervous, the sanguine, the lymphatic, and the bilious. But the aspect of each of them was so decidedly bilious, that we found no special satisfaction here. Then several engraved busts of General Washington were disposed in such ways as to present its various frontages, written over with the names of the faculties, each surmounted with a graduated hemisphere resembling a wire rat-trap, and designed, we suppose, to measure off the relative extent and interest of the faculties that were printed upon the cranium. Not finding here the Scientific Basis, we had recourse to the text. But we were doomed to be disappointed a third time, for we found nothing in this except the familiar phrenological doctrines of the faculties and the temperaments, with the addition which we have already noticed. In this phrenological muddle of faculties, &c., there occur many truisms about education which would have been much more intelligible, though perhaps less imposing, if they had not been phrased in the phrenological dialect, and shaped to its barbarous classification. We ought to add that there is interwoven in the discussion a queer doctrine of the Apostolic Church, and the mystic significance of the number twelve, which we are not sure that we understand well enough to describe. As we are not prepared to give any recommendation of this book ourselves, we will transcribe one from the late Bishop Hopkins. "As a whole, I regard your work as a very admirable contribution to the philosophy of true education, which presents a more profound and scientific view of the subject than any other work within my knowledge, and must, it seems to me, produce a highly beneficial influence on the minds of the thoughtful." We hope that in quoting this we have not offended against the maxim "*nil de mortuis*," &c.

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* *Ecce Cælum*: or, Parish Astronomy. In six Lectures. By a Connecticut Pastor. Boston: Nichols & Noyes, 117 Washington street. 1867. 12mo. pp. 198.

the Heavens, as part of God's glorious handiwork. The first five lectures pass the science in rapid review; the last treats of the Author of Nature, as related to its leading features. There is not a dry page in the volume, but much originality and vigor of style, and often the highest eloquence. It is, withal, evidently by an author at home in his subject, not "crammed" for the task. It affords a fine example of what an intelligent pastor can do, outside of his pulpit, towards training an intelligent people, and by imparting to them Nature's teachings, leading them "through Nature up to Nature's God"—the God of Revelation as well. To such a book the author need not hesitate to affix his name.

In a new edition he will doubtless correct the inadvertence on pages 115 and 133, by which the sun's diameter is made but half as large as it should be.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CIV.

JULY, 1868.

ARTICLE I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMTE: TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF M. SAISSET.*

THE religious reaction is bearing its fruits; it is bringing back into the arena of philosophy that materialism which has been so many times conquered; it is raising up new interpreters for the skepticism of the eighteenth century, and it is restoring to the decried atheism of the *Système de la Nature* some attraction and some prestige. Nor is this more than the

* M. Emile Saisset was born at Montpellier on the 16th of September, 1814. After giving instruction in various places in philosophy, he gave, for a number of years, courses of lectures on Greek and Latin Philosophy in the College of France. He was then made Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Sorbonne, in place of M. Damiron. Besides editing the Letters of Euler, and translating and editing the writings of Speurgor and of Clarke, he is the author of a number of original discussions which are marked by distinguished ability. The following Article is from the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. A supplementary Article from M. Saisset on the same theme will appear in our next Number.—EDS. OF THE NEW ENGLANDER.

inevitable effect of the crisis through which we are passing. In the presence of fanaticism on the one side and of hypocrisy or feebleness on the other, is it surprising that many noble spirits, repelled at once by everything that is doing and by everything that is preparing, rush to the last extremes and oppose to the insolence of a reaction which deems itself sure of victory, the challenge of a radical negation? We understand, but at the same time, we deplore the condition of these spirits. They forget that if positive religions have too often chained thought, they express in their way, in their progressive evolution, the most legitimate need of the human reason,—the need of passing beyond the limits of the visible world in order to repose in the bosom of God, and to maintain in this divine communion those sentiments which give to human life its worth and its dignity, the love of the good and the beautiful, the love of our fellow-men, faith in the invisible and the ideal, and that sacred hope which lights up the darkness of the tomb with the quickening rays of the future.

To call these aspirations of thought, these presentiments of the heart, chimerical; to confine man within the narrow horizon of the visible world, is not only to misunderstand human nature; it is also to reduce the rôle of philosophy and to infringe upon the noblest rights of free thought. How is it possible, indeed, to accord a high esteem to human reason, if it can teach us none of those things which it is so necessary for us to know? How is it possible not to despise a philosophy, which falls below our most irresistible aspirations, and instead of sustaining and bearing forward the soul in its flight, only burdens and hinders it?

Such is the danger to which materialism, contrary to the intention of its advocates and without their knowledge, is exposing philosophy. The reaction which is to-day drawing away so many minds, was not born yesterday; it has been in existence and been powerful, ever since the day when philosophy ceased to cultivate those noble instincts which slumber at critical moments, but which soon awake because they have indestructible roots in the depths of the human soul. It had been foreseen, in the eighteenth century, by those great minds which were the strength and the glory of their times; I mean

Montesquieu and Voltaire, Turgot and Rousseau. They saw the torrent of materialistic ideas bursting forth and they perceived the necessity of restraining it. Who has ever paid to the religious sentiment a homage more sincere and free than the author of the *Esprit des Loix*? Who has ever been more ardent than the eloquent author of *Emile* in grappling with skepticism and materialism in the day of their triumph? Did not Voltaire himself, that one of all these rare men who pledged himself most deeply to the philosophy of the senses, always do reverence to the sacred idea of an infinite intelligence? Did he not compromise that popularity which was so dear to him, in order to crush with his incomparable good sense and his annihilating sarcasm, the atheism of Holbach and of La Mettrie? But an invincible force was mastering everything. Voltaire and Montesquieu soon passed for timid spirits, who had only half shaken off the yoke of ancient prejudices, and other sages came to announce to mankind, that to believe in God and in the immortal soul was puerile and weak.

From this moment dates that energetic reaction, which, confined at first within certain limits, gradually gained courage by its progress and which makes itself felt to-day by all Europe, occupies statesmen, and alarms all thoughtful minds. It seems to us that a great lesson is to be drawn from this spectacle, which saddens without disturbing us; it is, that freedom of thought finds its true bulwark, not in a narrow philosophy which denies wants that it cannot satisfy and feelings that it cannot explain, but in a philosophy more large and pure, as vast as the mind of man, as profound as his heart, which welcomes every true idea, nourishes every noble desire, explains every sacred belief, and leaves to its adversaries only their violence and their follies.

This is the barrier which we must oppose to the projects of a party, which only our faults can render invincible. A recent experience should serve as our guide. In the period which preceded the year 1830, these same hopes and these same plans were manifested which are now springing up again with redoubled ardor. To combat them some firm minds raised the standard of a generous philosophy; that glorious standard, lowered for a moment, the men of the next generation must again grasp and defend.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

EDITED BY
PROFESSOR GEORGE P. FISHER, PROFESSOR TIMOTHY DWIGHT,
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JULY, 1868.

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introduction or in his treatise upon Hygiene. He is too ardent and confiding an admirer of Herbert Spencer to keep out of sight his devout recognition of his principles, and to avoid introducing some allusions to those who are jealous of a materialistic philosophy. But the philosophy is too crudely and boldly stated to do any harm, and the allusions are generally too blind to be understood. We cannot, therefore, seriously object to these defects in what would otherwise be an excellent elementary treatise.

HECKER'S SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF EDUCATION.*—Mr. John Hecker's "Letters on the Scientific Basis of Education," &c., &c., is an exposition of the ordinary assumptions and classifications of Phrenology, with the addition of seven spiritual organs, surmounted by Godliness, which is located on the top of the head (pointing skyward, we suppose). This faculty is made the organ of the Holy Spirit's presence and influence. For this condescending compliment to Christianity, so unusual in the devotees of Phrenology, President Stearns of Amherst College makes a profound obeisance in the following language: "I thank you especially for recognizing the presence of the divine mind with the human, and its action upon it." The Hon. G. W. Hoss, the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Indiana, says: "I thank you in the name of an humble believer in Christianity, that you declare the importance of *moral culture*; that you clearly recognize the operations of the Holy Spirit. In brief and fine, I can condense my statement into a single line, by saying that I am of the opinion that the doctrine set forth in these pages is to be the *New Evangel of Education*." After reading these and other testimonials, we turned with awakened and eager expectation to the contents of this new Philosophy and Gospel combined, thinking to find something very extraordinary in the science which has called forth such expressions of gratitude for the compliment paid to Christianity,—on the principle, we suppose, that from so exalted a source "small favors should be thankfully received." In examining the contents of this treatise on a Scientific Basis, our attention was first attracted to four imposing plates illustrating the temperaments—the

* *The Scientific Basis of Education Demonstrated.* By an Analysis of the temperaments and of phrenological facts, in connection with mental phenomena and the office of the Holy Spirit in the processes of the mind:—in a series of letters to the department of public instruction in the city of New York. By JOHN HECKER. New York: Published by the Author, 56 Rutgers street. 1867.

nervous, the sanguine, the lymphatic, and the bilious. But the aspect of each of them was so decidedly bilious, that we found no special satisfaction here. Then several engraved busts of General Washington were disposed in such ways as to present its various frontages, written over with the names of the faculties, each surmounted with a graduated hemisphere resembling a wire rat-trap, and designed, we suppose, to measure off the relative extent and interest of the faculties that were printed upon the cranium. Not finding here the Scientific Basis, we had recourse to the text. But we were doomed to be disappointed a third time, for we found nothing in this except the familiar phrenological doctrines of the faculties and the temperaments, with the addition which we have already noticed. In this phrenological muddle of faculties, &c., there occur many truisms about education which would have been much more intelligible, though perhaps less imposing, if they had not been phrased in the phrenological dialect, and shaped to its barbarous classification. We ought to add that there is interwoven in the discussion a queer doctrine of the Apostolic Church, and the mystic significance of the number twelve, which we are not sure that we understand well enough to describe. As we are not prepared to give any recommendation of this book ourselves, we will transcribe one from the late Bishop Hopkins. "As a whole, I regard your work as a very admirable contribution to the philosophy of true education, which presents a more profound and scientific view of the subject than any other work within my knowledge, and must, it seems to me, produce a highly beneficial influence on the minds of the thoughtful." We hope that in quoting this we have not offended against the maxim "*nil de mortuis*," &c.

*ECCE CÆLUM.**—This modest volume presents a new phase of the "Ecce" literature. It is connected with the original series—"Ecce Homo," "Ecce Deus," etc.—only by analogy of title, not of subject or aim. It touches questions, not so much of Revealed, as of Natural Theology, and abounds rather in the facts of science, than in theological speculations. It presents, in truth, an admirable *résumé* of the sublime teachings of Astronomy, as related to natural religion—a series of brilliant pen-photographs of the Wonders of

* *Ecce Cælum*: or, Parish Astronomy. In six Lectures. By a Connecticut Pastor. Boston: Nichols & Noyes, 117 Washington street. 1867. 12mo. pp. 198.

a hundred hostile schools. Another still more significant symptom of their decline is the equal impossibility of a new religion and of a new metaphysics. What can be found, in the matter of religion, better suited to satisfy and charm the imagination than Catholicism? And how can a tissue of abstractions be conceived, more harmonious, more simple and more strong than the pantheism of Spinoza or that of Hegel? In Catholicism the religious era has reached its culminating point, as that of the metaphysical era has been attained in pantheism. And so what are they doing, who would maintain this double *régime*? The Catholics, ridiculous prophets of the past, propose to us for the future the institutions and the ideas of the middle ages; on the other hand, the philosophers plunge into history and erudition and propose to build upon the *débris* of all the systems the ruinous edifice of an impracticable eclecticism.

But their efforts are useless; both *régimes* are doomed to destruction by the irresistible force of things. For three centuries a new spirit has been developing itself in the world. In spite of a thousand obstacles it is spreading from day to day, and is penetrating everywhere. With Copernicus and Kepler it long ago mastered astronomy. Galileo, Descartes, Bacon introduced it into physics, and Boerhaave conquered for it the domain of the physiological and medical sciences. At the end of the eighteenth century it created chemistry by the hands of Lavoisier. In our own day Bichat has finally established it in the science of life. This new spirit is the spirit of the positive philosophy. Instead of seeking the essence of things, it studies things themselves; in the place of the fruitless play of abstraction, it establishes the profound and fertile investigations of calculation. It bridles the imagination instead of giving it the rein. It weighs, calculates, observes. Its preëminent characteristic is to prove everything which it affirms; to be able to find everything which it seeks; to know how to be ignorant of everything which it cannot discover.

All the sciences have passed in turn through the religious and through the metaphysical *régime* before reaching the positive *régime*. In astronomy the imagination at first conceived *genii*, angels, charged with the guidance of those immense spheres and the direction of their evolutions; they were, as

Plato said, the dancing chorons of the immortal Gods. Metaphysical abstraction dethroned these divinities, but what did it put in their places? Hypotheses, abstract and mysterious numbers, mechanical vortexes. The positive philosophy has breathed upon the chimera of vortexes, as it had shattered the solid heavens of the ancient astronomy, and it has substituted for these imaginary conceptions the law of universal attraction.

You will find the same revolutions in the history of the physical and natural sciences. The phenomena of nature were attributed at first to causes, which were deified by the imagination; fire was Vulcan, water Neptune. Then the philosophers came and proposed their atoms, their elements. To-day the atoms of Democritus and the four elements of Empedocles are scarcely less decried than the Gods of mythology. We see in nature only facts and laws.

The religious and the metaphysical *régimes* have kept their credit in two sciences only, that of man and that of history. To drive them from these and to give to the positive spirit the universal empire, it is necessary first to uproot that false prejudice, diligently disseminated by theologians and philosophers, that there exist two distinct orders of facts,—the facts which are perceived by the senses and those which appear only to consciousness. All facts are homogeneous, not, of course, that between a physical phenomenon and a physiological phenomenon science does not note differences, perhaps ineffaceable, but every real phenomenon must be observable, and for this, must be capable of perception by the senses.

There are only two ways of observing the mental and moral nature of man: either our intellectual faculties are grasped in their physical action, in their palpable effects, in their various manifestations, or, on the other hand, the physiological instruments are noted which serve to produce these. All other observation is vain. The philosopher fancies that he is observing man: what does he do? He isolates himself in his *ego*; he works himself up, and takes his reveries for realities and his abstractions for existences. Psychology can exist as a science, only on condition of attaching itself to physics, of being a sort of *cerebral physics*. The same is true of social phenomena. There is nothing essential in the species, which is not found in

the individual. If physiology has physics for its basis, the science of the human species, or history, has for its root physiology and physics. It is a *social physics*.

Suppose these two gaps filled up; suppose that fortunate geniuses succeed in firmly establishing these two new sciences, cerebral physics and social physics, consider the admirable simplicity, the great and beautiful economy of human science.

Before intelligence, lies one vast and unique object, namely, *facts*. You meet at first with the most simple facts, which are also the most general; they are those with which the mathematics is concerned. To the eyes of the algebraist, nature is only a system of magnitudes; this is the highest point to which abstraction can ascend. From the first feeble essays of mathematical science in its infancy to the sublime discoveries of Descartes, of Leibnitz, of Lagrange, even to the marvels of the integral and the differential calculus, the object has always been the same, to measure magnitudes.

If, leaving these abstractions, you take a step towards nature, magnitude becomes more limited; you find, first, extension and soon motion. Extension, in its limitation and its universal laws, is the object of geometry; motion, considered in the abstract, is the object of rational mechanics.

Although extension is more restricted than simple magnitude, although motion, added to these ideas, increases their complexity, we have thus far considered only very simple and general facts, so to speak, abstract facts. If, instead of conceiving of extension and motion in general, you trace out in the expanse of the heavens the curves which the stars describe, you will pass from pure geometry and from rational mechanics to astronomy.

Astronomy embraces all worlds, but if its object is immense, it falls short of attaining it, and considers it only in its external features. On the surface of the earth, on the other hand, objects do not shrink from observation; you can seize them and subject them to all the processes of experiment. This is the object of physics, a science less vast than astronomy, less severe in its methods, less sure in its calculations, but penetrating more deeply into the secrets of things.

Chemistry goes further still. The phenomena which the physicist investigates are never profound enough to change the constitution of beings. Chemists, on the other hand, aspire to explain to us those mysterious affinities, those startling transformations, those sudden decompositions which give so much variety to the face of the universe.

We have reached the limits of observation in its dealings with inorganic beings. Chemistry, when it has reached the first degree in the scale of living beings, stops and gives place to physiology. We find ourselves here in the presence of the most profound but also of the most imperfect of the sciences. In proportion, indeed, as it rises, it meets with more complicated facts. Organization becomes richer, more perfect and more diversified. To nutrition and reproduction is added sensation, to sensation intelligence, to this reason and will. On the basis of the vegetable physiology rises animal physiology ; on both reposes the physiology of man.

Man is social ; society does not destroy his nature, but modifies its laws. By the single fact of a common life, phenomena are developed which no physiological induction would have led us to expect. Hence a new branch of the science of life, social physiology, which Montesquieu and Condorcet sketched and which the positive philosophy is called upon to establish.

How luminous is this classification ! At the summit, the supreme science of the mathematics, the most independent, the most simple, the most exact of all. It observes the most elementary facts, which are at the same time the most general. To the simplicity of its objects it owes its incomparable exactness ; to their generality its absolute independence and its universal supremacy ; all the sciences depend upon it ; it alone is independent of all. At the opposite extreme, stands social physiology, in other words, the science of the higher functions of life ; the least simple of all the sciences, the least exact, the least independent and yet the most admirable. Its very complexity, which is the cause of its dependence, is the cause also of its beauty, as the beauty of the mathematics lies in the simplicity of its object. For the mathematics never leaves the region of abstraction ; physiology touches life, that is, the being

in what is most real and complete belonging to it. Between these two sciences are ranged the others, each resting upon those which precede it and supporting those which follow it, constantly increasing in complexity and in dependence, decreasing in exactness and in generality, less simple but more rich, less exact and more difficult, less perfect and not less excellent.

This order, so simple and so regular, is also the order of the historic development of the sciences; the mathematics and astronomy are the most ancient and the most advanced. More than twenty centuries ago Thales demonstrated the properties of the equilateral triangle, and Pythagoras those of the square of the hypothenuse, while the science of life dates from the last century.

The scheme which has just been drawn out embraces all the sciences. Nothing can be imagined more abstract than calculation, or more complicated than life. All the particular sciences, geology, botany, and mineralogy, logic, aesthetics, morals, ideology, natural right, politics, and in their train all the arts range themselves between the great lines which divide the objects of thought. Everything is classified and arranged, and this grand whole, so imposing and so varied, is essentially nothing more than the application of the same instrument, namely, observation aided by calculation, to analogous objects, namely facts, in view of the same results, namely laws.

Who knows, indeed, whether a still higher degree of simplicity and of unity is not to be reached. Already the positive philosophy has suppressed the vain distinction of physical facts and moral facts. Other distinctions may one day be, not perhaps effaced, but weakened by the progress of the human mind. It is worthy of remark that, in proportion as a science develops and establishes itself, it becomes more accessible to the mathematics. Who laid the imperishable foundations of astronomy? Who calculated the regular orbits of the stars and made it possible for Halley and Clairant to predict the return of certain comets with unerring precision. It was the mathematics. Why were Galileo and Descartes the true founders of physics? Because to the genius of observation they joined that of calculation. What was the work of Lavoisier? It may be stated in a single word; he *weighed*, and

chemistry was created. What are many eminent chemists seeking to-day? The means of introducing mathematical relations into the variable proportions of the elements. Why, finally, has physiology made so little progress? Why is its movement irregular, why are its results uncertain, why are its inductions conjectural? It is because life in its free and varied movements, in its sudden changes, slips from the grasp of calculation. But will not calculation in the end conquer life also and impose upon it its laws? It has already made conquests not less remarkable; by the theory of probabilities, it has, so to speak, enslaved chance; by the differential calculus, it has reached the infinite itself.

Science would thus be brought to a wonderful homogeneity. Facts palpable and in a sense measurable by the compasses, laws demonstrable by calculation—such would be the common stock of all the sciences. But is it possible then to repel a sublime hope? When facts have once been subjected to calculation, will they not at last be inevitably reduced to a single law. Science from that moment on, would be complete, it could do no more. What an honor for man and what a source of power! Physics, as soon as it was able to make use of the calculus, increased a hundred-fold the resources of industry; it became the sovereign of nature. Introduce this power of calculation into the science of life, of organic life, of intellectual life, of social life, and you will see springing up a new industry not less fruitful than that which governs the physical world, the great and sacred industry which has for its object to cure the ills of man, to assure and charm his existence, to regulate his intellectual operations, his feelings, his character, his civil and political conditions. What a future of happiness, of peace and of glory for humanity!

The positive philosophy confesses that we are far from this ideal; but it is much that we have caught a glimpse of it. To prepare for its coming, two things must be done; the last blows must be given to the religious and metaphysical *régimes*, and then all the intellectual energy which is fruitlessly wasted on them, must be turned towards the organization of the two sciences which remain to be created, the experimental science of man and that of the human race.

It seems as if Aristotle had bequeathed something of his organizing mind to the master of philosophy in the middle ages, St. Thomas Aquinas. For the Angelical Doctor, the science of God must necessarily be the first and the most important of all; but let it not be supposed that the *Summa* is only a theological treatise; it is literally a complete system of human knowledge, a sort of encyclopedia for the use of the thirteenth century. Physics has its place in it, and even a sort of rude and primitive geology. The *Summa* is the work of a great mind, organizing the sciences in the midst of an age of barbarism, under the inspiration of a sublime spiritualism.

The science of nature, imperfectly understood but not rejected by St. Thomas, recovers its legitimate rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Bacon summons men to the exploration and conquest of the physical universe, and in his turn, he attempts to organize the work of the human mind. It is here especially, that the mental superiority of the English philosopher shines out. Bacon is not simply a lover of physics, he is an enthusiast,—I might almost say a fanatic for them; he calls himself the *pontiff of the senses*; the conquest of nature by man, appears to him a sacred enterprise, a sort of new redemption, of which science is to be the Messiah. For this reason the name of Bacon was especially celebrated by the materialists of the last century, and it is this which exposed him to the wrath and to the sarcasms of Joseph de Mais-tre. The new materialists call upon him in their turn. Well, we ask nothing better than to go with them often to the school of this great master. When he prefaces the *Novum Organum* by that magnificent review of human knowledge which fills the *De Augmentis*, do you see him sacrificing metaphysics to physics? Do you see him confounding the science of man with that of nature? By no means; he is able to resist the impulse of his genius, the spirit of his nation; he traces with a firm hand and with that ingenious vivacity which characterizes his style, the grand outlines of the human mind. "The object of philosophy is three-fold: God, nature, and man. Beings strike our intelligence with a triple ray. One direct ray shows us nature; we attain to God through the unequal medium of creatures by reflected rays; it is by a reflected ray that man appears and unveils himself to himself."

When the sciences first arose in Greece, they were all mingled in a confused unity. Thales and Parmenides wrote with an admirable simplicity on "Being" or on "the Nature of Things." These were the titles of their poems, for veritable poems they were, in which the imagination had assuredly a larger share than experience. In proportion as the sciences extended their researches, and as facts and ideas accumulated, they tended to separate themselves, and soon even to isolate themselves from one another.

The coming of Aristotle arrested this dissolution. It was an undertaking worthy of that vast and powerful brain,—the attempt for the first time to organize the sciences, to embrace them all without ever confounding them, to divide without disuniting them, to avoid sacrificing any one of them, and to comprehend at once the rich diversity and the harmonious unity of the human mind, and of things without.

The classification of Aristotle should be placed among his titles to glory. We wish to signalize here only a single feature in it and M. Comte will understand us. Aristotle is above all other things an incomparable observer of nature; he is the very genius of experience. Without being very profoundly versed in the mathematics, he had yet read those words, which are said to have been written over the door of Plato's school: *Let no one enter here who is not a geometrician.* But these great minds, while understanding the value of the mathematics, knew also that they are not the ultimate limit of the human mind. The author of the *Histoire des Animaux*, like the author of *Timæus*, proclaims the necessity and the superiority of the first philosophy. The mathematics stands higher than physics, the science of movable things, by reason of the immobility of its object; but above the mathematics and physics Aristotle places the first philosophy, that eminent science, which, like the mathematics, contemplates the fixed and the eternal, and like physics, the real and living being; no longer an abstract immobility or a variable reality, but the principle which is at once the most immovable and the most real, eternal and living, the ideal of nature and of the human mind, the supreme unity, in one word, God.

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M. Comte brings to us to-day, after Aristotle and Bacon, a new classification. Certainly such an enterprise is not wanting in grandeur and is not inopportune. All those minds which desire order in the sciences and which feel the necessity of uniting them to philosophy, in order to arrest the movement of dissolution which is isolating and decomposing them, are occupied with this problem. Not a few have attempted to solve it. Among *savants*, I will mention the illustrious Ampère; among philosophers, Jouffroy, whose lamentable death has snatched him from this labor and from so many other hopes.

If we were to compare the classification of M. Comte with that of Ampère, we should not hesitate to say that the former seems to us far preferable. The work of Ampère is essentially lacking in simplicity. Everything has been sacrificed to the effort after a perfect symmetry, and in this respect, the classification of the illustrious physicist is, we confess, a veritable prodigy; but this advantage has been too dearly purchased to admit of much recognition; and the entire work, ingenious as it is, is deficient in grandeur. The classification of M. Comte has other defects, but it at least reposes on a natural and firm datum. In general, whenever M. Comte confines himself to the sphere of the positive sciences, he excels. Unfortunately he has another ambition; he proudly aspires to a philosophy. That which in his eyes gives all its importance to his work, is that it is allied with a philosophical principle, and what is this principle? It is, in a single word, the absolute homogeneity of the sciences, obtained by the exclusion of psychology and of metaphysics. This double claim, which answers to so many old prejudices not yet overthrown, and to so many antipathies as keen as they are unfounded, is worthy of a thorough discussion.

III.

The positive philosophy prides itself upon its great precision. Severe towards every hypothesis, it proposes to recognize no authority but that of observation. But it begins with an enormous hypothesis and by openly giving the lie to experience. For it maintains that all the phenomena of the

universe are essentially homogeneous; that is to say, that in spite of a thousand real differences, they are all equally observable by the senses. Here, then, an immense class of facts is rejected or distorted at the outset: namely, psychological facts. By what right, I ask? Is it maintained that there are no facts but those which affect the senses? Let it be proved. Or is the statement based upon the conviction that there exist no substances which are not material? Then we have here a metaphysical system, the rudest in the world, I readily admit, but, after all, a system, and yet the positive philosophy claims to be wholly disinterested in reference to systems and to believe wholly in facts. This disinterestedness is abandoned; this religion of facts is violated. A class of phenomena which appears troublesome is thrown overboard; and it is thrown overboard in the name of a system.

I know what will be the reply of the positive philosophy; it will challenge us to prove the existence of psychological facts; it will arm itself against us with all the objections, with all the prejudices which are at present directed against psychology and the psychological method.

Psychology has been, in truth, unfortunate during the last forty years; it has united against itself the most diverse adversaries. Nothing is more natural than that Gall, Broussais, and with them that army of intractable materialists, which enrolls its recruits among the followers of physiological and medical science, should have attacked psychology; but that Catholic philosophers, such as Bonald, Lamennais and their recent imitators, should have been seen to descend into the same arena and practice the same outrages upon a science which is the basis of spiritualism, is one of the most astonishing scandals which have been exhibited to our times by the defenders of the church. This is party spirit! It associates the most opposite doctrines; here, for example, it makes Catholic philosophy the unexpected auxiliary of all those schools, born of *Saint-Simonianism*, which rally around the names of Fourier, of Pierre Leroux, and of M. Buchez.

What a host of adversaries of psychology! But I am forgetting some, and those, too, not the least ardent; I mean the German philosophers. It is curious that the latter accuse us,

not like M. Comte and M. Littré, of losing ourselves in abstraction, but of being too timid, too servilely attached to experience, in a word, too positive, and they maintain that with our modest and circumspect psychology, we shall never attain the absolute. We have already met these adversaries. Let us leave them for the moment. For it will always be in France a title to glory and a condition of strength for a school of philosophy, that it bases itself on facts: our hereditary good sense arms us in advance against the prestige of these logically extravagant, daringly chimerical methods, which impetuous minds are trying in vain to acclimate in our country. Let us return, then, to more dangerous opponents, and let us see what is said in France by all these schools leagued against psychology.

Psychology, they tell us, is an illusory science. It claims the title of a science of observation, but what does it observe? Man? The human species? No, it observes the *ego*. And what is the *ego*? An isolated being, which is attached by no bond to nature, which retires within itself and observes itself in solitude. This *ego*, without organs, is a pure abstraction. It observes itself, you say; but what has it to observe? It does nothing; it produces nothing. If it acted, it could not observe itself. Separated from the body, from society, from real life, shut up within itself, without passion, without ideas, without a practical object, it is condemned to inertness. You place it on a point in the midst of empty space; what can it do there? Dream or sleep; construct systems or lose itself in the silent languors of ecstasy. In order to observe life, it is necessary to live; in order to live, it is necessary to act; in order to act, it is necessary to have a body, an earth, a society. Your *ego* which lives without acting, which observes life and has lost its own, is a contradiction. It is very easy to see that all this is not serious; that this psychology, so vaunted as a science of observation, is only a despairing effort to substitute for a system of metaphysics which is decried, new systems, tricked out with a false appearance of precision, an ingenious means of depriving the physical sciences of their prestige, and of speculating undisturbed under the protection of imaginary experiences.

These are objections which seem serious and weighty ; I admit it and go further ; I find them unanswerable on one single condition, namely, that they are addressed not to creatures of the imagination, to a monster which is invented for the purpose and called psychology, but to the real psychology, such as a considerable school has taken pride for forty years in cultivating. Evidently there is a misunderstanding here. The psychology which our adversaries attack, we repel as well as they. The psychology which we practice, our adversaries do not appear to know. Who will clear up this confusion ?

This will be done, I think, in the following manner ; and I will begin by a confession, which, doing full justice at the outset to the adversaries of psychology, will have perhaps some chance of disarming them, and in any case will give clearness and precision to the debate.

It must be confessed that psychologists have sometimes allowed themselves to be carried away by a twofold illusion ; they have believed and have said that psychology was a new science ; they have believed and have said that the facts of consciousness were absolutely separate from and independent of organic facts. To understand these two errors of some psychologists, we must go far back in history ; we must picture to ourselves the situation of the Scotch school in the eighteenth century, for it is from Scotland that these two errors have come to us.

It was the skepticism of Hume which raised up the Scotch school. In opposition to this keen and strong intellect, this mighty doubter, it was not enough to appeal to the authority of common sense ; to the dialectics of Hume it was necessary to oppose a method,—a method regular, precise, rigorous, insensible to the attacks of skepticism. But in the eighteenth century and in the land which had produced Bacon and Newton, what method was more naturally indicated than that to which the physical sciences owed their prodigious impulse and their imposing discoveries—I mean the method of observation and induction ? The Scotch conceived the idea of carrying this method with all its precision and rigor into the domain of the moral sciences, convinced that those *regulæ philosophandi*,

which had guided the thought of Newton to the discovery of the universal law of matter, would have no less power to reach the most hidden laws of the mind. Moral facts, facts of consciousness, may indeed be different from physical facts, they are still facts, and hence observation can reach them, experience may be applied to them, induction may draw from them the most inevitable conclusions. Captivated by this great idea, the Scotch fancied it new. They thought with the best faith in the world, that everything in philosophy was to be begun over again and that a new era was about to open for it, which would be marked by the most astounding discoveries. It was a first mistake, a first source of illusions. The Scotch committed another error, also, that of exaggerating the separation of the two classes of facts which they had justly distinguished, and also the identity of the methods which each of them requires.

When, in 1813, from that chair which then attracted few listeners, but around which was silently growing up a new school of philosophy, M. Royer-Collard attacked in front the *Condillacism*, which was already shaken, but which was seeking to make good its retreat by transforming itself into the ingenious theory of Laromiguière, he thought rightly that nothing could be more advantageously opposed to sensualism than that solid and simple Scotch method, which bases on the most exact observation the purest spiritualism. Like Reid, M. Royer-Collard believed that this method was wholly new, that it set aside everything which had preceded it in philosophy, and that it was about to produce the most unexpected results; like Reid, he taught that psychological facts, subjected to the same method as physical facts, form a world wholly separate and independent. Such were the ideas which M. Royer-Collard borrowed of Reid and of Dugald Stewart, and which found an interpreter of marvelous clearness and persuasive grace in M. Jouffroy. A passage conspicuous for its style, the preface of the "sketches" of Dugald Stewart, was for the psychological method a sort of manifesto, which rendered popular his name and his principles. Unfortunately, nowhere have the Scotch ideas been more exaggerated, I mean the separation of psychology and physiology, the identity of

the methods in the difference of the facts, and especially that false idea that all philosophy was to be remade. M. Jouffroy even went so far as to say that the question of the spirituality of the soul was premature,—an unnecessary scruple, which adversaries without either loyalty or decency have recently shamefully abused, but which strongly marks the extreme point to which one may be led by the exaggeration of the Scotch school.

Let us frankly confess that if to the Scotch school belongs the honor of having forcibly proclaimed the psychological method, if it has used it with success in opposition to the sensualism of Locke and the skepticism of Hume, it has often been mistaken in regard to the nature and the reach of this method. It has failed to comprehend the true difference between the facts of consciousness and psychological facts, and by a natural consequence it has exaggerated at once the identity of the methods and the separation of the facts. Finally it has been mistaken in regard to the past and the future of the psychological method; it has falsely supposed that the past had been ignorant of it; it has conceived for the future exaggerated hopes.

While M. Royer-Collard was introducing into France the Scotch mind, with its great merits and also with its errors and its illusions, a French philosopher, who owed nothing to any foreign influence, an intellect of little breadth, perhaps, but of wonderful force and sagacity, Maine de Biran, found at once in the Cartesian traditions and in a profound reflection the true root of psychology, and established on bases which can never be shaken, the distinction and the union of the physical and the moral sciences.

Without being a man of erudition, Maine de Biran well knew that he had not invented psychology. He took pleasure in placing his most original ideas under the protection of the authority of Leibnitz, and going back from Leibnitz to Descartes he found in the *Cogito, ergo sum* the source of modern psychology. No doubt if his historic researches had been more extended he would have loved to discover in the *Dialogues* of Plato and even in the conversations of Socrates

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the noble beginnings of that method which the great philosophers of antiquity knew how to employ with a masterly skill and sagacity.

Did Maine de Biran consider the facts of consciousness as wholly separate from and independent of vital phenomena? The author of the *New considerations on the relations of the physical and the moral* would have smiled at the question. Let it be remembered that he had passed his life in the profound investigation of one single fact of the science of man, the fact of muscular effort, and this fact is the knot in which psychological life and organic life, elsewhere divided, touch and unite. To penetrate the mystery of this union by an assiduous and combined study of the facts of consciousness and of their organic conditions, and from this luminous point to shed light over all the double existence which constitutes man,—such was the scientific enterprise of Maine de Biran, such is his lasting title in the eyes of history.

M. Cousin, a pupil of Maine de Biran, has always devoted himself, with a zeal as honorable to his character as to his intellect, to the work of bringing into notice the name, the writings, and the ideas of his master. Does he differ with him on this capital point? Not at all. With the exception of a few passages in his earlier writings, which give evidence of the Scotch influence, M. Cousin, in all his subsequent career, has been constantly faithful to this doctrine, that the psychological method distinguishes the physical and the moral in man without separating them, and that in this respect it is as ancient as spiritualism and philosophy. Finally, M. Jouffroy himself, whom we have just seen in the first essays of his youth led astray by following Dugald Stewart, returned by the original movement of his thought, and the solitary progress of his meditations, to the pure doctrine of Maine de Biran. He has left us a lasting testimony of this happy transformation in his memoir on the *Distinction between psychology and physiology*, written in reply to M. Broussais, which caused the Academy of Moral Sciences, that old athlete of medical materialism, to start from its seat. I venture to say that Maine de Biran would have recognized himself in the

memoir of Jouffroy, and that he would have envied his skillful disciple that masterpiece of clearness and of rigorous precision.

Having cleared up this delicate historic point, I address myself with confidence to the objections raised against psychology, and if I am not mistaken, it becomes easy to scatter them. It is supposed, then, that there is involved in psychology a new method, which consists in ceasing to act in order that the mind may look in upon itself, and contemplate itself abstractly, in perfect forgetfulness of society and of nature, and that, too, in order to reach a sort of phantom, or abstract entity, an *ego*, a pure spirit, a something endowed with an entire independence, with an absolute liberty, and loaded with a host of marvelous attributes. I acknowledge that such an *ego* is a phantom, that such an isolation is fruitless and dangerous, that such a spiritualism is insensate, in a word, that such a method has no root in history, in common sense, in the nature of things. I abandon the exaggeration of psychology to its adversaries, but I cling to its principle and I defend it in the name of the entire history of human thought.

The question between us and the materialists is no longer, to know whether man can feel, think, will without organs, but whether it is the same thing to have the consciousness of a thought, of a desire, of a sensation, and to recognize the cerebral lobe, the nervous or muscular tissue, which are or may be the organic condition of the sensation which I experience, of the thought which I form, of the voluntary act which I desire to execute. To state this question is to answer it. There is involved here not a system, but a fact.

We venture to say that only an unusual dose of systematic obstinacy can close the eyes of a man of good faith to this difference; but not to repeat here arguments which are well known, I will content myself with putting to the adversaries of psychology a decisive question. Is the notion of cause or force an idea which springs properly and immediately from physics or physiology? MM. Comte and Littré answer, No, and they are quite right. On this ground they forbid the physicist and the physiologist to investigate causes, and in general they openly profess to believe that this investigation

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is interdicted to the human mind. This is logical, but it is not enough; for if MM. Comte and Littré are right, not only must physics, physiology, and all the sciences of nature abandon the hope of discovering any cause, not only must the human mind interdict itself all speculation of this kind, but the very idea of cause does not exist. For whence can it come, if the senses cannot give it, if the science of nature cannot account for it, and if, on the other hand, there is nothing beyond the science of nature, beyond the senses? I consider the objection unanswerable. Hume understood it, and perceiving that the senses cannot explain this notion he took the bold course of denying it. MM. Comte and Littré show more respect for common sense; but in truth I find them here either too keen or too timid, intrepid as they ordinarily are in the matter of negations. However this may be, the idea of cause exists in language, in common sense, in the human mind; it must be explained. It is here that the legitimacy and the power of the psychological method appear in the brightest light. In every thought, in every internal act, it recognizes the existence of a fixed and permanent subject, which perceives itself as a force, as a cause, not as an abstract cause, but as an active, living, fruitful cause, in relation with a system of organs, which now obey it and now rebel against it, which react upon it when they have felt its action, and bring it into connection with nature, society, universal life. This perception of the unchanging force of the *ego* is that which essentially constitutes a psychological phenomenon.

Once more, the *ego* is not isolated, for not only in the impressions which it receives from without and in the exterior acts which it helps to accomplish, but even in the most abstract reflection, in the most energetic effort to isolate itself from the physical world, there is always within us a confused sentiment, an indistinct image of external things; this is a fact of observation which all the great psychologists, Aristotle and Kant in the first rank, have long since recognized, but if, as is said in technical language, the *ego* is never without the *non-ego*, this does not prevent it from distinguishing itself from that, from being able to discern the difference between that which comes

properly from itself and which is its own, and that which, coming from without, reveals to it foreign causes.

This is the very simple distinction which separates, without isolating them, the physical and the moral worlds, and gives to spiritualism a legitimate and indestructible foundation. The Scotch, I acknowledge, and especially Dugald Stewart, have not always understood the nature of this distinction. They have supposed that psychology, like physics, had for its object only facts, not seeing that at the same time it fastens upon a cause, namely, the very principle which has consciousness, the *ego*. Not well understanding the nature of psychological facts, isolating them from the *ego* and thus considering them abstractly, they have separated them too much from the other facts, perceived by the human intelligence. But what matters this passing error? Is not every method, however legitimate it may be, exposed to be falsified in its application? Have the mathematicians, whose method is justly considered infallible, never been mistaken in regard to its nature and in regard to the conditions of its legitimate employment?

Psychology is not the creation of yesterday. Before the Scotch had proclaimed its excellence, it was in the world; it had already established itself by durable labors, by immortal services. Because the name of this science is not old, some have fancied themselves authorized to treat it with disdain; but in truth when we hear certain physiologists speak in a tone so severe and so haughty, of a science as ancient as the human mind, we cannot sufficiently admire so great confidence. Would not one say that physiology is a very mature science while the science of the moral man is still in its cradle? Take care! The comparison is all to the advantage of psychology. In affirming that among the organic functions there is not one that is really known, I am sure that I shall not be contradicted by any impartial physiologist. For organic life has two great objects, to preserve and to reproduce itself. But assimilation and reproduction are still two mysteries in physiology, which have not been penetrated.

I do not fear to affirm that the moral in man has been vastly more studied than the physical. Adam Smith knew the laws of sympathy much better than any physiologist knows the

seat and the organic condition of this curious phenomenon. We know better how we think than how we digest, and there is not a single important function of the organization, which is nearly as well understood as the psychological function of reasoning. *Savants* boast that astronomy is a perfected science; but two thousand years before Laplace, Aristotle had determined the movement of certain intellectual operations, with as much precision and exactness as the author of the *Mécanique Céleste* has employed in fixing the orbits described by the stars in space.

That psychology should be a science much more advanced than physiology, is explained by a reason as simple as it is profound; the principle of animal life is unknown to us, and physiology is reduced on this point to conjectures. It is otherwise with psychology, which immediately grasps the principles of the phenomena which it observes and in this way embraces the effects of life, and life itself in its source. Where should we be, if, in order to understand our moral nature, the laws of our thought, the origin of our passions, the principle of our actions, the rule of our conduct, we were obliged to wait, till naturalists were agreed upon the infinite number of questions which divide them and which perhaps will never be answered? Thank God, there is no need of this. Plato confused the canal of digestion with that of inhalation, the œsophagus with the windpipe; did this prevent him from being a profound psychologist, an eminent moralist? The *Philebus*, the *Symposium*, the *Republic* are full of keen and profound observations which do not wait for their confirmation till physiologists shall be agreed upon the gray matter and the white matter in the brain. Aristotle was not deeply versed in the physiology of man; he was so little acquainted with it that he was ignorant of the existence of nerves. Is this the same as saying that the treatise *on the Soul* is not a masterpiece of psychology, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* are not admirable studies of the passions of the human heart, that the *Organon* is not the imperishable code of logic?

Not to speak of all the psychology so ingenious, so elevated, of the fathers of the Church and of the mystic teachers of Christianity, of St. Augustine, of Bonaventura, of Gerson,

can there be cited in any science monuments more durable than the *Search after Truth*, the *New Essays on Human Understanding*, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, not to speak of the *Discourse of Method*, and the *Meditations*, those sacred books of philosophy, in which are written down, under the dictation of reflected consciousness, the rights of the human mind and the first principles of all the sciences. It will be said that all is not solid in these monuments and that they are far from being built on the same plan and with the same materials. I acknowledge it; but where is the great work, except perhaps in pure geometry, which time and the contradiction of men have left untouched? Not one can be named. The *Harmonice Mundi* of Kepler is a book full of conjectures which science has falsified; the *Dioptrics* of Descartes and even the *Optics* of Newton have been left far behind in the progress of physics. The chemistry of Lavoisier is not that of Berzelius. The book *Of Life and Death* forms an epoch in physiology; Bichat wrote it scarcely thirty years ago; is it standing to-day?

In recalling to mind the great monuments of the science of psychology from Socrates to Descartes, and from Descartes to Immanuel Kant, I have spoken only of regular works, but how much delicate and profound psychology is scattered through all those literary master-pieces, whose immortal authors would have been sadly embarrassed, if they had been asked questions in regard to the convolutions of the brain, which the most stupid school-boy answers fluently after a few months of study. What an incomparable analysis of the human heart are the *Confessions* of St. Augustine! I do not know whether Gerson was a great anatomist, but I learn more from him about human nature by reading over the *Imitation of Jesus Christ* than by consulting the most learned treatises on physiology. St. Francis of Sales, Montaigne, Jean Jacques Rousseau,—are they not in their way eminent psychologists? For psychology is not a study for the use of a few meditators; it is the consciousness of life. Whoever lives, not with the life of the senses limited by material objects, nor with that superficial life, which, spending itself day by day, spreads itself wholly over that which is without, and flows away in-

cessantly, like water constantly pouring into a vessel without bottom, but with a life powerful and full, daily augmented and strengthened by the progress of ideas and sentiments; whoever lives thus, whether he meditates in solitude like Malebranche or frequents the court like La Bruyère and La Rochefoucauld, whether he creates psychology in action like Shakespeare and Molière, or sums it up in abstract formulas like Kant, whether he composes the *Critique of Pure Reason* or *Faust*, poet or metaphysician, priest or layman, philosopher in fact or in intention, labors for the progress of psychological science; he traces a chapter, a page, or at least a few lines of that immortal book which man is writing on man, and which began the day a human being first suffered, that is, the day he first reflected.

For this grand psychology, which is the work not only of philosophers, but, so to speak, of the human race, what does the positive philosophy propose to substitute? I am ashamed to say, and those who are acquainted with the exact minds of MM. Comte and Littré would never guess. It is a science the most conjectural, the newest, the least positive; but why speak of science? No, it is that something equivocal and misbegotten which is called phrenology. The man to whom it has been given to commence the science of man is Dr. Gall. The twenty-seven faculties recognized by this great philosopher, and rapidly raised to thirty-five by that other profound thinker, Dr. Spurzheim, with the twenty-seven or thirty-five corresponding cerebral convolutions which Dr. Vimont did not fail to find in the skull of a goose, this is for the positive philosophy, the *beau idéal* of the science of man.* It is acknowledged, to be sure, that these first labors of cerebral physiology are very imperfect. The *theosophy* is not admitted and this is characteristic; we are spared the *amativity*, the *habitativity*, the *destructivity*, the *constructivity*, the *secutivity*. I thank the positive philosophy for it in the name of our mother tongue; but without wishing to triumph by an excess

* See the excellent little book of M. Flourens, *Examen de la Phrénologie*, and his great work entitled: *Recherches expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système nerveux*. Second Ed., 1842.

of these ridiculous sketches, I have the right to say that there is something significant in this rehabilitation of phrenology by the positive philosophy, and that a school obliged to take under its protection such monstrous efforts, puts all sound minds on their guard and pronounces its own condemnation.

IV.

If the positive philosophy had no other defect than that of altering or suppressing a considerable number of facts, it might indeed be accused of incompleteness, but it could not be declared radically false. It would be necessary to enlarge the base of the edifice, not to throw it to the ground. But the positive philosophy aims higher than spiritualism; the negation of the facts of consciousness is only a means which it employs to reach absolute ideas, and the ruin of psychology is a prelude to the destruction of metaphysics.

Absolute ideas, metaphysics, these are the mortal enemies of the positive philosophy. According to it, the peculiar trait of the double tyranny which human thought has been obliged to undergo before reaching the era of its emancipation, has been that it has rested on absolute ideas. On the contrary the distinctive feature of the new *régime*, the positive *régime*, is the substitution of sciences for metaphysics, of relative for absolute ideas.

There are here two distinct questions, though very closely linked together; that of absolute ideas and that of metaphysics proper. It is clear that if there exist in the human mind no absolute ideas, all metaphysics is impossible; but we may admit certain absolute ideas and yet not be obliged to recognize metaphysics as a science. It was in this way that Kant, the greatest adversary that metaphysics ever encountered, supposed that he escaped skepticism and gave to the mathematical sciences, to the philosophy of nature, even to morals and to aesthetics a firm foundation, in recognizing a certain number of absolute ideas, of *a priori* notions, necessary for the guidance of man in his intellectual operations and in the accomplishment of his destiny.

MM. Comte and Littré do not seem to have the slightest fear of skepticism. Like Kant they reject metaphysics, but

they do not, like him, guard certain absolute ideas, and they seem convinced that these are not at all necessary to organize the sciences and the entire work of the human mind. I certainly admire this daring; yet it is difficult for any one who has studied, however little, the history of thought, not to find something *naïve* in such great audacity. One does not venture to suspect a man as learned as M. Comte, a man who flatters himself that he has discovered the science of history, of having remained a stranger to the history of philosophy, but we shall be allowed to say that the undertaking to do without absolute ideas in the organization of the physical and moral sciences, is more worthy of a primitive epoch than of a century enlightened by a great experience. Eclecticism, so disdained by the positive philosophy, has at least the advantage, that by an impartial knowledge of the past it guards one against many illusions. I will allow myself to remind MM. Comte and Littré of those great trials to which the undertaking which they wish to accomplish has been subjected. To cite facts to positive philosophers, is to employ the method of discussion most likely to please and to persuade them.

Nearly two thousand four hundred years ago, a precursor of the positive philosophy, Heraclitus, maintained that there are no absolute ideas, that all is relative. "A man," he said with familiar and expressive energy, "does not bathe twice in the same river." If this is so, the object of science is not the being in itself, it is the phenomenon. To what did this principle lead Heraclitus? To see nothing in the universe but a sort of universal phenomenon produced by a single agent, and governed by a single law. What do MM. Comte and Littré say of this consequence? We shall see, perhaps, in a moment that Heraclitus has revealed their secret, but however this may be, did the development of Heraclitus stop there? Not at all. The supreme logic of history, which imposes upon sensualism as its inevitable consequence, absolute doubt, raised up after Heraclitus, Protagoras and Pyrrhon, who said that if there are only relative phenomena, and if nothing is fixed and absolute, if sensualism is the measure of all things, it follows that everything is at the same time true and false, just and

unjust, beautiful and ugly, according to the impression of each person and the varying points of view.

Does not this conclusion appear rigorous to MM. Comte and Littré? I might ask them to read again the *Theatetus*, but I have to propose to them an authority greater than that of Plato. It is again history, which, four centuries after Heraclitus, brought out on a grander scale the same trial. The Stoics, by a contradiction which cannot be too prominently mentioned, had mingled with a sublime morality a sensualistic ideology. What happened? They were driven first to a materialism precisely analogous with that of Heraclitus, and soon the dialectics of *Ænesidemus* imposed upon them absolute skepticism. Pass over eighteen centuries; from Athens and Alexandria transport yourself to the country of Locke and you will witness the same spectacle. The names alone are changed. *Ænesidemus* is called Hume. The same idea lies at the base of the dialectics of the two Pyrrhonians; it is the idea of force or cause, the foundation of metaphysics. If there is nothing absolute in the idea of cause and in ideas in general, how shall we attain the absolute in things? And if everything is relative, there is nothing but probabilities and conjectures in the science of the universe, as in that of man.

Does this three-fold trial appear sufficiently decisive to MM. Comte and Littré? Do they hope to be happier than Heraclitus and Chrysippus, Locke and Condillac? Let them then have the kindness to entrust to us the secret which they possess for constructing the mathematical and physical sciences without any of those ideas which they call absolute, like the ideas of cause, of unity, of mind, of time, of identity. Will they construct the rational mechanics without the notion of force and time? arithmetic and algebra without the idea of unity? geometry without the idea of space and without the axioms? Are there no absolute ideas? But everything in the mathematics is absolute. Is there nothing but relative facts? But everything in geometry is necessary. That is a singular philosophy which professes to organize the positive sciences and ignores the most simple conditions of their existence. They are singular philosophers who make war upon systems and have themselves a system by which they are so blinded

that they lose even the perception of facts. Who would have supposed that M. Comte would push his horror of absolute facts so far, as to wish that there might be in geometry only simple phenomena? He talks to us about geometrical phenomena. Nothing more is wanting but algebraic phenomena.

After so rude a war upon absolute ideas, the positive philosophy decides to be gracious to one of these ideas, the idea of law. It is easy to understand this. The rejection of the idea of law would have been its destruction; for the positive philosophy makes two claims, that of having discovered the fundamental law of humanity, and that of having reduced all science to the search for certain laws. It was then impossible to suppress the idea of law; but necessary as it was not to deny it, it was equally inconsistent to introduce it; for this is certainly an absolute idea or none deserves this name. He who speaks of law speaks of something invariable, universal, necessary. As Montesquieu has ably written, "Laws are the necessary relations which derive from the nature of things." MM. Comte and Littré distinctly accept this beautiful definition. It is admirable; but it is fatal to their doctrine; for the senses and experience are evidently incapable of conducting to anything universal, invariable, necessary. MM. Comte and Littré rightly say that the true characteristic of a science is to foresee, and this just remark will show that there is a profound sense in the idea that races in their childhood form superior intelligences by according to them the gift of prophecy; but to be a good prophet it is necessary to predict unerringly, and how could experience, which applies only to the present and the past, anticipate unaided the future?

Here, then, we must rise to a conception which transcends the horizon of physics, the idea of a universal order, of a general plan of the world, of a common end toward which all beings tend, and which explains the law of their movements. But of all absolute ideas, there is none more unconquerably repugnant to the positive philosophy than that of a final cause. Here MM. Comte and Littré find a powerful and unexpected auxiliary; it is Descartes. Yes, I acknowledge it. Descartes has proscribed in physics the use of final causes, and I add that in this he has rendered the

science of nature a considerable service. For, in the first place, the scholastic philosophy had strangely abused final causes, and Descartes, in banishing them, accomplished a necessary reaction; besides, it cannot be denied that the proper object of the science of nature is to observe facts, and not to discover their causes. Every *a priori* idea in regard to the principles and the ends of beings is essentially subordinate to experience, which is, and which should remain here, the supreme judge. But is it to be concluded from this that the idea of final cause is not in the human mind? that it has not its place and its office in science? and not only in that high science which recognizes in God an intentional cause, the first principle and the ultimate end of the universe, but also in the science of nature? I appeal here to Kepler, to Linnæus, to Leibnitz, to Maupertuis, to Euler; I appeal to Harvey, who discovered the circulation of the blood by an application of the principle of final causes; I appeal to Bacon himself, who has written, I know, an ingenious phrase against final causes, but who, in cutting off from physics the investigation of ends, gave it over expressly to metaphysics, its true domain, thus distinguishing the spheres of the two sciences without sacrificing either, dividing the labor of the human mind without destroying its harmony, without compromising its unity.

To what now, in the last analysis, does the absolute negation of final causes lead? After having heard Descartes, let us listen to Spinoza. From the master, who is himself astray, but whose sound and sober nature still restrains him, let us go to the daring and intemperate disciple. The author of the *Ethics* will tell us that the idea of the end is a chimera, like the idea of good and evil, like that of free will; and that all beings, man like the rest, develop themselves according to the necessary laws of their nature. I point out this conclusion to MM. Comte and Littré; it is particularly adapted, if I am not mistaken, to make them reflect. Both have the most ardent desire to save morality from the shipwreck of absolute ideas, both repel the sad doctrine of interest, both recognize principles of conduct superior to selfishness; but logic is stronger than the most honorable intentions. If man has not been created for an end, if he acts according to the fatal laws

of his organization, as water flows, as blood circulates, we have done with every idea of good and evil, with all liberty, with all moral responsibility.

This is the ultimate point to which the simple negation of absolute ideas leads. It remains for us to see whether MM. Comte and Littré have been more fortunate against metaphysics.

V.

The prejudices of the eighteenth century on this subject still remain in many minds. It is important to dissipate them. Let the friends of the independence of the human mind clearly understand that to sacrifice metaphysics is to sacrifice philosophy altogether; it is to rob free thought, not only of its most noble right, but of that which underlies and consecrates all the others.

Among the false prejudices which hinder metaphysics from recovering the high consideration which it enjoyed in the seventeenth century, I will mention particularly two: the first is that metaphysics, or, as it is also called, ontology, is, as it is supposed, a science which speculates at random about the *ego* and the *non-ego*, the absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite, and claims to explain *a priori* the origin, the essence, and the basis of all things; an abstract science, without any connection with the realities of nature and of life; a conjectural science, which having at its service neither experience nor calculation, consumes itself in sterile hypotheses; a proud science, which despises the other sciences because it is ignorant of them, and claims to explain the depths of a universe of which the visible surface is unknown to it.

The second prejudice which the eighteenth century has bequeathed to us against metaphysics is, that it turns in a circle of systems which incessantly return: spiritualism and materialism, pantheism and dualism, dogmatism and skepticism, such are the eternal heroes of this monotonous drama, fantastic characters which disappear from time to time to reappear with new masks, always armed against one another, inflicting upon each other mortal wounds without ever killing, and playing a piece which has and can have no *dénouement*.

Are these prejudices legitimate? And, first, is it true that metaphysics is a science isolated from all the others, which aspires to construct for itself outside of the universe and of humanity an independent domain? I will reply to this question with perfect sincerity. The truth is, I confess, that metaphysicians have sometimes imposed upon common sense, in regard to the nature of metaphysics. There have been found more than once rash spirits who have fallen into this abstract ontology, which so justly appears suspicious to serious minds, but I say that this manner of understanding metaphysics is contrary to the general teaching of tradition. I say that the great thinkers, whose names mark the memorable steps which the human mind has taken, Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz, have understood very differently the nature and the conditions of the first philosophy.

I will explain myself still more explicitly on this point. The father of modern metaphysics has given us as the basis of all his speculations, a fact of consciousness. For what is his famous *cogito, ergo sum*? It is the being who thinks, taking possession of himself by reflection, escaping from doubt by affirming his own reality, his peculiar individuality, and from this firm starting point taking his flight in order to rise not to an abstract absolute, but to a real and living God, the first principle, and the supreme ideal of thought and consciousness.

This metaphysics, at once sensible and sublime, conquered without effort all the great minds of the seventeenth century, not only Malebranche and Fénelon, but more severe minds, Arnauld and Bossuet. And yet into the soil of the philosophy of Descartes fatal germs had slipped; we know what hand cultivated them.

Assuredly there were great qualities in the mind of Spinoza, but it lacked one of the distinctive features of those excellent intelligences whose memory is dear to humanity; it lacked the perception of the limitations of our minds. The metaphysics of Spinoza has nothing human: it is the attempt of a man to cease to be a man and to usurp the place of God. In place of the realities of this world, he offers us abstract conceptions, such as substance, attribute, mode, and others like these. But this is not a philosophy which we can use; it is a sort of al-

gebra, with mysterious and obscure signs. Now in what does all this end? In a universal fatalism and in a theism so abstract that it almost resembles atheism. I am not surprised that a cry was raised in the seventeenth century to reprove these doctrines, and with this began the excessive reaction, which from the metaphysician fell upon metaphysics, and against which all the genius of Leibnitz had no power.

It belonged to the German philosophy to glorify Spinoza, for it is his legitimate heir. Hegel is Spinoza still, but a Spinoza still more audacious and chimerical. Like the Dutch philosopher, the metaphysician of Berlin claimed to place himself at the outset in the bosom of the absolute, and from this height to explain, by the simple force of logic and on the basis of a certain number of abstract conceptions, the universal economy of things. Hegel is ignorant of nothing. He knows the *why* and the *how* of everything; he has found, and he confides to every one who chooses to read it and is able to understand it, the formula for God. Was it possible that common sense in Europe, and especially in France, should not rise against these extravagant pretensions? Certainly not. For myself, I abandon without regret to the disdain of exact minds, this pompous ontology of the Germany of our times, and if the positive philosophy contented itself with protesting against such irregularities, I could only heartily applaud; but it is not so. The positive philosophy falls into another excess, perhaps more dangerous still: on the pretext that metaphysics has been abused, it proscribes it altogether, and because it is impossible for man to satisfy his curiosity in regard to God, it claims to reduce God to the capacity of our intelligence and of our heart.

Against such a negation, I appeal in my turn to that same common sense which properly repels the temerities of an ontology without rule or restraint; I ask every sensible man what he thinks of a philosophy which proposes to do without God. It is no longer an abstract ontology which is in question; we are not speaking of those transcendental speculations which try to grasp and describe the properties of the absolute, as we grasp and describe those of a triangle or a circle. The question is, whether man is forbidden to pass beyond the sensi-

ble universe to reach causes behind effects; to rise to the idea of a perfect cause; to discover and to adore among the impenetrable depths of his infinite nature, those of his attributes, of which the striking evidence is spread over the face of the universe, and those perfections more sacred still, of which we find in our souls some obscure rays—wisdom, justice, happiness.

This is the great object of metaphysics, not as it is understood and pursued to-day in Germany, but as it has been understood and cultivated by all those strong minds which have known true force and true light, which have not employed their vigor in struggling against the impossible nor their depth in being incomprehensible, and in losing themselves in the abyss of their speculations. If one were to believe the philosophers of the positive school, one would suppose that the metaphysicians form in history a family of dreamers, deluding themselves with chimeras, dwelling among the clouds, strangers to the positive sciences, to the observation of nature and of mankind. But one of these dreamers, Plato, is simply the greatest moralist of antiquity; another, Aristotle, is its greatest politician, and wrote also that history of animals which excited the respect of Cuvier. Another dreamer, Descartes, is the inventor of mathematical analysis, the most powerful instrument which geometry has ever employed: another has discovered the infinitesimal calculus, and, if this great honor is disputed, there is another at least of which no one can rob him, that of having taken the most penetrating and comprehensive view that has ever been obtained, of all the sciences and of all human things. These are the dreamers, the empty minds, which the positive philosophy charges with illusions. As if they had ever thought of separating the metaphysics from the positive sciences! As if they had ever aspired to the vague and ambitious ontology of a few intemperate minds! Is it, then, Aristotle who claimed to construct *a priori* the science of God—Aristotle, the philosopher of experience, to whom the Platonic theory of ideas was suspicious, because it seemed to him to abandon too soon the solid ground of facts, to take its flight into sublime regions? Plato himself, so often accused of caressing brilliant chimeras, also had the wisdom to recognize the limit of human intelligence. In one of his boldest works,

the Timæus, that Genesis of Platonism, he began with these words, so often quoted: "It is difficult to find the author and father of the Universe, and impossible, after having found him, to make him known to everybody."

When it is necessary only to carry back ideas to this principle, and to trace up to God all the good and the beautiful in the order of beings, Plato *affirms*, with a just assurance; but when it is necessary to explain the relation of God to the world and to unveil the origin of existence, Plato is so undecided that he is reduced to conjecture. Let us listen again to Timæus: "Thou wilt not be astonished, Socrates, if after so many others have spoken on the same subject, I essay to speak of the Gods and of the formation of the world, without being able to express to you my thoughts in a language perfectly exact and free from all contradiction. And if my words have no more improbability than those of others, thou must still be contented with them, and bear in mind that I who speak and you who judge are all men, and that on such a subject only probable statements can fairly be demanded."

I might multiply citations and proofs, but it is evident to any one who casts an impartial glance on the history of metaphysics and is able to distinguish the broad highway, which the masters have followed, from the by-paths into which a small number of rash spirits have strayed,—it is evident, I say, that metaphysics does not necessarily aspire to occupy an isolated region. Without doubt it overlooks the particular sciences, but it is because it rests upon them; without doubt it leads to a point higher than nature and higher than humanity, but it is because in nature and in humanity it seizes upon the characteristics from which it composes and writes down the science of God. The physical and moral sciences make no acquisition by which it does not profit; enlightened by their labor, it furnishes them its light; it is a perpetual exchange, which constitutes at once the life of the sciences and its own. To it may be applied the ingenious and true phrase of Bacon; it commands only on condition of having obeyed. *Imperare parendo*: that is its motto.

It must be intelligible now, what there is that is peculiar in the movement of metaphysics. It cannot develop itself like

geometry or mechanics, the homogeneous sciences which are founded on a small number of notions, contemplating simple and homogeneous relations, springing up and growing by a uniform process. Metaphysics, vast as the human mind, is, like it, marvelously complicated ; no method should be foreign to it ; abstraction and observation, induction and calculation even, analogy, analysis, all the processes, all the means of knowing, belong equally to it, because it embraces all beings, all life, proposing to itself in turn matter and mind, nature and man, the finite and the infinite, rising from the world to God and descending again from God to the world, uniting all, conciliating all, aspiring at least in the measure of human weakness, and following the progress of the sciences, to reconcile and unite all. It follows from this that metaphysics cannot advance with an equal and continuous movement and, as it were, in a straight line ; it has, like the human mind, its halts, its wanderings, its weaknesses followed by quick starts. Drawing after itself, so to speak, the immense procession of all the products of thought, its movement is the variable resultant of a host of diverse forces and of an infinite number of movements.

This brings me to do justice in a few words to the second prejudice with which the positive philosophy arms itself against metaphysics ; it is that, as is said, it has made no progress during three thousand years. We hear this fine axiom repeated every day with an astonishing coolness, by men who profess to believe in the power and progress of reason ; but is it possible that while the science of nature and the science of man have made such great progress, the science of God has remained stationary ? To think so, is not to comprehend at all the harmony of human knowledge, or the whole economy of the history of ideas.

I can understand that men who speak in the name of Christianity, should maintain that metaphysics was powerless before the gospel and that since, it is superfluous ; I should also find on this side, perhaps, a certain number of enlightened minds who would at least grant me that Platonism was not altogether useless in preparing the way for the religion of Christ, nor Peripateticism, for organizing theology in the

middle ages, and that Cartesianism also did something for the grandeur of the Church in the seventeenth century, and for those great verities which are the common property of Christianity and of philosophy ; but when I hear men who declare themselves freed from all authority, who see in the history of civilization only the history of the movements of the human reason, when I hear them ask what progress metaphysics has made in three thousand years, I seem in truth, to be dreaming.

I will ask them first, if they have faith in the progress of civilization, and then if they think that the movement of historic speculations is wholly a stranger to this process. I will ask them if they think that the religious ideas of the Europe of the nineteenth century are inferior to the ideas of the Greeks and Romans in the time of Lycurgus and of Numa. But I wish to put to them a question still more precise ; has Christianity, I will say to them, been a fortunate event for humanity ? No one doubts it. Now what has Christianity done ? A thing which is at once very grand and very simple ; for certain ideas about God, about the soul, about its destiny, it has substituted other ideas. In other terms, for a certain metaphysics it has substituted another metaphysics. What matters here the form of the ideas ? It is the ideas themselves that are in question. Well, the ideas of Christianity about the incarnation and the redemption are metaphysical ideas and it is these glorious ideas which have saved the world and formed modern society.

From the revolution, which is called Christianity, I pass to a very different revolution, that which changed the face of Europe fifty years ago. Is it imagined that metaphysics had no part in it ? It will doubtless be said that the century which saw the French revolution was a century of reaction against metaphysics. I am the first to acknowledge it ; but let us understand each other. Without doubt there is much skepticism in the eighteenth century ; but I find it on the surface rather than below. Metaphysics appears there much decried ; in reality no century has had more faith in ideas. It is not so much against metaphysics in itself that the eighteenth century declared war as against a certain metaphysics. And what one ? That one which appeared to it to be a support of the hostile powers, and an obstacle to the triumph of the new ideas, the

spiritualistic metaphysics. It is not so easy then to dispense with metaphysics; whether our object be to organize or to destroy, we must address ourselves to her. It is she who under one form or another is guiding the world, and the human mind cannot be more gratuitously or more mortally outraged, than by the assertion that *she* is doomed to endless agitations.

The positive philosophy is the heir at once of the prejudices of the eighteenth century against certain systems, and of its secret and passionate love of other systems which are well known. If we trust to appearances only, MM. Comte and Littré seem perfectly neutral among the different systems. How should they choose spiritualism in preference to materialism or theism rather than its opposite. These systems are contrary solutions of an insoluble problem. Matter, mind, soul, God, —pure phantoms of the imagination, which makes or unmakes its spider's webs, beyond the sphere of reason! Between Plato and Epicurus, between Descartes and Gassendi, one may remain undecided as between two works of fiction, as between two styles of music. Such an indifference is very proud and very disdainful; its votaries should at least remain faithful to it. But I maintain that MM. Comte and Littré are far from indifferent among the systems; assuredly not that I doubt the perfect sincerity of their declarations; but they have unconsciously adopted a metaphysics, and I cannot conscientiously congratulate them on their choice. Wishing to continue the tradition of the middle ages, they might have revived the spiritualism of Turgot and of Rousseau, or else the moderate sensualism of Voltaire; but no, they have gone far back of that; they have descended even to the metaphysics of Holbach and of La Mettrie.

Sensible phenomena, and beyond them the vague suspicion of a unique cause of these phenomena, a cause blind, indeterminate, producing everything by necessary laws; such is in substance the metaphysics of the *Système de la Nature*. It is precisely that of the positive philosophy.

The positive philosophy admits no facts but those which are appreciable by the senses; it recognizes that these facts have laws, but necessary laws; it adds that these laws are very simple, but this is not by any means the same thing as saying

that there is in nature a plan conceived with intelligence. No, these laws are simple because they result immediately from the properties of matter. Now, is this matter, the blind cause of necessary facts, simple or manifold? This is a question in regard to which, it is true, the positive philosophy does not pronounce clearly; but Holbach and his friends pronounced no more clearly, and provided the soul and God were once suppressed, they were accommodating in regard to everything else.

I regret to insist still, and yet we must follow the positive philosophy to the end and sound it to the bottom. Between the hypothesis of a divine intelligence and that of a blind and fatal cause, or of an infinity of such causes, do MM. Comte and Littré hold the balance even? They ought to do so according to their system, and one could wish for their sake that they did so; but they do not. It is impossible, without a profound sadness, to see these enlightened and sincere minds display a sort of rage against the idea of the divine providence. In presence of the evils which are heaped upon man, and of the astonishing contradictions which are found in nature, I understand and I deplore the anguish of a troubled spirit; I can explain to myself the doubts which assail the naturalist and the philosopher. But this ardent and obstinate negation, this desolating dogmatism, excite in me a melancholy astonishment and a sadness without sympathy. Those heavens, that harmonious universe which filled the souls of Kepler, of Newton and of Linnæus with a religious enthusiasm, seem to MM. Comte and Littré badly made; they forget themselves even so far as to say, in distinct terms, that this world only shows a degree of wisdom inferior to that which man possesses, and that it is easy, in the detail as well as in general, to imagine something much better. Is it possible that the nature of things has been so unskillful and so inconsistent? Is it possible that it has been able to people space with infinite worlds, to cause torrents of life to circulate in the breasts of all beings, and yet that it has not been able to give them laws so reasonable that one of its innumerable creatures can approve of them? Is it possible that it has been able to produce the intelligence of these two philosophers, who are so dissatisfied with it, and has not been able to equal that intelligence in its

combinations? Can it be that that which MM. Comte and Littré imagine in their closets, that is to say, according to their systems, that which germinates in the brains of these two feeble organic machines, destined to endure but a day, is more reasonable, more beautiful, more harmonious than the system of existences which nature realizes in its eternal evolution in immensity? Really, what has become of the logic, the intelligence, the good sense of the advocates of the positive philosophy?

But there is one more feature which surpasses the rest. M. Comte exclaims somewhere, "It used to be said, *Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei*; to-day the heavens declare only the glory of Newton and Laplace." This enthusiasm in atheism—let us speak plainly—this fanaticism in absurdity does not belong to our times. For myself, in reading this astonishing passage, I seemed to grow at least sixty years older; I fancied that I was carried back to the eighteenth century, and that I was listening at the court of Frederic to some outburst from *the King's Atheist*, or to one of those sallies with which Diderot, at the end of a banquet, amused the guests at the house of Holbach.

After all, I ask nothing better than to take as serious this perfect indifference, which the positive philosophy professes to entertain among all the systems; but I question whether this position, more in conformity with its general declarations, is more tenable than the foregoing. You propose to me to abandon, once for all, metaphysical questions, and you offer me in exchange the visible world, to know and to conquer it; but what is it to abandon metaphysics? It is to abandon problems such as these: Does there exist above this imperfect justice of men an eternal justice to which one may appeal from their iniquitous decisions? Above our wisdom, always mixed with folly, and our virtues full of weakness, is there not an infallible wisdom, an unmixed goodness, a purity without spot or blemish; the absolute type of personality, the ideal which ravishes, sustains, excites my personality, always miserable and always fainting? Is there in me a principle superior to death, or am I a being, like so many others, destined to fill up in my turn that chasm which devours life; a feeble machine, the most complicated, but also the most delicate and the most exposed

of all machines, which feels more keenly, only to suffer more, which thinks, only to know its own misery, and which has nothing better to do in its short passage here below than to curse its being and that useless ray of intelligence which fatality has placed within it.

These are the problems which the positive philosophy invites us to suppress; it only remains for it to show us how to do so. I am a man, and you propose to me to suppress the problem of the human being! I have a thirst for immortality, and you take away from me the hope of it! You invite me to study, to love nature; but what is nature worth to me if God is not in it? This curiosity without an object, this labor without an incentive, this life without poetry and without dignity, have no further interest for me. Give me, beyond my mortal destiny, the feeblest ray of a future, and on this earth, of which you offer me the pleasures, I will willingly yield you my share.

The philosophers to whom I address myself are not among those optimists of materialism who conceive of no other happiness than that which the earth can give; they are elevated minds which have known the burden of life, and it is easy to see even that they have cast more than one dark glance upon the condition of humanity. What remedy do they propose to us? Resignation. Resignation in fatalism, resignation without God and without a future—I say that it is impossible. I say that it is madness. The author of *Faust* also invites us to be resigned in the name of absolute fatality. “Most men,” he says, with his disdainful and bitter serenity, “wait from day to day, before resigning themselves, till the hopes of yesterday shall have vanished. They put their resignation in small coin. The true philosopher resigns himself once for all.” Vain and cruel words! Ah! no doubt, when one is endowed with genius and power, when one fills Europe with his fame, when honors, homage, wealth, consideration, all the gifts of nature and of society are heaped upon him, especially when to an immense intellect one unites a cold and selfish heart, it is easy then to be resigned; but to invite to that fantastic resignation the poor miner buried under ground, the peasant bent over the furrow, the innocent victim of injured society, the unrecognized man of genius, the old man who finds at the end of a well-

filled career only misery and hunger,—is it not an impious mockery? And not to speak of these extreme misfortunes, does not each one of us, however favored he may be by nature or by birth, feel, if he has a man's heart, all the woes that belong to humanity? Is he not poor, an orphan, persecuted in the person of all those whom the world persecutes, whom it abandons and who suffer? Though you be even the most selfish and at the same time the most favored of men, you are still a man, that is, an animal more unhappy than the others, if he must die utterly, for he is the only one that thinks of death.

It is, you say, the nature of things. I answer that you make the nature of things absurd. You make it construct a thinking being, who of necessity proposes to himself a problem and who is absolutely unable to solve it, a being whose organization obliges him constantly to seek that which it forbids him ever to find. What then is man? Pascal will say, a chaos, a chimera, an incomprehensible monster. But when you have reached this point, one of two things is necessary; either to succumb or go a step further. And to take this step, as Pascal did,—is it not to succumb after all?

Certainly this sad result is diametrically opposed to the intentions of the partisans of the positive philosophy. The liberty of thought has no more fervent champions. Well, they must be clearly told that the greatest services which can be rendered to the enemies of that reason, which is so often denounced and whose sacred rights are to-day in peril, is to persuade men that the great problems, of which the progressive solution constitutes the honor of reason and the dignity of philosophy, are for our intelligence impenetrable enigmas.

I think, then, that I have the right to say to the friends of the positive philosophy: There is a radical contradiction at the bottom of all your ideas and of all your plans. You desire to liberate the human mind and you are forging chains for it; you desire to divide its labor and you destroy its harmony; you desire to organize the sciences and you break up their unity. After having proclaimed an inviolable and almost superstitious respect for facts, you begin by denying all those which are troublesome, that is to say, by cutting in two the domain of thought and by suppressing the better part of it. Reduced

to the sciences of nature, you profess to give us a philosophy of them, and yet you deny all those absolute ideas, which alone could furnish them with a solid basis and with fruitful directions. Finally, you crown all these negations by one supreme negation which leaves all nature without cause and without law, the human mind without a principle, life without an object, humanity without restraint, without ideal and without hope. And you decorate this with the fine name of positive philosophy and think you are opening to human thought a new era of emancipation and of progress. No, your philosophy is not new. We have known it for two thousand years; it was once called epicureanism and marked in Greece the decline of ideas. At a more recent and glorious epoch it has been a useful means of attack, a powerful engine of war against institutions condemned to perish. But the nineteenth century has something better to do than to blow up the dead embers of the past. It should show the world that metaphysics is not simply a redoubtable force, skillful in piling up negations and ruins, but also a beneficent power, capable of replacing all that it has destroyed, and which, after having beaten down the crumbling portions of the edifice, will be able to construct another more firm and vast for the generations of the future.

ARTICLE II.—THE AUGUSTINIAN AND THE FEDERAL THEORIES OF ORIGINAL SIN COMPARED.*

By George Park Fisher.

THE one word which expresses both the nature and the end or aim of Christianity, is Redemption. The correlate of Redemption is Sin. Parallel, therefore, in importance with the doctrine of Redemption in the Christian system is the doctrine of Sin. The two doctrines, like the facts which they represent, are mutually inseparable. If it be true just now that the Person and Work of the Redeemer engross attention, to the comparative exclusion of other topics of theology, it is equally true that no adequate discussion, and much more no adequate solution, of the questions belonging to this theme, are practicable, apart from right views of sin. The disease must be known and admitted before you can comprehend the remedy. "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." The Gospel is unintelligible or is a folly to him who is blind to the vast disorder which the Gospel comes to rectify. Either as a theoretical or as a practical system, he can make nothing of it.

* In our Article on Dr. Taylor's Theology, in the last number of the *New Englander*, we several times referred to the work entitled *Outlines of Theology*, as representing the views of Dr Hodge of Princeton. We were aware that the name of Dr. A. A. Hodge was on the title-page, but from our recollection of the preface, we supposed that his labors in connection with the book were those of an Editor. This, if we mistake not, is a general impression. On reverting to the preface, we find it stated that the list of questions, two or three chapters excepted, is from the senior Dr. Hodge's Lectures, as given to the "classes of forty-five and six." "In frequent instances" Dr. A. A. Hodge "has drawn largely" from his father's published articles. Two chapters are "little more" than an abridgment of his father's later lectures. The materials gathered by Dr. A. A. Hodge which form "a large element in this book" were written down "after frequent oral communication" with his father, "both in public and private." We make this explanation in order to remove the impression that we were not aware that Dr. A. A. Hodge was concerned in the preparation of the work. Certainly we were justified in considering it an authentic exposition of the elder Professor's system.

We take occasion to explain a single sentence in the Article referred to. On

We deem it to be of the highest consequence to distinguish, so to speak, great doctrinal facts from philosophical theories attached to them. The truths of Christianity involve and suggest problems, which, in some cases, the Scriptures do not profess to explain. Explanations of human invention may be of more or less value; but it is hurtful not only to theology as a science, but also to the cause of practical religion, when these explanations are elevated to the rank of dogmas, and the inculcation of them is made part and parcel of the teaching of the Gospel.

It is partly this conviction which has led us to undertake the present discussion. We believe that a great, unquestionable, universal fact, like that of sin, deserves to be admitted in full earnest by everybody. At the same time, we believe that there are theories of human device, which have been invented to clear up difficulties, but which, in truth, create vastly more

page 318, we say of Dr. Taylor:—"He did not say that it may be that God cannot exclude sin from every moral system, but only from the best," &c. A more accurate statement would be that he did not deem it *absolutely essential* to say that God cannot, &c. That is, it is not necessary to say this, in order to silence the skeptic. We remark (p. 328 of the Review) that Dr. Taylor held that it cannot be proved *a priori* that God can prevent sin in any moral system. Of course he must have held that it *may be* that God cannot do this. And this proposition he does maintain in his volumes on MORAL GOVERNMENT (I. 308 seq., II. 441 seq.)

There has been a general impression that he held that there is *no ground for the opinion* that God can exclude sin from any moral system. But he distinctly stated to us, in reply to an inquiry, that this impression is erroneous, and that his meaning was as we have given it on p. 328. On a close examination of the passages referred to in the published Lectures, it will be seen that he says nothing inconsistent with this. He maintains that it cannot be demonstrated that God can exclude sin from a moral system, *from the nature of agency*; nor can it be proved (that is, demonstrated) from facts,—since wherever sin is actually prevented, its prevention *may be* due to the system with which all the sin that does exist is certainly connected.

This inaccuracy, which we notice in looking over our Article, is immaterial, as far as the distinctive principles of Dr. Taylor are concerned. The possible incompatibility of the prevention of sin by the divine power, with the best system, is the doctrine on which he finally rested his refutation of the skeptical objection to the benevolence of God. That is to say, he usually discussed the question with reference to the actual state of things—the existing system. At the same time he contended that there can be no demonstrative proof that a moral being who *can* sin, will not sin, and hence no complete, decisive proof, that sin can be kept out of any moral system by the act of God.

embarrassment than they remove. We do not here assert this equally of *all* the theories which theology has broached concerning this great matter. The limits and applications of our remark, the progress of the discussion—especially if we should pursue it beyond the present essay—will make clear.

There are three theories respecting original sin which we shall have occasion specially to consider in this Article. The first is the Augustinian; the second may be called the Augustino-federal or the Semi-federal; and the third the Federal theory.

The fundamental idea of the Augustinian theory is that of a participation on the part of the descendants of Adam in his first sin; in consequence of which they are born both guilty and morally depraved. The fundamental idea of the Federal theory is that of a vicarious representation on the part of Adam, in virtue of a covenant between God and him, whereby the legal responsibility for his first sinful act is entailed upon all his descendants; participation being excluded, but the propriety of his appointment to this vicarious office being founded on our relation to him as the common father of men. The Augustino-federal or Semi-federal theory is a combination of the two, the covenant relation of Adam being prominent, but participation being also, with more or less emphasis, asserted.

Besides these theories, some have held to hereditary sin, but rejected both participation and the covenant. Others have embraced the doctrine of an individual preëxistence and fall,—a preëxistence either transcendental and timeless, or in time. Others still have denied the existence of native sin, or of any sin prior to a personal act of choice in the present life. Spinoza and all other Pantheists deny of course the essential antagonism of moral good and moral evil, so that to them the problem loses its proper significance. But these last theories of Christian theology, as well as this anti-christian, necessitarian hypothesis, we have no particular occasion to discuss in this place.

The Federal doctrine is the offspring of the seventeenth century. In fact it may almost be said of it, in the form in which it is now held, that it is the offspring of the eighteenth

century ; since in the preceding age the great majority of the theologians who adopted the theory of a covenant coupled with it the Augustinian principle. That is to say, they maintained the Augustino-federal or Semi-federal doctrine, as above defined.

The Federal theory has of late been defended chiefly by Scottish theologians and by the Princeton school in this country. It supposes a contract or covenant of the Creator with the first man, to the effect that he should stand a moral probation on behalf of mankind, so that his act, whether sinful or holy, should be judicially imputed to them, or accounted theirs in law ; and the legal penalty, in case he sinned, be duly inflicted on them as well as on him. Adam's relation to us in this matter is compared to that of a guardian to his wards, an envoy plenipotentiary to his sovereign, or, generally speaking, of an agent to his principal, it being understood that the agent keeps within the legal bounds of his commission. Adam sinned, his act is imputed to us, and the penalty is inflicted. We are condemned to begin our existence destitute of righteousness and positively sinful, and under a sentence of temporal and eternal death. Notice certain particulars of this theory :

(1.) In distinction from ordinary covenants, in the covenant with Adam the conditions are not mutually imposed, but it is a sovereign constitution imposed by the Creator upon the creature.*

(2.) The representative element, in virtue of which Adam stood for his posterity, depends on the special and sovereign ordination of God, in distinction from the principles of natural and universal justice. In other words, it is not the natural union of men with Adam, but the " federal union which is the legal ground of the imputation of his sin to them.†" The kinship of Adam and his descendants is a reason why he, and not another, is appointed their representative ; but the justice of imputation depends exclusively upon the covenant or the federal relation in which he is placed.

(3.) Our " guilt " for Adam's sin is simply and solely a legal responsibility. As we had no real agency of any sort in com-

* Dr. A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*.

† *Ibid*, pp. 228, 240.

mitting that sin, there is no ground for self-reproach on account of it ; we are not called upon to repent of it ; nor can God, for that act of Adam, look upon us with moral disapprobation. There is no more propriety in regarding ourselves with moral displeasure on account of that transgression, than there would be in taking credit to ourselves for the righteousness of Christ.

(4.) It is said that our inborn moral depravity is the penalty of that imputed sin, and eternal death the penalty of this in-born depravity. But it is also said that for imputed sin alone, apart from this inherent depravity, which is its penalty, eternal death would not be inflicted.

Augustine's theory rests on the idea that human nature as a whole was deposited in the first man. This nature, as it came from the hands of God, was pure. The long battle which Augustine fought with Manichæan philosophy, both in his own personal experience and after his conversion, made him sedulous to avoid their peculiar tenet. But human nature, existing in its totality in Adam, was corrupted in the first act of transgression, and as such is transmitted to his descendants. The instrument of this transmission is the sexual appetite. This appetite is itself the fruit of the first sin, as well as the means whereby the sinful nature is communicated from father to son. The race was embodied in its first representative, and the qualities which it acquired in his act, which was both generic and individual, appear, when the race is unfolded or developed, as the personal possession of each individual at birth. As a personal act, the first sin was not our act but the act of another ; yet it was truly the common act of mankind in their collective or undistributed form of existence. For the consequences of this act all are therefore responsible ; and as soon as they exist as individuals, they exhibit in themselves the same corruption of nature,—the same inordinate appetites (concupiscence), and slavery of the will to sin,—which resulted to Adam. "This theory," says Neander,* "would easily blend with Augustine's speculative form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the Platonic-Aristotelian Realism in the doctrine of general conceptions, and conceived of general

* *Church History*, II. 609.

conceptions as the original types of the kind realized in individual things." Into this particular topic connected with Augustine's philosophy, we do not care to enter here. It is a fact that Realism either in the extreme Platonic form or in the more moderate Aristotelian type, prevailed from Augustine down through the middle ages, being embraced by the orthodox schoolmen, and ruling both the great schools during the productive, golden era of scholastic theology. That the realistic mode of thought extensively influenced Protestant theology at the Reformation and afterwards, admits of no question. But since it is far from being true that all Augustinians have been avowed, much less, self-consistent, Realists, it is better when we speak of them as a class, to say that they are swayed by a realistic mode of thought than that they are the advocates of an explicit Realism. It should be added that Realism, as far as it affected Augustine, was rather a prop than a source of his doctrine. The fact of innate sin was so deeply lodged in his convictions that he was ready to welcome any plausible support or defense of it that lay within his reach.

There is no need of citing from Augustine passages in which his doctrine of a generic sin in Adam is set forth. They are familiar to scholars. Indeed, after he became established in this opinion, and through all of his numerous treatises relating to the Pelagian controversy, there is a great uniformity in his expressions on this subject. The same set of propositions and arguments appears and reappears. In that great sin of the first man, our nature was deteriorated, and not only became sinful, but generates sinners.* We were all in Adam and sinned when he sinned. In his interpretation of Romans v. 12, he first sets aside the supposition that the *in quo* of the Vulgate refers to "sin" or to "death," and infers that it must refer to Adam himself. "Nothing remains," he says, "but to conclude that in that first man all are understood to have sinned, because all were in him when he sinned; whereby sin is brought in with birth and not removed save by the new birth." He then quotes approvingly the sentence ascribed to

* De Nupt. et Concup. II. xxxiv.

Hilary, the Roman Deacon: "it is manifest that in Adam all sinned so to speak, *en masse*."* By that sin we became a corrupt mass—*massa perditionis*.

So important was this hypothesis in his view, that his defense of the doctrine of Original Sin turned upon it. Without it, he knew of no refuge against the sharp and merciless logic of his adversaries. Pelagius himself was a man of no mean ability; but in Julian of Eclanum, Augustine found his full match in dialectic ability. Julian was an acute and vigorous, as well as an honest and fearless antagonist. He seized on the vulnerable points in Augustine's theory, and pursued him with questions and objections, which the latter was utterly unable to parry except by his Realistic hypothesis. This is strikingly shown in the *Opus Imperfectum* or Rejoinder to the Second Response of Julian. The Pelagian makes his appeal to the sense of justice which God has implanted in every human breast, and which utters a firm and indignant protest against the doctrine that we are blamed, condemned, and punished for what we could not have prevented. He lays hold of passages which Augustine had written in favor of the voluntariness of sin, whilst he was bent on controverting the Manichæans. To all this Augustine could only reply that sin began in an act of the human will—the will of Adam; that in him was the very nature with which we are born; that we thus participated in that act, and justly partake of the corruption that ensued upon it. He constantly falls back, first on the authority of Paul, in the fifth of Romans, and hardly less often on the authority of Ambrose, whose assertion of our community of being with Adam and agency in his transgression, had the greatest weight with his admiring and reverential pupil.

But how vital the hypothesis of sinning in Adam was in Augustine's theology is perhaps most manifest in the way in which he treats the litigated question of the origin of souls. We may say here that a great mistake is made by those who imagine that creationists—that is, those who believe that each soul is separately created—cannot be Realists. Whether they

* Cont. duas Epp. Pelag. iv. 7. Conf. Op. Imp. II. lxiii., De Pec. Mer. et Remis., III. vii.

can be consistent and logical Realists may, to be sure, be doubted. At the present day Traducianism—the theory that souls result from procreation—is accepted by theologians who believe, with Augustine, that we sinned in Adam. But this is very far from being the uniform fact in the past. Even Anselm, like the Schoolmen generally, was a Creationist. He, with a host of theologians before and after him, held firmly to our real, responsible participation in Adam's fall and to the corruption of our nature in that act, and yet refused to count himself among the Traducians. We must take history as it is and not seek to read into it our reasonings and inferences. If we do not find philosophers self-consistent, we must let them remain self-inconsistent, instead of altering their systems to suit our ideas of logical harmony.

In respect to the question of the origin of souls, the letter of Augustine to Jerome is a most interesting document, and one, the importance of which, we are inclined to think, has not been duly recognized.* He had previously expressed himself as doubtful on the question, though obviously leaning towards the Traducian side.† But the fear of materialistic notions, enhanced as it was by the opposition of the Church to the refined materialism of Tertullian, deterred Augustine then, as always, from espousing the Traducian theory. This fear, it may be here observed, together with the feeling that this theory gives too much agency to second causes in the production of the soul, operated in subsequent times to dissuade theologians from giving sanction to the same hypothesis. The letter to Jerome is a candid and memorable expression of the difficulties in which the writer found himself involved on the subject to which it relates. To him Augustine resorts for light. He begins by saying that he has prayed and still prays God to grant that his application may be successful. The question of the origin of souls is one of deep concern to him. Of the soul's immortality he has no doubt, though it be not immortal as if it were a part of God, and in the same mode in which He is immortal. Of the immateriality of the soul, he is equally certain; and his arguments to show the absurdity of supposing

* Epistol., Classis III. clxv.

† De Gen. ad Lit. L. x.

the soul to occupy space, are convincingly stated. He is certain, moreover, that the soul is fallen into sin by no necessity, whether imposed by its own nature or by God. Yet the soul is sinful and without baptism will perish. How can this be? He entreats Jerome to solve the problem. "Where did the soul contract the guilt by which it is brought into condemnation?" In his book *De Libero Arbitrio*, he had made mention of four opinions in regard to the origin of souls,—first, that souls are propagated, the soul of Adam alone having been created; secondly, that for every individual a new soul is created; thirdly, that the soul preëxists in each case, and is sent by God into the body at birth; fourthly, that the soul preëxists, but comes into the body of its own will. A fifth supposition that the soul is a part of Deity, he had not had occasion to consider. But he had gained no satisfactory answer to the problem. Beset by inquirers, he had been unable to solve their queries. Neither by prayer, reading, reflection, or reasoning, had he been able to find his way out of his perplexity.*

"Teach me, therefore, I beg you, what I should teach, what I should hold; and tell me, if it be true that souls are made now and separately with each separate birth, where in little children they sin, that they should need in the sacrament of Christ the remission of sin;" "or if they do not sin, with what justice they are so bound by another's sin, when they are inserted in the mortal propagated members, that damnation follows them, unless it is prevented by the Church [through baptism]; since it is not in their power to cause the grace of baptism to be brought to them. So many thousands of souls, then, which depart from their bodies without having received Christian baptism,—with what justice are they condemned, in case they are newly created, with no preceding sin, but, on the contrary, by the will of the creator, each of these souls was given to each new-born child, for animating whom he created and gave it,—by the will of the Creator, who knew that each of them, through no fault of his own, would go out of the body without Christian baptism? Since, then, we can neither say of God that he compels souls to become sinful, or punishes the innocent, and since likewise it is not right to assert that those who depart from the body without the sacrament, even little children, escape from damnation; *I beseech you to say how this opinion is defended which assumes that souls come into being, not all from that one soul of the first man, but for every man a separate soul, like that one for Adam!*"

Other objections to creationism, Augustine feels competent easily to meet; but when it comes to the penalties inflicted on little children, he begs Jerome to believe that he is in a strait

* IV.—"et ea neque orando, neque legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando invenire potuimus."

and knows not what to think or to say. "Magnis, mihi, crede, coarctor angustiiis, nec quid respondeam prorsus invenio." What he had written in his book on Free-Will of the imaginary benefits of suffering even to infants, will not suffice to explain even the sufferings of the unbaptized in this life. "I require, therefore, the ground of this condemnation of little children, *because, in case souls are separately created, I do not see that any of them sin at that age, nor do I believe that any one is condemned by God, whom he sees to have no sin.*" He repeats again and again this pressing inquiry. "Something perfectly strong and invincible is required, which will not force us to believe that God condemns any soul without any fault." He fervently desires from Jerome the means of escaping from this great perplexity; he would prefer to embrace the Creationist theory; but on this theory, he sees no possible mode in which native, inherent depravity and the destruction of the unbaptized can be held, consistently with the justice of God.

Such was the theology of Augustine. No one can be charged with sin but the sinner. He knows nothing of guilt without fault. If there is no real participation in Adam's transgression on our part, he can see no justice in making us partakers of its penalty, or in attributing to us a sinful nature from birth. "Persona corrumpit naturam; natura corrumpit personam." So the doctrine was summarily stated. In Adam human nature, by his act, was vitiated. That corrupted nature is transmitted, through physical generation to his descendants. They acted in him—in another—and are, therefore, truly counted sinners, being sinfully corrupt from the beginning of individual life.

This became the orthodox theology of the Western Church. Where there were deviations from it in the Catholic Church, in the middle ages or subsequently, the attempt was always made to cover up the difference and to maintain a seeming conformity to the teaching of the authoritative Latin Father. As Augustine, more than any other human teacher, inspired the Reformers, so his doctrine on this subject was generally accepted without dispute. The pages of the leading Reformers swarm with citations from him on this as on various other topics. Nor is this agreement with Augustine confined to

them. Through the seventeenth century, after the doctrine of original sin, in a great portion of the Protestant Church, had taken on a new phase, still it was to Augustine that all appealed. There is hardly a Calvinistic writer of distinction in that age who does not fall back on his characteristic definitions, and seek by means of them to fortify the doctrine of innate guilt and depravity. Having pointed out the essential features of the Augustinian view, we might spare ourselves the trouble of showing in detail, by historical inquiry, that every theory at variance with it is modern and an innovation. Who does not know that the old Protestant, as well as the orthodox Catholic theology, was Augustinian? But as our main design is to explain the origin of certain departures from this ancient and long prevailing doctrine, we shall, as briefly as possible, follow down the course of its history.

Anselm, from his mingled devoutness and intellectual subtlety, not less than from his chronological position, may be called the father of the Schoolmen. As a theologian, until we come to the Angelic Doctor, he stands without a rival. In his able and ingenious treatise on original sin, which forms a kind of sequel to the *Cur Deus Homo*, he says, in agreement with the Augustinian theory, that when Adam and Eve sinned

"The whole, which they were, was debilitated and corrupted:" not only the body, but through the body, the soul; and "because the whole human nature was in them, and outside of them there was nothing of it, the whole was weakened and corrupted. There remained, therefore, in that nature the debt of complete justice"—that is the obligation to be perfectly righteous—"which it received, and the obligation to make satisfaction, because it forsook this justice, together with the very corruption which sin induced. Hence, as in case it had not sinned, it would be propagated just as it was made by God; so, after sin, it would be propagated just as it made itself by sinning." Thus it follows "that this nature is born in infants with the obligation upon it to satisfy for the first sin, which it always could have avoided, and with the obligation upon it to have original righteousness, which it always was able to preserve. Nor does impotence excuse it"—that is, this nature—"even in infants, since in them it does not render what it owes, and inasmuch as it made itself what it is, by forsaking righteousness in the first parents, in whom it was as a whole—in quibus tota erat—and it is always bound to have power which it received to the end that it might continually preserve its righteousness."*

* De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec. ii.

That sin pertains exclusively to the rational will is a proposition which Anselm clearly defines and maintains ; and on this branch of the subject he gives to the Augustinian theology a precision which it had not previously attained. Augustine holds that native concupiscence, or the disorder and inordinate excitableness of the lower appetites, is sinful ; but he also holds it to be voluntary, in the large sense of the term. In the regenerate, the guilt (*reatus*) of concupiscence is pardoned ; but the principle is not extirpated. It does not bring new guilt, however, upon the soul, unless its impulses are complied with, or consented to, by the will. To these opinions the strict Augustinians in the Catholic Church have adhered ; but, laying hold of that distinction between concupiscence and the voluntary consent to it, which Augustine assumes in respect to the baptized, the Semi-Pelagians, as they have been generally styled by their opponents, have affirmed that *native* concupiscence is not itself sinful, but only becomes such by the will's compliance with it. At the first view, it would seem as if Anselm adopted this theory, and so far deviated from Augustine. Anselm declares that as sin belongs to the will, and to the will alone, no individual is a sinner until he is possessed of a will, and with it inwardly consents to the evil desire. "The appetites themselves," he says, "are neither just or unjust in themselves considered. They do not make a man just or unjust, simply because he feels them within him ; but just or unjust, only as he consents to them with the will, when he ought not." The animals have these appetites, but are rendered neither holy or unholy on account of them. "Wherefore there is no injustice (or unrighteousness) in their essence, but in the rational will following them."* This certainly sounds like "new-school" theology. But we find that Anselm holds fully to the propagation of sin through seminal or spermatric corruption, after the manner of Augustine. He asserts, as we have seen, the existence of a properly sinful nature which is transmitted from generation to generation. His real theory would appear to be, that a wrongly determined will, or a will already determined to evil, is a part of our inheritance. But he sticks

* *Ibid.*, l. iv.

to his sharply defined proposition that sin is predicable of the will alone; and hence he denies that spermatric corruption is sinful. Sin is not *in semine*, but simply the necessity that there shall be sin when the individual comes to exist and to be possessed of a rational soul.* This whole theory turns upon the distinction of nature and person. The descendants of Adam were not in him as individuals; yet what he did as a person he did not do *sine natura*; and this nature is ours as well as his.† Thus, no man is condemned except for his own sin. "Therefore, when the infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for the sin of Adam, but for his own. For if he had not sin of his own, he would not be condemned." This sin originated in Adam, "but this ground which lay in Adam, why infants are born sinners, is not in other parents, since in them human nature has not the power, that righteous children should be propagated from it.‡ This matter was decided and irreversibly so far as more immediate parents are concerned, in Adam. It is Anselm's opinion, we may add, that original sin in infants is less guilty than if they had *personally* committed the first sin, as Adam did. The quantity of guilt in them is less. In this he does not differ from Augustine, who thought that the perdition of infants would be milder and easier to bear than that of adult sinners.

The most popular text-book of theology in the middle ages was the Sentences of Peter Lombard. It held its place for centuries in the European universities, and there were few of the foremost Schoolmen who did not produce a commentary upon it. It presents the doctrine of Augustine in its essential parts, with abundant citations from his writings. Sin did not spread in the world, it affirms, by imitation of a bad example, but by propagation, and appears in every one at birth.§ Original sin is not mere liability to punishment for the first sin, but involves sin and guilt. That first sin not only ruined Adam, but the whole race likewise; since from him we derive at once condemnation and sin. That original sin in us is concupiscence.

* c. vii.

‡ c. xxxi.

† c. xxiii.

§ Lib. II., Dist. xxx. (Cologne, 1576.)

Our nature was vitiated in Adam; "since all were that one man; that is, were in him *materialiter*." We were in him "materialiter, causaliter," or *seminally*. The body is wholly derived from him. It is the doctrine of the Lombard that each soul is created by itself, but is corrupted by contact with the material part which is vitiated in Adam.* He gives this explicit answer to the problem which Augustine declines to solve. The law of propagation, says Peter Lombard, is not suspended in consequence of the entrance of sin into the world; and the corruption of the soul in each case is an inevitable result of its conjunction with the body. Augustine, in the *Encheiridion*, had admitted that the sins of more immediate parents as far back as the third or fourth generation, *may* be imputed to the child, but had not positively sanctioned this view. The Lombard argues that he could not have entertained it without inconsistency, since it would be incompatible with his doctrine that the sin and punishment of infants are comparatively light.† He does not deny the position of Anselm that sin belongs to the will;‡ yet he is careful to say that the soul on uniting with the body becomes *ipso facto* corrupt; since if an act of self-determination be supposed to intervene, it would be actual, and not original sin. On the whole, his representations accord with what we have explained to be the idea of Anselm.

We pass now to the prince of the scholastic theologians, Thomas Aquinas. This most acute and profound writer manifests caution in handling so difficult a theme; but his conclusions, as might be expected, coincide with the dogma of Augustine. Aquinas says that "although the soul is not transmitted, since the *virtus seminis* cannot cause a rational soul," yet by this means "human nature is transmitted from parent to offspring, and with it, at the same time, the infection of nature."§ Hence the newborn child is made partaker of the sin of the first parent, since from him he receives his nature through the agency of the generative function. No man is punished except for his own sin. We are punished for the sins of near ancestors only so far as we follow them in their trans-

* Lib. II., Dist. xxxi., xxxii.

† Ibid., Dist. xlii.

‡ Lib. II., Dist. xxiii.

§ Sum. Theol. I. ii. Q. LXXXI. Art. i.

gressions.* The main point in the explication of original sin is the nature of our union with Adam. This Aquinas sets forth by an analogy. The will, by an imperative volition, bids a limb, or member of the body, commit a sin. Now an act of homicide is not imputed to the hand considered as distinct from the body, but is imputed to it as far as it belongs to the man as part of him, and is moved by the first principle of motion in him,—that is, the will. Being thus related, the hand, *were it possessed of a nature capable of sin*, would be guilty. So all who are born of Adam are to be considered as one man. They are as the many members of one body.

“Thus the disorder (inordinatio) which is in that man who sprang from Adam, is not voluntary by the act of his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who moves ‘*motione generationis*,’ all who derive their origin from him, just as the soul’s will moves all the limbs to an act; whence the sin which is derived from the first parent to his posterity, is called original: in the same way that the sin which is derived from the soul to the members of the body, is called actual; and as the actual sin which is committed by a bodily member is the sin of that member, only so far as that member pertains to the man himself (*est aliquid ipsius hominis*), so original sin belongs to an individual, only so far as he receives his nature from the first parent.”†

Cajetan, the renowned commentator of Aquinas, undertakes to explain and defend the analogy. The descendant of Adam belongs to Adam, as a hand to the body; and from Adam, through natural generation, he at once receives his nature and becomes a partaker of sin.

The realistic character of Aquinas’s doctrine appears strongly in the argument by which he attempts to prove that no sins but the first sin of the first man are imputed to us.‡ He sharply distinguishes between nature and person. Those things which directly pertain to an individual, like personal acts, are not transmitted by natural generation. The grammarian does not thus communicate to his offspring the science of grammar. Accidental properties of the individual may, indeed, in some cases, descend from father to son, as, for example, swiftness of body. But qualities, which are purely personal, are not propagated. As the person has his own native

* Ibid., Q. LXXX. Art. viii.

† Q. LXXXI. Art. i.

‡ Ibid., Art. ii.

properties and the qualities given by grace, so the nature has both. Original righteousness was a gracious gift to the nature at the outset, and was lost in Adam in the first sin. "Just as original righteousness would have been transmitted to his posterity at the same time with the nature, so also is the opposite disorder (*inordinatio*). But other actual sins of the first parent, or of other later parents, do not corrupt the nature, as concerns its qualities, (*quantum ad id quod naturæ est*), but only as concerns the qualities of the person."

Original righteousness was principally and primarily in the subjection of the will to God. From the alienation of the will from God, disorder has arisen in all the other powers of the soul. Hence the deprivation of original righteousness, through which the will was subject to God, is the first or *formal* element in original sin, while concupiscence or "*inordinatio*" is the second, or *material* element. Thus original sin affects the will, in the first instance. Its first effect is the wrong bent of the will. Aquinas's analysis of native, inherent depravity is substantially accordant with that of Anselm.

The Reformers, as we have said, were Augustinians. As the imputation of Adam's sin was conceded generally by their Catholic opponents, as Pighius and Catharinus, at the same time that innate depravity, in the strict sense, was frequently denied, it was on this last element in the doctrine of original sin that the first Protestant theologians chiefly insisted. But the same realistic mode of thought—the same theory of a common nature corrupted in Adam—pervades their writings. In Calvin's representation of the doctrine, two propositions are constantly asserted. One is, that we are not condemned or punished for Adam's sin, apart from our own inherent depravity which is derived from him. The sin for which we are condemned is our own sin; and were it not for this, we should not be condemned. The other proposition is, that this sin is ours, for the reason that our nature was vitiated in Adam, and we receive it in the condition in which it was put by the first transgression.

These propositions are so clearly set forth, both in the Institutes and the Commentaries, that it is hardly requisite to prove that he held them. But to remove all doubt on this point, and for another purpose which will appear later, we translate the following passages :

"Observe the order here, for Paul says that sin preceded ; that from it death followed. For there are some who contend that we are so ruined by the sin of Adam, *as if we perished by no iniquity (culpa) of our own, in the sense that he only as it were sinned for us.* But the Apostle expressly affirms that sin is propagated to all who suffer its punishment. And he urges this especially when he assigns the reason shortly after, why all the posterity of Adam are subject to the deminion of death. The reason is, he says, that all have sinned. That sinning of which he speaks, is being *corrupted and vitiated.* For that natural depravity which we bring from our mother's womb, although it does not at once bring forth its fruits, yet it is sin before the Lord and deserves the penalty. And this is the sin which is called original. For as Adam at his first creation, had received gifts of divine grace as well for himself as for his posterity ; so, separating from God, he depraved, corrupted, vitiated, ruined, our nature in himself ; for having lost the image of God, he could only bring forth seed like himself. Therefore we have all sinned, as we are all imhued with natural corruption, and so are iniquitous and perverse."*

Calvin renders his doctrine perfectly clear by the distinction which he makes, in his note on ver. 17, between Christ and Adam. "The first difference," he says, "is that we are condemned for the sin of Adam not by imputation alone, *as if the punishment of the sin of another were exacted of us :* but we bear its punishment because we are guilty of the sin (culpae) also, in so far as our nature, vitiated in him, is held bound (obstringitur) with the guilt of iniquity."

To the same effect are his remarks on Ephesians ii. 3 ("we are by nature children of wrath.") The passage, he says, confutes those who deny original sin ; "for that which naturally is in all, is surely original : Paul teaches that we are all naturally exposed to damnation : therefore sin is inherent in us, *because God does not condemn the innocent.*" "God," he adds, "is not angry with innocent men, but with sin. Nor is it a cause for wonder if the depravity which is born (ingenita) in us from our parents is deemed sin before God, because the seed which is thus far latent, he discerns and judges."

* Com. on Romans v. 12.

In full coincidence with these statements, is the chapter on Original Sin, in the Institutes :

These two things are to be distinctly observed ; first, that being thus vitiated and perverse in all the parts of our nature, we are, on account of this corruption, deservedly held as condemned and convicted before God, to whom nothing is acceptable but justice, innocence and purity ; *for this is not liability to punishment for another's crime* ; for when it is said that by this sin of Adam we become exposed to the judgment of God, it is not to be understood as if, being ourselves innocent and undeserving of punishment we had to bear the sin (culpam) of another ; but because by his transgression we all incur a curse, he is said to have involved us in guilt (obstrinxisse). Nevertheless, not only has punishment passed from him upon us, but pollution instilled from him is inherent in us, to which punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, although he often calls it another's sin, (that he may the more clearly show that it is derived to us by propagation), at the same time asserts it to belong to each individual. And the Apostle himself most expressly declares (Rom. v. 12,) that ' death has passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,'—that is are involved in original sin and defiled with its stains. And so also infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation with them from their mother's womb, are exposed to punishment, not for another's sin but for their own. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, they have still the seed inclosed in them ; even their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and cannot be otherwise than odious and abominable to God. Whence it follows that it is properly accounted sin in the eye of God, *because there could not be guilt (reatus) without fault (culpa)*. The other thing to be remarked is that this depravity never ceases in us, but is perpetually producing new fruits, &c."*

That sin has its seat in the will and that the wrong bent of the will is the sole obstacle in the way of the sinner's repentance, Calvin distinctly affirms.

Turning to the Lutheran side, we find that Melancthon defines Original Sin to be the corruption with which we are born, and which is consequent on the fall of Adam.† He says further : " If any one wishes to add that we are born guilty on account of the fall of Adam, I make no objection (non impedio)".‡ But he strongly objects to the imputation of the first sin, independently of our native, inherited depravity. Original sin, he says, is, in its *formal* aspect guilt, or the condemnation of the person who is guilty ; but this relation pertains to some sin. The question, therefore, is, what is the proximate foundation of this relation, or as they call it, the proximate matter—materiale propinquum. The foundation of

* Inst. I. i. 8.

† Loc. Com. v. (Hase's Ed. p. 86.)

‡ Ibid. p. 85.

this guilt is the vice in man which is born with us, which is called defects, or evil inclinations, or concupiscence." The imputation of the first sin is conditioned on—in the order of nature, consequent upon—this innate depravity.*

Both elements, imputation of the first sin and inherent depravity are distinctly brought out in the Augsburg Confession, as issued by Melancthon in 1540.

Brentius, another leading name, among the early Lutheran theologians, exemplifies the prevalent realistic mode of representation upon this subject. "Inasmuch as all the posterity of Adam were in his loins, not for himself alone was he made an idolater in his own person, but he propagated idolatry to all his posterity, so that as many men as descend from him, are idolaters." "He drew with him the whole human race, which was then in his loins and was to be propagated from him, into so great ruin, that it could neither entertain right sentiments respecting God with its mind or obey God with its will."†

The Lutheran theologians were most of them, including Luther himself, Traducians. Herein they differed from the body of the Calvinists.

We have now to inquire into the origin of the Federal theory? How did the doctrine of a covenant with Adam become connected with Augustinism? The best histories of doctrine ascribe this innovation to Cocceius the celebrated theologian of Holland, Professor at Franeker, and then at Leyden, where he died in 1669. It is not denied that germs of this theory may be found scattered in the writings of theologians of an earlier date. It is seldom that a theory is absolutely new with him who first gives it currency, and with whose name it is afterwards associated. But Cocceius has the credit not only of introducing the method of bringing the matter of systematic theology under the three covenants, but also of engrafting the conception of a covenant with Adam, as the representative of the race, upon Calvinistic theology. There is no distinct mention of such a covenant, as far as we have been

* Ibid., p. 91.

† Quoted by Heppe, *Dog. d. Deutsch. Prot im 16tn. Jahr.* I, 390, 391.

able to discover, either in the writers of the first age of the Reformation, or afterwards until near the time of Cocceius. There is no mention of such a covenant in the Augsburg Confession, the Form of Concord, or in any other of the principal creeds of the Lutheran Church. There is no mention of it in the principal Confessions of the Reformed Church, with the exception of the Creeds of Westminster; for the Formula Consensus Helvetica, where the Covenant appears, is a creed of minor importance and of comparatively insignificant authority. We do not find the doctrine of a covenant with Adam in the First Basle Confession (1532), the Second Basle (or First Helvetic) (1536), the Gallic (1559), the First Scottish Confession (1560), the Belgic (1562), the Heidelberg Catechism (1573), the Second Helvetic Confession (1565), the Hungarian (1570), the Polish (Declaratio Thoruniensis 1645), or the Anglican Articles (1562).

Perhaps we shall best satisfy our readers in regard to this historical question, by referring to one or two authorities of great weight. The first is Weissmann, the learned Lutheran, who in his History of the Church in the Seventeenth Century, has entered into a somewhat full account of the rise of the Federal theology. The Federal method, he says, originated with Cloppenburgius, a Franeker theologian, and was farther carried out by Cocceius. To these men it is chiefly due. From their time, the Federal method spread in the Reformed Church, especially of Holland, so that the systems constructed on this model can hardly be numbered. "Among Lutherans," adds Weissmann, "this method did not find many favorers. Rather does Foertschius think, and publicly teach in his *Breviarium Select. Theol.*, that this method has not less inconveniences, than belong to methods previously used; adding, that the Federal doctrine, both respecting covenants and promises, as it is held among the learned and publicists, cannot be applied to theology, except by an abuse and perversion of terms."* In another passage, Weissmann sets forth the objections to Federalism, which were brought forward by

* Weissmann, *Introductio in Memorabilia Eccl. Historias Sacrae*, &c. Vol. II. p. 698 seq.

Lutheran theologians. Among them are the considerations, that the word *covenant* in the New Testament is very sparingly used, and does not signify that which is here in controversy; that in covenants and contracts respect is had to a benefit to be conferred on both parties, which, as far as God is concerned, cannot be here supposed; that man previously owed all things to God, and, therefore, there is no need of a covenant and compact; that the Mosaic economy alone partakes of the nature of a covenant.*

Under the name of Cocceianism, were included a variety of opinions; and the advocates and antagonists of this theologian waged a heated conflict that agitated the Reformed Church, especially in Holland. Numerous opponents of Cocceianism who were actuated by hostility to the Cartesian philosophy, or to some other real or imaginary doctrine which came to be identified with the name of Cocceius, held to the theory of a covenant with Adam. Van Mastricht, for example, was an Anti-Cocceian. Yet it remains true that this last theory found its way into theology, very much through the influence of the most distinguished advocate of the Federal method.

A second witness respecting the rise of the Federal theory, is Campegius Vitringa. In the text, and especially in the editorial notes connected with the text, of his system, is a very full statement of the history of this change in theology. For some time, says Vitringa, it has pleased divines to describe the state of man in Paradise, by the term covenant, which they style the Covenant of Works or of Nature, to distinguish it from the Covenant of Grace. "That Adam lived in a state of friendship with God, and looked for a certain good under certain conditions, has been already shown. That this state can *sano sensu*, be called a covenant, is not doubted. *Still we must hold that in the Scriptures this designation does not clearly appear, unless, perhaps, you choose to apply Hosea vi. 7 to this relation rather than to the Mosaic history; so that the Bible makes no mention of the covenant: on the contrary, this notion is clearly presented to us, that God, as absolute and natural Lord of man, has treated him as a subject, of whose*

* Ibid., p. 1103.

affection and obedience he desired to make trial. *And it really seems that the notion of a covenant pertains to the economy of grace; both Scripture and reason favoring this view.*"

It is stated in the note, that the opposition to this notion by Episcopians and other Arminians, in which they were followed by Socinians, stimulated Calvinistic theologians to espouse and defend it with more zeal.*

These last observations are deserving of especial notice. It would appear that the idea of the covenant of works was carried back to the Adamic constitution from the analogy of the covenant of grace, with which theologians were familiar; and the opposition of Arminians and Socinians tended to confirm and spread the innovation.

The Federal system was considered, at the outset, a softening of Calvinism. Predestination was mitigated, in appearance at least, by this introduction of juridical considerations. Theology seemed to take on a more Biblical cast. Hence the Federal method was disliked by the Protestant schoolmen, as they were called; that class of Calvinistic writers in whose hands theology, especially after the rise of the Arminian controversy, ran out into endless hair-splitting, according to a dry and rigid scheme, Predestination being the central idea.

But what is the covenant with Adam, as distinguished from the law of nature? What is the nature of this positive constitution? The covenant is, in its essence, a *promise*—a promise of such blessings, on the condition of obedience, as the rational creature is not entitled to by the law of nature. It is a gracious act on the part of God; an act of condescension. He couples with obedience a reward wholly disproportionate to the creature's deserts,—namely, eternal life. In this general definition all are agreed. In regard to more specific points in the definition, theologians vary from one another. The attaching of the promise to a *brief* term of obedience, for example, is sometimes regarded as one element in the covenant. But if we seek for the precise difference between the provisions of the covenant and the principles of natural and universal justice, which were of binding force, independently of it, we find this

* Vitringa, *Doctrina Christ. Relig.*, etc., Vol. ii. p. 241.

* Ibid., 247.

difference to consist in the magnitude of the promise and in the appointing of a special test of obedience. Inasmuch, however, as this special test was a revealed law, and might have been laid upon Adam, had there been no covenant, the substance of this positive constitution lies in the gracious promise that is connected by the Creator with the law.

Thus it will be seen that the covenant does not of necessity affect the substance of the Augustinian doctrine at all. The theory of the covenant may be accepted at the same time that the posterity of Adam are held to be really partakers in his sin and guilt. The breach of the law and the breach of the covenant were one and the same act. If the posterity of Adam really broke the law in Adam, they broke the covenant also. Even on the supposition that they took part in the transgression of the law, and did not take part in the violation of the covenant, still Adam brings on them no *condemnation* which they do not themselves deserve by sinning in him; they merely lose blessings to which they have, and could have, no title on the foundation of natural law. I lay a command upon a child. It is a reasonable command, and by the law of nature, I have a right to impose it; and I have a right to affix a certain punishment to disobedience. But I freely promise that in case he obeys, I will grant to him and to his brothers also, some high and undeserved privilege. Now suppose him to disobey. They, as well as he, lose something; but they lose nothing which the law of nature gave them. Suppose them, in some way, to participate in his disobedience; they, too, justly incur the positive penalty prescribed by the law, in addition to the negative forfeiture through his breach of the covenant. They suffer no greater penalty than they really deserve; they lose a greater reward than obedience would have given them a title to, apart from a special, gratuitous promise.

The mistake of the modern defenders of Imputation is in ignoring and denying the capital fact of a TRUE AND REAL PARTICIPATION IN ADAM'S SIN, which still formed the groundwork of the doctrine of original sin long after the Federal theory came into vogue. They mistake history likewise, by ascribing their own purely Federal view to the great body of Calvinistic theo-

logians in the seventeenth century, who were Augustinians as well as Federalists, holding to the second type of doctrine which we mentioned in the beginning—the Augustino-federal.

There is another historical error of a kindred nature, which pervades the Princeton discussions of original sin. These assume that the old Calvinists held to the immediate or antecedent imputation of the first sin—that is, to the condemnation of men for it, independently of their native depravity. But with the exception of certain supra-lapsarians, the Calvinistic view was, that the ascription to men of the first sin, and the ascription to them of native, sinful corruption, are each conditional to the other. The first could not take place without the second, as an inseparable part or accompaniment; and the order in which the two occur, is indifferent, as far as orthodoxy was concerned. This has been conclusively proved, and the error above stated has been fully exposed, in a series of learned articles, from the pen of R. W. Landis, D. D., which were published in “the Danville Review.”* As we do not care to do what has been so well done already, we shall have less to say here on this particular point. But having had occasion, before and since the appearance of these Articles, to traverse a great portion of the same ground, we can give an intelligent assent to this main position of the learned author.

The proposition which we are now concerned to maintain, is that in the prevailing theology of the seventeenth, as well as the sixteenth century, even after the covenant theory was adopted, the doctrine of participation in the first sin—the old groundwork of Augustinism—was still cherished.

(1.) The most approved orthodox theologians of that age confirm this statement. From a throng of witnesses we select one, for the reason that he is an acknowledged representative of the strict Calvinism of his times. The following passages are from John Owen :—

Of original sin, he says “that it is an inherent sin and pollution of nature, having a proper guilt of its own, making us responsible to the wrath of God, and not a bare imputation of

* In the Numbers from Sept. 1861 to Dec. 1862, inclusiv c.

another's fault to us, his posterity."* Answering the objection that the first sin is not ours, is not our voluntary act, he refers to the covenant, but adds:—

"That Adam, being the root and head of all human kind, and we all branches from that root, all parts of that body whereof he was the head, *his will may be said to be ours*. We were then all that one man,† we were all in him, and had no other will but his; so that though that be extrinsical unto us, considered as particular persons, yet it is intrinsical, as we are all parts of one common nature. As in him we sinned, so in him we had a will of sinning;‡ Original sin is a defect of nature, and not of this or that particular person." "It is hereditary, natural, and no way involuntary, or put into us against our wills. It possesseth our wills, and inclines us to voluntary sin."§ "If God should impute the sin of Adam unto us, and therein pronounce us obnoxious to the curse deserved by it, —if we have a pure, sinless, unspotted nature,—even this could scarce be reconciled with that rule of his proceeding in justice with the sons of men, 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die;' which clearly granteth impunity to all not tainted with sin. Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by his mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, yet never by his justice, inflicting the latter where the former is not. Sin imputed, by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ. The unsearchableness of God's love and justice, in laying the iniquity of us all upon him who had no sin, is an exception from that general rule he walketh by in his dealing with the posterity of Adam."|| The grounds of the imputation of Adam's sin to us are, "1. As we were then in him and parts of him; 2. As he sustained the place of our whole nature in the Covenant God made with him; both which, even according to the exigence of God's justice, require that his transgression be also accounted ours."¶ "There is none damned but for his own sin. When divines affirm that by Adam's sin we are guilty of damnation, they do not mean that any are actually damned for this particular fact, but that by his sin, and our sinning in him, by God's most just ordination, we have contracted that exceeding pravity and sinfulness of nature which deserveth the curse of God and eternal damnation." "The soul then that is guilty shall die, and that for its own guilt. If God should condemn us for original sin only, it were not by reason of the imputation of Adam's fault, but of the iniquity of that portion of nature, in which we are proprietaries."** "The sin of Adam holds such relation to sinners, proceeding from him by natural propagation, as the righteousness of Christ doth unto them who are born again of him by spiritual regeneration. But we are truly intrinsically, and inherently sanctified by the Spirit and grace of Christ; and, therefore, there is no reason why, being so often in this chapter (Rom. v.) called sinners, because of this original sin, we should cast it off, as if we were concerned only by an external denomination, for the right institution of the comparison and its analogy quite overthrows the solitary imputation."††

* "Display of Arminianism," *Works*, X. 70.

† "Omnes eramus unus ille homo."—Aug.

§ Ibid., p. 73.

** Ibid., p. 80.

|| Ibid., p. 74.

†† Ibid., p. 71.

‡ Ibid., p. 73.

¶ Ibid., p. 75.

One of the great arguments of the defenders of immediate or antecedent imputation in our day is founded on the analogy of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and especially of his righteousness to us. But Owen, like the old Calvinists generally, supra-lapsarian speculatists being excepted, makes a marked distinction between these various instances of imputation. This is evident from two of the passages quoted above.

In his work on Justification, also, he says:—

“None ever dreamed of a transfusion or propagation of sin from us to Christ, such as there was from Adam to us. For Adam was a common person to us, we are not so to Christ; yea, He is not so to us; and the imputation of our sins to him, is a singular act of divine dispensation, which no evil consequences can ensue upon.” “There is a great difference between the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to us, and the imputation of our sins to Christ; so that he cannot in the same manner be said to be made a sinner by the one, as we are made righteous by the other. For our sin was imputed to Christ, only as He was our surety for a time, to this end, that he might take it away, destroy it and abolish it. It was never imputed to Him, so as to make any alteration absolutely in his personal state and condition. But His righteousness is imputed to us, to abide with us, to be ours always, and to make a total change in our state and condition as to our relation to God,” * &c.

The combination of the Augustinian and Federal theories, which is manifest in the citations from Owen, appears in the creeds of the Westminster Assembly. In the Confession, it is said of Adam and Eve,—

“They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of His sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.”

In the larger Catechism, we read,—

“The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression.”

The proof-texts which were attached to these statements, and were printed with the emphatic portions in italics, show most clearly that the Augustinian conception was side by side with the Federal, in the minds of the framers of these creeds. What

* “The Doctrine of Justification,” &c., (Phil. ed.), p. 227.

they meant to teach is clearly set forth in the "Brief Sum of Christian Doctrine," which was issued by the authority of the Assembly.

"God in six days made all things of nothing, very good in their own kind, in special He made all the angels holy; and made our first parents, Adam and Eve, the root of mankind, both upright and able to keep the law within their heart; which law they were naturally bound to obey, under pain of death; but God was not bound to reward their service, till he entered into a covenant or contract with them, and their posterity in them, to give them eternal life upon condition of perfect personal obedience, without threatening death, in case they should fail.

"Both angels and men were subject to the change of their own free-will, as experience proved, God having reserved to himself the incommunicable property of being naturally unchangeable. For many angels, of their own accord, fell by sin from their first estate, and became devils. Our first parents being enticed by Satan, one of these devils, speaking in a serpent, did break the covenant of works, in eating the forbidden fruit, whereby they and their posterity, being in their loins, as branches in the root, and comprehended in the same covenant with them, became not only liable to eternal death, but also lost all ability of will to please God; yea, did become by nature enemies to God, and to all spiritual good; and inclined to evil continually. This is our original sin, the bitter root of all our actual transgressions, in thought, word, and deed."

Plainly we have here the old doctrine of a nature, corrupted in Adam, and as such, transmitted to his posterity; the covenant idea being superadded, but not yet supplanting the Augustinian. Baxter, Goodwin, and most of the contemporary Calvinistic divines, are full and explicit in the inculcation of this same doctrine.

(2.) The Placcæan controversy and the publications consequent upon it, afford decisive proof of our position that the Augustinian idea of participation in the first sin prevailed among Calvinistic writers long after the acceptance of the covenant theory. The French school of Saumur, one of the Protestant academies of theology, had for its professors, after the year 1633, three men of marked ability and erudition, Louis Capellus (Cappel), Moses Amyrædus (Amyraut), and Joshua Placcæus (La Place). Before them, John Cameron, a Scotchman by birth, had produced some commotion by his doctrine in regard to the operation of grace, which was that

* Quoted by Dr. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, p. 41.

the spirit renews the soul, not by acting on the will directly, but rather by an enlightening influence on the intellect. This was broached partly for the sake of parrying Catholic objections to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination and election. Cameron's theory did not mitigate this doctrine in the slightest degree, as was admitted so soon as his theory was understood. His substantial orthodoxy was allowed by those who withheld their sanction from the theory. The most eminent of his pupils was Amyraut. He boldly propounded the doctrine of hypothetical, universal grace, as it was called, which was really the doctrine of universal atonement. He maintained that there is in God, in some proper sense, a will or desire (*velleitas*, *affectus*) that all should repent and be saved. The decree of election follows in the order of nature the decree providing the atonement. The attempt was made in two National Synods to procure a condemnation of his doctrine, but in both cases it failed. He successfully defended himself, and proved that his doctrine was not inconsistent with the creed of the Synod of Dort. Cappel was a Biblical scholar, and by his critical opinions in this department caused a commotion only less than that excited by his colleague. He taught that the vowel pointing of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is an invention later than the Christian era, and clothed with no infallible authority; and that the masoretic text of the Ancient Scriptures is open to amendment from the comparison of manuscripts and versions. Placæus is the one of these three disturbers of theological quiet, with whom we have to do at present. He was understood to deny that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, and to resolve original sin into mere hereditary depravity. At the Synod of Charenton, in 1644-5, Garriolius (Garrisole), the head of the rival school of Montauban, presided. In no small degree through his influence, there was carried through the Synod a condemnation of the opinion attributed to Placæus, although his name was not mentioned. This opinion was pronounced an error, and was declared to involve in peril the doctrine of inherent sin itself, since apart from the imputation of the first transgression, this doctrine rests on no secure foundation. Placæus did not consider himself to be at all touched by the decree of Charen-

ton. He explained afterwards that he did not deny the imputation of Adam's sin; but only that this imputation is independent of, and prior to, inherent depravity. He distinguished between mediate and immediate or antecedent imputation. The former imputes Adam's sin not directly, but mediately,—on the ground of our inherent depravity, which is its first fruit and effect. This depravity is first imputed to us, and then the sin from which it comes. When he made this explanation, Drelincourt, the distinguished Pastor of Paris, who had been a member of the Synod and on the committee that drafted the decree, wrote to Placæus an expression of his satisfaction and confidence, saying that they had never intended to condemn the doctrine thus explained. That the doctrine of Placæus involved no serious departure from the current orthodoxy, was likewise conceded by other prominent theologians who at first arrayed themselves against him. While the matter was in agitation, and before Placæus had corrected what he deemed a grave misapprehension of his views, Andrew Rivet, a Frenchman by birth, but then a professor in Holland, prepared, for the purpose of counteracting the supposed error of Placæus, a copious collection of testimonies on the subject of imputation. It is a collection of citations from standard creeds and numerous orthodox theologians. His prime end, as we have said, is to make it manifest by an appeal to authorities, that besides native, inherent depravity, original sin involves the imputation of the first transgression. These testimonies are very interesting and important for the light which they throw on the particular questions which we are here considering. In former articles in the "Princeton Review," the mistake has been made of supposing that the design of Rivet was to assert the doctrine of antecedent or immediate imputation,—that is to say, to maintain that Adam's sin is imputed to us and made a ground of condemnation prior to, and irrespectively of, native corruption. This was no part of his plan. If it had been, his testimonies would have overthrown himself. For, as we have already remarked, if we count out a handful of supra-lapsarians, the general theory was that the imputation of Adam's sin and native depravity are inseparable, so that the one cannot exist without the other.

Rivet is simply opposing the theory that original sin comprises no element but native depravity. Whoever held to a participation in Adam's sin, such as involves a legal responsibility for it, might put the elements of the doctrine in whatever order he saw fit.

Here let us explain what we consider the real philosophy of Imputation, as the subject was generally viewed. Sometimes Adam's actual sin was said to be truly and really ours; but this was not the common representation. That sin was the act of another: it is imputed to us, as far as its guilt and legal responsibility are concerned, because we were all *participes criminis*. In a strict philosophical view, participation is the first fact in order, and the first thing to be proved. Take an illustration. A. B. is charged with a crime. Three other persons are accused of being accomplices. They did not do the deed—with their own hands fire the dwelling or commit the act of homicide. But they are charged with being participants, in the legal idea of the term, and *therefore* partakers of the guilt of the principal and liable to the same penalty. His act is imputed to them by the law. But before this is possible, the *fact* of participation must first be established; for on this fact their legal responsibility for the criminal act depends. Now extend the illustration and suppose that this deed was the transgressor's first criminal act, and as such brought on him a corrupt character, or engendered, as it inevitably must, a corrupt principle. A principle of the same sort is found to have simultaneously arisen in the hearts of those whom we have spoken of as accomplices. But as they in their proper persons have done no criminal act, can this principle, in their case, be regarded as truly and properly sinful? Not unless they can be connected with the original act of wrongdoing, as accomplices or participants. Now it will be found that Rivet and his witnesses, when they insist on the imputation of the first sin, are contending against the idea that mere native corruption is the whole of original sin; just as Calvin and many others deny that imputation is the whole. Both belong inseparably together. One may give the logical priority to inherent depravity, provided he includes under it participation in the first sin, on which imputation ultimately

rests; and another may make imputation first, it being understood that participation is the condition of it. The fact of *participation*, by which the first act is both personal and generic, and therefore ours in one sense, and not ours in another, is the point of coincidence between both views. The circumstance that participation is sometimes implied, rather than expressed, both by those who give the precedence to imputation, and those who give the precedence to native corruption, occasioned some misunderstanding between them, and has been since a fruitful source of misunderstanding to their interpreters. But, as we have already observed, if we except a few supra-lapsarians, the fact of a true and real, though not personal, participation in the first sin, is everywhere held. Not unfrequently the true philosophical order, with participation in its proper place, is found in the writers quoted by Rivet. We may cite Pareus, as an example:—

“Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes these three deadly evils, actual iniquity (*culpam*), legal guilt (*reatum*) or the penalty of death, and habitual depravity or deformity. These concur in connection with the first sin, simultaneously in the parent and posterity: with this difference only, that Adam was the principal sinning agent, admitting iniquity, meriting guilt, casting away the image of God, and depraving himself. All these things belong to his posterity by participation, imputation, and generation from a sinful parent. Thus it is a futile dispute of sophists, whether it was only the first iniquity (*culpa*) or only guilt, or only disorder, pollution or native vitiosity. For it is all these. Giving a broad definition, you may say it is the fall and disobedience of the first parents, and in them of the whole human race, in which all alike (*pariter*), the image of God being cast away, depraved their nature, were made enemies of God, and contracted the guilt of temporal and eternal death, unless deliverance and reconciliation take place by the Son of God, the Mediator.” “All are dead by the offense of one man. Therefore, the offense was the offense of all, but by participation and imputation.”*

Statements parallel with this of Pareus might be quoted in abundance.†

* Riveti Opera, T. III. §10.

† That participation is an essential element in original sin, may be seen especially by reference to the passages, in Rivet, from Musculus, Viretus, Bucanus, Polanus, Chamierus, Mestrezatius, Whittaker, (Professor at Cambridge), Davenant, Ames, Walens, Junius, Frisius, Hommius—who says, “*Peccatum Adami non est nobis omnino alienum, sed est proprium cujusque, quod propter hanc naturæ communionem singulis hominibus non tantum imputatur, sed a singulis etiam est perpetratum*”—Laurentius, Zanchius, Piscator, Textor, Crocius, Bucer,

What has been said will prepare us to comprehend the Placæan controversy. Having made a careful examination of the writings of Placæus, we feel competent to state what his views really were. His great aim was to confute the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation. He was at first understood to deny participation, but this misunderstanding, as was said above, he corrected. His opinions are expressed, prior to the Synod of Charenton, in the *Theses Salmurenses*.* God, he says, counts no man a sinner who is not truly so. Either Adam's actual sin is imputed to us, or our original, inherent depravity. The former cannot be proved from the Bible. We sinned in Adam, as we died in him. Human nature was in Adam, generically the same as in us, but numerically distinct from human nature in us considered as persons. Hence our sin is the same generically, but not numerically with his. If he was appointed to obey or disobey instead of us, why not to be punished instead of us, also? If his first actual sin was ours, why not his act of generating Cain or Seth? The true doctrine is that of seminal corruption. The sensitive soul—the animal soul—is produced from the parent; the intellectual or rational soul is directly created. The soul on entering the corrupted physical nature, is not passively corrupted, but becomes corrupt actively, accommodating itself in character to the other part of human nature; as water, by an appetency of its own, takes the form of the bowl into which it is poured.

In the copious treatise on Imputation, which he wrote after the action of the Synod, he develops his system with great fullness and likewise with great ability.† The report that his doctrine had been condemned by the Synod, he says, had been eagerly caught up by those unfriendly to Saumur.‡ But the terms of their decree did not touch him. The decree did not condemn those who restrict original sin to inherent depravity,

Chemnitz, (the author of the *Examen. Conc. Trid.*) Compare the two Dissertations on Original Sin by Rivet himself, *Disput. II.* (T. III. p. 747), and the *Theses Theolog. de pec orig.* (T. III., p. 824). In the former, sections x—xvi (inclusive) and xxiv deserve particular attention; in the latter, sections 5, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 42.

* *Syntagma Theol. in Acad. Salm., &c.* Edit. Secunda. P. I. 205, seq.

† Placæi opera Omnia: Editio novissima: Franequer. *De Imp. primi pec. Adami Disput., &c.* Tom I., p. 161, seq.

‡ P. 162.

but those who *so* restrict it to inherent depravity as to deny the imputation of Adam's first sin.* This he does not deny. He holds to imputation, but to mediate, not immediate imputation.† Adam's first actual sin is imputed to us in the sense that it is the cause of our guilt by causing our depravity, and further as our inherent sin involves and implies a consent to his first transgression.‡ In defense of the propriety of using the term "imputation" to designate this view, he appeals to Romans ii., 27: "If the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision."§ He holds that we participate in Adam's sin, and habitually consent thereto at the outset of our personal life. It may be truly said that we were in the loins of Adam, and sinned in him and with him.|| The sin of Adam is communicated to us by propagation. The corruption that followed Adam's first actual sin is imputed to us as passing over to us—*idem specie*—Adam communicating at once sin and nature.¶ He appeals to Calvin, to Gualter, to Chamier, to Rivet, in support of his doctrine as to the difference in the mode of the imputation of Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness.** The analogy of Christ's relation to us proves nothing in favor of immediate imputation. Our sins are not imputed to Christ as their author, but as a surety; but Adam's sin is imputed to us as its authors. The one is of grace, the other on the ground of desert.†† But our own faith is the necessary condition of justification, just as our intermediate depravity is the necessary prerequisite of the imputation of Adam's sin. He contends that his antagonist, Garrisole, admits everything that is essential to the Placæan doctrine. For he allows that the guilt of Adam's first sin and of inherent depravity are one and the same guilt. There are not two guilts, or guiltinesses, but only one.

Placæus claimed that his conception of the subject is identical with that of Calvin. He could appropriate the language of Calvin in the Institutes and in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, as a faithful description of his doctrine. It

* P. 176.

† P. 178.

‡ Pp. 284, 286, 179.

§ P. 284.

| P. 188.

¶ P. 198.

** Pp. 195, 198, 201, 206.

†† P. 185.

appeared at first to the opponents of Placæus, as we have more than once remarked, that he had dropped the idea of participation in the first sin; but this was simply because he dwelt so much on seminal corruption and the law of propagation, according to which depravity passes from father to son. But Anselm and Calvin might have been attacked with as much justice as Placæus. This attack on Placæus is an indication that the doctrine of Original Sin was in danger of being removed from its Augustinian foundation.

One of the most active opponents of the doctrines of the Saumur Professors was Francis Turretine. Though he had studied at Saumur as well as at Paris, he allied himself with the more rigid theologians of Montauban. He became the head of a party at Geneva, which labored to procure the condemnation of the Saumur views by the Swiss Church. Opposed to this party at Geneva were Mestrezat and Louis Tronchin, colleagues of Turretine, and other theologians of a liberal and tolerant spirit. Turretine and his party at length effected a partial success by securing the promulgation and partial enforcement, for a time, in Switzerland, of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, which they took the lead in framing. They were not deterred from this step by the remonstrance of eminent ministers of foreign churches, among whom were the Paris pastors, the younger Daillé, and the famous Claude, together with the distinguished theologian of Holland, J. R. Wetstein. Turretine and the party to which he belonged professed to regard with charity and toleration the ministers who differed from them on the points of theology to which the *Consensus* relates; they were only anxious to keep the Swiss Church free from erroneous teaching. Their creed is leveled at the peculiar doctrines of each of the three Saumur Professors. Against Cappel, they go so far as to assert the inspiration of the Hebrew vowel points in the Old Testament, and to condemn, also, his critical views respecting the Hebrew text—thus giving their solemn sanction to the Buxtorfian grammar and criticism! Having demolished Capellus, the *Consensus* condemns Amyraldism,—universal atonement and the doctrine that God desires the salvation of all. Anyrant's doctrine of universal grace is carefully defined and denounced.

Then the Placæan doctrine, or the doctrine which Turretine persisted in ascribing to Placæus, is put under the ban. The Consensus never acquired authority outside of Switzerland. Within about fifty years it was abrogated. One of the strongest advocates of this last measure was Turretine's own son, Alphonso Turretine, who was as zealous in opposing as his father had been in advocating it.* If there was ever a creed which deserves to be called the manifesto of a theological party, rather than a confession of faith on the part of the Church, the *Formula Consensus* is that one. And yet we have seen this partisan document, with its not only verbal but literal inspiration, according to the grammar of Buxtorf, quoted side by side with passages from the Augsburg Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism!

But even the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* associates with the theory of the Covenant that of a real participation in the first sin. It affirms that prior to actual sin, man is exposed to the divine wrath for a double reason, "first, on account of the *παράπτωμα* and disobedience which he committed in the loins of Adam; then by reason of the consequent hereditary corruption, introduced at his very conception, by which his whole nature is depraved and spiritually dead."

If we turn to the "Institutes" of Turretine, which was published in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, and when the antagonism to Placæus had produced its full effect in determining the form of theology on this subject, we see, indeed, vestiges of the genuine Augustinian doctrine, but we see also that this is well-nigh supplanted. Turretine leans strongly to the supra-lapsarian philosophy, which explains moral phenomena by reference to the will of God, as the ultimate found-

* In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the younger Turretine says that the Consensus would exclude from the ministry many excellent ministers of God; almost all the doctors of the first four centuries and a great number of ages following; almost all of the Reformers, a great part of the Reformed theologians of France, and the ablest among them; a great portion of the German theologians, and almost all the theologians of the English Church.

This letter may be read in the Supplement to Bayle's Dictionary by Chauseppié,—*Art.* "Louis Tronchin," Note C. The earlier letter of F. Turretine to Claude, on the other side, is in curious contrast with the sentiments of his son. This may also be read in Chauseppié.

ation, rather than his immutable justice. The doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation coheres with that system, and was espoused by its advocates. In their view, it is sufficient that God determines to consider one guilty if another sins. His determination to establish such a constitution makes it just. There is one word in Turretine's discussion of imputation which is quite significant as marking the doctrinal transition which we are attempting to sketch. He founds imputation on our natural union with Adam, as the father and root of the race, and on the federal union with him, our appointed representative. "The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not only the natural union which comes in between us and Adam,—otherwise all his sins would have to be imputed to us, but chiefly the *moral and federal*, by which God framed a covenant with him as our head."* It is chiefly—"præcipue"—the covenant relation on which the justice and propriety of imputation are made to rest. At the same time there are passages in this author which go beyond the more modern theory of immediate imputation and in the direction of Augustinism. He declares, in arguing against Placæus, that the orthodox doctrine holds to both sorts of imputation, immediate and mediate; implying that they are inseparable. He says: "In the propagation of sin, the accident does not pass from subject to subject"—that is, sin does not go from person to person—"because the immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature, vitiated by the actual transgression of the person, which being communicated to the posterity of Adam, this inherent corruption is communicated in it. As, therefore, in Adam, person infected nature, so, in his posterity, nature infects person."† Sin is transmitted—handed down. But sin is not a substance, it is an accident. Hence it inheres in something. It inheres not in the person, but in the *nature*, which being corrupted in Adam, passes down to his descendants. Alluding to Hebrews vii. 9—"Levi, also, who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham,"—Turretine denies that it is to be figuratively taken. It is to be taken in the proper sense. Abraham in that solemn action sustained the person of Levi or of the Aaronic sacerdotal order that was to spring from him;

* P. I. Loc. IX., Q. IX., xi.

† Ibid., Q. X., xxii.

and this he did properly and truly, though his other relations,—his faith, for example—were merely personal.*

Apart from the supposed Scriptural foundation for the theory of the Covenant, it is easy to account for the spread of it, and for its displacement of the Augustinian idea. The old difficulty growing out of the origin of souls by separate acts of creation, which was the accepted hypothesis among Calvinists, was felt with ever-increasing force. In particular, the Covenant theory suggested a plausible mode of meeting two objections to the doctrine of original sin in its ancient form. One thing which had not been satisfactorily explained was the non-imputation of other sins of Adam, besides the first, not to speak of all his other actions, to his posterity. If we participated responsibly in the first sin, why not in his subsequent acts also? The other fact that demanded explanation was the non-imputation of the sins of nearer ancestors, even of all mankind, to each individual. The theory of a common nature, when taken as a sufficient explication of the subject, was attended with these difficulties. The solution had been commonly sought in the hypothesis that all acts of Adam subsequent to the first, as well as the acts of nearer kindred, are phenomenal, personal. That act alone corrupted the nature. But the Covenant, it was thought, furnished an easier and better answer. The Covenant, by its terms, turned upon the conduct of Adam for a limited period, and one act of sin on the part of Adam forfeited all its privileges and brought upon mankind the judicial forfeiture. It is true that the difficulty remained until the fundamental principle of Augustine was wholly given up. How can mankind, it might still be asked, participate in the first act alone? For it was still the prevailing view, throughout the seventeenth century, among adherents of the Covenant theology, with the exception of *Supra-lapsarians*, that in that first sin there was a true and proper participation. It seems to have been long felt by theologians that the Covenant would not answer of itself, without the doctrine of real participation, in confronting objections to imputation and native depravity; and yet the two props were hardly congruous with one another. When

* Q. IX., xxv.

the justice of imputation on the ground of a federal relation was called in question, they fell back on the theory of participation; but when asked why all the actions of Adam are not imputed to us, they pleaded the Covenant.

The process of supplanting the Augustinian theory was consummated in the eighteenth century. But Calvinistic theology in England, having nothing but the Covenant to rest upon, found itself in the hapless plight which is described by the younger Edwards in his account of the state of things when his father began his labors. To illustrate the half-hearted tone and helpless situation of the representatives of Calvinistic doctrine, we have only to refer to three of the most conspicuous of them, Ridgeley, Doddridge, and Watts. Ridgeley says that Adam's sin is ours only in a forensic sense.* He considers how the imputation of it can be justified. 1. It is said: "If Adam had not fallen, we should be content with the arrangement." This, answers Ridgeley, is not a sufficient answer. 2. If his posterity had existed, the law of nature would have directed them to choose Adam for their representative, he being the common father. This answer, says Ridgely, "bids fairer to remove the difficulty," but does not wholly remove it. 3. God chose Adam to be our representative, and we ought to acquiesce. But this, Ridgeley replies, will not satisfy the objector; it puts the sovereignty of God, he will say, against his other perfections. Ridgeley comes to the conclusion that the guilt of men for Adam's sin cannot be so great as the guilt we contract by actual sins.† Here he takes up an opinion which the Schoolmen and later Roman Catholics had avowed but which the old Protestant theology had looked upon with disfavor. The punishment of infants, Ridgeley thinks, will be the mildest of any. Accusations of conscience will not belong to those who have no sin save original sin. How we can be properly sinful at birth is the point which Ridgeley, even with the help of the Covenant, is obviously puzzled to explain.

According to Doddridge, men are born with evil propensities; but the difficulty of supposing this "*is considerably les-*

* These citations are from the Am. Ed. of Ridgeley's System, Vol. I.

† P. 141.

sened” if we suppose that things are so constituted upon the whole as that a man is not *necessarily* impelled to any actions which shall end in his final destruction.”* What remains of the difficulty, says Doddridge, is the same under other schemes as under the scheme of Christianity. The sin of Adam is, “in some degree,” imputed to his posterity.† The covenant with Adam is, “in some measure,” for his posterity.‡ “*It may seem probable*” that the posterity of Adam would have been advantaged by his obedience, but to what extent we cannot say.§ One rational creature, we may be certain, will not be made finally and eternally miserable for the sin of another. What the state of those who die in infancy is, we know not.

Watts affirms that the fact of infants being the descendants of Adam will not account for their miseries and their death. We must also suppose that he is our legal representative. Of this theory of representation, Watts naively observes: “I must confess I am not fond of such a scheme or hypothesis.” “No! I would gladly renounce it,” “if I could find any other way” to vindicate Providence.¶ The appearance of injustice, in one man’s making millions of men sinners, is relieved, “*in some measure*,” if Adam is regarded as our natural head. Legal representation will “do much” towards removing all remaining appearance of injustice.¶ Watts tries to answer the objection that we did not consent to this representation by Adam. 1. A nobleman, when guilty of treason, disgraces and impoverishes his descendants as well as himself. 2. God bestows blessings on children and deprives them of privileges on account of parents’ sins. 3. The appointment of Adam, with his advantages for remaining upright, was a very advantageous thing for his posterity. Souls are separately created, but are defiled by entering corrupt bodies. This transmission of sin, says Watts, is the greatest difficulty in the doctrine. *It would not be just to punish infants eternally.*** The infant children of wicked men, he thinks, are annihilated at death.††

Into this plight were candid and excellent men brought by

* Doddridge’s Lectures, Prop. 133, Schol. 3.

† P. 414.

¶ P. 235.

§ P. 414.

** P. 309.

† P. 413, (London ed., 1763.)

| Works, vi., 224, 225.

†† Pp. 309, 314.

their federal theology. Such timid theologues were an easy prey to their Arminian assailants. Doubtless it is to Watts and Doddridge that President Edwards refers, towards the end of his treatise on Original Sin, where he confutes the opinion of "two divines of no inconsiderable note among the Dissenters of England, relating to a *partial imputation* of Adam's sin."

President Edwards fell back on what was substantially the old doctrine of original sin. In reading his discussion we seem to be carried back to Aquinas and Augustine. His original speculations are to support this doctrine, but they do not materially modify it. It is true that he calls Adam our federal head, but the covenant is only "a sovereign, gracious establishment," going beyond mere justice, and promising rewards to Adam and his posterity, in case he should obey, to which neither he or they could lay claim.* What he attempts to make out is a true and real participation in the first sin. The human species rebelled against God, and that act, as far as the morality of it is concerned, is ours not less than Adam's. There is a consent to it, or a concurrence in it, on our part. The first rising of a sinful inclination *is* this consent and concurrence; and our guilt for this first rising of sinful inclination is identical with our guilt for Adam's sin. There is not a double guilt, as if two things were "*distinctly* imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God." We really constitute with Adam one complex person—one moral whole; as truly so as if we coexisted with him *in time*, and were physically united to him as the members of the body are to the head. "The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition is not to be looked upon as sin *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin. It is as it were the *extended pollution* of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the branches with the root; or the *inherence* of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act."† In saying that this is a *constituted* union, Edwards does not mean that it is artificial, unreal, or merely legal. It depends, to be sure, on the

* Edwards (Dwight's ed.) II, 543.

† P. 544.

will of God, but not more so than does the accepted fact of personal identity. It is a divine constitution, but it is natural--a constitution of nature. The first depravity of heart and the imputation of Adam's sin, "are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself." Depravity, as an established principle, unlike the *first rising* of depravity in the soul, "is a *consequence* and *punishment* of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt." Our share in the first sin is really the same as if we were parts of Adam, "all jointly participating and all concurring, as *one whole*, in the disposition and action of the head." It will be seen that the conception of Edwards is very like that of Aquinas. One original point in Edwards's explication of the subject is the careful distinction between the *first rising* or manifestation of sinful inclination in the soul, and the same as an established principle. Had this distinction been explicitly made by Placcus, and by advocates of mediate imputation generally, their doctrine would not have been mistaken for a mere doctrine of hereditary sin. Edwards presents a philosophical theory and defense of participation. His aim is to show that it is no absurd or impossible thing for "the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostasy, so that this, in reality and propriety, shall become *their sin*;" "and therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to them."*

In New England, among the followers of Edwards, only so much of his theory was retained as asserted an infallible connection, in virtue of an established constitution, between Adam's first sin and the existence of a sinful inclination in each of his descendants. This sinful inclination was regarded not as a real participation, but only as a virtual or *constructive* consent to the first sin of Adam. The doctrine of mere inherited depravity on the one hand, and Hopkinsianism and the new-school theology on the other, were the natural conse-

* P. 559.

quence. Imputation of Adam's sin was given up. On the contrary, Calvinists of the Princeton School planted themselves on the federal theory, took up the doctrine of Immediate Imputation, which had brought the English Calvinism of the eighteenth century into such difficulties, and making Turretine their text-book, waged war upon the New England views, not wholly sparing Edwards himself.

When we direct our attention to the Roman Catholic theology we observe that the doctrine of immediate imputation, which Abelard and certain Nominalists broached in the middle ages, has found little favor in later times, except among Latitudinarians. The orthodox Catholic theology—the representatives of Augustinism—have regarded the whole Federal theory with distrust and aversion. It is remarkable that in the Council of Trent the Federal theory was brought forward by Catharinus, the opponent of Calvin, and a man who was all his life suspected in his own church of being loose in his theology in relation to the points which separated Augustine from Pelagius. According to Father Paul, Catharinus explained his opinion to be that as “God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity, when he made him father of the faithful, so when he gave original righteousness to Adam and to all mankind, he made him seal an obligation in the name of all, to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments; which, because he transgressed, he lost, as well for others as for himself, and incurred the punishments also for them.”* Against this opinion the celebrated champion of orthodoxy, Dominicus Soto, protested.† He distinguished between the actual sin of Adam and the principle or habit “bred in the mind of the actor.” “This habitual quality,” remaining in Adam, “passed into the posterity, and is transfused as proper unto every one.” “He compareth,” says Father Paul, “original sin to crookedness, as it is indeed a spiritual obliquity; for the whole nature of man being in Adam, when he made himself crooked by transgressing the precept, the whole nature of man, and, by consequent, every particular

* We quote from the old English translation of Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, pp. 175, 177.

† 176.

person remained crooked, not by the curvity of Adam, but by his own, by which he is truly crooked and a sinner, until he be straightened by the grace of God." Afterwards, Father Paul observes that the opinion of Catharinus was best understood, "because it was expressed by a political conceit of a bargain made by one for his posterity, which being transgressed, they are all undoubtedly bound; and many of the fathers did favor that; but perceiving the contradiction of the other divines, they durst not receive it." In his theological writings, composed after the Council, Soto opposed the covenant theory and defended pure Augustinism. Bellarmine declares that the Council intended to condemn the doctrine of Pighius and Catharinus, who denied that innate depravity is properly sinful. This great expounder of Catholic theology maintains that the first sin of Adam was generic. "There could not be anything in infants," he says, "of the nature of sin, unless they were participant in the first sin of Adam."* This sin is imputed to all, who are born of Adam, since all, existing in the loins of Adam, in him and by him sinned, when he sinned.†

By common consent of Protestants, Jansenius is considered to have been, on the Catholic side in the seventeenth century, the most faithful follower of Augustine. He read all the writings of Augustine seventeen times, and his copious work on this Father was the fruit of his devoted labors. Now, Jansenius opposes the Covenant theory with all his might, as being at war with Augustinian theology. Recent theologians have invented that theory, he says. They could not have excogitated anything more foreign to Augustine's thoughts, more absurd in relation to his system, or more repugnant to his principles.‡ Augustine held that the greatness of the first sin is the cause of the corruption of nature and of the transmission of corruption; and so that "all things take place by no agreement, but happen from the nature of things, because the children are said to have sinned in the parent and to have been one with him."§ "In Augustine's view nothing else is

* Vol. III. Cont. II., Lib. V. c. xviii.

† Jansenius, *Augustinus* (Louvain 1640) T. II. p. 208.

‡ Ibid., c. xiii.

§ Ibid., p. 211.

original sin, but concupiscence with guilt." Jansenius declares that nobody ever had so wild a dream as to imagine that this great depravation of human nature comes upon men from some agreement made by God with their parents, or is propagated by the positive law or will of God.* Augustine, he says, never resorted to any compacts or positive laws of God for the explication of this subject. It was through the nature of things, in Augustine's view, that the first great sin, together with human nature, pass to the posterity of Adam.† We could quote from Jansenius pages of argument and warm denunciation directed against the Federal theory. It is not merely the idea of imputation without inherent sin—the notion of Pighius and Catharinus—that he opposes, but also the whole conception of a covenant with Adam, entailing a curse on his posterity. The significance and importance of his sentiments on this subject, theological scholars will at once comprehend. He considers the Federal hypothesis an innovation, hostile to the spirit of the Augustinian doctrine.

Here we pause in this historical investigation. It is clear to us, first, that the prevailing doctrine, down to a comparatively recent period, made the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity, each the inseparable condition of the other, instead of regarding the latter merely as the penal consequence of the former; and, secondly, that real participation in the first sin formed the groundwork of imputation, the covenant hypothesis without participation being a later notion, the offspring of the false and untenable philosophy which supra-lapsarian theologians vainly endeavored to establish in the Reformed Church.

We subjoin a brief statement of objections to the theory of immediate imputation on the federal basis.

1. The Scriptural argument for this theory will not bear examination. The relation to God under which Adam was placed is never called in the Scriptures a covenant. The advocates of the theory pretend to adduce but one passage where it is thus called,—Hosea vi. 7; but this passage is correctly

* Ibid., p. 247.

† Ibid., p. 246.

rendered in our version as follows: "For they like men"—not *like Adam*, which is the other rendering—"have transgressed the covenant." The offense of Ephraim and Judah is an example of a common species of depravity. It is not claimed that the teachings of Jesus Christ contain any reference to a Covenant with Adam or to a vicarious office such as the doctrine of immediate imputation attributes to him. If this doctrine is one of so vast consequence in the Christian system, it is astonishing that the founder of Christianity should make no mention of it. The circumstance that the same penalties which are threatened to Adam, likewise fall upon his descendants, proves nothing to the purpose. In whatever way they become sinful, these penalties are appropriately inflicted on them. If it is said by Paul (1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 47), that all die "in Adam," this is not saying that their death is the penalty of his sin. They die because they are the children of Adam, but how this takes place, or the causal nexus between the two facts, is not given. The real stronghold—if it can be called a stronghold—of the imputation theory is Romans v. 12 seq. We have not room to examine this passage in detail. The stress of the argument of the advocates of this theory, rests finally on the Apostle's statement that "condemnation" comes upon men "by one that sinned" and "by the offense of one," or by one offense. But the Apostle's declaration holds good, if the transgression of Adam brought mankind into a state of condemnation, whether this result was through their own depravity or not. The great thought of Paul is that Adam ruined the race, and Christ saved it. Our condemnation is traceable to one, our justification to the other. Intermediate agencies and proximate causes are left out of consideration. The manner in which the advocates of immediate imputation interpret these words of Paul reminds one of Luther's iteration of the "*hoc est meum corpus*" in his controversy with Zwingle. It is an example of that rather frigid style of exegesis, by which transubstantiation and consubstantiation became dogmas in large portions of the Church.

2. The extreme form of the doctrine of Imputation, which is in vogue at present, involves its advocates in the inconsistency of supposing that there is a sin for which we are respon-

sible in the full legal sense—as truly so as was its perpetrator,—but which does not bring on us, of itself, eternal punishment. Calvin and most of the old theologians were consistent in holding that the penalty could not be inflicted on us for Adam's sin alone, apart from inherent depravity; for they held that imputation is impossible apart from inherent depravity. But the Princeton writers, separating the one from the other and making inherent depravity merely the punishment of sin imputed, still make this depravity the necessary condition of the infliction of eternal death. Why? Did not Adam deserve this penalty for that first act alone? Is not our responsibility for it as great as his? Why would it not be just to inflict eternal death upon us for imputed sin alone? What a strange theory! Here is a sin in which we had no real part, for which we are not regarded with moral disapprobation, which we are not bound to repent of, and which does not bring on us, as a direct penal consequence, eternal death; and yet it is a sin for which we are legally responsible,—as truly so as the individual who committed it!

3. The Covenant hypothesis, regarded as a solution of the problem of sin, wears a superficial character. It is one of those artificial solutions of great moral and social problems, which remove difficulties in *too* easy a manner, at the same time that they raise difficulties greater than those they remove. There is a striking analogy between this hypothesis and the social compact theory of government, which was the product of the same age. A covenant between individuals was declared to be the foundation of civil society, and the obligation of civil obedience was made to rest on this imaginary contract. Certain perplexing questions appeared to be solved by this hypothesis, which was a mere legal fiction, and accordingly its mischievous bearing in other respects was overlooked.

The theoretical defenses of the federal hypothesis are weak enough. It is objected to the doctrine that men infallibly become sinners in consequence of Adam's sin, through a sovereign constitution—the idea of New England theology—that this doctrine attributes too much to the *will* of God. We will not here discuss the New England view; but, strange to say, this objection comes from those who found the Covenant itself on

nothing better. They hold that men are judicially condemned to be sinners, and to endure the penalty of sin ; but when we ask for the ground of this condemnation we are referred to the Covenant, and when we inquire into the justice of the Covenant, we are thrown back on the sovereignty of God. They seek to remove a difficulty by creating another, only one step distant, of a more formidable character. It is better, with Augustine, to leave some questions unanswered than to solve them by inventing hypotheses which are in open conflict with proper conceptions of the divine justice.

The most plausible defense of the Covenant hypothesis is that founded on *scientia media*. God foresaw that the descendants of Adam, if they were to be tried individually, would do no better than he, his inducements to right action being greater than theirs would be ; and, therefore, determined to treat them judicially according to his conduct. The *scientia media*, in such applications of it, is an exploded principle. It might as well be argued that because God foresaw that Adam and his posterity would be sinners, it would be just for him to condemn them all and punish them eternally, without any probation whatsoever.

The analogy of Christ's work is pleaded in support of the theory in question. But Owen, as we have seen, makes the relation of Christ, as the author of benefits to his people, an exception to the ordinary rule of the divine administration, and a case by itself. Not to insist on the propriety of this distinction, it is sufficient to say that the argument from the analogy of Christ's work depends wholly on the idea that distributive justice is satisfied by the atonement, so that the believer, apart from the consideration of the promise to him, could not be justly condemned. To identify the scriptural and orthodox conception of expiation with the last proposition is simply preposterous.

4. The doctrine of immediate imputation, in the form in which it is now held, involves, by necessary inference, the proposition that God is the author of sin. It is held that, on account of Adam's sin, God withdraws from the soul, from the moment of its creation—that is, never imparts to the soul—the grace, without which it cannot but sin. It is thus rendered

sinful, prior to moral choice—prior to the knowledge of moral distinctions. It is vain to urge that the act of God is of a negative character. What He does renders the effect inevitable. It is vain to say that the faculties of agency remain. By the supposition, it is just as impossible, from the moment of creation, to be holy as to see without light or to breathe without air. To suppose a man to be holy is even more absurd, for, on the withdrawal of grace, the powers of the soul necessarily fall into disorder and corruption. We do not see how the conclusion can be avoided, that God is the author of sin.

5. The imputation theory makes sin the penalty of sin, in a way which the Church has never countenanced. I am condemned to be sinful, as a punishment for the sin of Adam, who is called my representative. I had no real agency, it is asserted, in that sin. But sin is inflicted on me as a penalty for another's act. Now, this theory is totally different from the old view that a wrong-doer fastens on *himself* a habit which becomes too strong for him to cast off; so that his sin becomes his punishment. The theory of immediate Imputation makes sin to be inflicted on them who are *not* wrong-doers. They are sinful in pursuance of an ante-natal condemnation,—ante-natal, and of an earlier date than their creation. The Augustinian doctrine holds that native depravity is both sin and punishment; but it professes to bring this birth-sin under the great law of habit, to which we have just adverted. We sinned in Adam and brought on ourselves, as individuals, the sinful bondage to evil in which we are born. It is thus widely at variance with the modern theory, according to which we are slaves of sin for an act which we are not to blame for and with which we had nothing to do. The agency of God in relation to the existence of sin is discussed by President Edwards in his treatise on Original Sin; and he makes the precise distinction which we have made here. The *continuance* of a state of depravity according to a settled course of nature, is one thing; the *origination* of such a state in an individual is quite another thing. This is to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. The statement and admission of this distinction leads Edwards to introduce, at this point in his discussion, the realistic view of our connection with Adam, whereby his act is made to be ours

also, and thus to be a just cause of our inherent depravity from birth.

6. The theory of immediate Imputation is incompatible with a right conception of the nature of sin. Princeton essays in support of this theory make much use of President Edwards's proposition that the virtuousness or viciousness of acts of the will or dispositions of the heart lies not in their cause, but their nature. Without assenting to everything that Edwards teaches under this head, we fully accord with his main idea that blame and praise belong to acts and states of the will, and not to anything antecedent, to which they are in some sense due. In the chapter referred to, he is prosecuting his old crusade against the notion of choosing choices. But he guards his own meaning in the following remark: "As the phrase, *being the author*, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that *is acting*, or *in exercise* in that act; if the phrase, *being the author*, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being [to be] the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them." Men are responsible, according to Edwards, for their evil native character, or state of will, because they produced it through the generic act—the act of the race—in Adam. Whether that first sin *was* thus generic, and whether if it were so, it would justify the consequences just stated—whether, in other words, a generic act of this sort may, according to a righteous order, entail guilt on the individual and engender sinful character prior to an act of individual self-determination—we shall not here inquire. But this is manifest, that Edwards, like the Augustinians, supposed that an act of sin in which we truly and really took part is the indispensable condition of native guilt and depravity. This condition the doctrine of immediate imputation on the federal basis sweeps away. We are made to have a habit of sin from the outset, with no prior act of sin on our part, out of which it grew. This violates the fundamental conception of holy and sinful character, which both the Scriptures and the common sense of mankind decisively sanction.

ARTICLE III.—DIVORCE.

PART V.—DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES.

WE propose, in the present Article, to give some account of the state of divorce in our own country. A full view of this subject would embrace the law of divorce, the procedure of the courts in such cases, and the statistics of the subject. The last head ought to include the number of applications granted, the causes for which they were granted, and the number refused. In this broad field the materials are either too many or too few, or lie outside of our appropriate province. The law of divorce must be gathered from the statutes of a great number of independent lawmaking bodies, which are not unfrequently changing their legislation, so that supplement after supplement must be consulted to find out what is the last wisdom of the representatives of the people. The procedure of the courts belongs chiefly to the domain of lawyers, and is of use in our investigations only so far as it affects the facility of obtaining divorce and opens a temptation to discontented husbands or wives. The statistics are meagre; there are none known to us of the number of rejected petitions save in a single instance; and few of the States have published tables of the applications granted. The great State of New York, for instance, still allows this information to lie buried in the offices of the clerks of sixty counties. It will not be strange then, especially as statistical science is as yet new and imperfect in this country, if our exhibition of this part of the subject, although presenting some important results, shall be judged to be unsatisfactory. It is so to ourselves, and we regard this essay rather as breaking a path for others, than as having in itself a permanent value. May we not hope that some member of the new and vigorous society of Social Science will take up this subject and bring to light something more complete.

The first point to which we call attention, is the divorce laws of the several States of the Union. Here to avoid endless repetition we shall endeavor to bring the necessary details under a few heads, not feeling ourselves bound to do more than to give examples from classes of States so far as they can be classified. No such details are furnished to us from others, except the scanty ones in the notes to Chancellor Kent's 27th lecture, (Vol. 2, 95-128). Mr. Bishop, in his standard work on marriage and divorce (4th ed., 1864), declines setting out "*in extenso* the statute laws of our several states, relating to marriage or relating to divorce. Should this be done," says he, "a great number of our pages would be occupied with the work, while very little benefit indeed would result to the reader. "But it is observable," he continues, "that the statutory law of this country, relating to this subject, seems in general to have been drawn up by men who either did not possess much knowledge of the unwritten law which governs it, or did not regard such unwritten law as worthy to be considered by them in framing the statutes; and who, moreover, gave but little thought to the matter of the practical working of the statutes. The interpretations of these enactments, therefore, becomes a subject of great difficulty." One of his proofs of the truth of these remarks is taken from the general statutes of his own State, Massachusetts, where there is a provision (chap. 107, § 6) that a divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed for *adultery* or *impotency* of either party. But impotency, to justify divorce, must be according to common law an impediment at the commencement of marriage, rendering it voidable but not void, while adultery anterior to marriage is no cause of divorce at all. And again a sentence of divorce on the former ground declares that the marriage was originally void, but one on the latter assumes that the marriage was originally valid. Here there is a jumbling together of causes annulling and causes dissolving marriage; and the same is true of the laws of many of the other States which speak of impotency barely, while other laws are careful to define it as existing before marriage. How could such a provision be interpreted without a knowledge of common law? For under some codes *impotentia superveniens* may dissolve marriage, and more fre-

quently a previous adultery renders remarriage unlawful, or at least unlawful during the life of the innocent party.

Coming now to the laws of the several States we shall find that in some of the oldest ones their origin has had important influence on legislation down to the present time. The Puritans brought English law with them, but separated from it in the matter of divorce, by following, as they supposed, the rules of the New Testament. Adultery and desertion were thus the only causes of divorce, and from this beginning their legislation, following the analogy between desertion and certain other kindred offenses, degenerated until it lost sight of the New Testament entirely. Other colonies adhered more nearly to English law, or, as Maryland, may have been influenced by the Roman Catholic doctrine of marriage and so confined divorce within narrower limits. Louisiana has been subject to varying forces in the transition from a dependency of France and Spain to the complete American character. In the newer States various concurrent influences may have shaped the divorce laws, such as the views of some prominent man among the earlier settlers, and the origin, foreign or domestic, of large classes of their inhabitants.

At first divorces were mainly, if not exclusively, granted by an act of a colonial legislature in accordance with the practice then and until recently existing in England. In the "general laws and liberties of the Massachusetts colony" printed in 1672, there is no mention made of divorce. In the laws published in 1699, the only provision we find in relation to divorce is that all controversies concerning marriage and divorce shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council. Kent states in regard to more recent times, that the constitutions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi allowed divorce only by vote of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature after trial and verdict of a superior court, or a court of chancery. But later constitutions have, in all these States, rendered such actions of the lawmaking body unnecessary, if not forbidden its exercise altogether. He adds that in Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, the legislature and not the courts had power to decree divorce. In Connecticut and New York, where the courts had jurisdiction, it was not exclusive, but the legisla-

tures of these States occasionally made use of this power down to 1839-1840. "In 1836 divorces a vinculo were granted by the legislature of Illinois, without any cause assigned, and in 1837 by that of Missouri." But the evils and the questionable right of such special legislation have in great measure put an end to it. Such special legislation is now prohibited by the constitutions of at least twenty-three of the States, among the rest by that of New York framed in 1846; and almost all the recent constitutions contain similar restrictions.* Yet this way of granting divorces has not wholly disappeared. In 1865 an act of the loyal body then claiming to represent Virginia divorced a woman in Norfolk county from her husband; the same thing took place in Maine last year (1867); Pennsylvania still adheres to such legislation within the limits of a constitutional provision, "that the legislature shall not have power to enact laws annulling the contract of marriage, in any case where by law the courts of the commonwealth are, or may be hereafter, empowered to grant divorce;" and while we write there is a petition before the General Assembly of Connecticut, to dissolve marriage in a case not included within the general statute. Such acts have occupied the ground as well of sentences of nullity as of divorce proper and of separation from bed and board. This, we believe, is a broader field than the English parliament went over in their special acts of divorce legislation. And yet in England the occasion for this kind of legislative intervention was greater, and the power to exercise it clearer. It has been contended that such acts violate the Constitution of the United States by impairing the obligation of contracts, that they are retrospective, and that they confound the functions of the lawmaker with those of the judge. But if they merely declare a contract broken, they do not impair the obligation of contracts nor take the shape of *ex post facto* legislation; and if they are confined to cases of an extraordinary character, where the

* New York (Const. of '46), N. Jersey ('44), Maryland ('57), West Virginia ('61-8), Florida ('65), Alabama ('), Mississippi ('32), Louisiana ('64), Tennessee ('39-66), Texas ('66), Michigan ('50), Minnesota ('57-58), Wisconsin ('48), Indiana ('51), Illinois ('47-48), Iowa ('57), Missouri ('65), Kentucky ('60), Kansas ('59), Nebraska ('67), Nevada ('64), California ('49), Oregon ('57).

courts could not well provide a remedy, they involve no confusion of governmental functions. Still they are on more than one account undesirable.*

The States of the Union, if looked at with reference to their divorce laws, may be divided into those which provide both for absolute divorce and for separation from bed and board, and those which know nothing of the last mentioned procedure. They may also be loosely divided into those which have more closely followed English law, and those which have multiplied the causes of divorce without any precedent drawn from the fatherland, if they did not long ago start from a standing point which was not English. Some influence on legislation in certain States may be due to Scotch law which grants divorce in cases of desertion, and some perhaps to the laws of Germany. Louisiana has a position of its own, as showing a marked influence of French law, which is shaped to suit its peculiar condition.

We have examined the statutes of about twenty-three States, including nearly all the older ones, and in sixteen of these both absolute and qualified divorces are now authorized. The States which know nothing of separation from bed and board, such as Connecticut, Ohio, S. Carolina, Indiana, and, if we are not in an error, Illinois and Missouri, represent the earlier usage of the older colonies. This separation by the civil code of Louisiana (ed. of 1857) is necessary as a forerunner of divorce proper, in all cases except where adultery or sentence of infamous punishment is the ground for the petition to the court. In some States separation from bed and board may be pronounced by decree of court temporary or perpetual; it may be revoked by a formal judicial act; it is generally confined to certain crimes, such as cruelty, or drunkenness, or neglect to maintain a wife; but in other States, such as Rhode Island and Kentucky, it can be granted for any crime which is a cause of divorce *a vinculo*, if the parties desire it, and the court think

* Chancellor Kent, Mr. Bishop, and others hold the doctrine here given. Mr. Bishop (Vol. 1, § 690) teaches that while such acts are constitutional for the main act of divorcing, they can include no collateral matter such as a direction for the payment of alimony.

fit, and for other causes according to the court's discretion. It may, also, be followed in some States by divorce *a vinculo*, if the parties are not reconciled within a certain period, as five or ten years. These separations on the whole must form a small part of the entire number annually granted: in Massachusetts they constituted, between 1861 and 1865, about one-fourteenth of all the divorces, and they grow in great number out of the misconduct of husbands. Of course the laws make provision for the support of wives and children in such cases, but in some States, as New York, Ohio, and North Carolina, alimony can also be allowed to a wife without a legal separation. The laws of the last named State authorize the courts to decree divorce or separation from bed and board, or alimony if no more be demanded, whenever any just cause of divorce exists, thus constituting a third grade of release from married society as one *de facto* without bringing it into the forms of jural separation.*

We proceed now to give a sketch of the leading provisions of legislation in this country with regard to divorce in general, beginning with those States which have kept closest to the English usage. Here South Carolina may stand at the head, a State in which no case of divorce ever came before the courts, and no divorce was ever granted by the legislature, and which, having had with its old established church no ecclesiastical courts, never granted separation from bed and board. This state of things has continued until the present time. The new constitution, now before Congress for its approval, ordains that "divorces from the bond of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by law." As the structure of society has undergone a vast change since the outbreak of the rebellion, the State will ere long probably differ but little in its legislation from its neighboring sisters. The causes of the past attitude of South Carolina in regard to divorce have been the original form of civil government, the old established church and state pride which long manifested itself in unwillingness to follow the lead of others, rather than

* See Bishop, Book V. Chap. 30 and 31.

any strong religious feeling or regard for the supposed doctrines of the New Testament. As a slave State it has winked at concubinage, and the white wife has often had to endure the infidelity of her husband, as something inevitable, which no law could remedy and which public opinion did not severely rebuke. "Not only is adultery not indictable there," says Mr. Bishop, "but the legislature has found it necessary to regulate by statute how large a proportion a married man may give of his property to his concubine" (i. § 38). From the same author we quote the following words of Judge Watts of the State Court, delivered from the bench, showing that the jurists do not regard the system as wholly good, and as deserving of all the boasts which have been spent upon it. "In this country, where divorces are not allowed for any cause whatever, we sometimes see men of excellent characters unfortunate in their marriages, and virtuous women abandoned or driven away houseless by their husbands, who would be doomed to celibacy and solitude, if they did not form connections which the law does not allow, and who make excellent husbands and virtuous wives still." Here the law of 1 James I. making marriage, while a wife or husband is living, felony, which was adopted and inserted among the old laws of the colony, is practically disregarded. Probably this State has been freer than many northern ones from those offenses against the laws of marriage in which the wife is a guilty party, for the reason that the pistol or the dagger can work out its own justice, but there has, beyond question, been a plentiful crop of those other offenses on the part of married men, in which persons of the inferior race have been partakers and victims.

New York is another of the States which has adhered somewhat closely to English law in regard to marriage and divorce. Whether before the transfer of New Netherlands by the peace of Breda from the Dutch to the English in 1671, the Dutch law, allowing divorce for adultery and desertion, was put in practice, we are unable to say, but from this time until the revolution no divorce was granted in the colony, which had now come under English law and the influence of the English Church. For a dozen years from the declaration of independence, the legislature of the State had alone the power, after

the manner of the parliament of England, to dissolve the marriage tie by an act of special legislation. In 1787 a law was passed authorizing the Chancellor to declare marriage dissolved, but only in cases of adultery. Afterwards divorces from bed and board were introduced: we find them mentioned in the laws of the State published in 1813. The legislature still intervened by special acts, but this power was taken away by the third State constitution framed in 1846. Amid the changes in the laws and in the courts of this State, the law of divorce and the procedure for dissolving the marriage tie has continued with very little alteration until the present time. Meanwhile English law has been essentially altered, but the changes have brought it into near resemblance to the law of New York in almost all essential features. Both still treat adultery as furnishing ground for private action only. But the New York law has a decided advantage in the way of protecting public morals over the English, as it prohibits the defendant found guilty of adultery from marrying during the lifetime of the innocent complaining party.

Chancellor Kent has given us in his lucid and attractive way an exposition of the law and procedure in cases of divorce, as they came before the Court of Chancery, where he so ably presided.* We borrow from him and from the revised statutes (5th ed.) those particulars which it seems important for our purpose to mention. 1. If the offense of adultery is denied there must be a jury trial; if the defendant suffers the bill to be taken *pro confesso*, a referee must be appointed by the court, and the cause must be heard on the proof taken by him and on his report. 2. If the parties were married out of the State, it must be made to appear that they were inhabitants of the State at the time of the commission of the adultery, or that the commission took place within the State, and that the injured party was an inhabitant when the complaint was brought. If the parties were married within the State, it must appear that the complainant was domiciled in the State at the time

* He died in 1847, shortly after the Court of Chancery, as distinct from the common law courts, ceased, according to the constitution of 1846, to have existence.

of the offense and of bringing the suit. Other particulars, such as the actions of the complainant which may be a bar in the way of the petition being granted, and the effect of the divorce on dower and on the husband's right in his wife's estate, reappear in the laws of many other States and need no especial mention.

The causes for which divorce from bed and board may be granted are cruelty towards the wife, conduct rendering it unsafe for her to live with the husband, desertion, willful desertion and refusal to make provision for her support. The complaints of the wife must be specific, and may be dismissed if the defendant can bring forward her ill conduct in justification so as to satisfy the court. If the court separates the parties, it may provide for the support of the wife and children out of the husband's estate, and even if no decree of separation be made, such order for the wife's support may be passed. The decree may be perpetual or for a time, and may be revoked by the court on joint application of the parties upon evidence of reconciliation.

The other States, which seem to have followed English—or it may be Catholic—views of divorce, such as Maryland and Virginia, do not now differ essentially from the mass of their sister States; we pass them by therefore to say a word in regard to the state of divorce in Louisiana, as it is laid down in the civil code (edition of 1857). The code declares that “the law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract,” meaning by this we suppose that it has nothing to do with the moral and religious aspects of the institution. But when it goes on to say that marriage is a contract intended at its origin to endure until the death of the contracting parties, it seems a little inconsistent with itself, for whence can this indissolubility be derived but from moral and religious considerations. If the law will regard nothing to be marriage but such a permanent relation, it must be because concubinage for a time, although agreed to by contract between the parties, has an immoral character. The law itself has these peculiarities, that any offense for which divorce may be granted, may also be the cause of separation from bed and board; and that for every offense, excepting two, this separation must precede

divorce proper by a certain length of time. These two causes of immediate divorce are adultery and sentence of infamous punishment; and by adultery in the case of the husband is intended, as in the French code, his keeping a concubine in the house, or openly and publicly elsewhere. In other cases two years must have elapsed, since the sentence of separation without reconciliation of the parties, before divorce can be granted. The remaining causes of separation mentioned in the code are cruel conduct, making life insupportable, abandonment, defamation, and attempt of either party on the life of the other. A statute of 1827 ordains that no divorce shall be granted except for adultery, infamous punishment, cruel conduct as above, and abandonment for five years, in which case summons to return to the common dwelling must be made one year before application for the divorce. Are we then to understand that defamation and attempt on life can separate for a time, but not dissolve the marriage tie? As for the party guilty of adultery, it is provided that he or she can never marry the partner in crime, without incurring the penalty of bigamy, and having the marriage pronounced null.

We pass now to the laws of the great majority of the States, the leading characteristics of which are to grant divorce, or it may be separation, for a great variety of offenses, to take no account of religious considerations, and thus to aim at removing difficulties which arise between partners in marriage in a way which is revolting to the mass of Christian people. Add to this to a considerable extent a great looseness of procedure, which in the extreme instances of it opens the door to greater evils than the laws themselves, if severely applied, would produce.

These laws furthermore do not fairly represent the original plan of colonial legislation. The older States have in the course of time fallen far below the strictness of their ancient laws, and the new have started from the lower position on a downward road. It was natural for Maryland at first to be under the influence of the Catholic doctrine of divorce, and for Virginia to follow the model of England. The Puritan colonies began their legislation with two causes for divorce, adultery and desertion, holding in common with their Scotch

and Dutch brethren, and indeed with the Reformed Churches generally, as well as with the Lutheran, that the New Testament recognizes both of these as sufficient grounds for the dissolution of marriage. Desertion at that time was a very different thing from that which it is now. To go to some remote colony, or to the West Indies or to the old country, from disaffection of mind, or with the spirit of a vagabond, implied lifelong severance of family ties, and the probabilities were great that such a step involved adultery also. To these two causes was added absence for seven years in parts unknown without being heard of, which, in a law of the Massachusetts colony passed in the 5th of William and Mary, is modified to suit certain hard cases, into "three years' absence for one gone to sea, the ship not being heard of for three years, when a voyage is usually made in three months." But this is not really a third cause of divorce; it is only a declaration that the probabilities of death were so strong that a new marriage after that lapse of time ought not to be regarded as bigamy. And, indeed, a law of the first year of James the First, which lays down this same principle, and fixes on this very term of years in applying it, must have furnished a model and an authority to the colonists. Such was the early legislation, which continued substantially unaltered until after the revolution shook and broke off the old traditions, and a new development of society began. When now marriage began to be looked upon more and more as a mere contract, when religious and moral considerations were kept apart from political, when legislation, perhaps in inexperienced hands, set about removing palpable evils without looking at remote consequences, when cities with their peculiar vices and their low population grew in size and number, when an emigration from the eastern States gave up its lands and homes to an inferior class of society, and in the West many of the foreign settlers were trained up under loose laws of divorce—when such causes as these were acting, it is not strange that laxer principles, touching the sanctity of marriage, crept in and expressed themselves in legislation. But aside from these social causes of change in the laws, we must admit that there was a kind of logical necessity for a broader system of divorce. If desertion was a good ground for

divorce, it might be asked why should not neglect to provide for a wife, or refusal of cohabitation be such also, which are kinds of desertion, or imprisonment for crime, which is enforced desertion. Why should not cruelty and intemperance be good grounds, which practically break up the family union? And as there are other actions which lie on the borders of these, why should not they be good grounds for divorce, if the sufferer desires it? And so, for aught we know, by and by, it may be argued that, as the essence of the marriage, considered in its spirit, is love, when this ceases, there is no good reason why marriage should not cease at the pleasure of the parties. Thus we come to the Roman practice, to the conception of marriage as a mere contract, and to the principle that incompatibility of temper or a new passion may legitimately put an end to what even the Roman lawyers called the *individua vitæ consuetudo*.

It would be a dreary and profitless task, if we were able to undertake it, to give even an abstract of the laws relating to divorce of a large number of separate commonwealths. All that we shall attempt is to enumerate the causes, which authorize the dissolution of marriage in any of the States of which we have not already particularly spoken.

1. Adultery. This can be followed by divorce everywhere, and the definition is substantially the same throughout the States. It is, as the statutes of Rhode Island define it, illicit intercourse of two persons, one of whom is married. Certain States, as Alabama and Mississippi, in their criminal laws punish rather living together in open and notorious or continued adultery than a single act if brought to light; but we suppose that they would not depart, in the practice of the court, from the ordinary definition in this country. It is a singularity of the laws of one State that the cohabitation of divorced persons makes them guilty of this crime.

2. Desertion. This offense is called by several names, as 'abandonment,' 'utter,' 'malicious,' 'willful and continued,' 'continued and obstinate desertion,' 'absence without good cause,' 'abandonment and desertion.' The sense in all the forms of expression is no doubt the same. Absence from the common dwelling and the society of the wife or husband, not

for the purposes of business, but with the evil or "malicious intent of not fulfilling conjugal obligations," and that absence, not interrupted by occasional visits, but continued long enough to test the disposition of the offender, may be said to constitute the offense thus described in different words. What the time of continued absence shall be is generally indicated in the statutes. In Indiana it is "one year, or less,"* if the court is satisfied that reconciliation is improbable, and in Missouri two years without good cause. In four or five other States it is two years (Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Alabama, Tennessee), and three years in seven others (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Maryland, Georgia, Mississippi), while five years—the prescribed time in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, and Louisiana—is the maximum fixed in any of our laws. The statutes of Rhode Island prescribe five years or less according to the judges's discretion. In one or two States there is no time specified, as seems to be the case in New York and North Carolina. In a number of these States it is made to involve, if proved, separation from bed and board, in others divorce *a vinculo*, and in one or two the one or the other according to the aggravation of the offense as estimated by the court. In Massachusetts desertion for five consecutive years may furnish cause for separation, and a libel in this case is not defeated by a temporary return of the deserting party, if it seems not to have been *bona fide* but to have proceeded from an intention to defeat the divorce. The wife, leaving the husband on account of extreme cruelty or neglect to maintain her, does not desert him, and has her remedy as an injured party. After separation from bed and board, if no reconciliation take place, the originally innocent party can obtain a divorce at the end of five years, or either party at the end of ten.†

* But by an act of 1859, "or less" and what follows is stricken out.

† A curiosity of legislation is the act of Georgia, passed March 18, 1865, just before the Confederacy collapsed, to the effect that divorce *a vinculo*, may be granted to loyal females whose husbands are in the service of the United States, or have been voluntarily within the lines of the enemy, giving them aid and comfort. Comp. what is said of a similar cause of divorce in French law, in Article IV.

3. Imprisonment for crime is absence or forced separation, caused by the guilt of one of the parties, and preventing the fulfillment of conjugal and family duties. For this reason and perhaps on account of the disgrace also most of the States regard this as cause for divorce or separation. The length and the place of imprisonment and the kind of crime are variously defined. In Massachusetts hard labor for five years or for life is a good ground for divorce, and no pardon has any effect on the sentence. In Maine imprisonment for life dissolves marriage without legal process. Vermont agrees with Massachusetts except in the time of confinement, which is made to be three years or more. In other statutes the punishment authorizing divorce must be infamous, or for felony, or in a penitentiary, and its length two years, or not less than two, or for life.

4. In the statutes of a few States, as New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Kentucky, joining a religious society which holds marriage to be unlawful, together with refusal to cohabit with the married partner for six months,—as the law of New Hampshire adds, in a somewhat ambiguous construction of words—is made a ground for divorce. And accordingly there appears one case of divorce from a wife for this reason in the lists of divorces of Massachusetts during five years. The law of this State prescribes that the membership in such a sect shall have lasted three years before a libel can be presented, while that of New Hampshire, if we understand it, reduces the time to six months' refusal of cohabitation after joining religionists of this description.

5. Neglect to provide for a wife's maintenance or support lies between desertion and cruelty. So this also is added in a number of statutes as a reason for divorce, or for separation in those codes to which separation is known. This is at one time described as neglect or refusal of the husband to support the wife, when he has the ability (Rhode Island), at another as a wasting of his estate and neglect to provide for his family (Kentucky), or the refusal suitably to maintain a wife (Massachusetts), or gross and wanton neglect to maintain a wife (Michigan), or refusal to provide for her (New York). This wrong of the husband may involve separation in the last named State,

in Maine and in Massachusetts, separation or if the court thinks fit divorce in Michigan and Rhode Island, and divorce in Kentucky.

6. Connected with neglect to provide for the family and with cruelty also, are habits of intoxication, which are a cause of divorce or more frequently of separation in many of the codes. Sometimes this is described as habitual drunkenness (New Hampshire and other States), sometimes as gross and confirmed habits of drunkenness (Massachusetts), while again we find in some codes a specification of the length of time during which the habit has lasted. It is three years' habitual drunkenness in New Hampshire and two years' in Missouri. In North Carolina a statute authorizes the court, if a man becomes a spendthrift or a drunkard, to decree alimony without separation, provided the creditors are not thereby injured.

7. In almost all the statutes which we have consulted, cruelty, under some form of words or other, is a cause for either absolute or qualified divorce. Probably there is no code of any State in which this does not appear. It is described in such phrases as intolerable severity (Vermont), extreme cruelty (New Hampshire, Maine, and other States), cruel and abusive treatment (Massachusetts), intolerable cruelty (Connecticut), cruelty and conduct rendering cohabitation unsafe for the wife (New York); as cruelties endangering life and indignities, making life burdensome (Pennsylvania), which the laws of North Carolina and Tennessee substantially repeat, the first adding to it, turning the wife out of doors, the other, ejection. Louisiana has much the same definition. Tennessee further adds in her code, attempts on life by poison or other malicious means, which is made a cause of divorce, while cruelties, indignities, and ejection are causes of separation. In Kentucky, the cruelty, or gross cruelty, is measured by the time: it must have continued six months, but another specification is added—cruel beating or injury—to which no such continuance is attached, so that a single act, for anything that appears, may be a sufficient cause of divorce.

In some statutes it seems to be assumed that the husband only will be guilty of cruelty, as the stronger party; in others, the expressions are indefinite, and may apply to both. What

the view of the courts is on this point may be learned from Mr. Bishop's work, (i. §§ 761-763). In the list of divorces granted during five years, published by order of the legislature of Massachusetts, by the side of one hundred and nineteen divorces or separations granted for cruelty of the husband there appear three for cruelty of the wife. Taken in a wide sense, as including indignities and conduct rendering life unsafe, the remedy may be as much needed in some cases by the one sex as by the other.

Besides these causes for interference in the relations of married persons, some of the codes introduce others which occurred before the marriage, and rendered the union either void and unlawful altogether, or voidable if the complaining party chooses to assert his or her rights. As these cases have properly nothing to do with our discussion, which is confined within causes for divorce occurring after marriage, and as they are illogically brought together with divorces proper, we may pass them by. We may, however, notice those laws which prohibit marriage between a white and a black person, or between a freeman and a slave, as either now of questionable constitutionality since the races are placed on an equality, or as no longer having any application.

A few of the States have somewhat remarkable provisions in their divorce laws, which deserve particular attention, either as opening a wide door of divorce or as putting the whole subject within the discretion of the courts. In the Revised Statutes of Maine (1857), after causes for divorce had been mentioned, as if the burden of specifying numerous particulars was quite too great for the lawmaker or the codifier, we find it said that divorce *a vinculo* may be granted by any justice of the Supreme Court, at any term, in the county of the residence of either party to the application, "whenever in the exercise of a sound discretion he deems it reasonable and proper, conducive to domestic harmony, and consistent with the peace and morality of society—if the parties were married in this State, or cohabited here after marriage." In North Carolina, the statute, after providing for certain special cases, adds that if "any other just cause of divorce exists," the injured party may obtain divorce *a vinculo* or *mensa et thoro*, at

the court's discretion, or a decree of alimony only, if no more be demanded (Revised Statutes of 1855). The law of Indiana provides that divorce may be decreed by circuit courts on petition of a *bona fide* resident in the county for certain causes, and then adds, and for any other cause for which the court shall deem it proper that a divorce should be granted. But the action of the Circuit Court can be revised by the Supreme Court (Revised Statutes of 1862). In Iowa, the statute authorizes a divorce when the fact appears "that the parties cannot live together in peace and harmony, and that their welfare requires a separation."* In Rhode Island, divorce may be decreed for sundry causes, "and for any other gross misbehavior and wickedness in either of the parties, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant" (Revised Statutes). And in Connecticut a well known clause of a statute, passed in 1849, allows divorce for "any such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner, and defeats the purposes of the conjugal relation."† The discretion given by some of the laws in so important a matter must be very embarrassing to the judge, and may result in the most diverse usages, according as he has loose or strict notions of the sacredness of marriage. The looseness of others of these laws will almost, of course, stretch the facility of granting divorce to the extreme limit.

A number of laws determine the time of residence in the State before a party can bring a libel or petition for a divorce, and some others prescribe what effect foreign judgments in certain cases are to have within the jurisdiction of the States concerned. Both these points are of extreme importance, as emigration is so easy, and temporary residence in another State may be used for the purpose of obtaining a divorce not

* Bishop, I, § 832.

† Chancellor Kent (ii, p. 105, note) mentions statutes of Illinois and Missouri, of 1833 and 1835 respectively, that of the former authorizing the judges in chancery to decree divorces *a vinculo* for causes not specially assigned, "if they should be satisfied of the expediency of making such a decree," and that of the latter agreeing with the law of Indiana, as given in the text. If such laws are still in force, we must have overlooked them in examining the statutes of Illinois (1858), and the general statutes of Missouri (1865). They cannot, we think, now be in the codes.

possible in the State where the party had a previous domicile, and to which he expects to return. The States are naturally not willing to have their courts used by foreigners after a short sojourn for the purpose of effecting a divorce, and the difficulty of ascertaining whether due notice has been served upon the adverse party, when he is a non-resident, may oftentimes be very great. And, on the other hand, as divorce is more subject to local law than marriage is, so that by the law of nations no *forum* is obliged to recognize the validity of the divorce law of a different religion or state of manners, it will naturally come to pass that a State of the Union will not feel itself obliged by courts to allow a divorce granted in another State to have effect within its territory, from which the parties, being residents, or one of them, had gone abroad for the purpose of obtaining the divorce. But into the details of these matters we do not propose to enter: they come within the province of the courts, and the details into which they run must be learned from extensive treatises built on the decisions of courts, such as Mr. Bishop's commentaries. We only add, that a State like Indiana, whose divorce laws are exceedingly loose, where a year's residence qualifies a person to petition for a divorce, where a case can be tried thirty days after notices published in a newspaper of the county where the suit is brought, and whose divorce fully frees both parties from the marriage contract, opens a wide door as well for *ex parte* suits, where the defendant is ignorant of the proceedings, as for gross collusions, and loses its reputation among its sister States. "Nothing is more common," writes a gentleman of high standing, living in one of the cities of Indiana, "than to form an acquaintance with some respectably appearing gentleman or lady, who has come a stranger to our city, and learn soon after that the object of the visit is to remain long enough to apply for a divorce. There is, however," he adds, "a growing public sentiment demanding a change." The acts of 1859 indicate a slight influence of a better feeling. Abandonment is put at one year, the clause "or less, if the court is satisfied that reconciliation is improbable" being omitted. The petitioner must have resided—as was said before—one year in the State;

and judgments concerning divorce are opened on behalf of non-residents.

Nor need we here do more than allude to the obstacles put in the way of divorce by the laws of many of the States, when some previous conduct of the petitioner furnishes a good reason for the denial of his petition. Such conduct is—especially if adultery be the alleged cause of the petition—the complainant's or petitioner's similar infidelity, condonation, or indulgence shown in cohabiting with the defendant after knowledge of his or her offense, long delay to notice the offense which is at length brought before the courts, or connivance or collusion of the two parties. The principles that dictate such provisions of law will govern the courts where there are no express statutes of such an import.

More important is it for our special object to consider the results of divorce to the parties, the liabilities or disabilities and the penal consequences, if any, which may follow the offense of the guilty party. Here, first of all, the way in which the different States view the sin of adultery is deserving of notice. Some, as New York and South Carolina, have always followed England in not considering it a subject of criminal punishment, nor have we noticed it among the misdemeanors mentioned in the statutes of Kentucky, of Tennessee, or of Louisiana.* In some other codes the penalty is very small—in Maryland it is a fine of ten dollars, in Virginia of not less than twenty. In most of the States it is an offense subjecting the parties guilty of it to fine or imprisonment, or both, but the amount varies greatly. The fine generally falls between one hundred and five hundred dollars; the imprisonment runs up from confinement in a common jail of not more than sixty days, as in Georgia, or three months, as in Indiana, or not exceeding six, as in Missouri and in several other States, to a year, which is the maximum in most of the codes, or even to five years, as in Vermont, Maine, and Connecticut. In a few

* In Mr. Livingston's code the guilty woman forfeits all matrimonial gains and certain leading civil rights. Her partner in guilt is liable to a fine of between one hundred and two thousand dollars, or to imprisonment not more than six months. A husband keeping a concubine is subject to the same fines, and loses the right for a certain time of being a tutor or curator to his children.

States a repetition of the offense increases the penalty. Alabama imposes in the first instance a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, with imprisonment in a county jail, or confinement with hard labor for not more than half a year, while a renewed offense between the same persons trebles the fine and doubles the imprisonment, and a third transgression is visited with two years' hard labor in the penitentiary. The laws of Illinois, again, which impose on each party a fine of two hundred dollars or six months' imprisonment for the first offense, double or treble it for successive new ones.

The feeling of the early settlers in some of the older colonies was in striking contrast with the tender treatment which adultery meets with from existing laws in this country. The first laws of Massachusetts made it a capital crime. By the laws published in 1699, persons convicted of adultery were set on the gallows with a rope round the neck, one end of which was cast over the gallows, then they were whipped on the way to the jail not exceeding forty stripes, and were obliged to have a letter A, two inches long, "of color contrary to their clothes," sewed on the sleeve or back of the outer garment in open view. And if such persons were found without the mark they were to be whipped not exceeding fifteen stripes for each neglect to wear it. The Connecticut laws of 1673 required the same brand to be burnt in on the forehead, together with the wearing of a halter and public whipping. In Rhode Island, in 1655, a wife confessing her guilt was sentenced by the General Assembly to pay ten pounds fine and to receive thirty stripes in two installments.* And Vermont, although settled so long afterward, in the original laws follows the older colonies of Massachusetts and of Connecticut in its penalties, which are thirty-nine stripes or an A branded on the forehead and the same mark on the clothes, with a liability of ten stripes if the convicted person is found without it. In the statutes of 1787 the brand on the forehead is omitted, but the guilty persons are set on the gallows and are to wear the mark on their clothing. So also in Pennsylvania a law of 1705 exposed such persons to twenty-one lashes or a fine of fifty pounds for the

* Arnold's History of Rhode Island, I, 320.

first offense, to the same number of lashes with seven years' hard labor, or a fine of one hundred pounds for the second, and for a third to a repetition of the same penalties, besides the brand with the letter A. In Virginia, again, by a law of 1691, a fine of twenty pounds sterling was imposed for every offense, but if the offender was unable to pay the fine, thirty lashes on the back or three months' imprisonment could take its place. In 1696, the money fine disappears, one thousand pounds of tobacco and a cask, or twenty-five lashes or two months' imprisonment being now the penalties. In 1705 the statute omits imprisonment, but retains the tobacco and the cask or the twenty-five lashes. Thus the Puritan, the Quaker, and the Royalist colonies agree in the severity with which they punish the crime of adultery. But they agree also in softening down their legislation on that point. In Pennsylvania, imprisonment for a year or a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars now expresses the indignation of the community on this point. In Virginia, a fine of not less than twenty dollars seems to be the entire penalty. In Massachusetts, the crime is visited with a mulct of five hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the state-prison for three years or in a jail for not more than two. In Vermont the limits are five years' confinement or a thousand dollars fine, while in Connecticut imprisonment for not less than two nor more than five years is the only penalty. It were well if these penalties were not almost obsolete. In the reports of the Commissioner of the state-prison in Rhode Island we find in the course of twenty-eight years one solitary person imprisoned for that crime. And our impression is both that there is no peculiar slackness in executing the laws in that State, and that public opinion everywhere does not demand the infliction even of the pecuniary penalty. We are aware of the difficulties attending conviction for this crime, and the comparative innocence in some cases of the nominally offending party; but surely in the vast multitude of cases of divorce for adultery, many of which are blazoned before the eyes of men with disgusting publicity, there must be more deserving of punishment and capable of being convicted than are ever brought to justice. Meanwhile private vengeance, unpunished and excused, is taking the place of public law: it would not

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* Arnold's History of Rhode Island, I, 320.

on the liberty of divorced persons, so that, plaintiffs or defendants, they are entirely free to marry again the next day, and the adulteress is even the partaker of her sin. Some of their laws authorize separations from the parties—when the separation is made, and when they come reconciled and to come together, while the reconciliation is in the hands of the court, as a solemn act. The following are some of the restrictions on the liberty of remarriage after divorce which we have found in the laws of the older States. It is in some of the States left to the courts to decide whether the offending party shall marry again. In Virginia a decree may forbid remarriage, but may afterwards be revoked for sufficient cause. In Kentucky no such decree of remarriage can be legally made within five years. In Mississippi the law is as in Virginia, and in Missouri it is in any case of divorce as in Kentucky, with the additional proviso that the court may shorten this time of approbation, but that such order must be made in a term subsequent to that in which the divorce was granted. In several States cohabitation after divorce brings on the parties divorced the penalty due to adultery. This is the case in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Michigan. In others the offending party, or, it may be, the offending party where adultery furnishes ground for the divorce, cannot marry during the lifetime of the other party. Such a regulation we find in the laws of New York, North Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts; in which latter State such marriage, when unauthorized, ranks with polygamy in its penalty, but the judges may give liberty of remarriage if they see fit, on the petition of the guilty party, when the crime is not adultery. Finally, Louisiana, following the French code, prescribes that the offending party shall never marry the partner of his or her guilt, on pain of bigamy and of having such marriage pronounced a nullity. On the other hand, we have noticed no restrictions on the marriage of divorced persons in the laws of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Alabama, while several of these States—Maine, Con-

be strange if more persons had been put to death within ten years past by injured husbands than the law has caught with its very gentle hooks. So it must ever be. Rude justice, violent, lawless, excessive retribution fills a vacuum from which the justice of society has leaked out. Let society forbear to punish homicide, and blood-revenge becomes an institution. Let it forbear to punish adultery, and the aggrieved kill the offenders, not merely when caught in the act, which law often authorizes, but on calculation and in cool blood.

We are not aware that any other species of injury done by one of the married parties to the other is made penal, except so far as the same kinds of wrong, on whomsoever inflicted, are punished by society.

There are disadvantages in respect to property, to which, especially when adultery is the ground of divorce, the guilty party or parties, against whom the divorce is issued, are exposed. Thus, according to the laws of Maine, when the wife is an adulteress, the husband may hold both her personal estate forever, and the real estate also of which she was seized during coverture if they had a living child born during marriage, and if not, during her life, in case he survives her. But the court may grant her so much of her real or personal estate as is necessary for her maintenance. Similar laws exist in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Michigan.* The law of Tennessee prescribes that the husband's rights, if he is the complainant, to his wife's property shall be the same as if marriage had continued. Others still leave the whole subject of alimony to the judge's discretion, or fix a limit beyond which it shall not reach, which limit, where the husband is guilty, must not in Rhode Island exceed half his real estate and half his personal. In Maine, if the husband is guilty, the wife is to have dower in his real estate, as if he were dead, and to have her own restored to her.

In regard to the power of the guilty party to contract a new marriage, the States differ exceedingly. Some lay no restric-

* This law of Rhode Island refers to various kinds of offenses, those of the other States, we believe, to adultery only.

tions whatever on the liberty of divorced persons, so that, whether complainants or defendants, they are entirely free to marry one another again the next day, and the adulteress is free to marry anybody, even the partaker of her sin. Some of those States which in their laws authorize separations from bed and board, leave it to the parties—when the separation is perpetual—to become reconciled and to come together, while others put such reconciliation into the hands of the court, as a formal and solemn act. The following are some of the restrictions on the liberty of remarriage after divorce which we have noticed in the laws of the older States. It is in some of the States left to the courts to decide whether the offending party shall marry again. In Virginia a decree may forbid remarriage, but may afterwards be revoked for sufficient cause. In Kentucky no such decree of remarriage can be legally made within five years. In Mississippi the law is as in Virginia, and in Missouri it is in any case of divorce as in Kentucky, with the additional proviso that the court may shorten this time of approbation, but that such order must be made in a term subsequent to that in which the divorce was granted. In several States cohabitation after divorce brings on the parties divorced the penalty due to adultery. This is the case in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Michigan. In others the offending party, or, it may be, the offending party where adultery furnishes ground for the divorce, cannot marry during the lifetime of the other party. Such a regulation we find in the laws of New York, North Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts; in which latter State such marriage, when unauthorized, ranks with polygamy in its penalty, but the judges may give liberty of remarriage if they see fit, on the petition of the guilty party, when the crime is not adultery. Finally, Louisiana, following the French code, prescribes that the offending party shall never marry the partner of his or her guilt, on pain of bigamy and of having such marriage pronounced a nullity. On the other hand, we have noticed no restrictions on the marriage of divorced persons in the laws of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Alabama, while several of these States—Maine, Con-

necticut, Indiana—expressly declare the parties free to marry again.*

In looking back on the ground over which we have thus far traveled in this Article we perceive that the number of causes for which divorce may be obtained has been very considerably increased in modern times. There is an increasing desire to be freed from the marriage bond on grounds which were, of old, regarded as insufficient; and an increasing willingness on the part of lawmakers to gratify such a desire, as well as an increasing tendency to legislate on marriage as being a mere contract, to the neglect of its moral aspects. On the other hand, there is an impression in the mind of many persons that divorces, at least in a number of the States, are multiplying; that in a certain stratum of society—shall we call it Protestant society?—the feeling of the sanctity of marriage is passing away; that the highest crimes against that covenant which stands as a symbol of the union of Christ with his church, are either excused, or regarded as things of course, or even laughed at. Moral indignation, it is thought, no longer visits the adulterer or adulteress; the more vulgar newspapers joke about the crime, and divorced persons are no longer under that frown which met them formerly, even when divorced for causes below the greatest.

Is it true that divorces are increasing? Is it true that the number of them is at all equal to the number in those States in Europe where they are most freely granted? Is there any difference between the different States in the number of successful petitions for this privilege?

We propose to occupy the remainder of this Article with an exposition of the statistics of divorce, as far as the tables prepared in several of the States place them within our reach. We regret to say that the materials are scanty. It is only of late that tables of births, deaths, and marriages have been be-

* It is quite possible that errors may have crept into the sketches of divorce legislation which we have presented to our readers. We have spent a good deal of time in consulting the complete collection of statutes in the State House at Hartford, where the State Librarian offers every facility and assistance, but the hurry of taking notes, without the facility of verifying them afterwards in cases of doubt, must bring with it more than one mistake. We shall be happy if some charitable reader will set us right.

gun in a portion of the States, while but a few are going a little farther into social or moral statistics. Massachusetts has published one list of divorces for five years, which is clumsily prepared, and leaves to the reader of it the work of counting and registering. In Vermont and in Connecticut the lists are more convenient, but in the latter State the causes of divorce have not been published with regularity. In Ohio the eminent commissioner of statistics, who has recently been displaced, Mr. Edward D. Mansfield, has prepared very useful tables. But in most of the other States all this information lies buried in the desks of the county clerks, and no one, probably, has taken the trouble to collect and make it known to the world. Some tables may have been drawn up with which we are unacquainted. Yet even our inadequate materials will supply some valuable results.

In these comparisons we may as well confess that we originally had the state of things in Connecticut in view, and were desirous of ascertaining how far this commonwealth differed in one important department of morals, and in respect to one indication of social advance or decline, from its sister States. We were desirous, also, of finding out, if we could, whether there was any movement of divorce towards increase or diminution in number, and whether the law had anything to do with such movement. This has been done once, and well done, by a friend of ours, in an Article in the *New Englander*, entitled "Divorce Legislation in Connecticut," published in July, 1866.

At the risk of repeating what was there said we must remind our readers that to the two original causes of divorce—adultery and desertion—there were added two others in 1843, "habitual intemperance and intolerable cruelty," and that in 1849 a new batch of causes was superadded, viz: sentence of imprisonment for life, bestiality or any other infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment in the state-prison, and—what we have already spoken of—any such misconduct of the other party as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and defeats the purposes of the marriage relation. This last is generally known in the State as the "omnibus clause." It appears that after each of these advances in legislation there was an in

crease of divorces, that the divorces in 1864 were five times as many as in 1849, although the population had grown by the addition of less than one-half, of which one-half Catholics, who did not swell the divorces, formed not a small part; and that the "omnibus" clause, both directly and by its influence when other causes were weak, aided the petitioners for divorces not a little. Add to all this that after divorces are granted there is an unlimited license of remarriage, and that there is little fear of prosecutions for adultery. A man and woman once divorced may return to their old connection the next day.* The adulterer and his mistress, the adulteress and her paramour may be linked together in a union which they aimed, perhaps, to make possible by their crime. Herod and Herodias might live very comfortably under our laws, unless the tetrarch Philip were malicious enough not to sue for a divorce. Is it not time, if such is the case, to see whether we ought to warn our neighbors, or whether we had better advise them to follow our example. How, then, do statistics show that we stand?

The statistics we shall present under the heads of the ratio of annual divorces to annual marriages, and, as far as we are able, to families, and to population, and shall then seek to gather any lessons from them that they may convey.

In Vermont the ratio of annual divorces to annual marriages stands thus:

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratio.
1860,	94	2,179	1 to 23.2
1861,	65	2,188	" " 33.7
1862,	94	1,962	" " 21
1863,	102	2,007	" " 20
1864,	98	1,804	" " 18
1865,	122	2,569	" " 21
1866,	155	3,001	" " 19
Total,	780	15,710	" " 21.5

* A member of the committee raised to consider the subject of divorces in 1867 stated that he knew a couple in a town near his own who were divorced and married again a fortnight afterward, and obtained a second divorce on similar grounds with the first very soon afterward.

In Massachusetts,

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1861,	243	10,972	1 to 45
1862,	227	11,014	" " 48.4
1863,	239	10,873	" " 45.9
1864,	313	12,513	" " 40
Total,	1,022	45,372	" " 44.4

In Ohio, (the years begin in July of the year named).

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1865,	837	22,198	1 to 24
1866,	1,169	30,479	" " 26
1867,	975		

In Connecticut,

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1860,	310	3,978	1 to 12.83
1861,	275	3,757	" " 13.70
1862,	257	3,701	" " 14.44
1863,	291	3,467	" " 11.90
1864,	426	4,107	" " 9.64
1865,	404	4,460	" " 11.04
1866,	488	4,978	" " 10.19
1867,	459	4,779	" " 10.40
Total,	2,910	33,227	1 to 11.40

From Prussia we have some materials for instituting a comparison between that country of notoriously loose divorce laws and the States named above. We exclude the Catholic population, which cannot be done with accuracy in the States, and thus the story which the tables tell is unfairly in favor of the latter. For instance, in Connecticut, where the whole number of marriages was, as before stated, 4,978 in 1866, the marriages, in which both parties were of foreign birth, were 1,208. Now, of these it is safe to say that two-thirds, say 800, were Catholics, who rarely petition for divorce in this State. Deducting them we have the ratio of one divorce to less than eight and a half so called Protestant or rather non-Catholic, marriages.

Prussia, in 1855. Marriage of non-Catholics, 84,914; divorces, 2,937: ratio, 1 to 29.

Thus Connecticut is at the bottom of the list altogether. The ratio of divorces to marriages is here double what it is in Vermont, nearly four-fold that in Massachusetts, and much more than double that in Prussia. There are absolutely more divorces in Connecticut, on the average, by 108 (viz: 364 every year) than in Massachusetts, a State with two and a half times as many inhabitants. There were in 1866, more than half as many as in Ohio, a State with almost five times the population.

It ought to be said that the divorces in several of the States were unduly great in the year 1864, and have been so since the war. The reason must be that many hasty marriages were contracted by soldiers; the motive being, on the woman's part, to get a share of the bounty, or the pension, if the husband should be killed. But to counterbalance this, the marriages, as always happens in similar cases after a war, have increased quite perceptibly, so that the ratio is not much affected.

In Prussia the comparisons are made between the number of divorces and the whole number of married couples, or between the divorces and the whole population. The statistics which have fallen under our notice are the following, pertaining to 1838-1840.

Judicial district of Berlin: 57 divorces to 100,000 inhabitants.

"	"	Frankfort, 30	"	"	"
"	"	Magdeburg 35	"	"	"
"	"	Konigsberg 34	"	"	"
"	"	Stettin 36	"	"	"
"	"	Greifswald 16	"	"	"

In the Rhine provinces, among 600,000 Protestants, there were four divorces to 100,000 souls, which last item shows that in a Prussian province, where the general code is not used but the legislation is based on the code Napoleon and the people have had a different juristic training, the divorces are very few. Or in other words the Prussian divorce law encourages and multiplies divorces. This is shown also by the tables for other parts of Protestant Germany. Thus, in Saxony, in judicial districts, containing 900,000 inhabitants, taking the average

of 1836-1840, there were not quite 19 divorces to 100,000 souls. In Electoral Hesse there were in 1835, 24; in 1841, 23; in 1851, 16; in 1851, 17; in 1853, 14 divorces, which point to ratios varying between less than 4 and 2 to 100,000.*

Our comparisons of these data with similar ones in some of the United States must be based in part upon estimates. For Massachusetts, we follow Dr. Jarvis's estimates in the census of that State for 1865 (page 206). Vermont adds to its population so slowly that the United States census of 1860 may be taken to represent the present number of inhabitants. For Connecticut, we may calculate on a yearly addition of two per cent., which is about the same increase which prevailed between 1850 and 1860, but may be quite too large, and therefore tells too good a story for the State.

In Vermont, taking the average, as already given, there is one divorce annually to 3,125 inhabitants, 33 divorces to 100,000.

In Massachusetts, there were, in

1861, 19.7 divorces to 100,000.

1862, 18.2 " "

1863, 19. " "

1864, 24.8 " "

In Ohio, in 1865, there were $33\frac{1}{2}$ divorces to 100,000.

And in Connecticut, in

1860, 67.4 divorces to 100,000.

1864, 85.5 " "

1867, 87.5 " "

But this, bad as it is, as we said, tells too good a story, for our estimate of population embraces all the Catholics.

*From Strippelmann's *Ehescheidungsrecht*, an excellent work written by a lawyer at Cassel in Hesse, and published in 1854. Our authority for the other German statistics is Viebahn's *Statistik*, part 2, published in 1862. The American authorities are the annual reports of the Commissioners of Statistics in Ohio for 1855-57, a report submitted to the legislature of Massachusetts in 1856, embracing five years, from 1860 to 1864, the State Librarian's annual reports in Connecticut, which for several years have by law embraced divorces also, and for Vermont the public reports for 1860, 1861, and a manuscript detailed statement, kindly furnished by Henry Clark, Esq., of Rutland, Clerk of the Senate of that State. Rev. W. W. Andrews and others have rendered us important assistance.

In Prussia, again, as the following table shows, the divorces are steadily decreasing, owing, as Viebahn says, to the more "earnest treatment" of divorces on the part of the civil and church authorities. The table gives the number of divorces and of married couples at several intervals.

1818,	3,138	divorces,	or 1 to	517	existing	marriages.
1822,	2,832	"	"	617	"	"
1836,	3,291	"	"	593	"	"
1839,	2,789	"	"	731	"	"
1841,	2,714	"	"	774	"	"
1850,	2,920	"	"	798	"	"
1855,	2,937	"	"	965	"	"

This, however, indicates not the married couples among the Protestants, as it ought to do, but through the entire population. To get at the former, we should have to diminish the last list in about the ratio of 16 to 10. Thus, in 1855, it would be, instead of 1 to 965, 1 to 603.

We have no statistics of the number of married couples in this country, but the number of families is given in the last census of Massachusetts, and the average there found, of 4.7 to a family, will probably apply to the New England States in general. Then we should have to deduct those families at the head of which there is not a married pair, in order to make a comparison with Prussia; but we have no data to perform this process within our reach. The number of families, however, in Massachusetts, in 1865, was 269,968, and the ratio here would be for 1864 one divorce to 862 families. In Connecticut for the same year, there was one to less than 249 families.

Thus, Connecticut, according to all of these measures of its position, occupies a bad eminence among the States.* We should be glad to have it in our power to present more exact statistics touching the ratio of divorce to families, for it is the disease that undermines family life. The eminent commissioner of statistics for Ohio, in his report for 1865, has some

* Indiana and Missouri certainly have no statistics of divorce, and we suppose the same to be true of all the Western States. A friend residing in Indiana estimates the annual divorces there to be almost 2,000. If it be so, the ratio to the number of inhabitants surpasses that of Connecticut.

striking remarks on this great social evil. The number of divorces for that year was 837, which, says he "at the present population of the State, is 1 to 3,000 persons, and 1 divorce to 26 of the annual number of marriages. It is not a very pleasant thought, that, when we look upon twenty-six couples of young married people, we know that one of those couples must be divorced. Yet such is the state of fact. To begin with a marriage, we have these facts. One of every 60 persons we shall meet on a road will be married within a year. But as one-half the population are under the marriageable age, and more than half the residue are married, it follows that at least one in fifteen of all the marriageable people we meet will be married within a year, or two persons out of each thirty of a marriageable age, will be married in a year—giving one marriage to each thirty. Twenty-six times that is 780; and thus two persons out of 780, or one out of 390 of all the marriageable people in the State, will be married and divorced in a year. This is the ratio, although the actual divorce will probably not take place for several years."

A somewhat similar train of thought has occurred to us in regard to Connecticut, where, for several years, one divorce has taken place to about ten marriages. Deduct now the Catholics, deduct also the better class of society, than whom a class more observant of the family tie exists nowhere on earth, and we shall conclude that out of every seven couples that call themselves Protestant one will be divorced, while, according to Mr. Loomis's tables in the *New Englander*, July, 1866, two-thirds of the divorces will occur in less than six years after marriage. And we believe that the present law must bear the burden of this social immorality.

But we cannot help adding one comparison more. Dr Dwight, in his sermon on divorce,* says that when the flood-gates were opened at the outbreak of the French revolution, there were, according to the Abbé Gregoire, 20,000 divorces granted in France in about a year and a half. Now, there were, it is said, in 1791, about twenty-six millions of persons in France. Suppose now that two-thirds of these divorces belonged to one year. According to the rate in Connecticut in

* Theology, Sermon 121.

1866, there ought to have been in France over 26,000, or according to the rate in France there ought to have been less than 266 instead of 488 that year in Connecticut. If things go on so, people will begin to wish that the lower classes, among whom now divorces principally prevail, could come under Catholic influence.

We have little to add to this exposition. The causes of divorce are given in the various reports presented to the legislatures. Some of the information we annex. In Vermont, out of 571 divorces in five years, there were for adultery, 164; willful desertion, 188; desertion, 60; intolerable severity, 126; for refusal to support, 13; with 20 others, in most of which more causes than one are mentioned. In Massachusetts, out of 1,294 divorces granted in about five years, there were for adultery, 546, or 42.3 per cent.; for desertion, 589, or 45.6 per cent.; for cruelty, 122, or 9.4 per cent.; 15 for intemperance, and 21 miscellaneous. Here the large ratio for adultery is startling. Can this represent the real state of the case? In Ohio, out of 2,681 cases of which the causes are particularly assigned, there were granted for adultery, 935; for absence and neglect, 1,030; for cruelty, 440; for intemperance, 196. For Connecticut, we add to Mr. Loomis's tables those published by the State Librarian for 1866-67, borrowing his remark in his report for 1866, that the causes far exceed the number of divorces granted. These causes are mainly

	1866.	1867.
Adultery,	158	118
Desertion,	193	153
Cruelty,	91	78
Misconduct,	177	190
Intemperance,	91	91
	<hr/> 716	<hr/> 628

"The foregoing table of causes is wholly unreliable," says the Librarian in his report of 1867, and only so much seems to be deducible, that the cause of 'misconduct' under the *omnibus* clause of the act of 1849, is exerting increasing mischief, helping out other grounds where they are weak, and

having a baleful because a most indefinite and capricious influence of its own.

In Vermont, again, the husband is the libellant in 266 and the wife in 315 cases; in Massachusetts, if we have counted right, the husband in 428 cases and the wife in 866; and in Connecticut in the years named, the husband in one-third, the wife in two-thirds of the cases, which were 810 in number.

Of the number of cases presented to the courts and rejected—which if published might test the uprightness of the courts—we have no accounts, except that in Ohio in 1857 1,441 petitions came before the courts, of which 975 were granted, 245 dismissed, and 220 not disposed of at the close of the statistical year.

Of the origin of the applicants for divorce we have no items furnished to us, save that in Ohio the counties where the Catholics form a considerable part of the population fell below their ratio, while the “Western Reserve counties have a much larger proportion of divorces than the rest of the State.” These counties constitute “New Connecticut,” the settlers of which came from the old State. The fact is significant.

Has it not, we ask in closing, been made to appear that the laws of divorce in this country demand a thorough examination, and, in many States at least, a thorough revision, but especially in that State formerly the land of steady habits, where the law and the habits of the people show the greatest degeneracy.* And are not all the churches, all right minded

* In 1867 a Committee of the Legislature of Connecticut reported an act touching divorce, which was not passed but referred over to the next legislature as unfinished business. It contains some remedies for the defects of the present law, but they touch only minor evils. Section 1 requires, where the application for divorce is *ex parte*, the testimony of two credible witnesses residing in the State, to the good character and residence in the State of the applicant. Section 2 requires that no divorce cases shall be heard in chambers or elsewhere than in open court and in the regular court-room. Section 3 forbids granting divorce on the ground of misconduct, until one year after the commencement of the suit, and Section 4 forbids granting it for any other reason until six months after passing the decree, which is to be void unless the time for its taking effect be expressed therein.

people, all Protestants and Catholics, called upon to unite in a demand that there be some check on so great and threatening an evil as that which we have spoken of in this Article. What the duty of Christian churches is in regard to divorce, especially in their discipline, and what are the leading features of a good, or at least an endurable divorce law, we intend to consider in the next number of this journal.

ARTICLE IV.—PRINCETON EXEGESIS.—A REVIEW OF
DR. HODGE'S COMMENTARY ON ROMANS V. 12-19.

ALL persons who are familiar with theological discussions must have noticed one striking difference between the writings of the higher order of German scholars and those of the defenders of a certain so-called strict orthodoxy in this country and Great Britain. The former defend their own views fearlessly, and often inform their readers that all opposed to them are arbitrary or without foundation. But they are content to examine patiently the facts of the case, and are always ready to admit that none, but those who are really so, are fellow advocates with them on the same side. They give us a long array of names, from the earliest times onward, of men more or less celebrated—even of those who have been leaders of the Church,—and tell us frankly, if the truth demands it, that they have one and all maintained a certain doctrine, or opinion, or interpretation, which is inconsistent with their own; and then they throw themselves wholly upon what seem to them the facts and arguments, confidently believing that the truth will protect itself and will decide the controversy at the end. But the latter class of persons, on the other hand, from the very position which they hold, seem to be afraid to acknowledge anything; and no sooner do they enter on the defense of some theory, which they have derived from the teachers of their own narrow circle, than they feel called upon to assume that almost everybody, from the beginning of Christian history, has believed just what they believe, and has interpreted the Scriptures just as they interpret them. If one inquires in the line of theological doctrine, they declare with the utmost boldness, that theirs is the view of the great body of the reformers and the Church. If, with the freedom which belongs to Protestantism, one ventures to ask what the words of the Sacred Text mean, they instantly assure him that commentators and scholars of every class agree with them, that theirs

is the only simple and natural explanation which can be given. A few heretics, indeed, or a few persons who have theological prejudices and cannot endure the stronger doctrines of the Bible, may, here and there, have wrested the teachings of the Apostles into something quite contrary to the plain meaning of what they wrote. But these are persons clearly outside of the Church, or, if within it, they are so insignificant in numbers as to be unworthy of notice. The voice of the great Christian company is still in unbroken harmony, and is altogether in their favor. This assumption is, perhaps, more remarkable in the matter of the interpretation of Biblical passages bearing upon certain doctrines, than in that of the opinions of past theologians concerning those doctrines themselves. For in the course of long treatises or argumentations, the words of an author may fail to be comprehended, or there may be such qualifications and modifications, that particular paragraphs and sentences may seem to bear in a different direction from others, and so may be mistaken for the opposite of what they were, originally, intended to teach. But it seems hardly possible to suppose that a writer who translates a word or passage in the Scriptures in a certain way takes precisely the opposite view of it, unless, indeed, there be either a want of careful examination or an unwillingness to see what is plainly to be seen. But the class of writers to whom we allude, do not hesitate here more than elsewhere. Indeed, this confident assumption and assertion constitute no inconsiderable portion of their power and influence over their followers. Hundreds of minds, unaccustomed to examine for themselves, gain a more unwavering trust in what they have been taught to believe, because they hear their teachers continually repeating to them, that the Scriptures, literally interpreted, mean thus and so, and that all unprejudiced minds of every theological opinion, as well as in every age, have admitted the fact. And, doubtless, the repetition has its due effect not only on the disciples, but also on the masters themselves. They are led to firmer conviction, and are made bolder in their conflicts with adversaries, as they persuade themselves that what they have said so often must be the truth; until, by and by, the person who ventures to go back to the original sources for himself, and, in

his search, happens to discover another interpretation which has been adopted, in the past, by great numbers of learned scholars, or is even accepted by the majority of them at the present day, is immediately judged to be at variance with orthodoxy, or is charitably regarded as being in his life somewhat better than he is in his faith. No body of theologians in this country, during the past thirty or forty years, have been more constant illustrations of this peculiarity, than those whose center is at Princeton; and no example of this method of dealing, on their part, with Scriptural interpretation can be brought forward, which is more striking than that which has reference to the doctrine of Original Sin.

In his recently-published edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans—much enlarged beyond the limits of his earlier work, and, doubtless, presenting the results of his matured scholarship and reflection—Dr. Hodge sets forth before his readers the Princeton view concerning the imputation of Adam's sin, as founded upon the celebrated passage in the fifth chapter of that Epistle. He draws out his explanation of the verses at great length, claiming for it the authority of the Church, and defending it with all his ability; and then, at the close of his arguments and exegesis, we hear the solemn, and to his own mind and that of his followers, no doubt, decisive announcement—"It should be remembered, that the interpretation given to the several clauses in this passage is the simple, natural meaning of the words, as, with scarcely an exception, is admitted. The objections relied upon against it are almost exclusively of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character." We propose, in the present Article, to raise the question, Is it so? Is the meaning given by this distinguished theologian to the several words and phrases, as he asserts, the *natural and simple meaning*, to which the unbiased mind is most readily brought, and is this admitted, *with scarcely an exception*, either by his opponents or by commentators in general? The objections against the Princeton theory from what may be called the theological standpoint are numerous and strong enough, but the question to which we limit ourselves is, whether these are all, or whether, on the other hand,

it is not clear, that those objections which come from the philological or exegetical side are quite as numerous and quite as strong. In our opinion, they are, at least, about as numerous as the length of the passage will allow, for they are to be found at every successive step;—and the scholars who are at variance with Dr. Hodge far exceed in number those who accord with his views.

But, that we may have the ground clearly opened before us, we call attention, at the outset, to his paraphrase of the whole passage, which is as follows:—"By one man sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the relation of sinners to God; death consequently passed on all, because for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners. That this is really the case is plain, because the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more extensive than its violation; and consequently, if all are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. This universality in the infliction of penal evil cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to such evil before that law was given; nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil, who have never personally sinned at all. We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam. He is, therefore, a type of Christ. The cases, however, are not entirely analogous; for if it is consistent with the Divine character, that we should suffer for what Adam did, how much more may we expect to be made happy for what Christ has done! Besides, we are condemned for one sin only, on Adam's account; whereas Christ saves us not only from the evils consequent on that transgression, but also from the punishment of our own innumerable offenses. Now, if for the offense of one, death thus triumphs over all, how much more shall they who receive the grace of the gospel, not only be saved from evil, but reign in life through Christ Jesus! Wherefore, as on account of one the condemnatory sentence has passed on all the descendants of Adam, so on account of the righteousness of one, gratuitous justification comes on all who receive the grace of Christ; for

as on account of the disobedience of one we are regarded as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other we are regarded as righteous."

It will be seen from the above, that the main force of the passage, as thus explained, and the main peculiarity of the Princeton view lies in the words, "for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners." And were there any doubt on this point, after the mere examination of the paraphrase, other remarks which the author makes would be decisive—as, for example, "His design is to show that there is a form of death, or penal evil, to which men are subject, anterior to any personal transgression or inherent corruption." "It follows that they are regarded and treated as sinners, on the ground of the disobedience of another." "Adam's sin is the direct judicial ground or reason for the infliction of penal evil" on his posterity. Adam's sin "constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them," i. e. as sinners. "We are involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern." This statement, that we had no personal concern in Adam's sin, means, according to Dr. Hodge, that we did not participate in Adam's sin, and that we were not one moral person with him. We only sinned in him as our head and representative;—that is, he being our representative, his sin was "the judicial ground or reason why death passed upon all of us;"—or, in other words, while there is "no ground of remorse to us" for Adam's sin, because we did not commit it, we are justly exposed to condemnation on account of it. To the maintenance of the idea, then, *that men, though not having committed Adam's sin, are legally responsible for it, and are condemned, in consequence, to the endurance of penal evil, because he was their legal representative*, the theologians of this School are obliged to commit themselves, and they are obliged to show, that this idea is found in Romans v. 12-19.

In considering the tenableness or untenableness of their view in regard to this passage of Paul's writings, it should be borne in mind that, if the Apostle conveys any such meaning as this, it must be contained in the verb *ἡμαρτον* of vs. 12 considered in itself; or in the 13th and 14th verses, in their bear-

ing upon that verb; or in the thought of vs. 15, as modified and influenced by vs. 16 and 17; or, finally in the words *καὶ ἐστράθησαν ἁμαρτωλοὶ* of vs. 19, as giving the reason for the statement of the 18th verse. To the investigation of these four main points, therefore, we now turn, and, for the sake of greater order and clearness, we shall include whatever remarks may be suggested on subordinate points, under one or another of these heads.

I.

What, then, *in the first place*, let us inquire, is the "natural and simple meaning" of *ἡμαρτον* of the twelfth verse? In his earlier Commentary, published thirty years ago, and the eighteenth edition of which, issued in 1861, we have before us, the distinguished Professor seems to take the position, that this verb may be properly translated here by the words, "were regarded and treated as sinners."* And in support of such a translation, as in strict accordance with usage, he refers to two passages in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament—namely, Gen. xlv. 32 (or Gen. xliii. 9, which has the same words), and 1 Kings i. 21. His opponents in the controversies of those days assailed his position with earnestness, and, as we believe, conclusively showed that any such idea of the verb was, in the strictest sense, against the usage of the Greek language, and that the two instances quoted from the Septuagint—even allowing all that could be claimed with regard to them—could not, with any reason, be made to bear upon the verse now under consideration. It will hardly be necessary to repeat what they said, or to renew the argument. Nothing, it will be admitted, but *the absolute necessity of the case*, could ever make us translate the verb *ἡμαρτων* in this way even in those verses. In other words, if we could find any possibility in the context, of assigning the ordinary active meaning to the

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verb, the universal classical and Biblical usage of the word would lead us instantly to do so. The same is true of every other case, and, therefore, so far from adopting any such interpretation readily, as the natural signification, the presumption is overwhelming against it; so overwhelming indeed, that, among all the lexicographers whose works we have at command, only one even alludes to any such meaning of the word anywhere, and he only in this passage and Gen. xlv. 32. But we regard Dr. Hodge himself as having abandoned this position at last. The opportunities for examination of the Greek language, during thirty years, and the accumulating evidence derived from the views of all the celebrated scholars of Germany, who have, within that time, accomplished so much in this department, could scarcely fail to drive any man, in some measure, away from a view so utterly without foundation. Accordingly, we find, in the recent edition, that he throws the argument above alluded to into a subordinate place, and acknowledges that πάντες ἥμαρτον "signifies all sinned and can signify nothing else." We may consider the controversy on this particular point, therefore, as now at an end. And we respectfully suggest, that the objections presented by those who believed, long ago, that this was the only possible signification of ἥμαρτον, were not "of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character."

It must not be supposed however, from what has just been said, that Dr. Hodge has come over to the ground of his adversaries altogether, in regard to this word. Far from it. His doctrinal opinions still keep their hold upon him, and he now informs us that, wherever we find the words πάντες ἥμαρτον, which "can signify nothing else but all sinned," the question must be asked, *in what sense* did they all sin? This question he answers in the present case, by saying we sinned "putatively" in Adam, or his sin was "legally and effectively" ours:—and so he comes, substantially, to the same position as before, while he reiterates, in decisive terms, that this is "the simple and natural meaning" of the words. But where do we discover anything which justifies such an idea? The verb, "to sin," ἁμαρτάνειν is very familiar to the New Testament writers, and one which nearly all of them use. This verb, and its kindred noun and adjective, ἁμαρτία and ἁμαρτωλός, are employed

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by Paul more frequently than by any one else—more than fifty times in this one Epistle to the Romans. Surely, something can be determined, from so manifold cases, as to what he meant by it. He and his associate authors make a *usage for themselves*, so that we need not go beyond their own writings, in order to reach a decision of the question. Now, there is not a single instance, from the beginning to the end of the New Testament, outside of the verse which is now under consideration, where any one of them uses the verb in the sense assigned to it by Dr. Hodge. No such thought as that of “sinning legally or putatively” was in their minds in connection with it. We may safely challenge the production of any passage in contradiction of what we say, and we may appeal to the Princeton theologians themselves in proof that it cannot be done, for, amid all the controversy and after all the years of investigation, they do not point us to a single one. What is the probability, then, as to the meaning here, *when we look simply at the verb itself*? Is it that Paul passes altogether outside of the circle of his ordinary thought and presents an entirely new idea, in a word which had, beyond most other words even, a definite meaning of its own, and had never before been made to convey to his readers or hearers anything beside? Is it not, rather, that the ordinary explanation in other cases is to be adopted, with confidence, in this case also,—unless, indeed, the surrounding context renders it impossible? Moreover, the Greek language, elsewhere, shows the same uniform usage with the New Testament, so far as the verb is employed to express the idea of sinning. The two solitary examples from the Septuagint, to which reference has been made, are the only ones which are cited from all the Biblical or classical writings, as showing the possibility of such an interpretation;—and these are so peculiar, as we have already remarked, as to have no parallelism with the present case. If the meaning claimed is to be admitted there, it is forced into the verb by the context, and is to be found rather in the words which are to be supplied in thought, as modifying and limiting it.* It cannot, therefore, be true, that “the simple and natural

* The LXX passages are *not decisive* as supporting this view taken by Dr. Hodge. This has been shown by different writers already, and it will only be

meaning" of the *verb itself* is that which is here assigned to it by Dr. Hodge. We, and not he and his friends, are on the right ground thus far.

But we are told, that, if it is not *in the verb itself*, that we are to see this thought, it is in the use of it *in the aorist tense*. The declaration of the apostle, it is said, is not, they all *sin*, but they all *sinned*,—that is, when Adam did, or in him,—and it is added, "the only possible way in which they could have sinned in him is *putatively*." As for this latter statement, the spirits of an army of theologians and commentators rise up at such a suggestion, and deny its truth. What mean the whole history and progress of that theological opinion from Augustine down, which has conceived of us as, in *another than putative* sense, sinning in Adam, if we are to be turned aside or silenced with such a remark? We fear our venerated author, in his enthusiastic defense of his own theory, loses sight, for the moment, of the fact that he is wandering away from the great multitude of orthodox theologians. The question is one of possibility. How does Dr. Hodge know that the only way in which a man can possibly sin in Adam is the

necessary to refer to them very briefly. Gen. xlv. 82 (xlvi. 9.) contains the words of Judah when speaking to his father in regard to Benjamin, "If I bring him not unto thee, *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι εἰς τὸν πατέρα* (xlvi. 9, *εἰς σέ*) *πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας*. We find the verb here having the form *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι*, *I shall be having sinned*, and the preposition *εἰς* with the accusative following and modifying it. May not the proper inference, from this peculiar phraseology, be that these translators meant to represent Judah as saying—not, I will be regarded and treated as a sinner by thee—but if I do not bring Benjamin safely back, I will (shall) be, for all the rest of my life, a person who has done thee a wrong, or committed a sin against thee? The other passage (1 Kings i. 21) does not, indeed, contain the verb *ἡμαρτάνω* but may, properly enough, be considered in the same connection since it has the kindred noun. The words are those of Bathsheba to David in regard to the position of herself and her son, Solomon, in case Adonijah should be established upon the throne of his father. In that case, she declares that they would be sinners—*ἐσόμεθα ἡμαρτωλοί*. But the meaning here also, may evidently be (not to say is), that they would be sinners *to the view of the reigning prince*. These words, "to the view of the reigning prince" are naturally suggested by the context, and if they are supplied by the mind as part of the sentence, it is *these words alone* (and not any unusual use of the word, *sinners*) which give the peculiar sense to the passage. But we are considering here, it will be noticed, the signification of *the verb only*, and not of the verb as modified by other words.

way in which the thing is absolutely impossible—a contradiction in terms, for sin is something *actual*, and not something *merely putative*? We do not care, however, to discuss this question between the different parties, who think that, in *any* sense, we sinned in Adam, nor have we any desire to defend any particular view of this passage, at the present time. Our object is, merely, to inquire whether the view presented is the only simple one, in the light of the aorist tense which the verse contains. And here we call attention to the remarkable fact, that very many of the most eminent scholars, both in this and foreign countries, have taken the opposite view. Of the modern commentators in Germany, of highest reputation for linguistic knowledge, more than one half explain the verb, notwithstanding the aorist, as relating to the personal sins of individuals—and among them, surely, are men who cannot be complained of on account of their theological prejudices. But to say nothing of their opinions—who can deny that this aorist *may* be used in a somewhat figurative sense, so that Paul conceives of our individual, personal sinning as summed up and centered in Adam, not because we sinned either really or putatively when he did, but because, when he sinned, the whole future results were made certain, and so, in a sense, were already accomplished. Such an explanation may be, not unfrequently, given of the aorist tense in other places in Paul's writings. It seems even to be a favorite usage of his. When it is said, for example, that our old man was crucified with Christ, the meaning is, that we are brought into such a close union with Christ by our faith, that the carnal part is destroyed, and may be said to have been, as it were, even crucified when he was crucified. Why may not a similar idea be conveyed in the verse now under consideration? The most perfectly literal meaning of a passage is not always, as everybody knows, the most natural or the simplest one. And as for the probabilities of the case, we are content to leave it to the unprejudiced judgment of scholars, whether such a semi-figurative explanation is not more reasonable here, than one which violates the universal signification of the verb *ἀναστρέφειν*, as well as the universal idea of justice,—that a man cannot properly be treated as a sinner for the mere act of one whom

he did not authorize as his agent. But let us appeal to Dr. Hodge himself, in this matter, and see if there is not some other simple and natural meaning for the aorist tense here. In commenting on the passage, in the third chapter of this same Epistle, at verse 23, where Paul says πάντες ἡμαρτον καὶ ὁσπερ οὖνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, he accounts for the aorist tense of this same verb in the following language,—“The idea that all men now stand in the posture of sinners before God might be expressed either by saying, All have sinned and are sinners, [that is, by the perfect tense,] or all sinned, [that is, by the aorist.] The latter is the form adopted by the apostle:” and he adds a remark, in evident explanation of the substantial meaning of the whole passage—“All men are sinners and under the disapprobation of God.” But, if the expression πάντες ἡμαρτον can be explained in such a sentence as that in iii. 23, where is the difficulty in accounting for the aorist tense, in the same way, in v. 12? Every careful reader of the two passages in the original will see that they are alike in this regard, and that the question respecting the aorist tense is precisely the same.* If our distinguished author finds no trouble in referring the aorist to *actual sin* as he does in iii. 23, and in making it a simple and proper substitute for the perfect tense, “*all have sinned and are sinners*,” it is certainly somewhat surprising that the difficulty rises into so great proportions, after the few verses that intervene between that point and the middle of the fifth chapter. And we trust we may be pardoned if we say, that so sudden and complete a change of view, at the moment when the author comes to a passage

* The similarity in these two verses with regard to the aorist tense is such, that Commentators of note have referred the verb in iii. 23, also, to original sin. But Dr. Hodge, though quoting the views of such writers, decidedly rejects them by adopting the explanation given above. The admission that the aorist may be substantially equivalent to *the perfect* is all that the old adversaries of the Princeton School ever asked for, since, with this admission, their interpretation is a just one. We may add, that Dr. Hodge, also, allows what we have called the *semi-figurative* explanation of this aorist, for he says in his notes on iii. 23, “The sinning is [in the use of the aorist tense,] *represented* as past;” and though he does not italicise the word, as we have done, he seems clearly to show that this is the thought which he has in mind.

is the only simple and natural explanation which can be given. A few heretics, indeed, or a few persons who have theological prejudices and cannot endure the stronger doctrines of the Bible, may, here and there, have wrested the teachings of the Apostles into something quite contrary to the plain meaning of what they wrote. But these are persons clearly outside of the Church, or, if within it, they are so insignificant in numbers as to be unworthy of notice. The voice of the great Christian company is still in unbroken harmony, and is altogether in their favor. This assumption is, perhaps, more remarkable in the matter of the interpretation of Biblical passages bearing upon certain doctrines, than in that of the opinions of past theologians concerning those doctrines themselves. For in the course of long treatises or argumentations, the words of an author may fail to be comprehended, or there may be such qualifications and modifications, that particular paragraphs and sentences may seem to bear in a different direction from others, and so may be mistaken for the opposite of what they were, originally, intended to teach. But it seems hardly possible to suppose that a writer who translates a word or passage in the Scriptures in a certain way takes precisely the opposite view of it, unless, indeed, there be either a want of careful examination or an unwillingness to see what is plainly to be seen. But the class of writers to whom we allude, do not hesitate here more than elsewhere. Indeed, this confident assumption and assertion constitute no inconsiderable portion of their power and influence over their followers. Hundreds of minds, unaccustomed to examine for themselves, gain a more unwavering trust in what they have been taught to believe, because they hear their teachers continually repeating to them, that the Scriptures, literally interpreted, mean thus and so, and that all unprejudiced minds of every theological opinion, as well as in every age, have admitted the fact. And, doubtless, the repetition has its due effect not only on the disciples, but also on the masters themselves. They are led to firmer conviction, and are made bolder in their conflicts with adversaries, as they persuade themselves that what they have said so often must be the truth; until, by and by, the person who ventures to go back to the original sources for himself, and, in

his search, happens to discover another interpretation which has been adopted, in the past, by great numbers of learned scholars, or is even accepted by the majority of them at the present day, is immediately judged to be at variance with orthodoxy, or is charitably regarded as being in his life somewhat better than he is in his faith. No body of theologians in this country, during the past thirty or forty years, have been more constant illustrations of this peculiarity, than those whose center is at Princeton; and no example of this method of dealing, on their part, with Scriptural interpretation can be brought forward, which is more striking than that which has reference to the doctrine of Original Sin.

In his recently-published edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans—much enlarged beyond the limits of his earlier work, and, doubtless, presenting the results of his matured scholarship and reflection—Dr. Hodge sets forth before his readers the Princeton view concerning the imputation of Adam's sin, as founded upon the celebrated passage in the fifth chapter of that Epistle. He draws out his explanation of the verses at great length, claiming for it the authority of the Church, and defending it with all his ability; and then, at the close of his arguments and exegesis, we hear the solemn, and to his own mind and that of his followers, no doubt, decisive announcement—"It should be remembered, that the interpretation given to the several clauses in this passage is the simple, natural meaning of the words, as, with scarcely an exception, is admitted. The objections relied upon against it are almost exclusively of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character." We propose, in the present Article, to raise the question, Is it so? Is the meaning given by this distinguished theologian to the several words and phrases, as he asserts, the *natural and simple meaning*, to which the unbiased mind is most readily brought, and is this admitted, *with scarcely an exception*, either by his opponents or by commentators in general? The objections against the Princeton theory from what may be called the theological standpoint are numerous and strong enough, but the question to which we limit ourselves is, whether these are all, or whether, on the other hand,

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it is not clear, that those objections which come from the philological or exegetical side are quite as numerous and quite as strong. In our opinion, they are, at least, about as numerous as the length of the passage will allow, for they are to be found at every successive step;—and the scholars who are at variance with Dr. Hodge far exceed in number those who accord with his views.

But, that we may have the ground clearly opened before us, we call attention, at the outset, to his paraphrase of the whole passage, which is as follows:—"By one man sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the relation of sinners to God; death consequently passed on all, because for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners. That this is really the case is plain, because the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more extensive than its violation; and consequently, if all are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. This universality in the infliction of penal evil cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to such evil before that law was given; nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil, who have never personally sinned at all. We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam. He is, therefore, a type of Christ. The cases, however, are not entirely analogous; for if it is consistent with the Divine character, that we should suffer for what Adam did, how much more may we expect to be made happy for what Christ has done! Besides, we are condemned for one sin only, on Adam's account; whereas Christ saves us not only from the evils consequent on that transgression, but also from the punishment of our own innumerable offenses. Now, if for the offense of one, death thus triumphs over all, how much more shall they who receive the grace of the gospel, not only be saved from evil, but reign in life through Christ Jesus! Wherefore, as on account of one the condemnatory sentence has passed on all the descendants of Adam, so on account of the righteousness of one, gratuitous justification comes on all who receive the grace of Christ; for

as on account of the disobedience of one we are regarded as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other we are regarded as righteous."

It will be seen from the above, that the main force of the passage, as thus explained, and the main peculiarity of the Princeton view lies in the words, "for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners." And were there any doubt on this point, after the mere examination of the paraphrase, other remarks which the author makes would be decisive—as, for example, "His design is to show that there is a form of death, or penal evil, to which men are subject, anterior to any personal transgression or inherent corruption." "It follows that they are regarded and treated as sinners, on the ground of the disobedience of another." "Adam's sin is the direct judicial ground or reason for the infliction of penal evil" on his posterity. Adam's sin "constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them," i. e. as sinners. "We are involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern." This statement, that we had no personal concern in Adam's sin, means, according to Dr. Hodge, that we did not participate in Adam's sin, and that we were not one moral person with him. We only sinned in him as our head and representative;—that is, he being our representative, his sin was "the judicial ground or reason why death passed upon all of us;"—or, in other words, while there is "no ground of remorse to us" for Adam's sin, because we did not commit it, we are justly exposed to condemnation on account of it. To the maintenance of the idea, then, *that men, though not having committed Adam's sin, are legally responsible for it, and are condemned, in consequence, to the endurance of penal evil, because he was their legal representative*, the theologians of this School are obliged to commit themselves, and they are obliged to show, that this idea is found in Romans v. 12-19.

In considering the tenableness or untenableness of their view in regard to this passage of Paul's writings, it should be borne in mind that, if the Apostle conveys any such meaning as this, it must be contained in the verb *ἡμαρτων* of vs. 12 considered in itself; or in the 13th and 14th verses, in their bear-

thus received them might be, properly, distinguished by the language here employed. Thus, no less eminent a commentator than Meyer, in the latest edition of his work on this Epistle, says of this *καί*, "It refers to the fact that, in that period also (i. e., before the law of Moses), divine commands positively given were transgressed by some to whom they were given, but that not only those died, but those, likewise, who did not thus transgress."

The *possibility* of taking these words with some other reference than that made by Dr. Hodge we may regard, therefore, as established, and we are left to consider the *probabilities* of the case. In examining these, we find—in addition to the difficulties which have been already discovered, when discussing the Apostle's reasoning in the 13th and 14th verses taken together—the following points which may be briefly noticed. *First*, the expression, which is used, τοῖς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐν τῇ ἀνομιᾷ τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ, is a very strange one to describe infants. Why did not Paul *say* infants, if he *meant* infants? It was a word which not only would have conveyed his exact meaning, but would have avoided the misunderstanding of his language, which the phrase might have occasioned in the mind of any reader. "Those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" *might*, to say the least, be interpreted to mean, those who had not sinned against a positive law—and, especially, the phrase might be so understood by those who made this distinction between the persons who had the Mosaic Law and those who did not have it, as the Jewishly-disposed readers, for whose benefit Paul was writing, were so accustomed to do. Even to those who first received his Epistle his language must have been quite uncertain in its meaning, while as for those who should take it up in later days, he must, after a moment's thought, have been aware that such circumlocutions would be almost hopelessly obscure. How strange, then, that he should not have chosen the single and simple word, which would have saved himself from writing a bungling sentence, and have saved his readers, in all times, incalculable difficulty and controversy! We do not believe the Apostle wrote thus. But, whether he did or not, surely there is no great naturalness and simplicity in such an explanation of his words.

verb, the universal classical and Biblical usage of the word would lead us instantly to do so. The same is true of every other case, and, therefore, so far from adopting any such interpretation readily, as the natural signification, the presumption is overwhelming against it; so overwhelming indeed, that, among all the lexicographers whose works we have at command, only one even alludes to any such meaning of the word anywhere, and he only in this passage and Gen. xlv. 32. But we regard Dr. Hodge himself as having abandoned this position at last. The opportunities for examination of the Greek language, during thirty years, and the accumulating evidence derived from the views of all the celebrated scholars of Germany, who have, within that time, accomplished so much in this department, could scarcely fail to drive any man, in some measure, away from a view so utterly without foundation. Accordingly, we find, in the recent edition, that he throws the argument above alluded to into a subordinate place, and acknowledges that πάντες ἥμαρτον "signifies all sinned and can signify nothing else." We may consider the controversy on this particular point, therefore, as now at an end. And we respectfully suggest, that the objections presented by those who believed, long ago, that this was the only possible signification of ἥμαρτον, were not "of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character."

It must not be supposed however, from what has just been said, that Dr. Hodge has come over to the ground of his adversaries altogether, in regard to this word. Far from it. His doctrinal opinions still keep their hold upon him, and he now informs us that, wherever we find the words πάντες ἥμαρτον, which "can signify nothing else but all sinned," the question must be asked, *in what sense* did they all sin? This question he answers in the present case, by saying we sinned "putatively" in Adam, or his sin was "legally and effectively" ours:—and so he comes, substantially, to the same position as before, while he reiterates, in decisive terms, that this is "the simple and natural meaning" of the words. But where do we discover anything which justifies such an idea? The verb, "to sin," ἁμαρτάνειν is very familiar to the New Testament writers, and one which nearly all of them use. This verb, and its kindred noun and adjective, ἁμαρτία and ἁμαρτωλός, are employed

cannot have their own sins imputed to them, because they have not personally sinned against *any* law. This word, therefore, becomes one of importance in the controversy. But how are we to determine its meaning? We cannot but think, that the simple and natural way is, to inquire whether the immediate context suggests anything that may bear upon the question; and, then, to ascertain what is the Apostle's ordinary use of the word in the Epistle. But if we take this course, and look, first, at *the context*, we find, at the beginning of the verse, the same word, νόμου (without the article, just as it is in this case), and, beyond all doubt, with the meaning—the Mosaic Law. Dr. Hodge, as well as everybody else, admits this. Is it probable, then, when he says ἀχρι νόμου (until the Mosaic Law) sin was in the world, but sin is not reckoned where νόμος is not, that he intends anything by the second νόμος besides what he meant by the first? Or, in other words, does he not mean, in both cases alike, the Mosaic Law? It can hardly be questioned that the presumption is in favor of this view, and that the burden of proof rests on those who maintain the opposite. If, however, on the other hand, we examine the Apostle's *general usage* in regard to this word, another passage in this same Epistle presents itself to our notice, which resembles the one before us so closely as to have some proper influence on our determination of the question here. We refer to the last clause of the fifteenth verse of the fourth chapter, which reads, οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις—that is, where νόμος is not, transgression, also, is not. Dr. Hodge does not deny this close resemblance, but he takes pains to interpret the clause in accordance with his view of v. 13. But, in doing so, he is compelled to reject, as we have already had occasion to remark, any distinction between ἀμαρτία and παράβασις. If παράβασις, in iv. 15, means *transgression of positive law*, there can be no doubt that νόμου means *positive law*, i. e., the Mosaic Law.*

* We say, "i. e., the Mosaic Law," for our own convenience in the argument. We believe that, in general, when Paul speaks of positive law, he has the Mosaic Law in mind, but it is unnecessary to enter upon any defense of this view, for it is of no importance in our present discussion. Dr. Hodge, as we have seen, is obliged to hold that νόμος means, *any law whatever*; and if we show that, on the contrary, it means, *positive law as distinguished from the law of nature*, we do all that is essential to our purpose.

meaning" of the *verb itself* is that which is here assigned to it by Dr. Hodge. We, and not he and his friends, are on the right ground thus far.

But we are told, that, if it is not *in the verb itself*, that we are to see this thought, it is in the use of it *in the aorist tense*. The declaration of the apostle, it is said, is not, they all *sin*, but they all *sinned*,—that is, when Adam did, or in him,—and it is added, "the only possible way in which they could have sinned in him is *putatively*." As for this latter statement, the spirits of an army of theologians and commentators rise up at such a suggestion, and deny its truth. What mean the whole history and progress of that theological opinion from Augustine down, which has conceived of us as, in *another than putative* sense, sinning in Adam, if we are to be turned aside or silenced with such a remark? We fear our venerated author, in his enthusiastic defense of his own theory, loses sight, for the moment, of the fact that he is wandering away from the great multitude of orthodox theologians. The question is one of possibility. How does Dr. Hodge know that the only way in which a man can possibly sin in Adam is the

necessary to refer to them very briefly. Gen. xlv. 82 (xliv. 9,) contains the words of Judah when speaking to his father in regard to Benjamin, "If I bring him not unto thee, *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι εἰς τὸν πατέρα* (xliv. 9, *εἰς σέ*) *πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας*. We find the verb here having the form *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι*, *I shall be having sinned*, and the preposition *εἰς* with the accusative following and modifying it. *May not* the proper inference, from this peculiar phraseology, be that these translators meant to represent Judah as saying—not, I will be regarded and treated as a sinner by thee—but if I do not bring Benjamin safely back, I will (shall) be, for all the rest of my life, a person who has done thee a wrong, or committed a sin against thee? The other passage (1 Kings i. 21) does not, indeed, contain the verb *ἡμαρτάνω* but may, properly enough, be considered in the same connection since it has the kindred noun. The words are those of Bathsheba to David in regard to the position of herself and her son, Solomon, in case Adonijah should be established upon the throne of his father. In that case, she declares that they would be sinners—*ἐσόμεθα ἁμαρτωλοί*. But the meaning here also, *may evidently* be (not to say *is*), that they would be sinners *to the view of the reigning prince*. These words, "to the view of the reigning prince" are naturally suggested by the context, and if they are supplied by the mind as part of the sentence, it is *these words alone* (and not any unusual use of the word, *sinners*) which give the peculiar sense to the passage. But we are considering here, it will be noticed, the signification of the *verb only*, and not of the verb as modified by other words.

way in which the thing is absolutely impossible—a contradiction in terms, for sin is something *actual*, and not something *merely putative*? We do not care, however, to discuss this question between the different parties, who think that, in *any* sense, we sinned in Adam, nor have we any desire to defend any particular view of this passage, at the present time. Our object is, merely, to inquire whether the view presented is the only simple one, in the light of the aorist tense which the verse contains. And here we call attention to the remarkable fact, that very many of the most eminent scholars, both in this and foreign countries, have taken the opposite view. Of the modern commentators in Germany, of highest reputation for linguistic knowledge, more than one half explain the verb, notwithstanding the aorist, as relating to the personal sins of individuals—and among them, surely, are men who cannot be complained of on account of their theological prejudices. But to say nothing of their opinions—who can deny that this aorist *may* be used in a somewhat figurative sense, so that Paul conceives of our individual, personal sinning as summed up and centered in Adam, not because we sinned either really or putatively when he did, but because, when he sinned, the whole future results were made certain, and so, in a sense, were already accomplished. Such an explanation may be, not unfrequently, given of the aorist tense in other places in Paul's writings. It seems even to be a favorite usage of his. When it is said, for example, that our old man was crucified with Christ, the meaning is, that we are brought into such a close union with Christ by our faith, that the carnal part is destroyed, and may be said to have been, as it were, even crucified when he was crucified. Why may not a similar idea be conveyed in the verse now under consideration? The most perfectly literal meaning of a passage is not always, as everybody knows, the most natural or the simplest one. And as for the probabilities of the case, we are content to leave it to the unprejudiced judgment of scholars, whether such a semi-figurative explanation is not more reasonable here, than one which violates the universal signification of the verb *ἀναπαύσκειν*, as well as the universal idea of justice,—that a man cannot properly be treated as a sinner for the mere act of one whom

he did not authorize as his agent. But let us appeal to Dr. Hodge himself, in this matter, and see if there is not some other simple and natural meaning for the aorist tense here. In commenting on the passage, in the third chapter of this same Epistle, at verse 23, where Paul says πάντες ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑπερεβούνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, he accounts for the aorist tense of this same verb in the following language,—“The idea that all men now stand in the posture of sinners before God might be expressed either by saying, All have sinned and are sinners, [that is, by the perfect tense,] or all sinned, [that is, by the aorist.] The latter is the form adopted by the apostle:” and he adds a remark, in evident explanation of the substantial meaning of the whole passage—“All men are sinners and under the disapprobation of God.” But, if the expression πάντες ἥμαρτον can be explained in such a sentence as that in iii. 23, where is the difficulty in accounting for the aorist tense, in the same way, in v. 12? Every careful reader of the two passages in the original will see that they are alike in this regard, and that the question respecting the aorist tense is precisely the same.* If our distinguished author finds no trouble in referring the aorist to *actual sin* as he does in iii. 23, and in making it a simple and proper substitute for the perfect tense, “*all have sinned and are sinners*,” it is certainly somewhat surprising that the difficulty rises into so great proportions, after the few verses that intervene between that point and the middle of the fifth chapter. And we trust we may be pardoned if we say, that so sudden and complete a change of view, at the moment when the author comes to a passage

* The similarity in these two verses with regard to the aorist tense is such, that Commentators of note have referred the verb in iii. 23, also, to original sin. But Dr. Hodge, though quoting the views of such writers, decidedly rejects them by adopting the explanation given above. The admission that the aorist may be substantially equivalent to *the perfect* is all that the old adversaries of the Princeton School ever asked for, since, with this admission, their interpretation is a just one. We may add, that Dr. Hodge, also, allows what we have called the *semi-figurative* explanation of this aorist, for he says in his notes on iii. 23, “The sinning is [in the use of the aorist tense,] *represented as past* ;” and though he does not italicise the word, as we have done, he seems clearly to show that this is the thought which he has in mind.

which he makes the foundation of his peculiar doctrine of imputed sin, looks more as if it were occasioned by "theological," than "philological reasons."

But our attention is next turned away from the verb and the aorist tense, and is directed to the word *ἁμαρτία*, which is closely connected with it, both in the preceding and the following context. Dr. Hodge sets before us three significations of *ἁμαρτία*; first, actual sin, secondly, sinful principle or disposition, i. e. depravity, thirdly, guilt, by which he means, exposure to condemnation;* and he then states that, in this twelfth verse, all three significations, taken together, give the correct meaning of the word. "Sin entered into the world," then, means actual transgression, depravity and exposure to condemnation entered the world. But "sin entered into the world," he tells us, is equivalent to "mankind became sinners," and is thus explained by πάντες ἥμαρτον. What, then, is the meaning of πάντες ἥμαρτον? Evidently not, all men became exposed to condemnation, merely,—but, all men became actual transgressors, depraved, and exposed to condemnation. If, however, this be so, the very force and point of his explanation of πάντες ἥμαρτον is taken away, for he is never wearied of saying that this latter expression does not mean, at all, men became actual sinners, or men became corrupt, but that it means, simply and solely, all men sinned legally in Adam and thus became exposed to condemnation. If the two phrases are equivalent to and explanatory of each other, they cannot, at the same time, be quite different,—the former covering a very much wider ground than the latter.

But does *ἁμαρτία* mean what is claimed by the Princeton theologians—or, more particularly, does it ever mean *the guilt of sin*, i. e., *exposure to punishment, as distinguished from sin itself*? There is a certain class of passages, to which reference is made in support of the opinion that it does. They are those which refer to *bearing or taking away sin*, and are perhaps eight or ten in number, in the whole New Testament. We do not care to enter into a discussion here, as to whether these

* Our readers will remember, that this is the meaning which the Princeton writers uniformly give to the word *guilt* in this connection.

passages do not include something more than this one idea of liability to penalty, for such a discussion would consume much of our space, and would be of little moment for our present purpose. Admitting that they do convey this meaning alone, it must be remembered that they constitute a class by themselves, and are to be interpreted *with reference to the bearing of the verb*, which they contain, upon the noun. Apart from these passages, we find that there is not a single one where any such explanation can be allowed,* and, especially—which

* Dr. Hodge, indeed, claims that the word has this meaning (together with that of being "actual transgressors") in Romans iii. 9, but it seems quite evident that he is mistaken. The Apostle explains his meaning clearly by the verses that follow "We have charged both Jews and Greeks with being under sin," he says, and he justifies the statement by citing passages from the Old Testament, where their *sinfulness*, not their *exposure to punishment*, is spoken of. And in the 19th verse of the same chapter, he declares that these words of the Old Testament, describing their sins, are spoken in *order that* their mouths may be stopped, and they may become (as Dr. Hodge expresses it) in their own conviction, guilty, i. e., exposed to condemnation, before God. It cannot be, then, that the word *ἡμαρτον* in iii. 9, means anything besides *sin*. It was *because* they were sinners, that they would be, in the conviction of their own minds, justly liable to punishment. The same thing is manifest, if we look at another point. Paul says, We have before (i. e. in the previous part of the Epistle) charged, &c. But the thing which he had, patiently and at length, set forth in the preceding chapters, was the fact that the Jews and Gentiles were *sinners*. The statement which he makes at the beginning, is that the wrath of God is revealed against *sins*, and the proof which he gives is that *they have committed sins*, and therefore are subject to the wrath of God. In the same way, in these concluding verses, iii. 9-20, he speaks of their sins, vs. 9-18, and, only on the ground of these, of their exposure to punishment, vs. 19.

But even if this word in Romans iii. 9, does mean that they were under sin *and* its attendant exposure to condemnation, it is not a case in point, for it must refer *simply to the exposure to condemnation*, if it is to meet the demands of the Princeton interpretation of *ἡμαρτον*; and Dr. Hodge himself admits that it does not mean *this alone*.

As for the two or three passages, where it is said, "Ye shall die in your sins," and "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins;" they are either not to be taken in this limited sense which is claimed (that is, the word *sin* either has its ordinary meaning, or it includes sin *and* its attendant consequences)—or they are determined to the more limited sense by the very necessities of the sentence (that is, by the fact that "to die in your sins" *cannot mean anything else*, except "to die under the penalty of sin.") If, however, the former of these suppositions is true, the passages are (like Rom. iii. 9) inapposite to the matter in hand; if the latter, they are to be classed with those mentioned above, which speak of "bearing or taking away sin." In neither case, therefore are they proper exceptions to the universal statement which we have made.

may be regarded as of some importance to the point in hand—we find that in no case in the New Testament, where anything is predicated of *ἀμαρτία*, does the word have this meaning. If so, the conclusion is irresistible, that it does not have it in this verse, and consequently, if *πάντες ἡμᾶν*, as Dr. Hodge maintains, is substantially equivalent to *ἡ ἀμαρτία εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, that *ἡμᾶν*, likewise, cannot be thus interpreted.

This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of the phrase, *καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας θάνατος*. If *ἀμαρτίας* is determined in its meaning by *ἡμᾶν*, then Dr. Hodge's explanation of *ἡμᾶν* limits *ἀμαρτίας* to *exposure to punishment* or penal evil, and we must translate,—giving *θάνατος* the signification of *penal evil*, which he assigns to it,—“and penal evil came upon mankind by means of (or, as he says, because of) their exposure to penal evil.” But, is it likely that Paul would have used such language as this? Does he not mean by *θάνατος* something entirely distinct from *ἀμαρτία*—so that death is not caused by exposure to death, but by sin considered *in itself*, and not with relation to its consequences? Or, again, if this word, on the other hand, is equivalent to the preceding *ἀμαρτία*, and thus includes the three ideas, above mentioned, of actual sin, depravity and exposure to penal evil, the same difficulty, essentially, meets us. The translation of the clause then becomes, “and penal evil came upon mankind because of actual sin, depravity, and exposure to penal evil.” Admit that *ἀμαρτία* has this extended meaning in any case, is it probable that it has such a meaning in a case like this? When we speak of the cause of death as a disease or a crime, for example, and say, Death was the result of cholera, or of murder, we surely do not mean that death was the result of the *exposure to death* involved in either of these things, but the result of the things themselves. In other words, in such cases—though the idea of exposure to death may be included in them—we purposely set aside this idea, and limit ourselves to that which occasions this exposure. So, when it is said that death comes by sin, the meaning is, that death comes by sin *in itself considered*, and not either by sin and the consequent exposure to death together, or by the exposure to death alone.

The relation of the word *ἡμᾶν* to *ἀμαρτία*, however,

does not end with the two instances in which that word is used in the twelfth verse, but we find the same word twice in the following verse, which, as all allow, is so closely united with the twelfth. The Apostle says here, "Sin was in the world until the law," and, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law." The former of these two phrases Dr. Hodge explains as meaning, "Men were sinners and were so regarded and treated;" the latter as meaning, "Where there is no law sin is not punished;" that is, in one line, *ἀναγίτα* includes the idea of *sin itself and its penalty*, while, in the next, it is limited to the idea of *sin in itself alone*, and no idea of penalty is discovered, except in the verb *ἐλογίζετα*.* We may well ask where the worthy author gets his authority for going thus forwards, and backwards, and sideways, in such brief and closely united clauses. What evidence or probability—or we may even say, possibility—is there, that the inspired Apostle could have intended, in five successive cases of employing the same word, as noun or verb, within less than five successive lines, and in clauses which he has bound together as intimately as the laws of language will allow,—what evidence or probability that he could have meant, in the first two, actual sin, depravity, and exposure to condemnation—in the third, exposure to condemnation; in the fourth, actual sin and exposure to condemnation—and, finally, in the fifth, actual sin alone? Paul was often an obscure writer, and we have the authority of another Apostle for the statement, that he said many things which are not easy of explanation. But we know of no other instance where he has ever tasked the mental powers of his readers by such a course as this, or has hopelessly befogged them by using terms with no consistency and no precision. It required the theological mystifications of modern professors, trying vainly to throw their own preconceived notions of doctrine into his words, to bring his writings to such a condition. And if Peter could have read the comments on the great Apostle, which the head of Princeton Seminary has worked out, after thirty or forty years of

* That Dr. Hodge finds the idea of punishment in the verb alone, in this latter phrase, is evident from his language, "Sin is not imputed, that is, it is not laid to one's account and punished."

endeavoring to make the Bible support an untenable theory, he would have, doubtless, thought Paul's darkest passages full of light and clearness in the comparison, and would have regretted that he had ever called him a writer hard to be understood.

At this point we end our first inquiry,—that which has reference to the meaning of the verb *ἡμαρτον*, in the twelfth verse,—believing that we have shown, at least, that the “simple and natural meaning” of this verb is not the one which is assigned to it by Dr. Hodge, and that, if his interpretation is to be received, it must be because the demands of the following context force us to give up the natural signification for some other, which would less readily occur to the mind. But, before we pass onward in our discussion to the question next to be proposed, let us inquire, for a moment, as to the opinions of leading commentators respecting this phrase, *πάντες ἡμαρτον*. How many of them agree with the Princeton Professor? The most prominent commentators on the epistle to the Romans in England, at the present time, may, perhaps, be said to be Dean Alford and Dr. Wordsworth. But neither of them supposes that Paul meant to say, that all men—though without any participation in Adam's sin—are legally responsible for it, on the simple ground that he was their representative,—that, *antecedent to or independent of* any sin of their own, or any sinning in him in the strict and proper sense, they are exposed to condemnation simply for what he did. Such writers as Dr. Bloomfield, Mr. Conybeare, and Professor Jowett—of less authority, it may be, but still with some claim to reputation as scholars—are, likewise, at variance with the view we are examining. In this country, we are all full of theological prejudice, we suppose, according to the opinion of Princeton Orthodoxy, but it is, at least, a little remarkable that everybody of note, outside of their own narrow circle, is opposed to their interpretation;—not merely writers of the New School party, like Professor Stuart and Mr. Barnes, but the most distinguished Episcopalian scholar, Dr. Turner,* and the Baptist, Dr. Ripley. In Germany, Meyer, DeWette and Fritzsche,

* Dr. Turner prefers a different view, though not so decidedly as the others named.

confessedly stand at the head of the great company of recent New Testament Commentators, in the line of linguistic knowledge. But these scholars, as well as Rückert, and Reiche, and Tholuck, and Ewald, and Philippi, and Olshausen, and Julius Müller, and Van Hengel of Leyden, and numerous others—names among the foremost, all of them—whatever may be their differences among themselves, are thoroughly united in this, that they give no countenance to any such explanation of this verb. And it is refreshing even to hear the earnestness with which old Robert Haldane, of Scotland,* the very centre of Orthodoxy, in his own estimation, condemns the views of those who think we are involved in the consequences of Adam's sin, without being actually in his loins when he was created. "Does God deal with men as sinners," he says, "while they are not truly such? If God deals with men as sinners on account of Adam's sin, then it is self-evident that

* The view of Dr. Hodge finds prominent opponents not only everywhere else, but even in the Old School Presbyterian Church itself. The distinguished Professor of Theology, Dr. R. J. Breckinridge of Kentucky, who unites with him in contending against the re-union with the New School body, on account of its alleged deviations from the old doctrine, is unable to keep in his company at this point. He says ("Knowledge of God Objectively Considered," page 498) "It is infinitely certain, that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as sinners, dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent. The imputation of our sins to Christ affords no pretext for such a statement; because that was done by the express consent of Christ, and was, in every respect, the most stupendous proof of divine grace." He adds, that the righteousness of Christ is "never received except by faith, which is a grace of the Spirit peculiar to the renewed soul. In like manner, the sin of Adam is imputed, but never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin. That is, we must not attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship—by the union of which he is the *Root* of the human race; since we have not a particle of reason to believe that the former would ever have existed without the latter." And the Rev. Dr. Samuel J. Baird, in his "*Elohim Revealed*," devotes a large number of pages to a refutation of the Princeton interpretation of these verses—which he commences with the remark, "Dr. Hodge's exposition seems to us inconsistent alike with the grammatical structure and sense of the passage, and with the scope and design of the Apostle." I r. Baird, in this sentence, expresses precisely the view which we hold of the baselessness of all that is said by Dr. Hodge. And, surely, if Princeton exegesis does not extend its influence as far as Woodbury, New Jersey (the home of Dr. Baird), it is no wonder that it meets with no special favor in other regions of the world.

they are sinners on that account. The just God could not deal with men as sinners on any account which did not make them truly sinners." Now here are men of different countries and of varied theological positions, and not only this, but some of them are the men who know more about the uses and significations of Greek words, as employed in the New Testament, than any others of modern times. Their opinion is certainly worthy of the highest respect, and, if they are in harmony, it is to be set aside only for the strongest reasons. In this case it happens that they are not thus in harmony in their positive statements as to the explanation which ought to be given to this important phrase, but they are thoroughly and completely so in their rejection of Dr. Hodge's view respecting it. What shall we say then? We believe the unanimous answer of unperverted and unprejudiced minds to such a question would be—Dr. Hodge has not arrived at the right meaning; or, *if he has*, the right meaning is not the one that should, properly, be called, "*the simple and natural meaning.*" And, at all events, it is clear that his explanation is not admitted to be the natural and simple one, "with scarcely an exception," so far as this verb *ἡμαρτον* is concerned.

II.

Our *second main point of inquiry* has reference to the bearing of the thirteenth and fourteenth verses upon the twelfth. If the phrase we have been considering does not suggest the Princeton idea in itself, must we, nevertheless, receive it because of these two following verses? Dr. Hodge declares that we must. The 13th and 14th verses, he says, introduce the proof of the phrase, Death passed upon all men because (*πάντες ἡμαρτον*) all were regarded and treated as sinners for the offense of that one man. This proof is as follows: "This universality of the infliction of penal evil, alluded to in the end of verse 12th, cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to that evil before that law was given (vs. 13), nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil who have never

personally sinned at all (vs. 14). We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam." If we attempt to put the same statement more nearly into the phraseology of Paul, so as to be able to examine it more definitely as it appears in the Sacred Text, the reasoning becomes—using Dr. Hodge's language as nearly as may be—Sin is not imputed where there is no law; but sin was imputed before the law of Moses, therefore there was a law before the law of Moses, i. e. the law of nature; but even the violation of that law will not account for the universality of penal evils at that time, because those evils were inflicted upon those who had never broken that law, or personally sinned at all, i. e. the infants of that period. This is all that is contained in verses 13 and 14, and in this is the evidence that penal evils come universally upon all men, because they, without being sinners themselves, and without having committed Adam's sin, are treated as sinners on account of his sin.

But how much of this whole statement is the actual and conclusive proof of the point which is to be proved? What is it that shows the proposition, which Dr. Hodge finds in the latter part of verse 12th, to be unquestionably true? Evidently it can be only one thing—namely, the statement in the fourteenth verse in regard to infants. These had sinned in no way, it might be said, except putatively in Adam, and consequently, if penal evils come upon them, they must come as the direct and immediate effect of the sin which Adam committed. But, in the case of the adults before the Mosaic Law,—that is, between Adam and Moses—there was nothing to prove beyond question the point in hand, for the penal evils coming upon them might be the result of their own personal violation of the law of nature. In other words, if the author attempted to establish by argument the proposition that penal evils come upon all mankind independently of their own sins, he could accomplish his object only by citing a case where it was *manifest* to every mind that they *could not* come for *any other reason*. And the only case, which could possibly be regarded as of this kind, was the case of infants. But, if their case was the one which alone proved the point in hand,

why did the Apostle allude to any other case? Why, instead of saying simply, "This must be so, for the evils befalling infants cannot otherwise be accounted for," does he go through such a circumlocution as we find in the 13th and 14th verses? Here is a purpose that can be effected in a most simple and straightforward way. A single fact—according to the claim of the Princeton writers—is to be proved, and a single all-conclusive proof is at hand. Any writer possessed of a reasonable amount of common sense would state the fact, and follow it with the evidence; and it would be as clear as the sunlight to every reader. But the Apostle does no such thing. He involves the fact, which he desires to offer as proof, with something wholly irrelevant, and then sets forth the whole matter in the most indirect manner possible, thus: "Penal evils come upon all men for Adam's sin; because penal evils do not come without the violation of a law, but they did come before the law of Moses, therefore there was a law before the law of Moses; but penal evils came before the law of Moses, even upon infants who had not violated the law that was then existing." We remember hearing, some years ago, an argument brought forward to sustain a certain proposition, which depended solely on the evidence of a particular book, whose truthfulness everybody in the audience admitted. It was after this fashion—first, there is no intrinsic absurdity in supposing the proposition to be true; secondly, there is a probability that it is true; thirdly, it *is* true, because the book says so. It seemed to us, that the first two steps might properly have been omitted, as the last covered the whole case. But Paul's reasoning would be more faulty than this, if Dr. Hodge's theory were correct. It would be as absurd as to attempt to prove that the Democratic party hold a certain doctrine; first, by showing that Napoleon the Third holds it, and, secondly, because it is in the Democratic platform. Who could imagine that an inspired Apostle wrote after such a fashion, except one who was so blinded by preconceived theological opinions as to see only what he wished to see?

But, independently of this difficulty in the method of interpretation we are now considering, let us look, for a moment, at another. If infants are the class whose condition is brought forward

as the evidence of Paul's proposition in verse 12th (that men are treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, though they had no participation in its commission), why are not *all infants* spoken of? What reason for alluding to the infants *before* the time of Moses, rather than those *since* that time? They are both in precisely the same condition, and it is *all* infants, and not a *particular number* of infants living previous to a certain period of the world's history, who establish the fact in question—if, indeed, it be a fact. The argument on this subject was, long since, most ably and conclusively stated by Dr. N. W. Taylor (see his "Revealed Theology") and others; and it will be unnecessary to dwell upon it further here. But not only was there no reason why the Apostle should have limited himself to that particular body of infants, there was a very good reason why he should *not* have done so. By so doing he was in danger, either of leading his friends into the mistaken notion that the infants of a later time differed from the earlier ones—in being actual sinners from the moment of birth, while the earlier ones were not so—or of weakening the force of his argument to the view of his adversaries, who could charge this construction upon his words. We venture to say, that, in all respectable literature, no instance of more irregular and incoherent argumentation can be produced, than that for which Paul is here made responsible by the Princeton explanation of these verses.

But, again, the whole proof, according to this theory, is dependent on the citation of the case of infants. They must be alluded to *somewhere* in the passage, or there is, as we have already seen, no proof at all in it of what Dr. Hodge makes *πάντες ἡμᾶς* mean. Where, then, are they alluded to? In the words, it is answered, "Even over those who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression;"—and the reasons given for this view of these words are, *first*, that the adverb, *even*, marks the persons spoken of as a particular class among the general body of those who lived between Adam and Moses, and, *secondly*, that if so, the only class who can, consistently with the whole passage, be thus distinguished, are infants. If the force of either of these reasons can be set aside, this view of these words cannot be sustained, and, with

its failure, everything else which these writers say in regard to these verses fails also. With regard to the first, Dr. Hodge declares that "it is obvious that the first clause of the 14th verse describes a general class of persons, and the second clause, which is distinguished from the first by the word *even*, only a portion of that class." He should, more properly, have said it was obvious to *his mind*, for, certainly, it is not so to a very large part of those who have commented on this verse. The first clause of the verse reads, "Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam until Moses." What is the meaning of the words, "from Adam until Moses?" It seems to us that it clearly means from the *time* of Adam until the *time* of Moses—not the *persons who lived during that time*. It is as if the author had said—Death reigned from the year one to the year 2,500. At all events, this is a perfectly simple and natural meaning for the words, and one which should be set aside as untenable only for good and sufficient reasons in the context. Not only, however, do no such reasons exist in this case, but quite a conclusive reason is to be found for adopting this meaning—for the Apostle could scarcely make his design in the use of these words more manifest than he has done at the beginning of the preceding verse. The 13th and 14th verses, it will be noticed, are parts of one long sentence, consisting of three clauses bound together in the close union of reasoning. It is hardly possible, therefore, that the author should not, when saying, in one part of the sentence, Until the Mosaic Law, and, in another, From Adam until Moses, mean precisely the same thing—namely, *during the time that preceded the law of Moses*. But if he meant simply this, the adverb, *even*, does not, necessarily, distinguish *classes* between Adam and Moses, as Dr. Hodge maintains; and all the discourse about tautology and so forth, which a few writers of his tendencies indulge in against their adversaries (as if, on any other interpretation, the phrase would mean, Death reigned over a particular class of persons, *even* over that particular class of persons), is without foundation. There was, we will suppose for the moment, a certain peculiarity which distinguished *all* persons living before the giving of the law of Moses from all those living after that time—namely, that they did not trans-

gress any positive law. What should prevent the Apostle from distinguishing the former class from the latter by the word *even*, and from saying, as he does, in substance, in this verse—Death did not reign simply *after* the time of Moses, over those who *had* sinned against a positive law, but also *before* the time of Moses, *even* over those who *had not* sinned against a positive law. The word *even* merely marks and makes prominent the peculiarity of those who lived before the Mosaic law, and by it Paul brings forward, with greatest emphasis, the fact that death reigned *even over those persons, in whose case*—on his present standpoint in his argument—*it might seem least likely to have reigned*; namely, those who had not sinned in the way of transgression of positive law, as Adam had done. And it makes no difference, as to the possibility and propriety of using the word *even*, whether the persons alluded to were only a portion or the whole of those persons who preceded the Mosaic dispensation. Supposing Paul, instead of using the precise phraseology he has here employed, had said, “Death reigned even over all the persons who lived before the time of Moses, that is, over that portion of mankind who did not violate a positive law”—who would have found any difficulty in the passage? Why may he not, equally well, have changed the order and adopted the course he has,—“Death reigned before the time of Moses, even over that portion of mankind who did not violate a positive law?” There is nothing in all Dr. Hodge’s discussion of this whole passage, in his recent Commentary, which seems to us more astonishing than this—that after more than thirty years of opportunity for investigation, he has retained this old argument about tautology from his former work. The fact of the case is simply this, that the *et* (even) may be taken in either way, so far as it is considered in itself; and, if it is taken in the way suggested above, there is no tautology to be found.

But, supposing that Dr. Hodge is right with regard to this word, *even*, and that it does distinguish a special class among those who lived between Adam and Moses, does it, necessarily, refer to the class of infants? Certainly it does not, *so far as the mere words themselves are concerned*, for there were between Adam and Moses persons, more or less in number, who received positive commands from God, and who could be regarded as a class by themselves; while those who had not

thus received them might be, properly, distinguished by the language here employed. Thus, no less eminent a commentator than Meyer, in the latest edition of his work on this Epistle, says of this *καί*, "It refers to the fact that, in that period also (i. e., before the law of Moses), divine commands positively given were transgressed by some to whom they were given, but that not only those died, but those, likewise, who did not thus transgress."

The *possibility* of taking these words with some other reference than that made by Dr. Hodge we may regard, therefore, as established, and we are left to consider the *probabilities* of the case. In examining these, we find—in addition to the difficulties which have been already discovered, when discussing the Apostle's reasoning in the 13th and 14th verses taken together—the following points which may be briefly noticed. *First*, the expression, which is used, τοῖς μὴ ἀμαρτήσαντας ἐν τῇ ἀνομιᾷ τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ, is a very strange one to describe infants. Why did not Paul *say* infants, if he *meant* infants? It was a word which not only would have conveyed his exact meaning, but would have avoided the misunderstanding of his language, which the phrase might have occasioned in the mind of any reader. "Those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" *might*, to say the least, be interpreted to mean, those who had not sinned against a positive law—and, especially, the phrase might be so understood by those who made this distinction between the persons who had the Mosaic Law and those who did not have it, as the Jewishly-disposed readers, for whose benefit Paul was writing, were so accustomed to do. Even to those who first received his Epistle his language must have been quite uncertain in its meaning, while as for those who should take it up in later days, he must, after a moment's thought, have been aware that such circumlocutions would be almost hopelessly obscure. How strange, then, that he should not have chosen the single and simple word, which would have saved himself from writing a bungling sentence, and have saved his readers, in all times, incalculable difficulty and controversy! We do not believe the Apostle wrote thus. But, whether he did or not, surely there is no great naturalness and simplicity in such an explanation of his words.

Secondly, this interpretation of the phrase loses sight altogether of the proper force and emphasis of the word *παράβασις*. The Apostle does not say—those who had not sinned as Adam had, that is, according to Dr. Hodge, personally—but those who had not sinned *after the similitude of Adam's transgression*. Dr. Hodge ignores, or even denies, any distinction between *παράβασις* and *ἁμαρτία* in Paul's writings. But, in doing so, he is at variance with almost every New Testament commentator of linguistic reputation. Compare, for example, Ellicott's Commentary on Galatians ii. 18, and iii. 19; Trench's Synonyms; and the German writers in general. And any one who will examine the passages where the Apostle uses this noun, or the similar word *παράβατης*, will see for himself that in every case he has direct reference to violation of positive law. If, then, we insist that there is such a distinction between the words—so that, while *ἁμαρτία* means *sin*, *παράβασις* is used to denote *transgression of positive law*, we shall certainly not be liable to the charge of disregarding the usage of the language, or of wandering off under the guidance of theological prejudice. But, if Paul turns aside from his repeated use of *ἁμαρτία*, at this point, to employ a new word, which has a definite and well-established signification of its own—namely a certain kind of sin, i. e., transgression of positive law—and, if he describes certain persons as those who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's *transgression*, is it not the fair and natural inference, that he means to intimate that they *did* sin after some *other* similitude—that is, that they did sin *personally*, in a way which was *not* transgression of positive law? If, however, this be true, the words, of course, cannot refer to infants, since, as Dr. Hodge admits, they do not personally sin at all.

Thirdly, a similar conclusion is reached from an examination of the word *νόμον*, at the end of the 13th verse. The phrase, *μη ὄντος νόμου*, according to the Princeton view, means—if, or when, there is no law—*νόμου*, thus, having the general signification of *a*, or *any*, law. On this explanation of this word depends the interpretation of the whole argument in these verses; for, if the case of infants is presented at all in the passage, it must be simply as that of the only persons who

cannot have their own sins imputed to them, because they have not personally sinned against *any* law. This word, therefore, becomes one of importance in the controversy. But how are we to determine its meaning? We cannot but think, that the simple and natural way is, to inquire whether the immediate context suggests anything that may bear upon the question; and, then, to ascertain what is the Apostle's ordinary use of the word in the Epistle. But if we take this course, and look, first, at *the context*, we find, at the beginning of the verse, the same word, νόμου (without the article, just as it is in this case), and, beyond all doubt, with the meaning—the Mosaic Law. Dr. Hodge, as well as everybody else, admits this. Is it probable, then, when he says ἀπὸ νόμου (until the Mosaic Law) sin was in the world, but sin is not reckoned where νόμος is not, that he intends anything by the second νόμος besides what he meant by the first? Or, in other words, does he not mean, in both cases alike, the Mosaic Law? It can hardly be questioned that the presumption is in favor of this view, and that the burden of proof rests on those who maintain the opposite. If, however, on the other hand, we examine the Apostle's *general usage* in regard to this word, another passage in this same Epistle presents itself to our notice, which resembles the one before us so closely as to have some proper influence on our determination of the question here. We refer to the last clause of the fifteenth verse of the fourth chapter, which reads, οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις—that is, where νόμος is not, transgression, also, is not. Dr. Hodge does not deny this close resemblance, but he takes pains to interpret the clause in accordance with his view of v. 13. But, in doing so, he is compelled to reject, as we have already had occasion to remark, any distinction between ἀμαρτία and παράβασις. If παράβασις, in iv. 15, means *transgression of positive law*, there can be no doubt that νόμου means *positive law*, i. e., the Mosaic Law.*

* We say, "i. e., the Mosaic Law," for our own convenience in the argument. We believe that, in general, when Paul speaks of positive law, he has the Mosaic Law in mind, but it is unnecessary to enter upon any defense of this view, for it is of no importance in our present discussion. Dr. Hodge, as we have seen, is obliged to hold that νόμος means, *any law whatever*; and if we show that, on the contrary, it means, *positive law as distinguished from the law of nature*, we do all that is essential to our purpose.

But we have seen, above, that it is the almost universal opinion that *παράβασις* does have this meaning. *Moreover*, the same thing may be made clear in another way. The careful reader of Paul's Epistles will observe, that the fourth chapter of Romans corresponds, very exactly, with the early part of the third chapter of Galatians, and that the passage commencing with Rom. iv. 13, answers to that found in Gal. iii. 8-10. In both chapters, after the Apostle has stated the argument for the doctrine of Justification by Faith, which is drawn from the fact that Abraham was justified in this way, he adds, *Moreover*, the promise came by faith, and not by the law. In the passage in Galatians, however (Gal. iii. 8-10), there can be no doubt that the law referred to is the Mosaic Law, for Paul mentions, distinctly, the book containing that law. It follows, that he, undoubtedly, intends to speak of the same law in Rom. iv. 13—and so, in the whole passage with which iv. 13 is connected, and in which this 15th verse is included. *Again*, the whole progress of the Apostle's argument, which was against Judaistic persons, who rested on the Mosaic Law, would seem to show that this was the particular law he had in mind throughout, and, especially, in this fourth chapter, where he is drawing his proofs from their own Scriptures, the Old Testament. The probability, then, would seem to be—and here, again, we have the major part of the leading commentators with us—that *νόμον*, in the latter clause of iv. 15, refers to the Mosaic Law. But, with this admission, the similarity of the two clauses would afford an argument of no inconsiderable weight, that the same word, at the end of v. 13, has a similar meaning. *Once more*, we would remark with regard to the word *νόμον* in v. 13—though we do not insist greatly upon this point here, since we have not the space at command, in which to undertake the proof of our position—that the word is not used, with two exceptions, anywhere in that portion of the Epistle to the Romans which precedes this verse, with any other signification than "the Mosaic Law." These two exceptions are ii. 14, where the Gentiles are spoken of as a law unto themselves, and iii. 27, where the words, *By what law*—the law of faith, are found. But in these cases, even if they are allowed their full force as exceptions, we

think that such satisfactory explanations may be given, as to show that they do not, properly, bear against the general fact. If we are correct in this view, the argument becomes almost overwhelming in favor of giving the same interpretation to the νόμος in v. 13, which we are discussing. But, even without maintaining this ground respecting the general use of νόμος in these chapters, enough has been said to show that the Princeton view of this word at the end of v. 13 is, by no means the only natural one, and, as we are persuaded, by no means, the most probable one. And, as already remarked, if it is not, then, with the failure of their position with regard to this word, their position with regard to the reference, in these verses, to infants, is also lost.*

In our discussion of these 13th and 14th verses, thus far, we have omitted any notice of the word θάνατος, because it seemed to us of minor importance when simply contending against the Princeton interpretation of the passage, and, also, because it did not fall within the direct line of the argument which we proposed to offer. But, before passing to our next point, we may be allowed, perhaps, to suggest a single thought in regard to this word—showing that here, also, that interpretation meets with serious difficulty. This word, according to the Princeton theologians, means *Penal evil*; and it is the fact, that penal evil comes upon infants, which constitutes the evidence that all men are exposed to punishment on account of Adam's sin. But how are we sure that Paul's Jewish adversaries, with whom he was here arguing, would admit this proposition, that

* All who have examined this verse carefully are aware that there is no necessity of taking νόμος in the Princeton sense, in order to give a proper force and meaning to the verse; for the verb ἐλλογείται may be taken as having reference to the consciousness of sin in the man himself (so Calvin, Luther, Melancthon, Usteri, J. Müller, Rothe, Stuart, and numbers of others) or we may supply παράβασις, or say, reckoned as *transgression* (so Meyer, De Wette, Philippi, Alford, and others). In the former case the meaning would be, "though men do not impute to themselves sin, where there is no positive revealed law, yet there was sin in the world before the law, as shown by the fact of death. In the latter case, it would mean, though sin is not imputed or reckoned by God as *transgression* where there is no positive revealed law—that is, though sin is not reckoned or imputed by God, where there is no positive revealed law, as it is, where there is one, yet, &c.

penal evil comes upon infants. Supposing they had denied it, what would have become of his argument? If Paul's *mere assertion* was enough on this point, why did he waste words in arguing at all, and why did he not, rather, say at the outset, once for all, We are treated as sinners on Adam's account, all of us,—*you must believe this because I say it?* But he did not take any such course as this. On the other hand, he entered on an argument, as if he felt himself constrained to prove, *from facts that could not be doubted or gainsaid*, the truth of his proposition. Now, that penal evil comes or is likely to come upon infants is a thing which nobody among Paul's readers could know, independently of his assertion; for it is not stated by any one else in the Bible, and is a thing, which, if he did state it, was not at all unlikely to be denied by those who were opposed to him.* Is not the probability of the case,

* Dr. Hodge says, indeed, that "the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, or that on account of that sin all men are regarded and treated as sinners, was a common Jewish doctrine at the time of the Apostle, as well as at a later period. He employs the same mode of expression on the subject, which the Jews were accustomed to use. They could not have failed, therefore, to understand him as meaning to convey by these expressions the ideas usually connected with them. And such, if the Apostle wished to be understood, must have been his intention." He then refers to the pages of Wetstein, Tholuck, &c., for passages from the Rabbinical writings, and makes a long quotation from Knapp's "Theological Lectures" on the subject. We have not space here to enter into a full examination of the Rabbinical passages, but we wish simply to call attention to one or two points. In the first place, it has been doubted by prominent scholars whether the learned Jews did universally hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin; in the second place, if they did, they did not hold the Princeton form of it. They held generally that "the whole world sinned the same sin with Adam," or, as one of Dr. Hodge's quoted authorities has it, "that in the person of Adam the whole multitude or mass of his posterity had sinned." They also held that the death, which was occasioned by Adam's sin, was physical death only,—a meaning which Dr. Hodge rejects with emphasis. If then Paul, "in case he wished to be understood," must have "intended to convey by these expressions the ideas which the Jews were accustomed to convey," he certainly could not have intended to say any such thing as "that we are exposed to *penal evils* on account of a sin in which we had no participation." We should not consider the opinions of the Rabbis of much importance, in a case where Paul declared his own meaning, even if those opinions had been in favor of the Princeton theory. But, when the fact becomes apparent that the Jewish Rabbis entertained another view, we do not see any occasion for a reference to them in the learned commentary which is now engaging our attention.

As Dr. Hodge quotes Knapp as authority for the historical matter in regard

therefore, in favor of the supposition that he did not, by *θάνατος* in verse 14, mean penal evil, but *physical death* simply? He could point his readers, with great propriety, in such a discussion as this, to the fact that death, in *this* sense, had reigned, for everybody, who knew anything at all, knew this to be a fact; and no doubter of Paul's Apostolic authority or partisan opposer of his preaching could question the force of his argument for a moment. That view of this passage, then, which makes the physical death of infants the proof that they sinned in Adam, as being one with him, meets no objection from the word death. It has only to defend itself against the difficulties presented in other parts of the sentence. But the explanation of Dr. Hodge and his associates is weak at this point also, and, by giving this peculiar sense to *θάνατος* it seems to overthrow the very force of the Apostle's whole reasoning.

It remains only to add, that the large majority of the leading commentators of later times* are opposed to the Princeton

to the Rabbinical writers, and gives his statement much weight *because* he is opposed to the Princeton doctrine, we think we may be justified in making a brief quotation from the same author on another historical point, and giving his statement, here, also, some authority, *although* he is at variance with our venerable author. When speaking of the origin of this doctrine of the representative or federal headship of Adam, as held by Dr. Hodge and his associates, he says—not that it was “a common Jewish doctrine at the time of the Apostle”—but that it “was invented by some schoolmen,” and he speaks of it as having been defended “even in the eighteenth century,” as if it were remarkable that it had continued up to that period, and hardly possible that it could be believed anywhere in the nineteenth century. But Knapp's historical studies may have been confined to the time of the Apostle so exclusively, that he is not of much authority as to the times of the schoolmen. Without making any farther reference, therefore, to these statements of his on this interesting point, we close this note by citing his arguments against the doctrine in question. “This theory,” he says, “cannot be correct, because (1) The descendants of Adam never empowered him to be their representative, and to act in their name; (2) It cannot be shown from the Bible that Adam was informed that the fate of all his posterity was involved in his own; (3) If the transgression of Adam is imputed, by right of covenant, to all his posterity, then, in justice, all their transgressions should be again imputed to him as the guilty cause of all their misery and sin. What a mass of guilt, then, would come upon Adam! But of all this, nothing is said in the Scriptures; (4) The imputation of the righteousness of Christ cannot be alleged in support of this theory, for this is imputed to men only by their own will and consent.”

* We allow ourselves to speak here and elsewhere in our discussion, of *the more modern* commentators, because their judgment is worthy of the highest respect

view in the essential points of these verses—namely, the one respecting the reference to infants only, in the words “those who had not sinned,” &c. (v. 14), and the one respecting the force of the words *law, sin, and transgression*—as they are with regard to *ἡμᾶς*, of verse 12th.

III.

The *third main point of inquiry*, indicated at the outset of our discussion, has reference to the thought of the fifteenth verse, as modified and influenced by the sixteenth and seventeenth. It is confidently asserted that these verses render the Princeton explanation of the whole passage “almost certain.” Even if the statement contained in verse 12th, and the proof set forth in verses 13th and 14th, do not show, beyond question, that we are involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern, the three verses now before us declare it explicitly and with a threefold repetition. Paul seems to have had in mind, as it were, those very persons who might be disposed to doubt the “simple and natural” meaning of his language up to this point, but in order that none except the most obstinately blind among them might be left to final error, he determined to add, once and again and again, his solemn word, *It is surely so*. It becomes us, therefore, to examine, with due attention, these subjoined verses, and to see whither they lead us. If Dr. Hodge's representation is correct, it is best to be careful, lest we fight against the truth. But the results of our investigation thus far suggest the doubt whether he may not be incorrect here also; and, if so, Paul's solemn word has quite a different meaning. Now this threefold statement, on which the force of these verses wholly depends, is declared to be, in substance, this—for the offense of one all are condemned. But the Greek has it in three different forms of expression. The first and simplest of these is found

in these matters relating to the interpretation of the Greek text; and, also, because Dr. Hodge seems, in one or two places, to intimate that he is aware of his want of agreement with Calvin and others of the Reformers (see page 234 of his *Commentary*). But, if desirable, we might equally well refer to *their* writings, and show that they held to no such views, as those which he defends.

it is not clear, that those objections which come from the philological or exegetical side are quite as numerous and quite as strong. In our opinion, they are, at least, about as numerous as the length of the passage will allow, for they are to be found at every successive step;—and the scholars who are at variance with Dr. Hodge far exceed in number those who accord with his views.

But, that we may have the ground clearly opened before us, we call attention, at the outset, to his paraphrase of the whole passage, which is as follows:—"By one man sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the relation of sinners to God; death consequently passed on all, because for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners. That this is really the case is plain, because the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more extensive than its violation; and consequently, if all are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. This universality in the infliction of penal evil cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to such evil before that law was given; nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil, who have never personally sinned at all. We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam. He is, therefore, a type of Christ. The cases, however, are not entirely analogous; for if it is consistent with the Divine character, that we should suffer for what Adam did, how much more may we expect to be made happy for what Christ has done! Besides, we are condemned for one sin only, on Adam's account; whereas Christ saves us not only from the evils consequent on that transgression, but also from the punishment of our own innumerable offenses. Now, if for the offense of one, death thus triumphs over all, how much more shall they who receive the grace of the gospel, not only be saved from evil, but reign in life through Christ Jesus! Wherefore, as on account of one the condemnatory sentence has passed on all the descendants of Adam, so on account of the righteousness of one, gratuitous justification comes on all who receive the grace of Christ; for

as on account of the disobedience of one we are regarded as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other we are regarded as righteous."

It will be seen from the above, that the main force of the passage, as thus explained, and the main peculiarity of the Princeton view lies in the words, "for the offense of that one man they were all regarded and treated as sinners." And were there any doubt on this point, after the mere examination of the paraphrase, other remarks which the author makes would be decisive—as, for example, "His design is to show that there is a form of death, or penal evil, to which men are subject, anterior to any personal transgression or inherent corruption." "It follows that they are regarded and treated as sinners, on the ground of the disobedience of another." "Adam's sin is the direct judicial ground or reason for the infliction of penal evil" on his posterity. Adam's sin "constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them," i. e. as sinners. "We are involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern." This statement, that we had no personal concern in Adam's sin, means, according to Dr. Hodge, that we did not participate in Adam's sin, and that we were not one moral person with him. We only sinned in him as our head and representative;—that is, he being our representative, his sin was "the judicial ground or reason why death passed upon all of us;"—or, in other words, while there is "no ground of remorse to us" for Adam's sin, because we did not commit it, we are justly exposed to condemnation on account of it. To the maintenance of the idea, then, *that men, though not having committed Adam's sin, are legally responsible for it, and are condemned, in consequence, to the endurance of penal evil, because he was their legal representative*, the theologians of this School are obliged to commit themselves, and they are obliged to show, that this idea is found in Romans v. 12-19.

In considering the tenableness or untenableness of their view in regard to this passage of Paul's writings, it should be borne in mind that, if the Apostle conveys any such meaning as this, it must be contained in the verb *ἡμαρτον* of vs. 12 considered in itself; or in the 13th and 14th verses, in their bear-

ing upon that verb; or in the thought of vs. 15, as modified and influenced by vs. 16 and 17; or, finally in the words *κατεσθίοντες ἀμαρτίας* of vs. 19, as giving the reason for the statement of the 18th verse. To the investigation of these four main points, therefore, we now turn, and, for the sake of greater order and clearness, we shall include whatever remarks may be suggested on subordinate points, under one or another of these heads.

I.

What, then, *in the first place*, let us inquire, is the "natural and simple meaning" of *ἡμαρτων* of the twelfth verse? In his earlier Commentary, published thirty years ago, and the eighteenth edition of which, issued in 1861, we have before us, the distinguished Professor seems to take the position, that this verb may be properly translated here by the words, "were regarded and treated as sinners."* And in support of such a translation, as in strict accordance with usage, he refers to two passages in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament—namely, Gen. xliv. 32 (or Gen. xliii. 9, which has the same words), and 1 Kings i. 21. His opponents in the controversies of those days assailed his position with earnestness, and, as we believe, conclusively showed that any such idea of the verb was, in the strictest sense, against the usage of the Greek language, and that the two instances quoted from the Septuagint—even allowing all that could be claimed with regard to them—could not, with any reason, be made to bear upon the verse now under consideration. It will hardly be necessary to repeat what they said, or to renew the argument. Nothing, it will be admitted, but *the absolute necessity of the case*, could ever make us translate the verb *ἀμαρτανω* in this way even in those verses. In other words, if we could find any possibility in the context, of assigning the ordinary active meaning to the

* The exact language of the earlier edition is, "The word translated 'have sinned' [in the English Version] may, in strict accordance with usage, be rendered *have become guilty*, or, *regarded and treated as sinners*." The impression is left upon the reader's mind, that the author considered this a proper translation of the words, and against any such interpretation his opponents contended.

verb, the universal classical and Biblical usage of the word would lead us instantly to do so. The same is true of every other case, and, therefore, so far from adopting any such interpretation readily, as the natural signification, the presumption is overwhelming against it; so overwhelming indeed, that, among all the lexicographers whose works we have at command, only one even alludes to any such meaning of the word anywhere, and he only in this passage and Gen. xlv. 32. But we regard Dr. Hodge himself as having abandoned this position at last. The opportunities for examination of the Greek language, during thirty years, and the accumulating evidence derived from the views of all the celebrated scholars of Germany, who have, within that time, accomplished so much in this department, could scarcely fail to drive any man, in some measure, away from a view so utterly without foundation. Accordingly, we find, in the recent edition, that he throws the argument above alluded to into a subordinate place, and acknowledges that πάντες ἥμαρτον "signifies all sinned and can signify nothing else." We may consider the controversy on this particular point, therefore, as now at an end. And we respectfully suggest, that the objections presented by those who believed, long ago, that this was the only possible signification of ἥμαρτον, were not "of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character."

It must not be supposed however, from what has just been said, that Dr. Hodge has come over to the ground of his adversaries altogether, in regard to this word. Far from it. His doctrinal opinions still keep their hold upon him, and he now informs us that, wherever we find the words πάντες ἥμαρτον, which "can signify nothing else but all sinned," the question must be asked, *in what sense* did they all sin? This question he answers in the present case, by saying we sinned "putatively" in Adam, or his sin was "legally and effectively" ours:—and so he comes, substantially, to the same position as before, while he reiterates, in decisive terms, that this is "the simple and natural meaning" of the words. But where do we discover anything which justifies such an idea? The verb, "to sin," ἁμαρτάνειν is very familiar to the New Testament writers, and one which nearly all of them use. This verb, and its kindred noun and adjective, ἁμαρτία and ἁμαρτωλός, are employed

by Paul more frequently than by any one else—more than fifty times in this one Epistle to the Romans. Surely, something can be determined, from so manifold cases, as to what he meant by it. He and his associate authors make a *usage for themselves*, so that we need not go beyond their own writings, in order to reach a decision of the question. Now, there is not a single instance, from the beginning to the end of the New Testament, outside of the verse which is now under consideration, where any one of them uses the verb in the sense assigned to it by Dr. Hodge. No such thought as that of “sinning legally or putatively” was in their minds in connection with it. We may safely challenge the production of any passage in contradiction of what we say, and we may appeal to the Princeton theologians themselves in proof that it cannot be done, for, amid all the controversy and after all the years of investigation, they do not point us to a single one. What is the probability, then, as to the meaning here, *when we look simply at the verb itself*? Is it that Paul passes altogether outside of the circle of his ordinary thought and presents an entirely new idea, in a word which had, beyond most other words even, a definite meaning of its own, and had never before been made to convey to his readers or hearers anything beside? Is it not, rather, that the ordinary explanation in other cases is to be adopted, with confidence, in this case also,—unless, indeed, the surrounding context renders it impossible? Moreover, the Greek language, elsewhere, shows the same uniform usage with the New Testament, so far as the verb is employed to express the idea of sinning. The two solitary examples from the Septuagint, to which reference has been made, are the only ones which are cited from all the Biblical or classical writings, as showing the possibility of such an interpretation;—and these are so peculiar, as we have already remarked, as to have no parallelism with the present case. If the meaning claimed is to be admitted there, it is forced into the verb by the context, and is to be found rather in the words which are to be supplied in thought, as modifying and limiting it.* It cannot, therefore, be true, that “the simple and natural

* The LXX passages are *not decisive* as supporting this view taken by Dr. Hodge. This has been shown by different writers already, and it will only be

meaning " of the *verb itself* is that which is here assigned to it by Dr. Hodge. We, and not he and his friends, are on the right ground thus far.

But we are told, that, if it is not *in the verb itself*, that we are to see this thought, it is in the use of it *in the aorist tense*. The declaration of the apostle, it is said, is not, they all *sin*, but they all *sinned*,—that is, when Adam did, or in him,—and it is added, "the only possible way in which they could have sinned in him is *putatively*." As for this latter statement, the spirits of an army of theologians and commentators rise up at such a suggestion, and deny its truth. What mean the whole history and progress of that theological opinion from Augustine down, which has conceived of us as, in *another than putative* sense, sinning in Adam, if we are to be turned aside or silenced with such a remark? We fear our venerated author, in his enthusiastic defense of his own theory, loses sight, for the moment, of the fact that he is wandering away from the great multitude of orthodox theologians. The question is one of possibility. How does Dr. Hodge know that the only way in which a man can possibly sin in Adam is the

necessary to refer to them very briefly. Gen. xlv. 32 (xliv. 9,) contains the words of Judah when speaking to his father in regard to Benjamin, "If I bring him not unto thee, *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι εἰς τὸν πατέρα* (xliv. 9, *εἰς σέ*) *πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας*. We find the verb here having the form *ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι*, *I shall be having sinned*, and the preposition *εἰς* with the accusative following and modifying it. *May not* the proper inference, from this peculiar phraseology, be that these translators meant to represent Judah as saying—not, I will be regarded and treated as a sinner by thee—but if I do not bring Benjamin safely back, I will (shall) be, for all the rest of my life, a person who has done thee a wrong, or committed a sin against thee? The other passage (1 Kings i. 21) does not, indeed, contain the verb *ἡμαρτάνω* but may, properly enough, be considered in the same connection since it has the kindred noun. The words are those of Bathsheba to David in regard to the position of herself and her son, Solomon, in case Adonijah should be established upon the throne of his father. In that case, she declares that they would be sinners—*ἐσόμεθα ἡμαρτωλοί*. But the meaning here also, may evidently be (not to say *is*), that they would be sinners *to the view of the reigning prince*. These words, "to the view of the reigning prince" are naturally suggested by the context, and if they are supplied by the mind as part of the sentence, it is *these words alone* (and not any unusual use of the word, *sinners*) which give the peculiar sense to the passage. But we are considering here, it will be noticed, the signification of the *verb only*, and not of the verb as modified by other words.

way in which the thing is absolutely impossible—a contradiction in terms, for sin is something *actual*, and not something *merely putative*? We do not care, however, to discuss this question between the different parties, who think that, in *any* sense, we sinned in Adam, nor have we any desire to defend any particular view of this passage, at the present time. Our object is, merely, to inquire whether the view presented is the only simple one, in the light of the aorist tense which the verse contains. And here we call attention to the remarkable fact, that very many of the most eminent scholars, both in this and foreign countries, have taken the opposite view. Of the modern commentators in Germany, of highest reputation for linguistic knowledge, more than one half explain the verb, notwithstanding the aorist, as relating to the personal sins of individuals—and among them, surely, are men who cannot be complained of on account of their theological prejudices. But to say nothing of their opinions—who can deny that this aorist *may* be used in a somewhat figurative sense, so that Paul conceives of our individual, personal sinning as summed up and centered in Adam, not because we sinned either really or putatively when he did, but because, when he sinned, the whole future results were made certain, and so, in a sense, were already accomplished. Such an explanation may be, not unfrequently, given of the aorist tense in other places in Paul's writings. It seems even to be a favorite usage of his. When it is said, for example, that our old man was crucified with Christ, the meaning is, that we are brought into such a close union with Christ by our faith, that the carnal part is destroyed, and may be said to have been, as it were, even crucified when he was crucified. Why may not a similar idea be conveyed in the verse now under consideration? The most perfectly literal meaning of a passage is not always, as everybody knows, the most natural or the simplest one. And as for the probabilities of the case, we are content to leave it to the unprejudiced judgment of scholars, whether such a semi-figurative explanation is not more reasonable here, than one which violates the universal signification of the verb *ἀναστρέφω*, as well as the universal idea of justice,—that a man cannot properly be treated as a sinner for the mere act of one whom

he did not authorize as his agent. But let us appeal to Dr. Hodge himself, in this matter, and see if there is not some other simple and natural meaning for the aorist tense here. In commenting on the passage, in the third chapter of this same Epistle, at verse 23, where Paul says πάντες ἡμαρτον καὶ ὁσπεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, he accounts for the aorist tense of this same verb in the following language,—“The idea that all men now stand in the posture of sinners before God might be expressed either by saying, All have sinned and are sinners, [that is, by the perfect tense,] or all sinned, [that is, by the aorist.] The latter is the form adopted by the apostle:” and he adds a remark, in evident explanation of the substantial meaning of the whole passage—“All men are sinners and under the disapprobation of God.” But, if the expression πάντες ἡμαρτον can be explained in such a sentence as that in iii. 23, where is the difficulty in accounting for the aorist tense, in the same way, in v. 12? Every careful reader of the two passages in the original will see that they are alike in this regard, and that the question respecting the aorist tense is precisely the same.* If our distinguished author finds no trouble in referring the aorist to *actual sin* as he does in iii. 23, and in making it a simple and proper substitute for the perfect tense, “*all have sinned and are sinners*,” it is certainly somewhat surprising that the difficulty rises into so great proportions, after the few verses that intervene between that point and the middle of the fifth chapter. And we trust we may be pardoned if we say, that so sudden and complete a change of view, at the moment when the author comes to a passage

* The similarity in these two verses with regard to the aorist tense is such, that Commentators of note have referred the verb in iii. 23, also, to original *sin*. But Dr. Hodge, though quoting the views of such writers, decidedly rejects them by adopting the explanation given above. The admission that the aorist may be substantially equivalent to the *perfect* is all that the old adversaries of the Princeton School ever asked for, since, with this admission, their interpretation is a just one. We may add, that Dr. Hodge, also, allows what we have called the *semi-figurative* explanation of this aorist, for he says in his notes on iii. 23, “The sinning is [in the use of the aorist tense,] *represented* as past;” and though he does not italicise the word, as we have done, he seems clearly to show that this is the thought which he has in mind.

crease of divorces, that the divorces in 1864 were five times as many as in 1849, although the population had grown by the addition of less than one-half, of which one-half Catholics, who did not swell the divorces, formed not a small part; and that the "omnibus" clause, both directly and by its influence when other causes were weak, aided the petitioners for divorces not a little. Add to all this that after divorces are granted there is an unlimited license of remarriage, and that there is little fear of prosecutions for adultery. A man and woman once divorced may return to their old connection the next day.* The adulterer and his mistress, the adulteress and her paramour may be linked together in a union which they aimed, perhaps, to make possible by their crime. Herod and Herodias might live very comfortably under our laws, unless the tetrarch Philip were malicious enough not to sue for a divorce. Is it not time, if such is the case, to see whether we ought to warn our neighbors, or whether we had better advise them to follow our example. How, then, do statistics show that we stand?

The statistics we shall present under the heads of the ratio of annual divorces to annual marriages, and, as far as we are able, to families, and to population, and shall then seek to gather any lessons from them that they may convey.

In Vermont the ratio of annual divorces to annual marriages stands thus:

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratio.
1860,	94	2,179	1 to 23.2
1861,	65	2,188	" " 33.7
1862,	94	1,962	" " 21
1863,	102	2,007	" " 20
1864,	98	1,804	" " 18
1865,	122	2,569	" " 21
1866,	155	3,001	" " 19
Total,	730	15,710	" " 21.5

* A member of the committee raised to consider the subject of divorces in 1867 stated that he knew a couple in a town near his own who were divorced and married again a fortnight afterward, and obtained a second divorce on similar grounds with the first very soon afterward.

In Massachusetts,

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1861,	243	10,972	1 to 45
1862,	227	11,014	" " 48.4
1863,	239	10,873	" " 45.9
1864,	313	12,513	" " 40
Total,	1,022	45,372	" " 44.4

In Ohio, (the years begin in July of the year named).

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1865,	837	22,198	1 to 24
1866,	1,169	30,479	" " 26
1867,	975		

In Connecticut,

Years.	Divorces.	Marriages.	Ratios.
1860,	310	3,978	1 to 12.83
1861,	275	3,757	" " 13.70
1862,	257	3,701	" " 14.44
1863,	291	3,467	" " 11.90
1864,	426	4,107	" " 9.64
1865,	404	4,460	" " 11.04
1866,	488	4,978	" " 10.19
1867,	459	4,779	" " 10.40
Total,	2,910	33,227	1 to 11.40

From Prussia we have some materials for instituting a comparison between that country of notoriously loose divorce laws and the States named above. We exclude the Catholic population, which cannot be done with accuracy in the States, and thus the story which the tables tell is unfairly in favor of the latter. For instance, in Connecticut, where the whole number of marriages was, as before stated, 4,978 in 1866, the marriages, in which both parties were of foreign birth, were 1,208. Now, of these it is safe to say that two-thirds, say 800, were Catholics, who rarely petition for divorce in this State. Deducting them we have the ratio of one divorce to less than eight and a half so called Protestant or rather non-Catholic, marriages.

Prussia, in 1855. Marriage of non-Catholics, 84,914; divorces, 2,937: ratio, 1 to 29.

Thus Connecticut is at the bottom of the list altogether. The ratio of divorces to marriages is here double what it is in Vermont, nearly four-fold that in Massachusetts, and much more than double that in Prussia. There are absolutely more divorces in Connecticut, on the average, by 108 (viz: 364 every year) than in Massachusetts, a State with two and a half times as many inhabitants. There were in 1866, more than half as many as in Ohio, a State with almost five times the population.

It ought to be said that the divorces in several of the States were unduly great in the year 1864, and have been so since the war. The reason must be that many hasty marriages were contracted by soldiers; the motive being, on the woman's part, to get a share of the bounty, or the pension, if the husband should be killed. But to counterbalance this, the marriages, as always happens in similar cases after a war, have increased quite perceptibly, so that the ratio is not much affected.

In Prussia the comparisons are made between the number of divorces and the whole number of married couples, or between the divorces and the whole population. The statistics which have fallen under our notice are the following, pertaining to 1838-1840.

Judicial district of Berlin: 57 divorces to 100,000 inhabitants.

"	"	Frankfort, 30	"	"	"
"	"	Magdeburg 35	"	"	"
"	"	Konigsberg 34	"	"	"
"	"	Stettin 36	"	"	"
"	"	Greifswald 16	"	"	"

In the Rhine provinces, among 600,000 Protestants, there were four divorces to 100,000 souls, which last item shows that in a Prussian province, where the general code is not used but the legislation is based on the code Napoleon and the people have had a different juristic training, the divorces are very few. Or in other words the Prussian divorce law encourages and multiplies divorces. This is shown also by the tables for other parts of Protestant Germany. Thus, in Saxony, in judicial districts, containing 900,000 inhabitants, taking the average

of 1836-1840, there were not quite 19 divorces to 100,000 souls. In Electoral Hesse there were in 1835, 24; in 1841, 23; in 1851, 16; in 1851, 17; in 1853, 14 divorces, which point to ratios varying between less than 4 and 2 to 100,000.*

Our comparisons of these data with similar ones in some of the United States must be based in part upon estimates. For Massachusetts, we follow Dr. Jarvis's estimates in the census of that State for 1865 (page 206). Vermont adds to its population so slowly that the United States census of 1860 may be taken to represent the present number of inhabitants. For Connecticut, we may calculate on a yearly addition of two per cent., which is about the same increase which prevailed between 1850 and 1860, but may be quite too large, and therefore tells too good a story for the State.

In Vermont, taking the average, as already given, there is one divorce annually to 3,125 inhabitants, 33 divorces to 100,000.

In Massachusetts, there were, in

1861, 19.7 divorces to 100,000.

1862, 18.2 " "

1863, 19. " "

1864, 24.8 " "

In Ohio, in 1865, there were 33½ divorces to 100,000.

And in Connecticut, in

1860, 67.4 divorces to 100,000.

1864, 85.5 " "

1867, 87.5 " "

But this, bad as it is, as we said, tells too good a story, for our estimate of population embraces all the Catholics.

*From Strippelmant's *Ehescheidungsrecht*, an excellent work written by a lawyer at Cassel in Hesse, and published in 1854. Our authority for the other German statistics is Viebahn's *Statistik*, part 2, published in 1862. The American authorities are the annual reports of the Commissioners of Statistics in Ohio for 1855-57, a report submitted to the legislature of Massachusetts in 1856, embracing five years, from 1860 to 1864, the State Librarian's annual reports in Connecticut, which for several years have by law embraced divorces also, and for Vermont the public reports for 1860, 1861, and a manuscript detailed statement, kindly furnished by Henry Clark, Esq., of Rutland, Clerk of the Senate of that State. Rev. W. W. Andrews and others have rendered us important assistance.

necticut, Indiana—expressly declare the parties free to marry again.*

In looking back on the ground over which we have thus far traveled in this Article we perceive that the number of causes for which divorce may be obtained has been very considerably increased in modern times. There is an increasing desire to be freed from the marriage bond on grounds which were, of old, regarded as insufficient; and an increasing willingness on the part of lawmakers to gratify such a desire, as well as an increasing tendency to legislate on marriage as being a mere contract, to the neglect of its moral aspects. On the other hand, there is an impression in the mind of many persons that divorces, at least in a number of the States, are multiplying; that in a certain stratum of society—shall we call it Protestant society?—the feeling of the sanctity of marriage is passing away; that the highest crimes against that covenant which stands as a symbol of the union of Christ with his church, are either excused, or regarded as things of course, or even laughed at. Moral indignation, it is thought, no longer visits the adulterer or adulteress; the more vulgar newspapers joke about the crime, and divorced persons are no longer under that frown which met them formerly, even when divorced for causes below the greatest.

Is it true that divorces are increasing? Is it true that the number of them is at all equal to the number in those States in Europe where they are most freely granted? Is there any difference between the different States in the number of successful petitions for this privilege?

We propose to occupy the remainder of this Article with an exposition of the statistics of divorce, as far as the tables prepared in several of the States place them within our reach. We regret to say that the materials are scanty. It is only of late that tables of births, deaths, and marriages have been be-

* It is quite possible that errors may have crept into the sketches of divorce legislation which we have presented to our readers. We have spent a good deal of time in consulting the complete collection of statutes in the State House at Hartford, where the State Librarian offers every facility and assistance, but the hurry of taking notes, without the facility of verifying them afterwards in cases of doubt, must bring with it more than one mistake. We shall be happy if some charitable reader will set us right.

gun in a portion of the States, while but a few are going a little farther into social or moral statistics. Massachusetts has published one list of divorces for five years, which is clumsily prepared, and leaves to the reader of it the work of counting and registering. In Vermont and in Connecticut the lists are more convenient, but in the latter State the causes of divorce have not been published with regularity. In Ohio the eminent commissioner of statistics, who has recently been displaced, Mr. Edward D. Mansfield, has prepared very useful tables. But in most of the other States all this information lies buried in the desks of the county clerks, and no one, probably, has taken the trouble to collect and make it known to the world. Some tables may have been drawn up with which we are unacquainted. Yet even our inadequate materials will supply some valuable results.

In these comparisons we may as well confess that we originally had the state of things in Connecticut in view, and were desirous of ascertaining how far this commonwealth differed in one important department of morals, and in respect to one indication of social advance or decline, from its sister States. We were desirous, also, of finding out, if we could, whether there was any movement of divorce towards increase or diminution in number, and whether the law had anything to do with such movement. This has been done once, and well done, by a friend of ours, in an Article in the *New Englander*, entitled "Divorce Legislation in Connecticut," published in July, 1866.

At the risk of repeating what was there said we must remind our readers that to the two original causes of divorce—adultery and desertion—there were added two others in 1843, "habitual intemperance and intolerable cruelty," and that in 1849 a new batch of causes was superadded, viz: sentence of imprisonment for life, bestiality or any other infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment in the state-prison, and—what we have already spoken of—any such misconduct of the other party as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and defeats the purposes of the marriage relation. This last is generally known in the State as the "omnibus clause." It appears that after each of these advances in legislation there was an in

they are sinners on that account. The just God could not deal with men as sinners on any account which did not make them truly sinners." Now here are men of different countries and of varied theological positions, and not only this, but some of them are the men who know more about the uses and significations of Greek words, as employed in the New Testament, than any others of modern times. Their opinion is certainly worthy of the highest respect, and, if they are in harmony, it is to be set aside only for the strongest reasons. In this case it happens that they are not thus in harmony in their positive statements as to the explanation which ought to be given to this important phrase, but they are thoroughly and completely so in their rejection of Dr. Hodge's view respecting it. What shall we say then? We believe the unanimous answer of unperverted and unprejudiced minds to such a question would be—Dr. Hodge has not arrived at the right meaning; or, *if he has*, the right meaning is not the one that should, properly, be called, "*the simple and natural meaning.*" And, at all events, it is clear that his explanation is not admitted to be the natural and simple one, "with scarcely an exception," so far as this verb *ἡμαρτον* is concerned.

II.

Our *second main point of inquiry* has reference to the bearing of the thirteenth and fourteenth verses upon the twelfth. If the phrase we have been considering does not suggest the Princeton idea in itself, must we, nevertheless, receive it because of these two following verses? Dr. Hodge declares that we must. The 13th and 14th verses, he says, introduce the proof of the phrase, Death passed upon all men because (*πάντες ἡμαρτον*) all were regarded and treated as sinners for the offense of that one man. This proof is as follows: "This universality of the infliction of penal evil, alluded to in the end of verse 12th, cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to that evil before that law was given (vs. 13), nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil who have never

personally sinned at all (vs. 14). We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam." If we attempt to put the same statement more nearly into the phraseology of Paul, so as to be able to examine it more definitely as it appears in the Sacred Text, the reasoning becomes—using Dr. Hodge's language as nearly as may be—Sin is not imputed where there is no law; but sin was imputed before the law of Moses, therefore there was a law before the law of Moses, i. e. the law of nature; but even the violation of that law will not account for the universality of penal evils at that time, because those evils were inflicted upon those who had never broken that law, or personally sinned at all, i. e. the infants of that period. This is all that is contained in verses 13 and 14, and in this is the evidence that penal evils come universally upon all men, because they, without being sinners themselves, and without having committed Adam's sin, are treated as sinners on account of his sin.

But how much of this whole statement is the actual and conclusive proof of the point which is to be proved? What is it that shows the proposition, which Dr. Hodge finds in the latter part of verse 12th, to be unquestionably true? Evidently it can be only one thing—namely, the statement in the fourteenth verse in regard to infants. These had sinned in no way, it might be said, except putatively in Adam, and consequently, if penal evils come upon them, they must come as the direct and immediate effect of the sin which Adam committed. But, in the case of the adults before the Mosaic Law, —that is, between Adam and Moses—there was nothing to prove beyond question the point in hand, for the penal evils coming upon them might be the result of their own personal violation of the law of nature. In other words, if the author attempted to establish by argument the proposition that penal evils come upon all mankind independently of their own sins, he could accomplish his object only by citing a case where it was *manifest* to every mind that they *could not* come for *any other reason*. And the only case, which could possibly be regarded as of this kind, was the case of infants. But, if their case was the one which alone proved the point in hand,

why did the Apostle allude to any other case? Why, instead of saying simply, "This must be so, for the evils befalling infants cannot otherwise be accounted for," does he go through such a circumlocution as we find in the 13th and 14th verses? Here is a purpose that can be effected in a most simple and straightforward way. A single fact—according to the claim of the Princeton writers—is to be proved, and a single all-conclusive proof is at hand. Any writer possessed of a reasonable amount of common sense would state the fact, and follow it with the evidence; and it would be as clear as the sunlight to every reader. But the Apostle does no such thing. He involves the fact, which he desires to offer as proof, with something wholly irrelevant, and then sets forth the whole matter in the most indirect manner possible, thus: "Penal evils come upon all men for Adam's sin; because penal evils do not come without the violation of a law, but they did come before the law of Moses, therefore there was a law before the law of Moses; but penal evils came before the law of Moses, even upon infants who had not violated the law that was then existing." We remember hearing, some years ago, an argument brought forward to sustain a certain proposition, which depended solely on the evidence of a particular book, whose truthfulness everybody in the audience admitted. It was after this fashion—first, there is no intrinsic absurdity in supposing the proposition to be true; secondly, there is a probability that it is true; thirdly, it *is* true, because the book says so. It seemed to us, that the first two steps might properly have been omitted, as the last covered the whole case. But Paul's reasoning would be more faulty than this, if Dr. Hodge's theory were correct. It would be as absurd as to attempt to prove that the Democratic party hold a certain doctrine; first, by showing that Napoleon the Third holds it, and, secondly, because it is in the Democratic platform. Who could imagine that an inspired Apostle wrote after such a fashion, except one who was so blinded by preconceived theological opinions as to see only what he wished to see?

But, independently of this difficulty in the method of interpretation we are now considering, let us look, for a moment, at another. If infants are the class whose condition is brought forward

as the evidence of Paul's proposition in verse 12th (that men are treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, though they had no participation in its commission), why are not *all infants* spoken of? What reason for alluding to the infants *before* the time of Moses, rather than those *since* that time? They are both in precisely the same condition, and it is *all* infants, and not a *particular number* of infants living previous to a certain period of the world's history, who establish the fact in question—if, indeed, it be a fact. The argument on this subject was, long since, most ably and conclusively stated by Dr. N. W. Taylor (see his "Revealed Theology") and others; and it will be unnecessary to dwell upon it further here. But not only was there no reason why the Apostle should have limited himself to that particular body of infants, there was a very good reason why he should *not* have done so. By so doing he was in danger, either of leading his friends into the mistaken notion that the infants of a later time differed from the earlier ones—in being actual sinners from the moment of birth, while the earlier ones were not so—or of weakening the force of his argument to the view of his adversaries, who could charge this construction upon his words. We venture to say, that, in all respectable literature, no instance of more irregular and incoherent argumentation can be produced, than that for which Paul is here made responsible by the Princeton explanation of these verses.

But, again, the whole proof, according to this theory, is dependent on the citation of the case of infants. They must be alluded to *somewhere* in the passage, or there is, as we have already seen, no proof at all in it of what Dr. Hodge makes πάντες ἡμαρτον mean. Where, then, are they alluded to? In the words, it is answered, "Even over those who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression;"—and the reasons given for this view of these words are, *first*, that the adverb, *even*, marks the persons spoken of as a particular class among the general body of those who lived between Adam and Moses, and, *secondly*, that if so, the only class who can, consistently with the whole passage, be thus distinguished, are infants. If the force of either of these reasons can be set aside, this view of these words cannot be sustained, and, with

its failure, everything else which these writers say in regard to these verses fails also. With regard to the first, Dr. Hodge declares that "it is obvious that the first clause of the 14th verse describes a general class of persons, and the second clause, which is distinguished from the first by the word *even*, only a portion of that class." He should, more properly, have said it was obvious to *his mind*, for, certainly, it is not so to a very large part of those who have commented on this verse. The first clause of the verse reads, "Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam until Moses." What is the meaning of the words, "from Adam until Moses?" It seems to us that it clearly means from the *time* of Adam until the *time* of Moses—not the *persons who lived during that time*. It is as if the author had said—Death reigned from the year one to the year 2,500. At all events, this is a perfectly simple and natural meaning for the words, and one which should be set aside as untenable only for good and sufficient reasons in the context. Not only, however, do no such reasons exist in this case, but quite a conclusive reason is to be found for adopting this meaning—for the Apostle could scarcely make his design in the use of these words more manifest than he has done at the beginning of the preceding verse. The 13th and 14th verses, it will be noticed, are parts of one long sentence, consisting of three clauses bound together in the close union of reasoning. It is hardly possible, therefore, that the author should not, when saying, in one part of the sentence, Until the Mosaic Law, and, in another, From Adam until Moses, mean precisely the same thing—namely, *during the time that preceded the law of Moses*. But if he meant simply this, the adverb, *even*, does not, necessarily, distinguish *classes* between Adam and Moses, as Dr. Hodge maintains; and all the discourse about tautology and so forth, which a few writers of his tendencies indulge in against their adversaries (as if, on any other interpretation, the phrase would mean, Death reigned over a particular class of persons, *even* over that particular class of persons), is without foundation. There was, we will suppose for the moment, a certain peculiarity which distinguished *all* persons living before the giving of the law of Moses from all those living after that time—namely, that they did not trans-

gress any positive law. What should prevent the Apostle from distinguishing the former class from the latter by the word *even*, and from saying, as he does, in substance, in this verse—Death did not reign simply *after* the time of Moses, over those who *had* sinned against a positive law, but also *before* the time of Moses, *even* over those who *had not* sinned against a positive law. The word *even* merely marks and makes prominent the peculiarity of those who lived before the Mosaic law, and by it Paul brings forward, with greatest emphasis, the fact that death reigned *even over those persons, in whose case*—on his present standpoint in his argument—*it might seem least likely to have reigned*; namely, those who had not sinned in the way of transgression of positive law, as Adam had done. And it makes no difference, as to the possibility and propriety of using the word *even*, whether the persons alluded to were only a portion or the whole of those persons who preceded the Mosaic dispensation. Supposing Paul, instead of using the precise phraseology he has here employed, had said, “Death reigned even over all the persons who lived before the time of Moses, that is, over that portion of mankind who did not violate a positive law”—who would have found any difficulty in the passage? Why may he not, equally well, have changed the order and adopted the course he has,—“Death reigned before the time of Moses, even over that portion of mankind who did not violate a positive law?” There is nothing in all Dr. Hodge’s discussion of this whole passage, in his recent Commentary, which seems to us more astonishing than this—that after more than thirty years of opportunity for investigation, he has retained this old argument about tautology from his former work. The fact of the case is simply this, that the *ai* (even) may be taken in either way, so far as it is considered in itself; and, if it is taken in the way suggested above, there is no tautology to be found.

But, supposing that Dr. Hodge is right with regard to this word, *even*, and that it does distinguish a special class among those who lived between Adam and Moses, does it, necessarily, refer to the class of infants? Certainly it does not, *so far as the mere words themselves are concerned*, for there were between Adam and Moses persons, more or less in number, who received positive commands from God, and who could be regarded as a class by themselves; while those who had not

thus received them might be, properly, distinguished by the language here employed. Thus, no less eminent a commentator than Meyer, in the latest edition of his work on this Epistle, says of this *καί*, "It refers to the fact that, in that period also (i. e., before the law of Moses), divine commands positively given were transgressed by some to whom they were given, but that not only those died, but those, likewise, who did not thus transgress."

The *possibility* of taking these words with some other reference than that made by Dr. Hodge we may regard, therefore, as established, and we are left to consider the *probabilities* of the case. In examining these, we find—in addition to the difficulties which have been already discovered, when discussing the Apostle's reasoning in the 13th and 14th verses taken together—the following points which may be briefly noticed. *First*, the expression, which is used, τοῖς μὴ ἀναγρησασίας ἐν τῷ ὁμολογίᾳ τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ, is a very strange one to describe infants. Why did not Paul *say* infants, if he *meant* infants? It was a word which not only would have conveyed his exact meaning, but would have avoided the misunderstanding of his language, which the phrase might have occasioned in the mind of any reader. "Those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" *might*, to say the least, be interpreted to mean, those who had not sinned against a positive law—and, especially, the phrase might be so understood by those who made this distinction between the persons who had the Mosaic Law and those who did not have it, as the Jewishly-disposed readers, for whose benefit Paul was writing, were so accustomed to do. Even to those who first received his Epistle his language must have been quite uncertain in its meaning, while as for those who should take it up in later days, he must, after a moment's thought, have been aware that such circumlocutions would be almost hopelessly obscure. How strange, then, that he should not have chosen the single and simple word, which would have saved himself from writing a bungling sentence, and have saved his readers, in all times, incalculable difficulty and controversy! We do not believe the Apostle wrote thus. But, whether he did or not, surely there is no great naturalness and simplicity in such an explanation of his words.

Secondly, this interpretation of the phrase loses sight altogether of the proper force and emphasis of the word *παράβασις*. The Apostle does not say—those who had not sinned as Adam had, that is, according to Dr. Hodge, personally—but those who had not sinned *after the similitude of Adam's transgression*. Dr. Hodge ignores, or even denies, any distinction between *παράβασις* and *ἁμαρτία* in Paul's writings. But, in doing so, he is at variance with almost every New Testament commentator of linguistic reputation. Compare, for example, Ellicott's Commentary on Galatians ii. 18, and iii. 19; Trench's Synonyms; and the German writers in general. And any one who will examine the passages where the Apostle uses this noun, or the similar word *παράβατης*, will see for himself that in every case he has direct reference to violation of positive law. If, then, we insist that there is such a distinction between the words—so that, while *ἁμαρτία* means *sin*, *παράβασις* is used to denote *transgression of positive law*, we shall certainly not be liable to the charge of disregarding the usage of the language, or of wandering off under the guidance of theological prejudice. But, if Paul turns aside from his repeated use of *ἁμαρτία*, at this point, to employ a new word, which has a definite and well-established signification of its own—namely a certain kind of sin, i. e., transgression of positive law—and, if he describes certain persons as those who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's *transgression*, is it not the fair and natural inference, that he means to intimate that they *did* sin after some *other* similitude—that is, that they did sin *personally*, in a way which was *not* transgression of positive law? If, however, this be true, the words, of course, cannot refer to infants, since, as Dr. Hodge admits, they do not personally sin at all.

Thirdly, a similar conclusion is reached from an examination of the word *νόμου*, at the end of the 13th verse. The phrase, *μη ὄντος νόμου*, according to the Princeton view, means—if, or when, there is no law—*νόμου*, thus, having the general signification of *a*, or *any*, law. On this explanation of this word depends the interpretation of the whole argument in these verses; for, if the case of infants is presented at all in the passage, it must be simply as that of the only persons who

cannot have their own sins imputed to them, because they have not personally sinned against *any* law. This word, therefore, becomes one of importance in the controversy. But how are we to determine its meaning? We cannot but think, that the simple and natural way is, to inquire whether the immediate context suggests anything that may bear upon the question; and, then, to ascertain what is the Apostle's ordinary use of the word in the Epistle. But if we take this course, and look, first, at *the context*, we find, at the beginning of the verse, the same word, νόμου (without the article, just as it is in this case), and, beyond all doubt, with the meaning—the Mosaic Law. Dr. Hodge, as well as everybody else, admits this. Is it probable, then, when he says ἀπὸ νόμου (until the Mosaic Law) sin was in the world, but sin is not reckoned where νόμος is not, that he intends anything by the second νόμος besides what he meant by the first? Or, in other words, does he not mean, in both cases alike, the Mosaic Law? It can hardly be questioned that the presumption is in favor of this view, and that the burden of proof rests on those who maintain the opposite. If, however, on the other hand, we examine the Apostle's *general usage* in regard to this word, another passage in this same Epistle presents itself to our notice, which resembles the one before us so closely as to have some proper influence on our determination of the question here. We refer to the last clause of the fifteenth verse of the fourth chapter, which reads, οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις—that is, where νόμος is not, transgression, also, is not. Dr. Hodge does not deny this close resemblance, but he takes pains to interpret the clause in accordance with his view of v. 13. But, in doing so, he is compelled to reject, as we have already had occasion to remark, any distinction between ἀμαρτία and παράβασις. If παράβασις, in iv. 15, means *transgression of positive law*, there can be no doubt that νόμου means *positive law*, i. e., the Mosaic Law.*

* We say, "i. e., the Mosaic Law," for our own convenience in the argument. We believe that, in general, when Paul speaks of positive law, he has the Mosaic Law in mind, but it is unnecessary to enter upon any defense of this view, for it is of no importance in our present discussion. Dr. Hodge, as we have seen, is obliged to hold that νόμος means, *any law whatever*; and if we show that, on the contrary, it means, *positive law as distinguished from the law of nature*, we do all that is essential to our purpose.

But we have seen, above, that it is the almost universal opinion that *παράβασις* does have this meaning. *Moreover*, the same thing may be made clear in another way. The careful reader of Paul's Epistles will observe, that the fourth chapter of Romans corresponds, very exactly, with the early part of the third chapter of Galatians, and that the passage commencing with Rom. iv. 13, answers to that found in Gal. iii. 8-10. In both chapters, after the Apostle has stated the argument for the doctrine of Justification by Faith, which is drawn from the fact that Abraham was justified in this way, he adds, *Moreover*, the promise came by faith, and not by the law. In the passage in Galatians, however (Gal. iii. 8-10), there can be no doubt that the law referred to is the Mosaic Law, for Paul mentions, distinctly, the book containing that law. It follows, that he, undoubtedly, intends to speak of the same law in Rom. iv. 13—and so, in the whole passage with which iv. 13 is connected, and in which this 15th verse is included. *Again*, the whole progress of the Apostle's argument, which was against Judaistic persons, who rested on the Mosaic Law, would seem to show that this was the particular law he had in mind throughout, and, especially, in this fourth chapter, where he is drawing his proofs from their own Scriptures, the Old Testament. The probability, then, would seem to be—and here, again, we have the major part of the leading commentators with us—that *νόμον*, in the latter clause of iv. 15, refers to the Mosaic Law. But, with this admission, the similarity of the two clauses would afford an argument of no inconsiderable weight, that the same word, at the end of v. 13, has a similar meaning. *Once more*, we would remark with regard to the word *νόμον* in v. 13—though we do not insist greatly upon this point here, since we have not the space at command, in which to undertake the proof of our position—that the word is not used, with two exceptions, anywhere in that portion of the Epistle to the Romans which precedes this verse, with any other signification than "the Mosaic Law." These two exceptions are ii. 14, where the Gentiles are spoken of as a law unto themselves, and iii. 27, where the words, *By what law*—the law of faith, are found. But in these cases, even if they are allowed their full force as exceptions, we

think that such satisfactory explanations may be given, as to show that they do not, properly, bear against the general fact. If we are correct in this view, the argument becomes almost overwhelming in favor of giving the same interpretation to the νόμος in v. 18, which we are discussing. But, even without maintaining this ground respecting the general use of νόμος in these chapters, enough has been said to show that the Princeton view of this word at the end of v. 18 is, by no means the only natural one, and, as we are persuaded, by no means, the most probable one. And, as already remarked, if it is not, then, with the failure of their position with regard to this word, their position with regard to the reference, in these verses, to infants, is also lost.*

In our discussion of these 18th and 14th verses, thus far, we have omitted any notice of the word θάνατος, because it seemed to us of minor importance when simply contending against the Princeton interpretation of the passage, and, also, because it did not fall within the direct line of the argument which we proposed to offer. But, before passing to our next point, we may be allowed, perhaps, to suggest a single thought in regard to this word—showing that here, also, that interpretation meets with serious difficulty. This word, according to the Princeton theologians, means *Penal evil*; and it is the fact, that penal evil comes upon infants, which constitutes the evidence that all men are exposed to punishment on account of Adam's sin. But how are we sure that Paul's Jewish adversaries, with whom he was here arguing, would admit this proposition, that

* All who have examined this verse carefully are aware that there is no necessity of taking νόμος in the Princeton sense, in order to give a proper force and meaning to the verse; for the verb ἐλλογίζεσθαι may be taken as having reference to the consciousness of sin in the man himself (so Calvin, Luther, Melancthon, Usteri, J. Müller, Rothe, Stuart, and numbers of others) or we may supply παράβασις, or say, reckoned as *transgression* (so Meyer, De Wette, Philippi, Alford, and others). In the former case the meaning would be, "though men do not *impute to themselves* sin, where there is no positive revealed law, yet there was sin in the world before the law, as shown by the fact of death. In the latter case, it would mean, though sin is not imputed or *reckoned by God as transgression* where there is no positive revealed law—that is, though sin is not reckoned or imputed by God, where there is no positive revealed law, as it is, where there is one, yet, &c.

penal evil comes upon infants. Supposing they had denied it, what would have become of his argument? If Paul's *mere assertion* was enough on this point, why did he waste words in arguing at all, and why did he not, rather, say at the outset, once for all, We are treated as sinners on Adam's account, all of us,—*you must believe this because I say it?* But he did not take any such course as this. On the other hand, he entered on an argument, as if he felt himself constrained to prove, *from facts that could not be doubted or gainsaid*, the truth of his proposition. Now, that penal evil comes or is likely to come upon infants is a thing which nobody among Paul's readers could know, independently of his assertion; for it is not stated by any one else in the Bible, and is a thing, which, if he did state it, was not at all unlikely to be denied by those who were opposed to him.* Is not the probability of the case,

* Dr. Hodge says, indeed, that "the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, or that on account of that sin all men are regarded and treated as sinners, was a common Jewish doctrine at the time of the Apostle, as well as at a later period. He employs the same mode of expression on the subject, which the Jews were accustomed to use. They could not have failed, therefore, to understand him as meaning to convey by these expressions the ideas usually connected with them. And such, if the Apostle wished to be understood, must have been his intention." He then refers to the pages of Wetstein, Tholuck, &c., for passages from the Rabbinical writings, and makes a long quotation from Knapp's "Theological Lectures" on the subject. We have not space here to enter into a full examination of the Rabbinical passages, but we wish simply to call attention to one or two points. In the first place, it has been doubted by prominent scholars whether the learned Jews did universally hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin; in the second place, if they did, they did not hold the Princeton form of it. They held generally that "the whole world sinned the same sin with Adam," or, as one of Dr. Hodge's quoted authorities has it, "that in the person of Adam the whole multitude or mass of his posterity had sinned." They also held that the death, which was occasioned by Adam's sin, was physical death only,—a meaning which Dr. Hodge rejects with emphasis. If then Paul, "in case he wished to be understood," must have "intended to convey by these expressions the ideas which the Jews were accustomed to convey," he certainly could not have intended to say any such thing as "that we are exposed to *penal evils* on account of a sin in which we had no participation." We should not consider the opinions of the Rabbis of much importance, in a case where Paul *declared his own meaning*, even if those opinions had been in favor of the Princeton theory. But, when the fact becomes apparent that the Jewish Rabbis entertained another view, we do not see any occasion for a reference to them in the learned commentary which is now engaging our attention.

As Dr. Hodge quotes Knapp as authority for the historical matter in regard

therefore, in favor of the supposition that he did not, by *θάνατος* in verse 14, mean penal evil, but *physical death* simply? He could point his readers, with great propriety, in such a discussion as this, to the fact that death, in *this* sense, had reigned, for everybody, who knew anything at all, knew this to be a fact; and no doubter of Paul's Apostolic authority or partisan opposer of his preaching could question the force of his argument for a moment. That view of this passage, then, which makes the physical death of infants the proof that they sinned in Adam, as being one with him, meets no objection from the word death. It has only to defend itself against the difficulties presented in other parts of the sentence. But the explanation of Dr. Hodge and his associates is weak at this point also, and, by giving this peculiar sense to *θάνατος* it seems to overthrow the very force of the Apostle's whole reasoning.

It remains only to add, that the large majority of the leading commentators of later times* are opposed to the Princeton

to the Rabbinical writers, and gives his statement much weight *because* he is opposed to the Princeton doctrine, we think we may be justified in making a brief quotation from the same author on another historical point, and giving his statement, here, also, some authority, *although* he is at variance with our venerable author. When speaking of the origin of this doctrine of the representative or federal headship of Adam, as held by Dr. Hodge and his associates, he says—not that it was “a common Jewish doctrine at the time of the Apostle”—but that it “was invented by some schoolmen,” and he speaks of it as having been defended “*even in the eighteenth century*,” as if it were remarkable that it had continued up to that period, and hardly possible that it could be believed anywhere in the *nineteenth century*. But Knapp's historical studies may have been confined to the time of the Apostle so exclusively, that he is not of much authority as to the times of the schoolmen. Without making any farther reference, therefore, to these statements of his on this interesting point, we close this note by citing his arguments against the doctrine in question. “This theory,” he says, “cannot be correct, because (1) The descendants of Adam never empowered him to be their representative, and to act in their name; (2) It cannot be shown from the Bible that Adam was informed that the fate of all his posterity was involved in his own; (3) If the transgression of Adam is imputed, by right of covenant, to all his posterity, then, in justice, all their transgressions should be again imputed to him as the guilty cause of all their misery and sin. What a mass of guilt, then, would come upon Adam! But of all this, nothing is said in the Scriptures; (4) The imputation of the righteousness of Christ cannot be alleged in support of this theory, for this is imputed to men only by their own will and consent.”

* We allow ourselves to speak here and elsewhere in our discussion, of the *more modern* commentators, because their judgment is worthy of the highest respect

view in the essential points of these verses—namely, the one respecting the reference to infants only, in the words “those who had not sinned,” &c. (v. 14), and the one respecting the force of the words *law, sin, and transgression*—as they are with regard to *ἡμεῖς*, of verse 12th.

III.

The *third main point of inquiry*, indicated at the outset of our discussion, has reference to the thought of the fifteenth verse, as modified and influenced by the sixteenth and seventeenth. It is confidently asserted that these verses render the Princeton explanation of the whole passage “almost certain.” Even if the statement contained in verse 12th, and the proof set forth in verses 13th and 14th, do not show, beyond question, that we are involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern, the three verses now before us declare it explicitly and with a threefold repetition. Paul seems to have had in mind, as it were, those very persons who might be disposed to doubt the “simple and natural” meaning of his language up to this point, but in order that none except the most obstinately blind among them might be left to final error, he determined to add, once and again and again, his solemn word, *It is surely so*. It becomes us, therefore, to examine, with due attention, these subjoined verses, and to see whither they lead us. If Dr. Hodge's representation is correct, it is best to be careful, lest we fight against the truth. But the results of our investigation thus far suggest the doubt whether he may not be incorrect here also; and, if so, Paul's solemn word has quite a different meaning. Now this threefold statement, on which the force of these verses wholly depends, is declared to be, in substance, this—for the offense of one all are condemned. But the Greek has it in three different forms of expression. The first and simplest of these is found

in these matters relating to the interpretation of the Greek text; and, also, because Dr. Hodge seems, in one or two places, to intimate that he is aware of his want of agreement with Calvin and others of the Reformers (see page 284 of his *Commentary*). But, if desirable, we might equally well refer to *their* writings, and show that they held to no such views, as those which he defends.

in v. 15, in the words, *ei τοῦτο ἐνός παραπτώματι εἰ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον*, and is determined, as to its meaning, by the construction of the dative, *παραπτώματι*. As Dr. Hodge very properly says, it is "a mere exegetical question—what is the meaning of a given phrase? Does the dative here express the *occasional cause*, or *the ground or reason* of the result attributable to the offense of one man?" This is the question. Which does it express? The venerable Doctor assures us, that we must understand this dative as indicating *the direct ground or reason*, and presents us with four arguments as forcing us to this position; which four arguments we suppose are the only ones he has in mind, since, after so many years of thought, they are the only ones he has to mention. They are as follows:

First; "No one can pretend to doubt that such *may* be the force and meaning of this dative." Yes, we answer; and we add no one can pretend to doubt, that it *may not be*, and the answer rests on the same universal admission as the argument. The case is just this. Here is a passage, introduced in the way of explanation of what has been previously said. The passage is wholly dependent, for its peculiar shade of meaning, on a given word. This word is capable of being taken in two different senses. What, now, is the proper method of determining in which of the two senses it is *to be taken*? Evidently, as it seems to us, it is to turn to that preceding context, in connection with, and as a modification of which this passage stands; and, when we have ascertained what is the main idea there expressed, to interpret the doubtful word accordingly. But, if we have been successful in what we have attempted, we have, already, shown that the Princeton idea is not found in the verses that precede this point. We shall endeavor, also, to show the same thing yet more conclusively, by making it appear that quite an opposite idea presents itself in the 18th and 19th verses, which are so nearly a repetition of the 12th. The presumption, thus, becomes almost overwhelming, from the very beginning, that this dative, *παραπτώματι*, was not intended by Paul to be understood as Dr. Hodge understands it, but in the other sense, which he rejects. And this presumption becomes an argument of irresistible force, unless there is something to

be found, in the immediately succeeding context, to over-balance it and set it aside.

We are, thus, brought to Dr. Hodge's *second* argument, which is that this explanation of this dative is demanded by the words that follow. These words—since the 17th verse is precisely similar to the 15th in this regard—can only be those which are found in the latter half of the 16th verse, and which in the Greek, are as follows : τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξ ἑνὸς παράπτωμα. On the interpretation of these words, then, the whole question turns, so far as vs. 16th and vs. 17th are concerned. But we are assured, that these words form a clause, “which can hardly be forced” into any other sense than the one contended for at Princeton. The matter is declared, again, to be one, “not of theory or deduction, but simply of exposition;”—and the question is confidently asked, “What does the phrase, ‘a sentence of condemnation by, or for one offense,’ in this connection, mean?” But let us beg the distinguished Professor to pause a moment in his progress, until we look at this point a little more closely. The phrase, of which he speaks, is, in reality, two phrases. “A sentence of condemnation passing upon mankind *by* one offense” may mean one thing; and “a sentence of condemnation passing upon mankind *for* one offense” may mean quite another. And the very question before us here may be, to decide which of the two phrases Paul has actually used. The preposition, in the Greek, is ἐκ, which, according to Dr. Hodge himself, “expresses properly the idea of the origin of one thing from another; and is, therefore, used to indicate almost any relation in which a cause may stand to an effect.” If so, of course we are obliged to ask, in any given case, *what is the particular relation indicated there*, and we cannot answer this inquiry without taking into consideration *all the circumstances which the case presents*. Thus in the passage before us, if we find the phrase, “A sentence of condemnation passes upon mankind ἐξ ἑνὸς παραπτώματος”^{*}—that is, having its origin in one transgression,—we cannot determine, at once and absolutely, that this one transgression

^{*} We assume that this word is the proper one to be supplied here, without any discussion, because Dr. Hodge favors this view.

in v. 15, in the words, *ei τοῦτο ἐνός παραπτώματος* of *τοῦτο* and is determined, as to its meaning, by the construtive dative, *παραπτώματος*. As Dr. Hodge very properly remarks, "this is a mere exegetical question—what is the meaning of the phrase? Does the dative here express the ground or reason of the result attributed to one man?" This is the question. The venerable Doctor assures us, that the dative as indicating *the direct ground* of the result, is supported by four arguments as forcing upon us with four arguments we suppose are equally strong. Since, after so many years of discussion, we have not yet arrived at a decision. We are now to consider the position in a new light.

First; "No one can pretend to be just while he always sins." The force and meaning of this phrase is, that no one can pretend to be just while he always sins. The phrase is employed in the same sense in Gal. ii. 16, where the phrase of explanation of what is meant by *though faith is not, in the most strict sense, the wholly dependent force, but the means of justification, given word. The phrase is used uniformly and even at another point in the same connection. It is careful to express the true thought by the phrase in which we have the same difference of construction. In vs. 15 and vs. 17, the dative *παραπτώματος*, in vs. 16, the genitive with *διὰ*, both expressing most naturally the same idea; and the latter uniformly and without exception, the phrase *ἐκ πτωμάτων* while, in the 16th vs., the apostle substitutes the preposition *ἐκ*. But, if the phrase is very probably on mere rhetorical grounds. And we have no less absurd to claim that *ἐκ* here, must, of necessity, express the *cause*, in the Princeton sense, than it would be, in the same passage quoted from the Epistle to the Galatians, to maintain that *ἐκ πτωμάτων* must not only be taken in the same strict sense, but must also determine the meaning of *διὰ πτωμάτων* in the same verse, as well as everywhere else in Paul's writings.**

* Dr. Hodge refers to the phrase *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* in Gal. ii. 16, as an instance where "this preposition expresses the ground or reason." Why is he not kind enough to explain the phrase *ἐκ πτωμάτων* in the same verse also? The latter phrase, being found in connection with *διὰ πτωμάτων*, would have afforded an admirable

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we have, in the first, *κρίμα* as the subject, *ἐγένετο* as

verb, *ἐξ ἐνός* qualifying *ἐγένετο*, and *εις κατάκριμα*, equivalent

a predicate nominative; and, similarly, in the latter clause,

ῥάπισμα is the subject, *ἐγένετο* the verb, *ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων* the

phrase qualifying the verb, and *εις δικαλωμα* the predicate. The

author has, thus, been at much pains to show that *ἐξ ἐνός* is to

opportunity for comparing the use of the words in this verse of Galatians with that in Rom. v, 15-17. It seems unfortunate, therefore, that the Princeton expositor should have passed over the more important *ἐκ*, and have mentioned only the less important one. But such accidental oversights do occur, sometimes, even on the part of the most careful scholars. We suggest that, in his next edition, he should devote a few lines to this omitted point; and we also propose an inquiry for the author's consideration—namely, when we have in a passage two prepositions (as *διὰ* and *ἐκ*) in the same connection—one of which *always* denotes the *means*, and the other denotes (to use his own language) *sometimes* "the *instrumental*" and *sometimes* "the *efficient cause*"—whether we ought to adapt the meaning of the one that *varies* in its signification to that of the one that is *invariable*, or whether we should attempt to change the *latter* to meet the *former*? An answer to this question might be generally useful to the less advanced scholars who have occasion to use his Commentary, while, at the same time, it might have a particular and special bearing on this verse in the Epistle to the Romans.

be taken in this way ; and the meaning of the two clauses is, accordingly, this—The judgment became, as the result of one offense, a condemnatory judgment, and the free gift became, as the result of many offenses, a gift of justification.* But this is not what Dr. Hodge makes it mean—namely, that we are pardoned for many offenses ; but, as the result of many offenses, or, which is as nearly the same thing as possible, by occasion of many offenses, God's free gift became one of justification—substantially the same idea which is expressed, in a different form and connection, in the 20th verse, “ Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.” Paul simply states the great truth, so dear to his own experience, that the fact of our sins being so multiplied that we were utterly beyond all possible hope outside of himself, was the very ground of God's devising his plan of justification through faith ;—not the *immediate, direct cause*, independent of anything else, but the *occasion*, which his abounding mercy laid hold of to accomplish its own glorious purposes. And so, in the parallel and opposite clause, the condemnation of God is not proclaimed as coming upon men because of a sin in which they had no personal concern, *but simply as the result of that sin, with all that accompanied and followed it in the race of mankind*. Accordingly, when Dr. Hodge attempts to make out that the whole force of the contrast, as expressed in these clauses, lies in the idea that “ Adam brought the condemnation of *one* offense only, while Christ saves us from that of *many*,” he goes entirely outside of the true interpretation of the words ; and his whole theory with regard to the sixteenth verse becomes untenable, when it is considered in relation to this verse itself, as well as in relation to the dative *παρὰ πλείονα*, that precedes.†

* This is the view of the construction and meaning of the clauses, which is held now by almost, if not quite, every one of the commentators whose opinions on such questions are worthy of highest regard—as, e.g., Meyer, Ewald, DeWette, Tholuck, Alford, Van Hengel, &c.

† That the explanation of the latter of these two parallel clauses, which we have given above, is the true one, is beyond all reasonable doubt. But, even if it be not so, Dr. Hodge's view has no real advantage over that of his adversaries in regard to this 16th verse. For, in the first place, with respect to the *preposi-*

Dr. Hodge's *third* argument in support of his explanation of this dative is, that such an explanation "is demanded by the

tion, he and they are in precisely the same condition. He confesses that on his own interpretation, the *ἐκ* in connection with πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων must be taken in a different sense from the *ἐκ* in connection with ἐνός. The latter clause of the verse, he says, means "justification *from* many offenses," but the former means "condemnation *for*—that is, *directly* on account of—one offense." But his adversaries need do nothing more than this. They may say—and, in order to the establishment of their position, they need only to say—that, while the latter clause means "justification *from* many offenses," the former means "condemnation *indirectly* on account of, i. e. by means of, one offense." Dr. Hodge speaks of the difference in his two senses of *ἐκ* as "only a slight one." How much less slight is the one given by his adversaries! If the one view is within the proper limitations of the language, the other must be so likewise; and the only question to be decided is, which of the two views is *consistent with the context*. In the *second place*, we may turn our attention to the force of the comparison and contrast between Adam and Christ which is contained in this verse. Dr. Hodge remarks here, "To make Paul say that the offense of Adam was the means of involving us in a multitude of crimes, from all of which Christ saves us, is to make the benefit and the evil exactly tantamount. Here is no contrast and no superiority." We respectfully submit that there is a *contrast*—namely, that of *involving* us in a multitude of crimes and *saving* us from them—a contrast heaven-wide in its extent. But, as for *superiority*, how does Dr. Hodge *know* that there is *any* alluded to in the verse? He expressly excludes any such idea from those words in vs. 15 and vs. 17, in which, if anywhere, we should look for it—namely, the words "much more"—and, at the very beginning of his note on vs. 15, he says, "The attentive reader of this passage will perceive constantly increasing evidence that the design of the Apostle is *not* to show that the blessings procured by Christ are greater than the evils caused by Adam." As he uses the word *passage*, and speaks of *constantly increasing evidence*, both which expressions are ill-suited to a single verse of four lines, the inference would seem almost irresistible that he does not refer, in this remark, to the fifteenth verse alone, but to the two following verses, also, which, together with the fifteenth, make up what may be properly called a distinct passage. But if vs. 16 *does* contain the idea that the blessings procured by Christ are greater than the evils caused by Adam, while the 15th and 17th verses *do not* contain that idea, but the opposite, we do not see how the evidence increases *very constantly*. The author, therefore, is inconsistent with himself, and, where the oracle gives two different and opposite responses, we do not know why we may not accept either of them as the truth, according to the dictates of our own judgment. It certainly cannot be the highest degree of theological prejudice, therefore, to say that there is no thought of superiority expressed in vs. 16, but that the benefit and the evil are, on the contrary, *exactly tantamount*. And if so, what becomes of Dr. Hodge's argument drawn from this 16th verse, and where is the strength of his position as compared with that of his adversaries! Or, again, supposing there is a *superiority* hinted at in this verse, how does Dr. Hodge know that it is *the particular one* of which he speaks! Until he can prove that this is the *only one* which can be intended by the words of the Apostle, he cannot make any such assertion independently of a *considera-*

may be quite inaccurate to-day. If any man desires to know how so many sects, so nearly related to each other, came into being, and what it is that keeps them apart, he has before him one of the most complicated themes in the whole range of theological and ecclesiastical inquiry. We do not propose to solve the numerical mystery—still less to discuss the many questions, historical and dogmatical, which enter into any excuse for the origin and continued existence of those multiplied organizations. Yet, something must be attempted, in order that the remarkable pamphlet on our table, and the remarkable meeting of which it is the record, may be intelligible to our readers.

No ecclesiastical system in the United States is more often mentioned, or more widely known, than that which is denominated "the Presbyterian Church." In the Middle and Western States (not to speak of the Southern), that denomination is almost ubiquitous; and, till a comparatively recent period, it was quite generally identified, in the popular thought, with the religious system prevalent in New England. Members of our Congregational Churches, migrating to other regions, and rarely trained to appreciate the differences between one system of church government and another, found little difficulty in connecting themselves with congregations where the forms of worship hardly differed from those with which they were familiar, where the Westminster catechism was the manual of religious lessons for the children, and where they heard from the pulpit the same doctrinal phrases (though sometimes with a strong Scotch or Scotch-Irish accent) which they had always heard in New England meeting-houses. The missionary efforts with which the New England churches, soon after the revolutionary war, began to follow their children westward, were undertaken, not in the interest of the Congregational polity, but only in the interest of evangelical religion; and the very natural result was that by those missions, and by the whole current of emigration from the Eastern States, Presbyterianism, somewhat modified in its spirit and administration, was made to flourish. Many a church in Western New York and Northern Ohio, made up of Congregationalists from New England, and managing its internal affairs in its own way by the votes of the brotherhood,

endeavor to make him say, the question is at once settled. But if he does not say this anywhere, the mere fact that he presents an analogy between Adam and Christ, which *some persons might suppose capable of being carried to such an extent*, does not justify the assertion of any such view as theirs as unquestionably its true meaning. I may perfectly well use an analogy which will hold in several important respects, without intending to press it to an extreme point where it will not hold; and if I do thus use it, I am not to be judged by the *preconceived notions* of some mere literalist, or, perhaps, some person of narrowest views, but *by the language I have myself employed*. In the case before us, the Apostle may, properly enough, have represented the universality of the blessings which come upon mankind through the sacrifice of Christ, provided they on their part exercise faith, by the analogous universality of the evil results which have come upon mankind through the sin of Adam, as leading to and followed by their own sin; and he may have said, *with just this thought in mind*, Christ is the *source* of our justification, as Adam was of our condemnation; and yet he may not have intended, at all, that the precise relation of Christ to the former is, *in every minutest point*, the same with that of Adam to the latter. Especially may this be the case, when he takes care, himself, to limit his analogy in the very unfolding and development of it. Paul does not, indeed, explain to us fully in regard to the exact connection between Adam's sin and our sin or our death, but he does make it very plain, as we shall have occasion soon to show, that he holds no such idea as these extremists press into this comparison. Surely if he does so, he ought to be permitted to explain himself, and to be supposed to know what his meaning was as well as his commentators.

We pass, therefore, to the *fourth* and final argument for the Princeton interpretation of the dative, παραπτώματι, which is presented in the following words: "It is so plainly the correct and natural interpretation, that it is freely admitted even by the most strenuous opponents of the doctrine which it teaches." Who these persons are, we are not informed, except by a somewhat indefinite reference to a number of writers, whose opinions on another verse—and not, at all, on this

and the principle of sectarian propagandism under ecclesiastical superintendence and control. Four years later, when the mother church in Philadelphia chose for its pastor a young man (Albert Barnes) who, though trained in the Princeton Seminary, was born of New England blood and held the New England theology, the crisis began to be developed. While the alleged heresies of Mr. Barnes were still a subject of litigation in the judicatories—carried up from presbytery to synod and from synod to assembly, and then going down to begin again—a new fire was kindled by the removal of Dr. Lyman Beecher from the pastorate of a Congregational church in Boston to a Presbyterian professorship in a theological seminary at Cincinnati. Among the men now living, there are not many who remember the fury of that “seven years war” in the Presbyterian Church, from 1830 to 1837. The majority in the General Assembly of 1837, fearing that their party might never be a majority again, and convinced that to forego their advantage out of deference to ordinary considerations of honor or justice would be a mere tempting of Providence, resorted to a measure more like a *coup d'état* than like any respectable *coup d'église*. First, the Synod of the Western Reserve in Ohio, and then three great synods in central and western New York, because of alleged irregularity in the original constitution of their semi-Congregational churches were *excinded*—without trial or citation, by a declaration in defiance of historic truth, of good faith, and of constitutional order, as well as of Christian charity—that they were no part of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

Such was the schism which caused the existence of two distinct organizations, each calling itself “the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.” The quarrel which made two synods out of one, in 1741, was repeated more shamefully, as well as on a grander scale, in 1837, and made two general assemblies. Of course, some time elapsed before the line of separation between the sundered parts was completed. Neither of the two bodies could negotiate with the other; for each claimed as its own the very name appropriated by the other. But, inasmuch as the inconvenience of two “denominations” with a common denominator was not to

no argument, for the venerable Professor and ourselves are agreed with regard to it. But what this intermediate step or reason is, is the subject of dispute. Dr. Hodge's view is this; that the words signify "were regarded as sinners;" and that the two verses, taken together, mean, substantially, that "all men are *treated* as sinners on account of Adam's sin, for the reason that they are *regarded* as sinners on his account." If this is the true meaning, the controversy on the whole passage may, perhaps, be considered as terminated. We maintain, however, that the words do not and cannot have this meaning. The verb καθίστημι, Dr. Hodge remarks, "never, in the New Testament, means *to make*, in the sense of effecting, or causing a person or thing to be in its character or nature other than it was before. καθιστάνας τινα ἀμαρτωλόν does not mean *to make one sinful*, but to set him down as such, to regard or appoint him to be of that class." "When, therefore the Apostle says that the many κατεστάθησαν ἀμαρτωλοί by the disobedience of Adam, it cannot mean, that the many were thereby rendered sinful, but that his disobedience was the ground of their being placed in the category of sinners. It constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them." He also cites the following examples: "Thus, when Christ is said to have been 'constituted the Son of God,' he was not made Son, but declared to be such. 'Who constituted thee a ruler or judge?' *i. e.* Who appointed thee to that office? So, 'whom his Lord made ruler.'"

In reference to these remarks, we have two suggestions to make, in connection with which all that it is necessary to say on this subject may be said. The *first* is, that the statement respecting καθίστημι, that it never means "render" in the New Testament, is incorrect, and the *second*, that, if it were correct, it would not prove what Dr. Hodge maintains. Καθίστημι is a verb, which is found in the whole New Testament, outside of the present verse, twenty times, but Paul uses it only once. In one of these passages (Acts xvii. 15) it has a meaning so peculiar and unconnected with the point now before us, that we need not take it into consideration. Of the nineteen remaining cases, sixteen refer to appointments to office, and in these the verb is to be explained accordingly—this being one

of the well-known meanings of this verb. But, in the other three cases, it conveys no such idea. These are James iii. 6, and iv. 4, and 2 Peter, i. 8. The words in 2 Peter, i. 8, are those which follow the exhortation of the Apostle to his readers to add to their faith virtue, to virtue knowledge, to knowledge temperance, etc., and give the reason for the exhortation—"for if these things be in you, and abound, they *καθιστησιν* you not barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ." The question to be determined is, What these virtues are here declared to do for the Christian? Do they "appoint" him to be not barren nor unfruitful; or do they "set him down" in that position, in any other sense than that of *rendering* or *making* him what these words indicate? Do they not, in other words, "cause him to be in his character what he was not before," and would not be if he did not possess them? We are aware that some writers have denied this interpretation of the verb, even in this case, and have said that it means "cause you to appear as such.*" But such is not the view of the scholars who are most prominent for their knowledge of the Greek language; and one of the best German commentators remarks, in opposition to it, that this, in the first place, is a signification which the verb never has either in the classics or the New Testament, and, in the second place, it requires *εἰς* to be taken in the simple sense of *propter*, and thus loses sight of the object or end in view, which *εἰς* always suggests, even in those looser uses of it where it may be translated by the words "with reference to." But, even if we do not insist upon this apparently correct remark, the verse which immediately follows (viz. 2 Peter i. 9) seems to show that the author had no such idea, for, in setting forth the condition of the one who does *not* thus cultivate the virtues named, he says, "But he that lacketh these things is (*ἄσους*)—not *appears* but *is*—blind, shortsighted, and forgetful of the fact of the purification of his old sins." And then he goes on (vs.

* These writers, it will be observed, understand the verb as meaning—to *cause one to appear* as having *what he actually has* or as being *what he actually is*; and, thus, they differ from the view which we maintain only on the question whether this verb means *to make* or *render*, and not on the question whether the person *actually has* or *has not* the thing spoken of.

10), "Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall,"—not simply *appear* as persons who do not fall, but *actually* shall never fall. When we thus consider the peculiarities of the 8th verse itself and the statements of the 9th and 10th verses, which seem almost mere repetitions of it in a negative and positive form, and in which the author uses unmistakable language;—and when we, also, consider the fact, that this is a well known signification of the verb in the Attic Greek, as every lexicographer and every writer on the subject admits, how can we doubt that the Apostle Peter meant to say, These virtues, if you possess them in large measure, will render or make you not barren, nor unfruitful? In James iv. 4, we have the form *καθίσταται*. The verse reads "Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is (*ἐστὶν*) enmity with God? Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is (*καθίσταται*) the enemy of God." Does *καθίσταται*, in this verse, mean constituted in the sense of *made to appear* as the enemy of God—or does it mean constituted in the sense of *made*? The writer seems to make his meaning reasonably plain. On the ground of his declaration, that the friendship of the world is enmity with God, he predicates the statement, that any person who is minded to be a friend of the world, is placed in the condition of an enemy of God—that is, not he is made to appear so, but he is *constituted* or *rendered*, by this very fact, such an enemy; or, in other words, he, *ipso facto*, becomes so. The other passage (James iii. 6) we will not pause to examine. It will be sufficient to say, that not only Dr. Robinson, but Schirlitz, Schleusner, and Wahl give the word the same meaning, essentially, in this verse also. Wahl, whose authority Dr. Hodge seems to quote with much willingness elsewhere, says of *καθίστημι* in James iii. 6 and iv. 4, that it is "*fere idem quod επι sed fortius*," and in 2 Peter i. 8 (and, indeed, in the passage in Romans now before us), it has the signification "*reddere aliquem aliquid—Jemanden zu etwas machen*." That the great majority of the authorities of most weight give this sense to the verb, in one or more passages in the New Testament, is beyond all doubt; and we are content to leave this point between ourselves and Dr. Hodge in this position.

But it surely is a pretty bold assumption, even if the word is not used elsewhere in the New Testament in this sense, to maintain that Paul does not so use it here in Romans v. 19. For what are the facts? In all the other passages but three, it is, plainly, employed in connection with official appointments, and the meaning of the verb is defined by the connection in which it stands; in Paul's own writings, it is found only once (Titus i. 8) where it is employed for the same purpose, and we have no reason, therefore, to know, or to suppose, that he was unacquainted with other significations, which it might have under other circumstances; and, finally, it is perfectly clear that, in other Greek writings outside of the New Testament, and even in the Apocrypha, it is frequently used in the sense of which we have spoken. What evidence is there, then, that Paul may not, in a passage where he had no reference to official appointments,—and where any classical Greek writer might, in full accordance with the customs of the people, use the verb with such a purpose,—have employed this verb to convey the idea of “rendering” or “making” or “becoming,” instead of being limited to the one meaning of “appointing,” or any other meaning founded immediately upon that single one?*

But even if the verb does not mean “render” or “become,”—if it does not, anywhere in the New Testament, have the signification of *making*, in the sense of “effecting, or causing a person or thing to be in its character or nature other than it was before”—still it does not convey any such idea as Dr. Hodge is obliged to claim for it here. The meaning which he

* Dr. Hodge limits himself and his readers to the New Testament, when he is endeavoring to establish a certain meaning for this verb in the 19th verse, but in the corresponding passage (πάντες ἡμᾶς) in the twelfth verse, where the New Testament usage will not justify his interpretation, he goes on a search through the Septuagint, and, when he finds two solitary and doubtful passages in support of his view, he parades them before his readers as conclusive evidence of its correctness. It is said to be a poor rule that will not work both ways. If the worthy Doctor goes beyond the New Testament in vs. 12th, let him allow us to go beyond it in vs. 19th. If he limits himself to the New Testament in vs. 19th, let him follow the same course in vs. 12th. But the Princeton theologians do not fetter themselves in this way, for fear, we suppose, that they may be infected with the liberalism of New England.

gives, is "to regard"—they *were regarded* as sinners; that is independently of any sin of their own, or any participation in Adam's sin, or, in other words "antecedently to" being sinners, they *are regarded* as such, because of the sin of their first ancestor. They are regarded as sinners, then, without being so—before they are so—when they are not so. Unless this be the meaning of the word, the whole Princeton theory falls to the ground, so far as this verse is concerned. But where do we find any such idea as this, connected with this verb, in the New Testament, or anywhere else? Let us take the examples to which we are referred in the Commentary, and which have been already quoted:—"Who constituted thee a ruler or a judge," and "Whom his lord made ruler." Did the man who spoke to Moses simply mean to say, Who *regarded* thee as a ruler or a judge over us? Or did the lord of the mansion, of whom Jesus speaks as making his faithful servant ruler over his household, reward that servant's faithfulness by merely *regarding* him as such, while he was not, by any means, ruler at all? Or, to refer to Paul's own case, did he, in saying to his associate and helper, Titus, that he had left him in Crete to appoint elders in every city, mean that he had left him there for the purpose of *regarding* certain persons as elders, *independently of and "antecedently to"* their being such? The American people, in an unguarded moment, a few years ago, appointed Andrew Johnson to the office of Vice President of the United States; by means of which appointment he, afterwards, became the Chief Magistrate of the nation. Did they simply conclude to *regard* him as Vice President, so that some other action on their part was necessary to *make* him Vice President? No, they actually *made* him to be that which they appointed him to be—would that it had been otherwise! They did not, indeed, "cause him to be, in his character or nature, other than he was before," for no human power, probably, could do this. But they did, in a very important sense,—and every appointment does the same thing,—*make him different* from what he had been; that is, they changed his condition just so far as the possibilities of the case allowed.

Where, however, the circumstances and possibilities are not limited, as they are in this matter of official appointments, i. e.,

where character is spoken of, the idea of "making" is equally extended beyond its limited meaning. A man cannot be *made* or *constituted* a sinner without *being* one, any more than a man can be *appointed* Vice President without *becoming* Vice President;—and the verb καθίστημι indicates, in each case, all the change that is possible. Dr. Hodge introduces the phrase, "Christ was constituted Son of God," among his examples from the New Testament, to show that this verb means something else than *make*. Why,—instead of citing this passage, where the verb in question is not to be found at all,—did he not point us to 2 Peter 1. 8, and explain to us how his theory applies there? That Apostle *may possibly* have intended to say to his brethren, that if the virtues of the Christian life abounded in their hearts, they would cause them to *appear* before the world as (*what they actually would be*) not barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of the Lord Jesus. But, surely, there is no disputing the fact that he did *not* mean to say, that these virtues would cause them to appear not barren nor unfruitful, *independently of and "antecedently to"* their being so—to *appear not unfruitful, when they really were unfruitful*. Nor did James mean to tell his readers that the man who cultivated the friendship of the world, which he had just declared to be enmity with God, would *appear* to be God's enemy, or would be *regarded* as God's enemy, *while, in reality, he had not yet become so in his own heart*. The Christian Scriptures and the Apostles of the Lord do not discourse in this way, contradicting their own language and the very truths of the whole Divine teaching. If this is what the Princeton doctrine depends on, it has a sorry foundation indeed. Dr. Hodge must have looked after "the philological and exegetical" grounds of his interpretation pretty sharply, before he was able thus to discover what was not to be seen, and we cannot account for what he says, except by supposing that he deceives himself by his own language. "Καθιστάναι τινα ἀμαρτωλόν," he says, "does not mean to make one sinful, but to set him down as such, to regard or appoint him to be of that class." *To appoint* and *to regard* are, certainly, not the same idea, as we have already seen, but the venerable Professor seems, in the first place, to take hold of the fact that "to set a man

down" in a position may, sometimes, convey the idea of appointing him to it,—and, in the second place, of the fact that in our English idiom, the phrase "to set a man down" as something,—a thief, for example,—may mean "to regard" him as such, and that, too, even when he is not a thief at all, but an honest man;—and then (on the principle, we suppose, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another) he suddenly comes to the conclusion that *to appoint* and *to regard* are equivalent words. We would, respectfully, call his attention to the fact, however, that the phrase *to set down* has two entirely different senses "in the two cases; and we would, also, remind him that it is in the *former* of these senses that the Greeks so frequently used the verb *καθίστημι*, and *not* in the *latter*.*

Not only, however, is the worthy Professor at variance with all true views in regard to this verb, he is, also, at variance with himself. In his remarks upon the phrase "Sin entered into the world," at the beginning of the twelfth verse, he says, that it "means 'men became sinners' or, as the Apostle expresses it in the nineteenth verse, 'they were constituted sinners;'" and he there explains sin as signifying "actual sin, depravity and exposure to condemnation," thus throwing his peculiar meaning, as we have already seen, into this word *sin*. The words "were constituted," then, are simply equivalent, according to what he says in that place, to the word "became"

* We suppose the Princeton writers are easily led into such inaccuracies in the use of words by their habitual mode of speaking of those who differ from them in opinion. The long continued and often repeated remark of theirs—which has been used to frighten their followers away from all sympathy with more liberal theology—"Dr. Taylor and the New Haven divines of his times were Pelagians," means simply, They *were regarded as Pelagians* by the Princeton writers "*independently of and antecedently to*" their being so—*although they were not so*. And so—as they find themselves able to use such an expression with *such a meaning*, and to produce *much more impression* both on their own minds and on those of their pupils *by using it*, than they *could produce, by merely saying*, "*We regard Dr. Taylor as having been a Pelagian though he was not so.*"—they come to the conclusion that Paul might adopt a similar course in uttering the great truths of the Divine revelation. But Paul and his fellow Apostles had been taught in a different way, and they knew that one of the most important of all things for them, as instructors of the world, was to use words in their proper signification.

that is, they are taken in their true sense, and not as if they meant, simply, "were regarded." But if, on one page of his Commentary, when discussing the first of the verses of this celebrated passage, he quotes this phrase and puts his peculiar idea into the *noun*, leaving the verb in its proper signification, —we may well ask, how does he find himself able, on another page, when discussing this same phrase in connection with the last of these verses, to leave the noun to its regular meaning and change the *verb* to suit his singular theory? Rules of interpretation cannot, by any means, be supposed to twist themselves into every shape, after this fashion, and, thus, become adapted to the demands of each new emergency in which a commentator may happen to find himself. If they have any authority at all, they must continue in force over so brief a space as seven verses of the same chapter. We may, therefore, properly appeal for the justice of our statements respecting this verb *καθίστημι* to Dr. Hodge himself.

But after this discoursing about the verb—which is an addition to his earlier book, and seems to be the fruit of his linguistic study during the past thirty years*—he returns to what he had formerly said, and informs us that this expression "*were made sinners*" may, in accordance with a Scriptural usage, be explained (not now, indeed, in a proper sense, but) in a figurative way, as equivalent to *were regarded and treated as sinners*. He refers to 2 Cor. v. 21, where Christ is said to be

* We cannot help thinking that all unprejudiced readers of the recent edition will agree in the opinion that, so far as the success of Princeton theology is concerned, Dr. Hodge might better have remained in his old line. While he made no attempt in the way of justifying his interpretation, by appeals to the usages of the language, he was comparatively safe, for most of his followers would willingly receive his announcements of doctrine, without questioning their orthodoxy or their foundation in Scriptural truth. But there is always danger in inviting the reader or pupil to enter a region where the great law is that every man should investigate for himself—and the region of linguistic study is eminently of this character. The old garment of Princeton dogmatics is almost worn out, it is true, and we do not wonder that one who thinks himself compelled still to wear it should wish to have it somewhat repaired. The feeling is not an unnatural one. But the new piece, which Dr. Hodge tries to sew into it, only makes the rent worse than before—and the only reasonable, as well as Biblical, way is throw what cannot be mended wholly aside.

made sin, and we are spoken of as being *made* the righteousness of God in him. This particular verse may be open to considerable debate as to its precise meaning; as, for example, many have regarded *sin* as meaning *an offering for sin*, which would remove it altogether from the analogies of the present case. But, allowing all that may be claimed for it by Dr. Hodge, let us inquire *how many* such passages there are in the New Testament? As connected with the word *sin* or *guilt*, there are only two at the utmost—namely, the one just referred to and the one found in Gal. ii. 13, where Christ is said to have become a curse for us. If this latter verse be considered as expressing a similar idea to the former, and both be interpreted in the Princeton way, these two are all he has to present. But, in the *first* place, two such cases, among all the writings of all the Apostles, do not weigh very greatly against the presumption which lies in favor of a literal meaning; *secondly*, in neither of these cases is the verb now under consideration used; and *thirdly*, they both have reference to Christ, who consented to offer himself a sacrifice for our sins, and not to men in their relation to Adam. The other passages which have no reference to sin, but which may possibly be explained in a similar figurative way, are only two or three in number, if, indeed, they are more than a single one. What is the usage, then, of the New Testament writers? With respect to *mankind* and *sin*, it is absolutely universal against Dr. Hodge and his fellow theologians. There is no such idea as he professes to discover here to be found anywhere from Matthew to Revelation, in connection with this verb or any other which corresponds to the English word *made*. And even if we take into the account the few passages which refer to Christ, or something else besides sin, they are so insignificant in number and so open to discussion, as to have no appreciable bearing on the question in hand. It is little short of absurd, then, to pretend that “the simple and natural meaning” of the verb in this 19th verse, is that *figurative* one which we have to search for, as with a candle, in order to find it anywhere.

It is said, however, that if such a use is found anywhere in *any single passage*, in the New Testament, it is demanded here by the *antithesis* between the two clauses of the verse. To be made righteous must mean "to be regarded and treated as righteous," Dr. Hodge asserts, and to be made sinners must, likewise, mean "to be regarded and treated as sinners." But we deny, that "to be made righteous" strictly means "to be regarded and treated as righteous." The phrase here used may, perhaps, be regarded as referring to a future time when the persons spoken of shall be made *actually righteous or holy*, in which case the antithesis evidently makes no such demands as Dr. Hodge discovers. Or, if this be denied, it refers to these persons as being made righteous in the peculiar sense of other passages in Paul's writings, that is, righteous *by faith*. If now it be said that persons who are righteous by faith are simply regarded and treated as righteous, be it so; but that does not establish the Princeton view. Suppose we substitute for the word *δικαιοι* "righteous by faith," the words *justified persons*. Then the passage will read, As by one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall the many be made justified persons. Is not this a perfectly legitimate and proper sentence? And if the Apostle had expressed it in this way, would anybody have supposed either that *καταστάθηναι*, in either part of the sentence, must be taken to mean *were regarded*, or, if that could not be done, that *ἀμαρτωλοι* must have the peculiar signification of *sinners in a legal or forensic sense*? Of course not. But the mere presence of *δικαιοι* instead of "*justified persons*" introduces no new and difficult element into the verse; for every candid scholar must see, at once, that the Apostle uses *δικαιοι* in *two senses*, in different places, but that he never uses *ἀμαρτωλοι* in more than *one sense*. It is perfectly reasonable and perfectly simple, therefore, if, in drawing out his analogy, he uses *ἀμαρτωλοι* as he always does, while he limits *δικαιοι* to one of its two meanings. And the way to explain *ἀμαρτωλοι* is not by trying to force into it an impossible idea derived from *δικαιοι*, but to give it that signification which was the only

one that Paul or the Greek writers ever knew; and then interpret *δικαιοι* by the demands of the context.*

The endeavor of Dr. Hodge, then, to make these words of the 19th verse, by a figurative usage, convey the idea which he throws into them is as vain as is his attempt to show that the verb *καθίστημι* can be made to have the signification claimed for it. The phrase means *were rendered* or *made sinners*, or *became sinners*, and nothing else.† But if this is its meaning, the whole question in dispute, in regard to the entire passage, is settled. Dr. Hodge himself admits that this verse

* The analogy between Adam and Christ is pressed by the Princeton writers in this verse, as it is in *vs. 16*, to the utmost possible limit. But, in thus pressing it, they are wise beyond what is written. It cannot be too often repeated, that the extent of the analogy is to be determined only by what *Paul* says, and not by what *Dr. Hodge* and his associates think he ought to have said. As has been already remarked in connection with the 16th verse, it is very evident that the Apostle could have used the analogy with propriety as bearing on the universal relation of Adam and Christ to mankind, without intending to carry it into some minute points in which it would not hold. If he could not, what are we to do with large numbers of the Parables of our Lord; and, indeed, what are we to do with analogical reasoning in general, for there are few analogies which are perfect in every point. Indeed this whole passage, *vs. 12-19*, is but an example in confirmation of what we say, for the Apostle represents that Adam is a type or figure of Christ (*vs. 14*), but not a perfect one (*vs. 15*). But if he *could* have thus employed the analogy, we are obliged to ask of *Paul himself* whether he *did* thus use it—and we find, in this 19th verse, that he tells us, in the most distinct manner, by the use of this phrase *κατεστάθησαν ἁμαρτωλοί* that the analogy is *not complete*.

But not only may we say this respecting the analogy which is here used; we may add another point which is worthy of notice. Paul does not present us here with a mere *comparison* between Adam and Christ, but also with a *contrast*. So far from any necessity, therefore, of making the two cases precisely alike in every particular, the force of the passage is greatly *increased* by the *very difference* against which Dr. Hodge contends. The riches of the Divine goodness and the glory of the plan of redemption are made *more conspicuous*, if—while death comes upon men as the result of Adam's sin, yet *only as they merit it* by reason of their own sins,—justification, on the other hand, comes to them as the result of Christ's sacrifice, *without any merit of it* on their part.

† We give the translation here with the strict sense of the aorist tense, because Dr. Hodge insists upon this sense, and because the question immediately before us is simply as to the proper meaning of the verb, and not as to the use of the tense. Whether the aorist may not here be equivalent to a perfect or present (see Dr. Hodge's explanation of Romans iii. 28, already referred to), is a point on which we offer no opinion in the present discussion.

gives the reason for the statement of the 18th verse—that is, the reason why condemnation came upon all men as the result of Adam's sin. What is this reason, as we have now determined it? It is *not* that, *on account of* his disobedience, they were *regarded* as sinners, but that, *by means of* his disobedience, they were *actually made or became* sinners. *This is Paul's own statement of the case*, and here is his own explanation, presented in the most careful manner, as to what his meaning was. Moreover, Dr. Hodge admits that this phrase is equivalent to the words *πάντες ἕνα* of the twelfth verse, and, thus, that *those words* express the same reason for the great fact that death passed upon all men by means of one man's sin. Whatever this phrase, *κατεστάθησαν ἅμαρτωλοι* signifies, therefore, *that is the Pauline teaching in regard to this whole subject*; and if the Princeton notion is not found *in these words*—as we have seen that it is not—it *cannot be found anywhere*. It would seem impossible after the decision of this point by examining the universal usage of the language, both as to the noun and the verb, for this writer and his associates to hold up their explanation as the only *simple and natural* one. And yet we are solemnly informed that the great thought, which they think they have discovered in the twelfth verse, is presented here “in such a form as seems to set at defiance all efforts at misunderstanding or misinterpretation.” Paul, certainly, did everything he could, we may say on the other hand, “to set at defiance” such theologians as these, by endeavoring to say just what he meant to say, but they have proved altogether too much for him, for, while he can speak no longer in defense of himself, they can comment and theologize upon his words beyond all limits.

It remains only to add, in closing the consideration of these final verses, what we have stated at every successive step—that the commentators of the most eminent class who are with Dr. Hodge altogether are scarcely to be found, and those who are with him partially are few in numbers, compared with those who oppose his views. It is clear, therefore, *beyond all possibility of doubting*, when the facts of the case are fairly considered, that his interpretation of the several phrases of this pas-

sage is *not* "admitted with scarcely an exception"—whether the exceptions be viewed in relation to the phrases themselves, or the writers who have investigated their meaning. But—quite the opposite of this—it is especially worthy of notice that, with the rapid progress of Greek learning within the present century, the great body of scholars have been turning against these views more and more decidedly on "exegetical and philological grounds," until there is left hardly a single person, outside of a certain school of theological opinion, who thinks of holding them. Nay, even Dr. Hodge himself has not escaped the universal influence, as we have seen, for he now feels himself called upon to correct his old translations, at times, or to attempt to justify his former explanations by linguistic and grammatical arguments. Unreliable as these arguments have been shown to be, they prove, at least, that he feels *the necessity which is laid upon him*, and they unite with what all unbiassed minds are doing to give promise of the future. The signs of the times are truly favorable. This old system of interpreting the Bible under the influence of doctrinal theories, we may well believe, must pass away everywhere, at no very distant period, as the simple truth becomes more and more evident to mankind; and though it will, doubtless, linger longest just where it has found its abiding-place until now, yet, at last, the light must penetrate, it would seem, to those who are most unaccustomed to turn their eyes towards its brightness. And when another generation has passed, we shall look, with something of confidence, for clearer and more reasonable explanations of Paul's writings even from the Princeton School; while this venerable author, who still sees through a glass so very darkly, will then harmonize in all his views with those whom he has so long been opposing, for he will then have seen the great Apostle himself.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

LANGE'S COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. VOL. VI., EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS; AND VOL. VIII., EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS, TO TIMOTHY, TITUS, AND PHILEMON, AND TO THE HEBREWS.—Within the last three months two new volumes of this large Commentary have been published; one of them containing the Epistles to the Corinthians, translated by Dr. D. W. Poor, of Newark, N. J., and Dr. C. P. Wing, of Carlisle, Pa.; and the other containing all the Epistles from those to the Thessalonians to that to the Hebrews, translated by the late Dr. Lillie, Drs. Washburn and Harwood, Profs. Day and Hackett, and Dr. Kendrick. Of the Commentary in general we have expressed our views already, in connection with the parts of it which have been previously issued. Its greatest value to the American public is owing to the fact that comparatively little has yet been done among us to prepare anything better. Indeed, in some portions of the New Testament, this work furnishes almost the only thing we have, which will at all meet the wants of our ministers and students; and in respect to these portions, it may be said to be almost essential at present, to every one who wishes to have his library supplied with Commentaries in English. Most of our American clergymen are too limited in their means to purchase so large a work, as the whole of this of Lange will make, while, at the same time, they procure a good selection of other books in the same department. And it is, doubtless, better in books as in other matters, to make one's investments in different lines, and not all in the work of one man. Churches, however, which have a pastor's library—as all churches ought to have—would benefit themselves as well as show a kindness to those who preach to them, by placing all these volumes on the shelves of those libraries. In regard to the volumes now before us, Dr. Schaff, who is the leading manager of the translation, and who sustains about as much relation to the English as Dr. Lange does to the German work, commends to the reader's notice the fact, that they are prepared by writers of seven different denominations of Christians. We are not sure that this fact adds very much either

to the reliableness of the views presented, or the worth of the annotations. Judging from the attempts in the way of newspapers and other publications, or even of institutions, which are established on this plan of being in the highest degree evangelical, by gathering in the views of all sections—each respecting the other too much to advance anything controversial—we are not much disposed to believe that a very noble Christian development will be the result. But in a Commentary which is mainly a translation, of course, the injury arising from this source cannot be as great as in any independent work. We do not believe Lange's book is improved very much by giving the preparation and revision of it to members of a dozen different churches, or that it would be materially less valuable if Dr. Schaff had done it all himself. As it was, however, too gigantic a work for one man, and so the book will doubtless recommend itself to the sectarian spirit of different denominations, because they are represented in it, more than it would have done otherwise, we think the chief translator has probably taken a wise course. Certainly it is a course which we would not seriously condemn,—we only doubt whether it is properly a subject of special commendation.

These gentlemen, who have had charge of the translation of these Epistles, have done their portion of the work equally well with those who have gone before them in the earlier volumes. We are glad to see among them the names of Dr. Harwood, who takes so prominent a position among the scholars of the Episcopal Church, and Prof. Day, who has long been so well known in the department of Biblical learning, both of them residents of New Haven. Their names and those of their associates, Prof. Hackett and Dr. Kendrick, not to speak of the others, will be enough to assure the public that all has been done, which could be, to reproduce the German work, and to add to it whatever of value the necessary limitations of the plan would allow. As we have said in former notices of the book, Lange's original Commentary is not, and does not claim to be, a work of the highest order of scholarship, and it can hardly be made so by any one who merely calls himself a translator. But it is adapted to meet the wants of many persons—clergymen and others. The exegetical portion of it is reasonably good. The homiletical part may be useful, if properly used. The doctrinal part is equal to the same portion of most other similar works, but, of course, doctrines can only be

presented in full, and as they need to be, in thorough and extended doctrinal treatises.

BARNUM'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE. PARTS 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.—These parts of this work, received since our last number was published, carry it as far as the word *Shechem*, under the letter *S*. In commending the book again to our readers, we can only point them to our more extended notice of it in our January number, and say that the more they examine Mr. Barnum's Dictionary, the more, we are sure, they will be convinced that it is the best of all the abridgments which have been made of Dr. Smith's work.

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE LIFE OF JESUS.*—This volume comprises four discourses by Dr. Uhlhorn, Court Preacher at Hanover, on that most momentous and interesting theme, the Life of Jesus. The topics are the Life of Jesus by Renan, "the Character of Jesus Portrayed," by Schenkel; "A New Life of Jesus," by Strauss, the Gospels and the Miracles. The propositions of the skeptical critics are analyzed by the author in a fair, perspicuous manner, and are met by reasoning which is pertinent and conclusive, at the same time that it is level to the comprehension of the generality of readers. We know not where to look, within the same compass, for so good a statement and refutation of the forms of unbelief which are now in vogue. The book has the great merit of being intelligible and popular, without being superficial. The translator, Rev. Charles E. Grinnell, of Lowell, Mass., has performed his task with excellent skill and judgment. He has rendered his author into flowing, readable English; and the additional references which he has added to the text enhance the usefulness of the work to American readers. Mr. Grinnell has done a valuable service to the cause of Christian learning and Gospel truth, by making these timely discourses accessible to the public.

DISCUSSIONS IN THEOLOGY.†—Dr. Skinner's "Discussions in Theology" we are glad to see has reached a second edition. They

* *The Modern Representations of the Life of Jesus.* Four Discourses delivered before the Evangelical Union at Hanover, Germany, by Dr. GERHARD UHLHORN, First Preacher to the Court. Translated from the third German Edition. By CHARLES E. GRINNELL. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1868. pp. 164.

† *Discussions in Theology.* By THOMAS H. SKINNER, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1868.

are all able and the re-issue of them at the present moment is of happy augury. We are glad to see that while the eminent and venerable author is not unwilling to be received back to that reunited church from which he was so unreasonably constrained to withdraw, he has not abandoned the positions for which with so many saintly men he was denounced as semi-pelagian. Two of the Essays, we observe are on "the Nature of the Atonement." One is entitled "Impotence of Will: Will-not a real cannot." Among "the Fragments of thought" there are two suggestive topics entitled "Sin" and "the Reign of Sin," in which there is food for rumination at Princeton, as formerly there would have been ground for denunciation. The Articles on "Theory of Preparation for preaching" and "Delivery in Preaching" are admirable.

PROFESSOR MAURICE'S UNIVERSITY SERMONS.*—The Reverend now Professor F. D. Maurice, never fails to write with interest, and in these sermons he is in his happiest vein. Abounding in Christian feeling and in rich and felicitous illustration, he has done ample justice to his theme, in these four sermons on The Hope of the Missionary; the Hope of the Patriot; the Hope of the Churchman; and the Hope of the Man.

MISCELLANEOUS.

TAINÉ'S ITALY.—ROME AND NAPLES.†—Mr. Durand has done a good service to English readers by his translation of the first volume of M. Taine's "*Voyage en Italie*,"—"Rome and Naples," and we congratulate both him and the public that its favorable reception has encouraged him to follow it so rapidly by the concluding volume—"Florence and Venice,"—and by other works of the same author on various subjects connected with Art. We shall hope, in time, to welcome, also, a translation of the valuable *History of English Literature*, by which M. Taine is already well known to many readers. In the volume before us, the translator has followed the original very closely,—so literally, indeed,

* *The Ground and object of Hope for Mankind.* Four sermons preached before the University of Cambridge in November, 1867. By the Rev. F. D. MAURICE, M. A., Professor of Moral Philosophy, &c., &c. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1868.

† *Italy.—Rome and Naples.*—From the French of HENRI TAINÉ. By JOHN DURAND. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 8vo., pp. 356.

as not to be altogether free from occasional idiomatic peculiarities. But the style of this author suffers less diminution of spirit and energy from translation into English than that of most French writers. We venture to say that few more striking and original sketches of travel have been given to the public than this, whether we consider the vividness and picturesqueness of its style, its historic appreciation of ancient art, or its keen critical analysis of the great Italian masters and their world-renowned works. It would be strange if a nature so intensely dogmatic as that of our author did not pass many criticisms and judgments which may strike other minds as erroneous or, at least, doubtful. This is almost inevitable in the region of art-criticism, where so much depends upon the individuality of the observer, and his range both of knowledge and feeling. But we think all art-students must admit the general correctness of his estimate of the most famous names in Italian art. The critical study of pictures was the main object of M. Taine's travels, as a preparation for a professorial chair in the School of the Fine Arts in Paris. But in his book he treats us, by the way, to much that is striking and admirable in his description of the Italian cities—their palaces and elaborately ornamented churches, and their modern life in its social and political aspects—while his extended culture enables him to call up, in vivid portraiture, the ancient life and spirit of those historic places. In Naples, where he finds comparatively few pictures to claim his attention, he dwells on the rare natural beauty of the city in language so picturesque and so rich in coloring, that one recognizes him, at once, as an artist in his own realm. He portrays, in the most graphic manner, the magnificence and squalid misery which are so strangely mingled in its streets and buildings; he discerns, with clear eye and historic knowledge, the traces of its ancient Greek origin, and of its subjection to Spanish rule, and gives us passing glimpses into its present social state, fermenting with activity and excitement in regard to politics, science, and religion. Everywhere he blends the rich, descriptive imagery of the observer and lover of nature with the cultured appreciation of the historian and antiquarian. The natural loveliness of Italian landscapes recalling the descriptions of Homer, he diverges into an admirable chapter on "Homeric Life," while his visit to Herculaneum and Pompeii suggests another equally striking disquisition on "The City of Antiquity and its Life." We commend M. Taine's work to all who love art and enjoy

artistic writing, both for the things which he describes and the way in which he describes them. The reader of the present volume will need no additional inducement to follow the author in his researches in Florence and Venice, in the forthcoming translation of Mr. Durand.

ELDER JACOB KNAPP'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY.*—We have often thought that Paul gave evidence of a high development of Christian character, when he said, "Notwithstanding—no matter how it is done—every way Christ is preached and I do therein rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." There is so much preaching of one sort and another, which not only offends the taste, but seems on the one hand mainly destitute of all doctrinal knowledge of the Gospel, or on the other is attended by things which appear opposed to the solemnity or the calmness with which the soul should approach its religious life, that it is, difficult, at times, to persuade one's self that it is much better than no preaching at all. And yet, when we find large numbers welcoming it and apparently converted under it, the call seems to come to us to imitate the Apostle, if we can. Elder Jacob Knapp, whose *Autobiography* has been recently published, is a preacher whose discourses awakened in us a feeling of this order long years ago, and though it may have seemed a want of charity or love of the great cause to doubt the wisdom of his measures for a moment, we admit that, from our first hearing him until now, we have not much believed in his style of preaching or Christian labor. But, within the few months past, this record of his life appears, and informs us that more than one hundred thousand persons trace their conversion to his influence. And even if we should allow that fifty thousand of these were mistaken and were not converted at all, and that twenty-five thousand others were converted over again by some other revival preacher, who followed Elder Knapp a year or two afterward—having fallen away in the meantime—we should still have a vast number who would bear witness to his success. We confess that it makes one almost repent of all one's old feelings to think of what he has accomplished, and, as we read the brief narrative which he has given to the public, we can hardly help believing that he had a divine call to a peculiar work. The age of

* *Autobiography of Elder Jacob Knapp.* With an Introductory Essay. By B. JEFFERY. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1868. 12mo., pp. 341.

and organic unity. His speech, as reported (pp. 114, 115) is obscure; but its intention to mark that distinction is evident enough. It denies that "the unity of the Spirit spoken of by the Apostle Paul (Eph. iv.), the oneness of Christ's disciples in their relation to him and to the Father (John xvii. 21-23), is unity of organization. Referring to the fact that the Convention had been visited that morning by a formal deputation from a representative meeting of Episcopalians then sitting in Philadelphia, and that they had all had a good time together. "black prelacy," as the Scotch call it, and true-blue Presbyterianism enjoying sweet communion, like the leopard lying down with the kid in the millennium,—the venerable Doctor said,

"Here were persons from another denomination, entirely differing in the order of Church government, and yet we felt ourselves all one. What! organically! No! no! no organic union about it, but 'the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' We felt it; we rejoiced in it. I have never been in a situation in which I felt that unity more powerfully exhibited. Now, Sir, this is what I felt; 'the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' But you can have that without unity of doctrine."

It is much to be regretted that by the operation of a rule forbidding any speech to exceed five minutes in length, Dr. Junkin was interrupted just as he was proceeding to say why he was opposed to the organic unity of all Presbyterians—an attempt which would have required him to show that the unity of the Spirit, the very oneness which Christ, in his mediatorial prayer, desired for his disciples, may exist among churches, and be held in the bond of peace, without any organic union such as Presbyterianism delights in. His distinction, however, between the unity of the Spirit and organic unity—or rather his position that the former may exist and be manifested without the latter—does not seem to have been a taking one. There were indeed some members of the Convention who proposed a Presbyterian Alliance, something like a federation of sects, or a concerted coöperation in certain Christian enterprises; but their hope was that such coöperation and alliance, being all that is at present practicable, would be "an initial step," the beginning of a process that should "gradually bring all these now divided bodies into one compact and harmonious church."

respect him for his faithfulness and will believe that he has indeed preached the Lord Jesus.

The first part of the volume is made up of accounts of his labors in many different places; and then we have the author's views on various subjects, and several specimens of his sermons. The sermons are quite peculiar and somewhat "agricultural" in their character, but they are earnest and show a deep sense of the importance of the truth that is taught. The "views" are thoroughly out-spoken; and they manifest, in some places, a good measure of plain common sense. Elder Knapp does not believe in honorary titles for the ministry. He thinks they are forbidden by the Scriptures in explicit language; that no body of men have the right to confer them; that the reception of them is unworthy of the dignity of the ministerial office; and that the time is to be prayed for, when all Christians will be content to stand on one common level. Whether his reasoning from the Scriptures is good may be a subject of doubt; but we have long been of the opinion, that it would be better to bestow the title of Doctor of Divinity on every minister who attains the age of fifty years, or else to change the present system so far as to make real merit the only ground of conferring it, instead of giving it, as political offices are given, on recommendation or even by bargain. On the subject of "Anxious Seats" and "Speedy Admissions to the Church," the author takes very decided ground in favor of both. He thinks revivals are much aided in their progress by the immediate reception of converts into the fellowship of the church—"each new admission adding new courage" to those who are already Christians and "becoming an element of conviction" to those who are not. Elder Swan, one of Mr. Knapp's contemporaries and fellow workers, was accustomed to baptize those converted during his six o'clock meeting at nine o'clock, and those converted during his ten o'clock meeting at twelve o'clock, lest their religious ardor might become cooled, if they waited a day or two. But the great majority of wise Christians, we believe, hold the doctrine of perseverance strongly enough to make them doubt the genuineness of a conversion that may fail in the course of a night, and we hardly think Elder Knapp will convince them that they are mistaken. We have only space enough to add a single word on one other of the Elder's views. His remedy for the schismatic or sectarian character of the Protestant Church is an infallible one—if the sects can only be persuaded to use it. *Mutatis mutandis*, we be-

lieve all could be thus persuaded—even those who seem most exclusive and indisposed to harmonize with those outside of their own body; as, for example, the Episcopalians or Old School Presbyterians. His remedy is simply this—that all the Protestants should become close-communication Baptists. And he puts the case so plainly and simply, that we almost wonder that all our churches have not understood it before. The Baptists, he says, *cannot* unite with or merge themselves in the rest of the Protestant body, because they have conscientious scruples about “sprinkling,” but the other Protestants *can* join the Baptists, because they have no conscientious scruples against “immersion.” The sin of schism is, therefore, clearly with the Pseudo-baptists, and the way out of the sin is to be washed from it in the Baptist way. As this simple remedy, however, may not ever be universally adopted in this world, we are glad to find that Elder Knapp does not think “close communion” and consequent exclusiveness are to continue in heaven. His reason for the freedom from this difficulty in the upper world is worthy of notice. In answer to the question, “How the Baptists can commune with other Christians in heaven, if they cannot on earth,” he says, “There will be no bread and wine administered in heaven,” a remark which reminds us of one made by a clerical gentleman when discussing the universal difficulties between ministers and choirs. “The reason,” he said, “why there will be no such difficulties in heaven is simply this—all will be in the choir there.” The two reasons are equally forcible—and no greater condemnation of the Baptist close-communicationism can be found, than that it makes the bread and wine of the Lord’s Supper the means of shutting out from its fellowship the vast majority of Christ’s disciples. But with all his earnestness in defense of this peculiar doctrine, Elder Knapp has always been a hearty coöperator with those who would receive him favorably, in the great work of revivals and of the conversion of man. His story is told without any ostentatious display of himself or his success, and is certainly a very remarkable record of a preacher’s life.

LOOMIS’S METEOROLOGY.*—Prof. Loomis, in this work, has admirably systematized the heterogeneous materials which make up

* *A Treatise on Meteorology.* With a collection of Meteorological Tables. By ELLAS LOOMIS, LL. D., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College, and author of a “Course of Mathematics.” New York: Harper & Brothers. 1868. 8vo., pp. 805.

the Science of Meteorology, and, with his characteristic clearness of statement and skill in condensation, reduced them to a form of a methodical treatise, well adapted to be used as a text book in colleges and schools of science, and at the same time suited to the wants of meteorological observers, as well as of all persons desirous of studying the phases of nature, which most frequently arrest our attention and excite discussion.

In this treatise, the leading facts and principles of meteorology are presented in their freshest and most authentic form, by one whose special investigations in this department of science, as well as his accurate knowledge in all branches of physics, have peculiarly qualified him for the task. The chapter on "shooting stars, meteors, aerolites," embodies the most recent discoveries and conclusions respecting these bodies, and is one of great interest; yet we cannot help thinking that here, as well as elsewhere, a more frequent naming of authorities would have both contributed to the interest of the reader, and made it easier for those not familiar with the subject to determine to whom credit should be given for the views and discoveries presented, especially those of more recent date.

The volume is abundantly illustrated with cuts, and has a collection of important tables, together with a valuable list of works on meteorology, and that indispensable accompaniment of any book worth printing—an index.

THE MYTHS OF THE NEW WORLD.*—Mr. Daniel G. Brinton's handsome volume on the myths of the New World is not the first fulfillment of the promise of his early scholarship and refined taste. May his zeal not be too soon exhausted. The field which he has chosen for himself in this volume is difficult but fascinating; a field which many seem to have entered with high anticipations from which they have withdrawn with little satisfaction.

This volume promises well. The author has read abundantly the best and most profound writers of both ancient and modern schools. He has thought independently. His speculations tend in a healthful direction, recognizing as they do the highest and noblest in man's aspirations, and finding confirmation in all his mythologies for faith in the supreme and the eternal life.

* *The Myths of the New World.* A Treatise on the Symbolism and Mythology of the red race of America. By DANIEL G. BRINTON, A. M., M. D. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868.

The style is finished to a careful and even elegant elaboration. We do not like to say it is too elaborate, though we must confess its eloquent and well-rounded periods do now and then lead us to rove from the argument to the sentiment to which the logic conducts. This fault is, however, very venial amid the general excellence of the volume.

FARADAY AS A DISCOVERER.*—One of the most brilliant of modern scientific writers, Professor Tyndall, an associate and intimate friend of Faraday, has given us, in this modest volume, in the form of two discourses delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in January last, soon after the death of the great Philosopher, an exceedingly interesting sketch of his long and illustrious career as a man of science, and particularly as a Discoverer in the fields of Electricity and Magnetism, to which he chiefly devoted his extraordinary powers of observation and experimental analysis. Not only students of Physical Science, but all to whom the name of Faraday has become familiar, will here trace, with deep interest, the steps by which an obscure book-binder's apprentice rose, by the sheer force of native genius, to the highest rank as a philosopher, and to a world-wide fame.

The volume contains two portraits of Faraday, the one from a daguerreotype taken at the age of fifty, the other more recent, from a photograph.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS.†—Dr. Bledsoe's "Philosophy of Mathematics" scarcely makes good the promise of its title. We had hoped to find in it a thorough analysis and discussion of the fundamental conceptions and methods that are essential to the several branches of mathematical science. We find to our disappointment a special discussion of the infinitesimal method and of analytical geometry. These discussions are too technical for the general reader, but they are in acuteness worthy of the reputation of their distinguished author, and abound in interesting notices of the progress and history of these branches of mathematical science.

* *Faraday as a Discoverer*. By JOHN TYNDALL. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1868. 12mo., pp. 171.

† *The Philosophy of Mathematics*, with special reference to the Elements of Geometry and the Infinitesimal Method. By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, A. M. LL. D., late Professor of Mathematics in the University of Virginia. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1868.

POEMS OF FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE.*—Phœbe Cary's Poems of Faith, Hope, and Love, are indeed what the title announces. They are Poems indeed; simple, unpretending, and natural, but instinct with true poetic feeling, and smoothly gliding in rhythmic verse. There is little learned allusion, there is no strained sentiment, and no profound philosophy, but there are in every line the thoughts that interest all men, and the feelings which all experience,—or at least all who are sympathizing and good. The verse is not elaborate, but it is not homely. It is not intensely brilliant, but it is never dull. The easy movement of its sweetly flowing lines is always graceful, and often deserves much higher praise.

Not only are they truly poems, but they are also Poems of Faith, Hope, and Love; uttering from the heart the thoughts which are appropriate to these ennobling sentiments of the head and supporters of the life.

NEW POEMS BY OWEN MEREDITH.†—The New Poems by Owen Meredith belong to that school of poetry which is decidedly new. Unlike the poems of Phœbe Cary, which belong to all times and are suitable to any phase of society and life, these are the product of the thought, the speculation, the society, the science, the literature, the fashion, the culture of modern life as it is in England in 1860–1870. Every page reflects, in some way or other, the current life and high culture of the thoughtful men and women of the present decade. But there is also genius and poetic power on every page.

THE MASTERY SERIES.‡—The title of these little volumes has at first an unpleasant sound. It reminds us of a famous ointment called the master ointment, the ingredients of which were kept a profound secret by the village horse doctor whom we knew in childhood, but which he claimed had sovereign efficacy for every outward and inward bruise. As we learn however the special reason for appropriating the term in this case, our prejudices

* *Poems of Faith, Hope, and Love.* By PHŒBE CARY. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1868.

† *New Poems.* By OWEN MEREDITH. In two volumes. *Chronicles and Characters. Orval and other Poems.* Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1868.

‡ *The Mastery Series.* French, pp. 115.

‡ *The Mastery Series.* German, pp. 98.

‡ *Hand-book to the Mastery Series*, pp. 92. By THOMAS PRENDERGAST. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1868.

against it give way. The word mastery, in the use of Mr. Prendergast, is not intended to set forth the superiority of his method, but to describe its peculiarity of giving to the pupil the complete mastery of the language which he is learning, as far as he advances.

Mr. Prendergast's system is not to be confounded with the pretended rapid methods which are entitled "French without a Master"—"French in twelve Lessons." It aims to conduct the adult to a knowledge of an unknown language by methods and through advances similar to those by which the child learns its mother tongue. His cardinal principle is to make the forms and principal sounds of the language by the use of a very few sentences and a limited number of words. Only fifteen sentences are used in the French manual before us. The sentences are somewhat long, so as to exemplify a large variety of constituent phrases and dependent clauses, and to necessitate the employment of idiomatic peculiarities in the construction and arrangement of words. Upon each of these sentences, a considerable number of lessons are grounded, the object of which is to make each sentence and each part of a sentence perfectly familiar to the learner. So familiar that he knows them as well as he knows similar parts and wholes of his mother tongue. It is an essential feature of this system that each sentence in all its possible applications and combinations shall be perfectly *mastered* before the pupil proceeds to the one that follows. If this is done the author holds that the pupil will possess a fixed and ready frame-work ever at hand, with a sufficiently ample stock of works to give interest to the application and use of the skeleton. After this, subsequent progress will be easy and sure, for it will consist chiefly in learning new words, the combination and application of which in their places and uses will be easily accomplished.

The discussion of the subject in the hand-book is interesting, and the reader can scarcely doubt that if the system is pursued with strict fidelity and vigor, something at least of the promised advantages will be realized. Mr. Prendergast points out, with great clearness and truth, the principal embarrassments which students experience in learning new, especially living languages, whether they study them in or away from the countries in which they are spoken.

A faithful trial of this method can only vindicate the sufficiency of these hand-books to accomplish all that is promised. We cannot doubt that the method promises some important advantages above those which are ordinarily pursued.

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Problems of the Age; with Studies in St. Augustine on Kindred Topics. By Rev. A. F. Hewit. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 16mo. pp. 156.

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The Life of the Saviour. By Henry Ware, Jun. Sixth Edition. Boston: Amer. Unit. Assoc. 16mo. pp. xi., 271.

The Divine Teacher; being the Recorded Sayings of our Lord Jesus Christ. New York: C Scribner & Co. 16mo. pp. xxiii.; 199.

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Mystery No Hindrance to Faith or Duty. By Rev. William H. Goodrich, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee. 1868. 24mo. pp. 23.

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Grand-Papa's Arithmetic. A Story of Two little Apple Merchants. By Jean Macé. New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son. 1868. 16mo. pp. 142.

The Book of Praise; or, Hymns and Tunes for Public and Social Worship. Prepared under the sanction and authority, and in behalf of the General Association of Connecticut. Hartford: Hammersley & Co. 8vo. pp. 404.

How Shall we Paint our Houses? A popular treatise on the art of House-Painting, plain and decorative. Showing the nature, composition, and mode of production of paints and painters' colors, and their proper and harmonious combination and arrangement. By John W. Masury. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1828. 12mo. pp. 216.

THE REPRINTS OF BRITISH PERIODICALS BY THE LEONARD SCOTT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 140 Fulton Street, New York.

The Edinburgh Review, April, 1868.—The Positive Philosophy of M. Auguste Comte.—Western China.—The Monks of the West.—Technical and Scientific Education.—Bunsen's Memoirs.—The Irish Abroad.—Malleon's French in India.—The Disraeli Ministry.

Westminster Review, April, 1868.—Don Quixote.—The Pilgrim and the Shrine.—Modern Notions of Government: The Irish Question.—Hindu Epic Poetry: The Mahābhārata.—Popular Education.—The Church System of Ireland and Canada.—Spiritual Wives.—Democratic Government in Victoria.—Contemporary Literature.

North-British Review, June, 1868.—A Liberal Education.—Schools and Universities.—Mistral's Mirèio.—Saint Louis.—Creeds and Churches.—Memoirs of Baron Bunsen.—The Greek Idyllic Poets.—On Sleep.—The History of Writing.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Review, April, 1868.—Horace: The Causes of his popularity.—Linda Tressel, Part VII.—Historical Sketches of the Reign of George II., No. II.—The Minister.—William Edmondstone Aytoun.—Cornelius O'Dowd's Contributions.—Charles Kean and the Modern Stage.—The New Nostrum for Ireland: A Song.—The Battle for Place.

May, 1868.—Historical Sketches of the Reign of George II., No. III. The Man of the World.—Linda Tressel, Conclusion.—Horse-Flesh.—Unlucky Tim Griffin; His Love and His Luck, Part I.—The Odes of Horace, Continued.—Country Grammar Schools.—Cornelius O'Dowd's Contributions.—Mr. Gladstone and the State in its Relation with the Church.—A Mistake of Mr. Gladstone's.

June, 1868.—Grace Owen's Engagement, Part I.—The Law-Giver.—Unlucky Tim Griffin; His Love and His Luck, Conclusion.—The American Constitution and the Impeachment of the President.—Letters from a Staff Officer with the Abyssinian Expedition, Part II.—Cornelius O'Dowd's Contributions. Dreams in the Invalides.—George Eliot's Spanish Gypsy.

Littell's Living Age.—The novels, Linda Tressel, All for Greed, and The Brownlows, which have been published in *Littell's Living Age*, have been republished from the office of that Magazine in book form.

Rebellion Record.—The seventy-third number has just been published. This number completes the eleventh volume of this very valuable documentary history, which should have a place in every public and district library throughout the country.

Publications of the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, N. Y. City.—Ella Ross, the Widow's Daughter; or, a Story of an Earnest Life. 16mo. pp. 198.—Purpose. A Story based on Facts. By the author of The Climbers and Paul Venner. 16mo. pp. 495.—The Saviour's Bible; A Plea for the Old Testament. By Newman Hall, LL. B. 24mo. pp. 59.—The Stolen Child; or, Twelve Years with the Gypsies. 24mo. pp. 180.—Scenes in Switzerland. 24mo. pp. 58.—Jessica's First Prayer. Small quarto, pp. 83.

it shall appear that two-thirds of the presbyteries in each connection have consented to the plan, the reunion will be declared complete; and arrangements will be made for one General Assembly in 1870, which shall be neither Old School nor New School, but will yet be considerably less than Pampresbyterian.

We have little doubt as to what the result will be. At the end of thirty-three years the schism of 1837 will be no more. As members not of any Presbyterian schism, great or small, but of the Catholic Church of Christ, we heartily rejoice in the prospect. The original separation—in the long quarrel which produced it—in the measures by which it was effected—in the sectarian competition which it made inevitable—was a great scandal, dishonorable to the Christian name. The continued existence of two great sectarian organizations in such relations to each other, both acknowledging the same doctrinal standards, both having the same form of government, both using ostentatiously and persistently the same title—has been a continual scandal. We are willing to believe that the movement, with the enthusiasm on both sides urging it forward, indicates the prevalence of the evangelical spirit, and of Christian thought and feeling, against traditional antipathy. Our hearty desire is that the movement may proceed till the restored "Presbyterian Church in the United States" shall have drawn all the minor Presbyterian sects into union with itself—the attraction of gravitation toward the greater body overcoming the projectile force of organized schism. But we must be allowed to say, that, after that consummation, if history is philosophy teaching by examples, the union so auspiciously undertaken, and now so devoutly expected, will be, at the longest, not much more permanent than the separation has been.

This is not an agreeable vaticination, and if our utterance of it were likely to hinder a single presbytery from ratifying the treaty of reunion, we would even be silent. But we are studying an instructive chapter of ecclesiastical history, and we cannot do justice to the subject without a little more attention to some details of the plan on which the reunion is to be brought about. A little criticism of the plan, in the light

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of the sea, and portending a tempest. The first edition of it was comparatively unobjectionable (p. 637); for it only implied that charges of Antinomianism and Fatalism on one side, and of Arminianism and Pelagianism on the other, had formerly been bandied between the parties, and that the two bodies now recognize each other as honestly and fairly accepting the Confession of Faith. The new edition, by trying to mean more, encumbers itself with clauses which are needless, if the parties have confidence in each other, but which, if that mutual confidence fails, will soon prove to be worthless. It now stands thus:

"The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted 'as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;' it being understood that this Confession is received in its proper, historical—that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed—sense. It is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be allowed in the United Church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate Churches; and the Government and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, shall be approved as containing the principles and rule of our polity."

We assume that when the treaty of reunion shall have been duly ratified, this article will be a constitutional rule, binding all judicatories in the reunited church—just as the "Fourteenth Amendment," having been ratified by the requisite number of States, has become a permanent addition to the Constitution of the United States. Let us ask then what it means more than the well known Constitution of the Presbyterian Church has always meant. What will be its worth and force in a new conflict of theological systems?

1. A question has arisen in our thoughts, whether the clause (copied from the Philadelphia basis of union) which recognizes the Scriptures as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," does not, in fact, derogate somewhat from the formerly exclusive authority of the Confession, whether it does not imply that the Confession, not being an infallible rule of faith or practice, may contain some errors which were not corrected by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in 1788, and that

Oct 5

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

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PROFESSOR GEORGE P. FISHER, PROFESSOR TIMOTHY DWIGHT,
AND
WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

OCTOBER, 1868.

NULLIUS ADDICTUS JURARE IN VERBA MAGISTRI.

NEW HAVEN:
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1868.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

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ARTICLE I.—PAMPRESBYTERIANISM.*

Presbyterian National Union Convention, held in the City of Philadelphia, November 6th, 1867. (Minutes and Phonographic report.) Philadelphia: 1868. 8vo., pp. 160.

To persons of only ordinary information in such matters, the number of Presbyterian sects in the United States is hardly less mysterious than "the number of the beast" in the Apocalypse. We do not mean that the number is precisely "six hundred three score and six;" but only that the question how many is always difficult to be answered at any given time, and that the answer which was reasonably exact a little while ago

* The word *Pan-Presbyterian*—formed in imitation of *Pan-Slavic* and *Pan-Anglican*, and in ignorance or forgetfulness of the law by which, in the compounding of Greek words, *n* before a labial becomes *m* (e. g. Pamphylia—not Panphylia—has found some currency. But, inasmuch as usage has not yet established the exception, we follow the grammatical rule, and write *Pampresbyterian*.

may be quite inaccurate to-day. If any man desires to know how so many sects, so nearly related to each other, came into being, and what it is that keeps them apart, he has before him one of the most complicated themes in the whole range of theological and ecclesiastical inquiry. We do not propose to solve the numerical mystery—still less to discuss the many questions, historical and dogmatical, which enter into any excuse for the origin and continued existence of those multiplied organizations. Yet, something must be attempted, in order that the remarkable pamphlet on our table, and the remarkable meeting of which it is the record, may be intelligible to our readers.

No ecclesiastical system in the United States is more often mentioned, or more widely known, than that which is denominated "the Presbyterian Church." In the Middle and Western States (not to speak of the Southern), that denomination is almost ubiquitous; and, till a comparatively recent period, it was quite generally identified, in the popular thought, with the religious system prevalent in New England. Members of our Congregational Churches, migrating to other regions, and rarely trained to appreciate the differences between one system of church government and another, found little difficulty in connecting themselves with congregations where the forms of worship hardly differed from those with which they were familiar, where the Westminster catechism was the manual of religious lessons for the children, and where they heard from the pulpit the same doctrinal phrases (though sometimes with a strong Scotch or Scotch-Irish accent) which they had always heard in New England meeting-houses. The missionary efforts with which the New England churches, soon after the revolutionary war, began to follow their children westward, were undertaken, not in the interest of the Congregational polity, but only in the interest of evangelical religion; and the very natural result was that by those missions, and by the whole current of emigration from the Eastern States, Presbyterianism, somewhat modified in its spirit and administration, was made to flourish. Many a church in Western New York and Northern Ohio, made up of Congregationalists from New England, and managing its internal affairs in its own way by the votes of the brotherhood,

became gradually, under the guidance of its ministry, and perhaps without knowing when or how, a constituent portion of the presbytery in which its minister was one of the rulers over many churches. But, all the while, the growth of that spreading organization was the growth of two distinct elements, originally discordant, and not yet completely blended. The same antipathies, partly of ecclesiastical tradition, and partly of theological explanation, which, in the early days of American Presbyterianism, produced the schism of 1741, and were compromised, rather than extinguished, by the reconstruction in 1758, continued to operate. In those parts of the country where Presbyterian tradition was of Scottish origin, there was a jealousy of New England influence as tending to ecclesiastical disorder—a jealousy aggravated by chronic horror of the doctrinal innovations imputed to Bellamy, Hopkins, the younger Edwards, Emmons, and others like them. On the other hand, in the regions westward from the head waters of the Mohawk, through western New York and northern Ohio, and on toward the Mississippi between the same parallels of latitude—where the emigration from New England gave character to society—there was something like a responsive prejudice against Scotch veneration for Presbyterian forms, and against the narrowness of the Scotch theology, shut up within the lines and corners of what was called the triangle. The conflict of antagonistic ideas became more violent after the year 1822, when the Scottish and Scotch-Irish element was reinforced by a considerable accession from the Associate Reformed Church. Yet, it was evident that the advantages thus gained by one party over the other could not be lasting; for, by the constant stream of emigration from the Eastern States, and by the liberalizing effect of intercourse and of coöperation for the advancement of religion, the great Presbyterian Church in the United States was manifestly growing more and more unlike the Presbyterianism of the Kirk and schisms of Scotland. The formation of the American Home Missionary Society, in 1825, seemed significant of the progress of new ideas, and gave beginning to a controversy between the principle of voluntary coöperation among evangelical believers for the propagation of Christian institutions

and the principle of sectarian propagandism under ecclesiastical superintendence and control. Four years later, when the mother church in Philadelphia chose for its pastor a young man (Albert Barnes) who, though trained in the Princeton Seminary, was born of New England blood and held the New England theology, the crisis began to be developed. While the alleged heresies of Mr. Barnes were still a subject of litigation in the judicatories—carried up from presbytery to synod and from synod to assembly, and then going down to begin again—a new fire was kindled by the removal of Dr. Lyman Beecher from the pastorate of a Congregational church in Boston to a Presbyterian professorship in a theological seminary at Cincinnati. Among the men now living, there are not many who remember the fury of that “seven years war” in the Presbyterian Church, from 1830 to 1837. The majority in the General Assembly of 1837, fearing that their party might never be a majority again, and convinced that to forego their advantage out of deference to ordinary considerations of honor or justice would be a mere tempting of Providence, resorted to a measure more like a *coup d'état* than like any respectable *coup d'église*. First, the Synod of the Western Reserve in Ohio, and then three great synods in central and western New York, because of alleged irregularity in the original constitution of their semi-Congregational churches were *excinded*—without trial or citation, by a declaration in defiance of historic truth, of good faith, and of constitutional order, as well as of Christian charity—that they were no part of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

Such was the schism which caused the existence of two distinct organizations, each calling itself “the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.” The quarrel which made two synods out of one, in 1741, was repeated more shamefully, as well as on a grander scale, in 1837, and made two general assemblies. Of course, some time elapsed before the line of separation between the sundered parts was completed. Neither of the two bodies could negotiate with the other; for each claimed as its own the very name appropriated by the other. But, inasmuch as the inconvenience of two “denominations” with a common denominator was not to

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sisting on the duty of allegiance to the constituted government of the United States and of loyal obedience to the supreme law of the land, they assumed their own independence as a national church, and proceeded to institute "the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the *Confederate States of America*," incorporating not only into its acts, but even into its title, the political dogma of secession. So there was another schism of the original American Presbyterianism. The South, like the North, had a Presbyterian Church (O. S.) and a Presbyterian Church (N. S.). But, in the progress of events, the exigencies of a common cause and the attraction of political sympathy overcame the repellence of theological antipathies, and "the United Synod" of the Confederate States was merged in "the General Assembly." At the end of the war, the four schisms had been reduced to three. "The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the (late) Confederate States" assumed the style and title already borne by two other organizations, and became "the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States" (No. III).

Another and earlier separation from the original Presbyterian body consents to bear upon its own records a distinctive name. In the earliest years of the present century, Kentucky, then a new State, inhabited by a rude pioneer population, was made famous by a great religious awakening resembling in many respects that which took place a few years ago in Ireland. The extravagances of speech and action, the enthusiasms and the bodily manifestations (fallings, jerkings, convulsions, and other forms of epidemic catalepsy) which are always incidental to such a movement among an untaught and excitable people, were inspiring to men whose zeal outran their judgment, and alarming to sedate and thoughtful observers. In these circumstances, the need of more preachers among a people so willing to hear was painfully felt. Something must be done to supply that want. Why wait till men who were divinely called to preach could be regularly educated? By the zeal of the self-styled "Revival men" in the Transylvania Presbytery, the strict rules in the "Form of Government" were transgressed, notwithstanding the opposition of those who were stigmatized as the "Anti-Revival men."

Certain forward laymen were commissioned to labor as catechists and exhorters in vacant congregations; and soon afterwards some of them were formally licensed to preach, notwithstanding their lack of acquaintance with the learned tongues, and their inability to receive the Confession of Faith without qualification because of the "fatality" which their ignorance found in it and which their consciousness and common sense rejected. The strength of Presbyterianism in Kentucky had been so increased by the "revival" that the Cumberland Presbytery was constituted in addition to the three presbyteries already existing there. This new presbytery soon distinguished itself by multiplying the number of catechists and exhorters, by ordaining one of the irregular licentiates above-mentioned, and by proceeding to license more of the same sort. Such irregularities could not escape the notice of superior judicatures. After some years of contention and negotiation the Cumberland Presbytery asserted its independence, and became the nucleus of a new "denomination," well known in the western and southern States, "the Cumberland Presbyterian Church"—not the least among the tribes of the Presbyterian Israel. It accepts a revised and modified edition of "the Westminster Confession."

Not only was the original and undivided Presbyterian organization within the bounds of the United States a copy from the Kirk of Scotland, governed by similar judicatories—parochial, classical, provincial, and national—and accepting the same doctrinal standards; but several of the schisms which have originated in the peculiar history of Scotland, and the anomalous relations between the Kirk and the civil government of that land, have been transplanted to flourish in American soil. The earliest of those schisms—that of the Cameronians or Covenanters—began in the persecutions which followed the restoration of the Stuarts, and by which the attempt to establish an Episcopal government in the Kirk was carried on. When Presbyterianism was reestablished after the revolution of 1688, there were some who conscientiously condemned the new arrangement as falling short of what the nation had sworn to in the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, and who abhorred the Erastianism (a dreadful word in

Scotland) of any interference by civil government—and especially by the government of a king who had not taken the Covenant—in the affairs of the Kingdom of Christ. These were the Covenanters, or “Reformed Presbyterians”—the sole representatives, as they think, of the great Reformation in their country under Knox and the heroes of the sixteenth century. The Reformed Presbyterian Church in the United States deserves to be honored for its consistent and unflinching testimony against the institution of slavery. Always less zealous to extend itself than to maintain its own distinctive principles, pure and undefiled, within its own enclosure, it has had among its ministers here, as well as in its mother country, some truly eminent men. We find, however, that somehow there are, in the United States, two organizations, each rejoicing to call itself “the Reformed Presbyterian Church.” How there came to be two, and what peculiar principle or testimony either of them holds in distinction from the other, we do not know. We observe that the supreme judicatory of one is “the Synod of the Reformed Presbyterian Church,” while that of the other is “the General Synod of the Reformed Presbyterian Church;” but the Presbyterian Almanac for 1862 shows that in 1861 the thirty-eighth session of the “*General Synod*” consisted of only thirty-four ministers and elders, while that which calls itself “Synod” without calling itself “General,” included eighty ministers and elders.

In 1732, there arose in the Kirk of Scotland a sharp conflict on some obscure questions, hardly intelligible to an American mind, about the rights of patrons. The controversy went on with characteristic vehemence and pertinacity, till several of the most earnest preachers and most successful pastors in the establishment found themselves condemned for we know not what, and separated from their parishes and from the national church. Protesting against the sentence of the General Assembly, and insisting on the unimpaired validity of their relation to the people over whom they had been placed in the Lord, they seceded with their followers from the jurisdiction of the church-courts, and, as free ministers of Christ, they associated in a voluntary presbytery outside of the establishment. The “Associate Presbytery” grew into a synod. Then

the synod was rent in twain by a difference of judgment on a transcendental question of ethics involved in Scottish law; and instead of one Associate Synod there were two, the Burghers and the Anti-Burghers. Less than fifty years ago, these two, and perhaps some smaller sects, were merged in what is now so widely and so honorably known as the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The familiar name "Seceders" generally designates (if we do not misunderstand the nomenclature) this large and prosperous secession from the Kirk of Scotland—the largest and most prosperous till the "exodus" of the Free Church in 1842. In its own country it is distinguished by its assertion of what our British friends call voluntarism, by the comparative breadth of its orthodoxy, and by its religious activity especially in foreign missions.

Enterprising and aggressive from the first, the Associate Presbyterians early began to extend their ministry into the north of Ireland; and thence as well as from North Britain, members of their congregations migrated to this country. About the year 1754, at the request of a number of persons in Pennsylvania, two ministers were sent over from the Associate Synod (Anti-Burgher) with a commission to organize congregations, to ordain ministers, and to constitute a presbytery for the government of the congregations and the ministers. From this beginning arose, by slow degrees, the Associate Presbyterian Church in the United States. But in 1782, an attempt to unite that body with the Reformed Presbyterian Church was so far successful that another schism was organized. The "Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church" came into being with a residuary Associate Presbyterian Church on one side, and a residuary Reformed Presbyterian Church on the other side. Ten years ago a more successful attempt was made to bring the Associate and the Associate Reformed into one body; yet a portion of the Associate Church retained for a while its name and its isolated unity. Fragments, also, of the Associate Reformed organization maintained for a while their old name as well as their separate existence. Whether those fragmentary bodies have continued to this day is a question which our present information does not enable us to answer. "The United Presbyterian Church in North America" has now its General Assem-

bly, and in the number of its congregations and ministers it is the fifth of those Presbyterian bodies in the United States which claim that name for their highest judicatory.

We have warned our readers not to expect of us a complete catalogue of the Presbyterian sects now existing in our country. A few years ago there was a "Free Presbyterian Church," which had been formed because the New School Assembly was thought to be not quite intense enough in opposition to slavery. Perhaps that schism in behalf of freedom has been brought to an end by the removal of slavery. Perhaps, too, the "Independent Presbyterian Church" that began almost sixty years ago, and which at the end of fifty years still existed in the Carolinas, has been swept away by the war. These minor sects are worth remembering, only because they are instances to show how far the divisibility of Presbyterianism may be carried. But there are better reasons for mentioning how organizations which, though they do not affect the name "Presbyterian," are generally reckoned among the branches of "the great Presbyterian family."

Presbyterianism in Scotland, as established by Knox and his successors, is distinguishable in some respects from the ecclesiastical order in the Reformed or Calvinistic churches of the European continent. The "consistory," which was the best thing that Calvin could introduce in the circumstances in which he found himself at Geneva, became the model after which the government of the Calvinistic or Non-Lutheran churches generally was formed with more or less of variation. At that time the now familiar distinction between the church and the state did not really exist in Geneva—the only distinction being between the clergy and the people. Calvin's sagacity could see that the exclusion of profane and profligate persons from communion at the Lord's table was indispensable to the success of the reformation; but the majority of his colleagues in the ministry, being themselves not thoroughly reformed, could not be trusted. He, therefore, by his influence with the senate, established an arrangement by which he might enforce his moderately rigorous discipline, notwithstanding their reluctance or secret opposition. The discipline of the church, instead of being left in the hands of the col-

lege of presbyters or ministers, was committed to a body in which the six ministers were associated with twice as many laymen, who were to be appointed annually by the double senate of the little republic. Oalvin did not regard the lay members of his "consistory" as "elders" in any New Testament sense of the word, but only as representatives of the Genevese people, who, being a Christian state, were the Church of Geneva. He did not at first call them ruling elders, but only inspectors. In other countries where the Reformed discipline was established, the lay consessors were called elders or ruling elders, and in Scotland their office, instead of being renewed (as at Geneva and elsewhere) by annual appointments, was held for life.

When the Dutch, in 1624 (after maintaining a fort and trading station for a few years at the mouth of the Hudson), began the colonization of what is now New York, they brought with them the religious ideas and the ecclesiastical system of the United Netherlands. Ministers were sent from the mother country; and the congregations gathered by them were governed by consistories, in which representatives of the laity, annually elected, were consessors with the ministers. The ecclesiastical government of all the Dutch colonies was assumed to be within the jurisdiction of the classis of Amsterdam; as the Bishop of London, till a recent date, was supposed to be the diocesan of all Englishmen in the colonies and in foreign lands. Nor did the dependence of the Dutch churches in America on the mother church cease when the New Netherlands, by English conquest, became New York. Retaining their own language and traditions under English laws and in the midst of an increasing English population, those churches were governed by the classis of Amsterdam for a full century after the conquest. At last, in 1772, they became ecclesiastically independent of the old country, and the "Protestant Reformed Dutch Church in North America" was instituted, with its classes and its synod, after the model of the Reformed Church in Holland. Since that time the growth of the organization, though never rapid, has been sufficient to require the institution of "particular synods" between the classes and the General Synod. Within the last few months, after no

little agitation, the historic name, Dutch, which was so redolent of heroic memories revived by our historian Motley, and which was the best apology for the existence of the organization, has been renounced; and now instead of the "Protestant Reformed Dutch Church," we have simply a sect which proclaims itself "*the* Reformed Church in North America."

Kindred to the Dutch Reformed Church, is the "German Reformed." Early in the last century emigrants from Germany into the Anglo-American colonies, and especially into Pennsylvania, began to be gathered into congregations under the Calvinistic form of government. It happened, quite naturally, that they became dependent on the same ecclesiastical authority with the Dutch congregations, namely, the classis of Amsterdam in Holland, and they continued in that relation long after the Dutch churches in this country had gained their independence of European control. At last, in 1792, when the French revolution in its fury had conquered Holland, the German Reformed congregations in the United States found their communications with the governing classis so interrupted that a new arrangement seemed necessary. For some reason they formed an ecclesiastical organization of their own, instead of connecting themselves with the classes and Synod of the Dutch Church from which they were separated by a difference of language. The renewed and increasing emigration from Germany into the United States has given to this German Reformed Church, within the last fifty years, a rapid growth. While the churches which originated in the Dutch colonization have become increasingly American, and seem now almost disposed to forget their ancestry, the kindred organization, receiving a continual supply of the Teutonic element, still makes large use of the German language, and keeps up German modes of thought in its theology.

Such is what our brethren sometimes call, not "the Presbyterian Church" (which title is one of the apples of discord), but "the Presbyterian Family." The various branches of the family are so numerous, that the philosophic mind naturally looks for some method in which they may be conveniently classified. They all hold the Reformed or Calvinistic theology, variously modified, and subject their congregations to the

synodical system of government. We might distribute them by distinguishing, *first*, those who agree with the Episcopalians in recognizing three orders of church officers,—bishops or preachers (every ordained preacher being a bishop), elders, and deacons; and *secondly*, those who have properly only the two orders, bishops and deacons, and whose system permits the people to participate, by their frequently elected and responsible representatives, in all the government of the parochial church and of the churches in their confederation. Such a classification would put into one class those sects whose idea or model is derived from Scotland, and into another class those whose system of government imitates directly the Reformed Churches on the continent of Europe. With the first, the parochial government is by a “session;” and the next superior judicatory, intermediate between the session and the synod, is called a “presbytery.” With the second, the parish or congregation is governed by a “consistory;” and between that body and the synod stands the “classis.” Another classification may be made by distinguishing the American or indigenous sects of Presbyterians from those of foreign original. That which from the date of American independence styled itself “The Presbyterian Church in the United States,” was not an organization imported from abroad. Its earliest presbytery came into being by the voluntary agreement and fusion of New England Congregationalists and English Dissenters with religious emigrants from Scotland and the North of Ireland. The Westminster standards were not “adopted” till more than twenty years afterwards, when the presbytery had grown into a synod. On the other hand, the “Associate Presbyterian Church” and the “Reformed Presbyterian Church” were at first mere offshoots and dependencies of certain organized separations from the kirk of Scotland, and have always been recognized, in common parlance, as Scotch Presbyterians. We may therefore put all the sects which have originated within and from the original Presbyterian Church in the United States, into the indigenous class, including Old School, New School, Cumberland, Free or Anti-Slavery, and Southern; while the Scotch Seceder Churches of all sorts, the Dutch Reformed, and the German Reformed, fall into the other class.

A third classification may be made by distinguishing those who hold the Westminster standards with various degrees of stringency and various methods of explanation, and those whose doctrinal symbol is the Heidelberg Catechism. Still another classification, and perhaps the most important of all, is that which puts the multiplied schisms of "Psalm-singing Presbyterians" into one class, and the Hymn-singers into another. The Scotch-American churches (including that very considerable body "the United Presbyterian Church") are of one class, all insisting that only the Bible Psalms, or at the most the Psalms with some other portions of the Holy Scripture, literally rendered and barbarously broken into metre, may be lawfully sung in Christian worship. All the rest are in the other class, believing that it is the privilege of Christians to praise God not in psalms only but "in psalms, and hymns, and spiritual songs."

Such then is the diversity and such the unity of American Pampresbyterianism—if we may use the term, respectfully, as a convenient synonym for that descriptive and somewhat figurative phrase, "the great Presbyterian family." For the last ten years or more, there has been, on both sides of the fissure caused by the excising acts of 1837, an increasing desire for a complete reunion of the two great fragments. Indeed, for a much longer time, the mutual antipathy between Old School and New School has been gradually becoming less acrimonious. Ministers and elders, as well as simple laymen, found no difficulty in passing from one connection to the other, at their own convenience, without professing any change of opinion or of practice. Courtesies were exchanged, and in process of time an amicable correspondence and interchange of delegates was settled between the two General Assemblies, without either acknowledging itself to be less "General" or less "Presbyterian" than the other. Meanwhile important changes had taken place on both sides. The New School body as represented by its leading men and in its higher judicatories, had almost, if not entirely, outlived its affinities with Congregationalism. In the Old School body there was no longer any fear of losing its southern presbyteries, for secession and rebellion had swept them away. The great fire of patriot-

ism, kindled by the exigency of the nation, had melted many prejudices and wakened new feelings of fraternity. At last, in the year 1866, it came to pass that the two "General Assemblies of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America" held their separate sessions—always simultaneous—in one city, St. Louis. The members, sharing alike the hospitality of the good people there, were brought into friendly intercourse with each other. Not only did they meet in the same social circles and the same prayer meetings and public worship, but they had a more formal communion in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. After so long and so gradual a preparation, the time for an organic union seemed to have come, and a committee of each Assembly was appointed to confer with an equal committee of the other, and by their joint wisdom to devise a method in which the two organizations might be one again.

The first report of that joint committee was presented to each of the two Assemblies in 1867. It proposed a certain platform or plan of reunion which was to be published, by authority of the Assemblies, for deliberate examination by the churches, and the committee was to be continued that it might report, in 1868, any modification of the platform which might seem desirable after the expected examination and discussion of the whole subject by the churches on both sides.

Of the eleven carefully guarded articles proposed by the joint committee as "terms of reunion," the first is the most important.

"The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted 'as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures,' and its fair, historical sense, as it is accepted by the two bodies, in opposition to Antinomianism and Fatalism on the one hand, and to Arminianism and Pelagianism on the other, shall be regarded as the sense in which it is received and adopted; and the Government and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall continue to be approved as containing the principles and rules of our polity."

The second article, while providing that all the ministers and churches of either body shall have in the united body the standing which they have in their respective presbyteries at the time of the union, provides also that the semi-Congrega-

tional churches, of which there are many in the New School connection, "shall be advised to perfect their organization [by becoming thoroughly Presbyterian in their internal government] as soon as is permitted by the highest interests to be consulted;" that "no other such churches shall be received;" and that none but ordained elders shall be allowed to sit with the bishops in the General Assembly.

The third article prescribes the way in which the boundaries of synods and presbyteries shall be adjusted after the union, and directs that the official records of both branches shall belong to the united body as making up its "one history;" and at the same time it provides that no rule or precedent peculiar to either shall be valid till reestablished.

The articles from the fourth to the eighth relate to the consolidation of corporate rights, and to the union of the "Boards" which one Assembly has for Missions, for Education, and for Publication, with the "Permanent Committees" which have been established by the other Assembly.

In the ninth it is provided that the theological seminaries now under the care and control of the General Assembly (which are the Old School Seminaries) shall be permitted, at the request of their Directors, "to put themselves under synodical control;" and that those theological seminaries, which, like Lane Seminary and others in connection with the New School body, "are independent in their organization, shall have the privilege of putting themselves under ecclesiastical control."

So far as we can discover any important meaning in the tenth article, touching "the duty of all our judicatories, ministers, and people in the United Church, to study the things which make for peace, and to guard against all needless and offensive reference to the causes that have divided us," &c. it is that, after the union, there shall be no free and earnest controversy on the great questions in theology which were so sharply debated between Old School and New School before the rupture, and that the new policy shall be a policy of silence and restraint on those themes which are always agitated and disputed among Calvinists, except in times when stagnant orthodoxy is dying into indifference and unbelief.

The eleventh article provides that the terms of reunion shall be of binding force, if ratified by three-fourths of the Presbyteries in each body within one year after the final submission of them for that purpose.

In each of the two Assemblies, the report of the joint committee was favorably received (though not without some expressions of dissent, chiefly from men old enough to remember the times before the great excision), and was commended to the careful consideration of the churches generally. We need not say how gladly the proposals for union were received by the great body of earnest workers for Christ in the ministry and churches on both sides. Of course there was resolute opposition in some quarters. Professors of theology, especially in the Old School connection, were alarmed for their theology. Those persons generally—ministers, elders, and laymen—who had been trained to think that the glory of a church is in the tenacity of its adherence to the particular “testimony” or tradition by which it is distinguished from other churches, and which makes it a sect in distinction from the visible church catholic, were afraid of the consequences—afraid, perhaps, that they might be forced into some position not sectarian enough for the edification of “sound Presbyterians.” But notwithstanding the reluctance and opposition manifested even in some high places of authority, the best feelings of Christian souls on both sides of the dividing line was strongly favorable to an organic union on the terms proposed—or, perhaps, on any terms consistent with those securities for orthodoxy without which a synodical government may become that most tyrannical of all ecclesiastical despotisms,—the despotism of an insolent and bigoted liberalism.

Meanwhile a much more unexpected movement toward union had been begun elsewhere. While the great Old School General Assembly was sitting at Cincinnati, and the great New School General Assembly was sitting at Brooklyn, the little Synod of the Reformed Presbyterian (or Covenant-er) Church held its session in the city of New York. Mr. George H. Stuart, of Philadelphia, a distinguished merchant, and much more distinguished by his diversified and far reaching activity in religious matters, was a member of that Synod,

and to him the time seemed propitious for a more daring attempt. His Christian sympathies, always generous and impulsive, had been greatly quickened by the breadth of fellowship into which he had been brought as President of the late "Christian Commission," from the date of its organization to the end of the war; and at his motion the synod undertook "to inaugurate measures to heal Zion's breaches and to bring into one the divided portions of the Presbyterian family." A scheme was proposed for "a General Convention of the Presbyterian Churches of the United States, to meet in the city of Philadelphia, on the second Wednesday of September—for prayer and conference in regard to the terms of union and communion among the various branches of the Presbyterian family;" and the several Presbyterian judicatories then in session or soon to meet, were invited to unite in the call. It was proposed that every presbytery in the United States (including the classes of the Dutch and German Churches) should represent itself in the Convention by a minister and a ruling elder; and to carry the whole scheme into effect, a "committee of arrangement and correspondence" was appointed. By that committee, after more inquiry and consultation, the time for the convention was changed from the second Wednesday in September to Wednesday the 6th of November.

Such a proposal, proceeding from what is often called "the least of the tribes" that make up the Presbyterian Israel, and falling in with the movement already in progress for union between the Old School tribe and the New School, obtained a more favorable reception than it might have found in other circumstances. It seemed to be recognized (and why should it not have been?) as a Divine call. Not only was there much of serious thought concerning the importance of the end aimed at, but much of prayer, both public and private, for God's blessing on the great undertaking. At the appointed time, about two hundred and fifty delegates, representing seven different branches of the family, assembled in the First Reformed Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia—an edifice which (as we understand) had never been desecrated by the singing of anything else than "the Psalms of David" in Rouse's version. All the members of the Convention, save twen-

ty-four, were delegates from the various sects of Presbyterian Hymn-singers,—one hundred and sixty-two being Old School, and sixty-four New School, six Cumberland, five Reformed Dutch, and one Southern. The delegates from the Psalm-singers were equally divided between the United Presbyterians and the Reformed.

At the beginning, there was some embarrassment, chiefly occasioned by the form of the call, which contained a provision that "on all questions submitted for decision," each body represented, whether by many delegates or by few, should be entitled to an equal vote. In the organization of the Convention, and in all its proceedings prior to the adoption of a "result" as it would be called in a Congregational Council, the rule of voting by sects or "denominations" was disregarded as unnecessary and inconvenient; but in framing and adopting the basis or platform, each of the bodies represented voted separately. In many respects the meeting was a great success. To its members generally, and to sympathizing spectators, it must have been not only delightful, but instructive and edifying. Fortunately as well as fitly, Mr. Stuart, the originator and most efficient promoter of the call for the Convention, was made its President; and with his remarkable tact and skill in conducting great prayer-meetings, he succeeded in giving it, from first to last, a highly devotional character. Few ecclesiastical conventions within our knowledge, have been more distinguished by the constant flow of good feeling.

The history of Mr. Stuart's Pampresbyterian Convention is much more than an accidental digression from the longer if not larger history of the attempted reunion between the Old School and the New School "branches." In fact, that meeting was, as it were, a voyage of discovery and experiment. It was a praxis for the training of Presbyterians into a new habit of thought and feeling toward each other in their several sects, and toward all Christians. It was a school in which the providence of God gave them the opportunity of showing whether their experience of their system in its working hitherto, and their deep sense of the evils inseparable from their present relations to each other, could teach them anything. We may say, it was more than all this. The Spirit of Divine

grace was manifestly present in that Assembly, breathing upon all with influences which it seemed impossible to resist, and wakening them to aspirations which might have led them out of their bondage to the commandments of men and to traditions which (as the experience of centuries has shown) "do gender strifes," and not strifes only, but pestilent and lasting schisms. In our view, the pamphlet which reports to us in full, and with the appearance of much exactness, the proceedings and debates of that meeting, is most instructive as to the causes, the tendencies, and the probable results of the arrangements now in progress for a reunion of the Old School and New School Presbyterians.

I. First of all the reader cannot but observe, in the record of that meeting, an earnest and truly Christian desire for union. From beginning to end—from Mr. Stuart's address when taking his place as temporary chairman (before he was made President), to the "farewell meeting of conference and prayer" which followed the final adjournment of the Convention as an organized body—the desirableness of a hearty union among all who follow Christ, and especially among Presbyterians in the United States—was the burthen of speeches and of prayers. Indeed, the Convention itself was a manifestation of that desire. Nothing else than a deep conviction that the existing divisions are both unseemly and mischievous, could have prompted the call for such a convention. Nothing else could have prompted such a response to the call.

It may be well, however, to note the fact that the unreasonableness and wrongfulness, or, in one strong syllable, the *sin* of schism, was distinctly recognized in setting forth the desirableness of the union which the Convention was seeking and praying for. The Rev. John McMillan (Reformed Presbyterian) expressed, we are sure, no peculiar feeling of his own when he said,

"I feel that the Lord Jesus Christ . . . does not judge of any one branch of the Presbyterian Church, that it is altogether free of sin in regard to this divided state of the Church. I cannot feel that all the sin of the divided Church lies at the door of any one branch of it, or any two branches of it." . . . "I cannot but feel that there is sin enough at the door of all our churches, to bring

us all down to the dust ; but we are looking continually, as we are in our human nature disposed to look, away off from ourselves at some others, rather than turning our looks in upon ourselves." P. 88.

In the same tone, the Rev. W. C. McCune (Old School) said, "It has been assumed universally in this Convention, that union is a duty, and that division is a sin ;" and accordingly he proposed a preamble and series of resolutions for the more explicit expression of that unanimous conviction. Although in the course of business the resolutions were not formally adopted, we find no reason to think that any member would have voted against them. We give the last position of the preamble and the whole series of resolutions :

"Whereas, the more nearly the branches of the Church approach each other in faith, order, and worship, the greater is the sin which separates them ; therefore,

"Resolved, First, that the division of Presbyterians into various branches is a great and grievous sin, standing in the way of salvation, murdering souls, and hindering the conversion of the world.

"Resolved, Second, that no measure of brotherly love or coöperation in our work in our divided state, can release us from the obligation to forsake the sin of division.

"Resolved, Third, that we have faith in God, that if we go humbly to his word and humbly to His throne, He will show us the way out of this sin. Pp. 58, 59.

So in the formal "Address" from the Convention "to the ministers, elders, and people" which it represented, we find a distinct recognition of the divisions and schisms as sinful in the sight of God.

"Do not divisions and schisms in the Church, engendering, intensifying, and perpetuating discord and strife among brethren, grieve the Holy Spirit of God, who is the Spirit of peace and unity, and love ! And are they not pleasing to the spirit and prince of darkness, their author and fomentor ! Do not the instincts of every regenerated soul revolt at these spectacles of division and strife among brethren !" P. 146.

The desirableness of union and coöperation in the common cause was recognized in another way. Presbyterianism, and not that only but Christianity itself, is weakened by these divisions. Thus the Rev. E. W. Leonard (New School), a member from Iowa, said,

"We need union for many purposes. Ecclesiastically we [in Iowa] have not a literary institution of any magnitude connected with any branch of the Presbyterian Church." . . . "We need a union in order that the different forces of

the various presbyteries may be united to complete and endow, with a little assistance from the wealthy churches of the East, an institution of learning. We need it on this ground, further, because we have such a great rush of immigration not only from the different eastern States, but from Europe." . . . "We need to be united in order that we may relieve many ministers. I have estimated, and I think I am not far from correct, that if these different bodies were united, we might release one thousand to fill the places that imperatively demand ministers now; and perhaps \$200,000 to sustain them. The cry from the territories and the Northwest States is, More men! Towns are forming along the Pacific Railroad, which is extending at the rate of three miles a day. New towns are opening; Infidels, Catholics, and Universalists, are pushing forward. Why should we not unite, brethren, as a body, and lift up our standards against the flood of iniquity that is flowing to our shores and filling up the best parts of the country, and plant first, in advance of all others, the great Church that reflects the Reformed doctrines in all their purity!" P. 34.

Such things were not said by New School Presbyterians only. Rev. Cyrus Dickson, D. D. (Old School), from Baltimore, in the course of a very effective speech, put the case thus:

"We are spending our time and means in carrying on domestic missionary work; and in communities of people, we aid to support three or four ministers, where they can support only one. Our great West clamors for men. At every little cross-road you find more men at work than they ought to have. At some of the cross-roads you find three or four Presbyterian churches, and three or four ministers are starving, and their wives and children, for want of support. At every little four corners you will find a church that wants to be represented, and in little villages of five hundred or seven hundred, we find sometimes three or four ministers of the same denomination who desire to be delegates. What we want is this: but one store where there are customers enough for one store! one blacksmith's shop where there is work for but one blacksmith shop! . . . One church where there are enough supporters for one church!" P. 49.

With even more vehemence, Rev. Samuel L. Sawyer (New School), from Tennessee, reasoning from the fact that "there is an organic union already accomplished between the Old School and the New School South," "under the wonderfully fusing power of treason," said,

"You must unite the presbyteries; you must combine. It is the condition of life. We will die out without the union of the denominations. There are great counties in our region, all around us, that have not a single Presbyterian Church within them." . . . "I think I can count over eleven counties in my section of the State, that have not a single Presbyterian minister in them." . . . "By a little coöperation we can supply them, and build up one Presbyterian college there, and send out our candidates for the ministry. Those presbyteries that have

gone against us in the national struggle have united, and they are working against us now. Cannot the friends of Jesus Christ coöperate, if the enemies of the country can unite to weaken the Church?" P. 62.

The "Address," while recognizing, as we have seen, the evil of schism in the sight of God, insists with great force on the necessity of united effort in Christian work. It says, "We are able to possess the land if we will only unite our strength, husband our resources, and, in God's name, go forth to the toils, and tears, and triumphs of the great work before us. But if we continue to bite and devour one another, we shall be consumed one of another."

It would be uncharitable to represent this earnest desire for the union of all Presbyterians as having in it more of sectarian ambition than of a truly Christian catholicity. Everywhere the underlying thought is of Christ and his work in the world, more than of sectarian aggrandizement. Sometimes, in the reported speeches, we find a distinct expression of the truth that the union to be sought for is, essentially, a vital and spiritual oneness—the unity of a common cause—the unity of love to God and men, of faith in Christ and fellowship with him, and of aspirations and endeavors for the salvation of the world. For example, Rev. John H. Pratt (Old School), from Ohio, said,

"We need to be endowed with power from on high. You may take two masses of silver or gold, and put them in a crucible together, and you let these masses be melted and come to a fluid state, and the moment they touch they run together. And if God, in answer to our prayers, will send us the precious baptism of the Holy Ghost from Heaven, and humble our hearts with love to Christ, we will then flow together with new love." . . . "Let us not forget that we live under the ministry of the Spirit. Let us not forget that it is peculiarly in the province of the Spirit to take of the things that are Christ's and reveal them unto us; that it is in the Spirit we glorify Christ—that name by which we are called." P. 46.

We need not fill our pages with quotations on this point; but we cannot refrain from saying that Dr. George Junkin, since deceased, an Old School divine—celebrated for the part he had in the prosecution of Mr. Barnes, and in the proceedings generally which brought about the excision in 1837—recognized (what many of his associates in the Convention seemed to overlook) the wide difference between spiritual unity

and organic unity. His speech, as reported (pp. 114, 115) is obscure; but its intention to mark that distinction is evident enough. It denies that "the unity of the Spirit spoken of by the Apostle Paul (Eph. iv.), the oneness of Christ's disciples in their relation to him and to the Father (John xvii. 21-23), is unity of organization. Referring to the fact that the Convention had been visited that morning by a formal deputation from a representative meeting of Episcopalians then sitting in Philadelphia, and that they had all had a good time together, "black prelacy," as the Scotch call it, and true-blue Presbyterianism enjoying sweet communion, like the leopard lying down with the kid in the millennium,—the venerable Doctor said,

"Here were persons from another denomination, entirely differing in the order of Church government, and yet we felt ourselves all one. What! organically! No! no! no organic union about it, but 'the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' We felt it; we rejoiced in it. I have never been in a situation in which I felt that unity more powerfully exhibited. Now, Sir, this is what I felt; 'the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' But you can have that without unity of doctrine."

It is much to be regretted that by the operation of a rule forbidding any speech to exceed five minutes in length, Dr. Junkin was interrupted just as he was proceeding to say why he was opposed to the organic unity of all Presbyterians—an attempt which would have required him to show that the unity of the Spirit, the very oneness which Christ, in his mediatorial prayer, desired for his disciples, may exist among churches, and be held in the bond of peace, without any organic union such as Presbyterianism delights in. His distinction, however, between the unity of the Spirit and organic unity—or rather his position that the former may exist and be manifested without the latter—does not seem to have been a taking one. There were indeed some members of the Convention who proposed a Presbyterian Alliance, something like a federation of sects, or a concerted coöperation in certain Christian enterprises; but their hope was that such coöperation and alliance, being all that is at present practicable, would be "an initial step," the beginning of a process that should "gradually bring all these now divided bodies into one compact and harmonious church."

II. Our second remark, then, concerning the proceedings and debates of the Convention, is that the idea of organic union was constantly dominant. The earnest and truly Christian desire for union, recognizing the intrinsic sinfulness of schism, lamenting the waste of zeal and power which is inseparable from division, and feeling that no union can be worth anything which is not vital and spiritual, was always blended with the assumption that there can be no sufficient union that is not "corporate union,"—the consolidation of many churches into one church under one government, or of two or more sects into one more powerful sect,—union identified and perpetuated by an enforced uniformity. We have already intimated that now and then a purer and better idea of union among churches seemed almost dawning upon the Assembly. Rev. Dr. Samuel W. Fisher (New School) said, "As to our basis of union, we are, in this respect, catholic (?), and mean to be. The Presbyterian Church is a church not of narrowness, but of liberty. We believe in diversity of doctrine; in unity in the great fundamentals." Let us not be understood as affirming or denying the historical exactness of the words which we quote only as showing how near the speaker came to the apprehension of an idea larger than Presbyterianism. Rev. Dr. J. M. Stevenson (Old School) ventured to turn the thoughts of the Convention for a moment—while they were expecting the delegation of Episcopalians, "to the subject of even a wider union." He said, "May we not hope that eventually the border of this organic union may extend beyond these five or six [Presbyterian] denominations? We are all one body! One body in Christ Jesus! Then, brothers, as we are one body, let our minds and hearts go out to our Christian brethren of the same body." Other expressions of the same sort—some perhaps even stronger—might be gleaned from the proceedings; but they are few, and merely incidental. Indeed, the Convention being exclusively Presbyterian, representing nothing else than bodies organized under that form of government, it was quite natural that the union contemplated in the debates and proceedings should be Presbyterian union and therefore organic,—union under one supreme judicatory. The possibility of a catholic union was not the question. How to

dispose of all the organizations by which evangelical Christians are divided into rival sects, each striving to enlarge itself at the expense of the others, was not considered, probably not thought of for a moment. The only question was how to get rid of superfluous Presbyterian organizations and fuse them into one—how to arrange matters so that Old School Presbyterians and New School, those of the Westminster Standards and those of the Heidelberg Catechism, those who are free to sing hymns and those whose praise is articulated only in the stanzas of Rouse, may all be united in one harmonious and powerful sect. Of course the only union to be thought of was the identical union which Presbyterianism has been so long attempting to establish—a corporate union, organized and governed—a certain uniformity enforced by ecclesiastical authority; the “hundred sects of the Presbyterian Church,” as Professor McIlvaine called them (though a voice responded that there were at that moment only “eleven in this country”), all brought under one supreme judicatory, so that instead of being a hundred or even eleven, striving to outvie each other in number or in orthodoxy, they shall be organically one.

III. What, then, was the Convention to do? We observe that being earnest and practical men they went to work, with such light as their training and experience had given them, to find or to make a “basis” for the desired union. To a friendly observer looking on from a position quite outside of the Presbyterian family, it seems that the only and sufficient basis of union for all these sects must be a statement of the points on which they are agreed, and a frank agreement to differ on points on which they are not agreed. The Evangelical or “Regular” Baptist Churches in the United States, and the Congregational Churches, are well agreed in the essentials of Christian doctrine and in their church government; the differences, in these respects, between the two bodies, being no greater than the differences which each of them tolerates within its own communion. But on the question, What is baptism? and on the question, Who are to be baptized? they are not agreed. The difference about baptism separates them into two informal confederacies of churches, or, as the phrase goes, two “denominations.” Let it be proposed, now, to unite all

these churches so that they shall be not two denominations but one; how can that be done? Only three methods are conceivable. (1.) All the Congregationalists may become Baptists; or, (2.) all the Baptists may become Congregationalists; or, (3.) it may be agreed that each church shall practice according to its own light, and that the existing differences about how to baptize, and whom to baptize, shall be no bar to communion or to Christian coöperation. The first and second of these two methods have been tried without much success for about three hundred years, and there is little reason to expect that either of them will be more successful in time to come. Only the third method can be thought of as practicable, if experience is to be our teacher. So in the problem with which the Pampresbyterian Convention so bravely grappled. Six different denominations were represented,* each having, or being supposed to have, some valued peculiarities. As between any two of the six, the problem was precisely the same as that supposed between the Baptists and the Congregationalists. If, for example, the Old School branch and the Covenanter branch are to become one, the first must surrender its own peculiarities and adopt those of the second; or the second must surrender its own and adopt those of the first; or else each must agree to tolerate the other. If five of the six would agree to renounce their several peculiarities, and to adopt those of the sixth, the union would be complete—till the next division. But inasmuch as, to the eye of common sense, there was no prospect of success in that direction, common honesty, one might think, required the several parties in the Convention to speak out with no ambiguous utterance, and either to give up the problem as more difficult than the finishing of that famous tower on the plains of Shinar, or frankly to accept the new principle of mutual toleration. Yet the members of the Convention, with all their common sense and all their experience in ecclesiastical affairs, and with their most unquestionable integrity of purpose, seem to have thought that, in some other

* The roll shows *seven* denominations, but the one delegate from the Southern denomination seems to have taken no part in the proceedings. We know not what became of him.

way than by a distinct agreement to differ on the points of difference, all the peculiarities, save those of the Cumberland Presbyterians, could be compromised without any surrender or change of principle.

The paper which was finally adopted and commended to the several supreme judicatories for consideration, though entitled "Basis of Union," should rather be regarded as a basis of negotiation in order to union. It is not a constitution or compact, but only a platform of four principles on which a constitution may be framed in the progress of affairs. In the final vote by denominations, the Cumberland Presbyterian delegation, very properly and without any apparent interruption of good feeling, declined voting. Four out of nine of the Reformed Presbyterian delegation, and one out of ten of the United Presbyterian, voted against it. All the other delegations, Old School, New School, and Reformed Dutch, voted unanimously for it. Accordingly it was declared to be "adopted by the churches voting unanimously." Of course it must be regarded as the summing up of whatever wisdom the Convention had gained by three long days of debate and prayer.

The first of the four principles is in these words: "An acknowledgment of the Old and New Testaments to be the inspired word of God and the only infallible rule of faith and practice." In this there is no equivocation, and no compromise. All the parties agree in it. Though not in the Apostles' Creed, it is sufficiently catholic. At the same time it is Protestant and evangelical, excluding, on the one hand, the Romish doctrine of Church infallibility, and on the other hand, the Rationalistic denial of the deference due to the inspired documents of the Christian revelation.

The second principle of the proposed "basis" was much discussed and seriously modified in the Convention. It is the more important because of its connection with the negotiations between the Old School and New School General Assemblies :

"That in the United Church, the Westminster Confession of Faith shall be received and adopted, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures; *it being understood that this Confession is received in its proper historical, that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed sense.*

"While the committee recommend the foregoing basis of doctrine, they wish to be understood as recognizing the orthodoxy of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, of the Heidelberg Catechism, and of the Canons of the Synod of Dort."

In the form in which this article came from the committee, there was no attempt to explain or define the sense of the Confession; and instead of expressly "recognizing the orthodoxy of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms," and of the other documents named, the committee only desired "not to be understood as impugning the orthodoxy of the Heidelberg Catechism and of the canons of the Synod of Dort."

Any person not thoroughly conversant with the family traits of the great Presbyterian family, would naturally ask, at the first reading of this second article, What does this mean? And what is to be the application and use of it? It was well understood in the Convention, and frankly admitted, that by this "basis of doctrine" the Cumberland Presbyterians would be excluded from the contemplated union. Their Confession of Faith is recognized by themselves as differing from the Westminster Confession. Probably it was thought that the Reformed Dutch Church would be conciliated by recognizing the orthodoxy of its standards—especially as no such compliment was paid to the standards of the Cumberland branch. But what is "the Westminster Confession of Faith?" There is a certain form of doctrine commonly known as "the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." Every minister, every licensed preacher, and every elder in the Old School and New School branches, has "sincerely received and adopted" that form of words "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;" and most of them, we dare say, think that in so doing they have sincerely received and adopted the Westminster Confession. But the fact is otherwise. The Westminster Confession was not modified for the first time by the Cumberland secession. In the year 1788, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia formed and established "the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States," and in so doing eliminated from the standards one doctrine which was precious to the Westminster Divines. The Westminster Confession (Ch. xx. Sec. 4) affirms that those who publish such opinions

or maintain such practices as are contrary to the light of nature, or to the known principles of Christianity, whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation, or to the power of godliness; or such erroneous principles or practices, as either in their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them, are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the church—may lawfully be called to an account, and proceeded against by the censures of the church, *and by the power of the civil magistrate.*” This last clause the two great branches of the Presbyterian family have expunged. So instead of confessing (Ch. xxiii. Sec. 3) that it is the duty of the civil magistrate to convoke synods, to be present in them, and to take care that they do nothing against the truth, these American Presbyterians, Old School and New School, have foisted into the Confession a doctrine which the Westminster Divines abhorred. “It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, *without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest*, in such a manner that *all ecclesiastical persons whatever* shall enjoy the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions without violence or danger.” “No law of any commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder the due exercise” of church government and discipline “among the voluntary members of *any* denomination of Christians according to their own profession and belief.” This is sound doctrine; but it is a piece of new cloth sewed on an old garment. The Westminster Divines would have anathematized such doctrine, for, in *their* Larger Catechism, they expressly teach that “*tolerating a false religion*”—instead of being a duty, as these degenerate Presbyterians make it—is one of “the sins forbidden in the second commandment.”

What then did the committee and the Convention mean by thus proposing the Westminster Confession as the “basis of doctrine” on which all Presbyterians, save the poor Cumberland wanderers, may stand together in one denomination? It is impossible to suppose that they intended anything like double dealing. Yet some passages in the debate seem as if there was some unwillingness to be explicit. The Reformed

Presbyterians, and, if we mistake not, the United Presbyterians, accept the Westminster standards "whole and entire." Accordingly Rev. Mr. Morton (R. P.) said, "It is evident we are not agreed as to what the Confession of Faith is; some of us suppose it to be one thing, and some another." Some things in the debate are not quite clear. We are not sure that we understand what "a delegate" (U. P.) meant when he said, "If you adopt the Westminster Confession of Faith, I want you to go the whole figure. I wish you to adopt it in its historical sense, but I do not wish to have it adopted at all until you come together upon some basis of organic union that will take the Reformed Presbyterian and Cumberland Presbyterian with the rest." Rev. Dr. Crawford (R. P.) asked, outright, "Is the Westminster Confession of Faith, as here referred to, that as amended by the Old School; or is it the Westminster Confession of Faith?" The President—himself a delegate from the Reformed Presbyterian branch—replied, "Doctor, you are getting too deep in theological questions for me." Then followed a colloquy, which was evidently "the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties."

"DR. CRAWFORD: I wish to vote intelligently, and wish to know if I am to vote for the Westminster Confession of Faith as I understand it, or for the Westminster Confession of Faith as the Old School understands it?"

"A DELEGATE: For the latter.

"DR. WYLIE: (In whose R. P. Church the Convention was sitting.) Every one takes it as he understands it.

"DR. MARSHALL: I vote against it as interpreted.

"THE PRESIDENT: I gave no interpretation. I said I could not define it.

"DR. WYLIE: The chairman does not decide upon that question; it is left to each individual, as I understand it. That question came up in the committee, Mr. Moderator, and we agreed to leave it to be understood as the Church understands it.

"REV. J. MORTON (R. P.) said: I vote against the adoption of that amendment (about 'the historic sense'), because I do not know what was understood to be the 'Confession of Faith,' by the bodies represented here. I offered a substitute to test matters. The Convention has not entertained it, and I do not know what you are voting for." P. 118.

All this confusion comes, we venture to suggest, from the want of a clear conception of what is necessary in order that the sects represented in the Convention may become, intelligently and honestly, one sect. A single moment of thought

ARTICLE IV.—THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE
CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.

[The following Article, which was delivered as an Address at the last Anniversary of the Theological Department of Yale College, is a timely and strong attack on that great error, which has been so fruitful of evil to the Church,—the doctrine that the Christian ministry is a priesthood. One of the leading functions of the ministry—that of teaching the truths of the Gospel—is emphatically set forth. In addition to what is usually meant by teaching, there is likewise a pastoral office which belongs to the ministers of Christ. They are not only appointed to teach, but also to *rule*, not in an arbitrary spirit, yet in some appropriate meaning of the term. They are not merely teachers, but likewise “overseers” of the flock. (Acts xx. 28.) Moreover, it is, to say the least, open to doubt whether the extirpation of the false doctrine that the clergy are endowed with priestly prerogatives would produce that catholic unity among Christians which it is desirable to realize.—EDS. OF THE NEW ENGLANDER.]

As we reckon time on the scale of our brief and hasty lives, it is now many years since I went out from these Theologic Halls, and these walks of sacred learning. According to the average of human life which vital statistics establish, more than a generation of the world's human population has since then been born and passed away. Wondrous changes have, in that interval, passed over ourselves and all things around us,—this venerable seat of learning, our country, the world.

Other men, in my student days, were filling these chairs of instruction, venerable indeed in mind, in wisdom, in character, but not yet venerable in age. Taylor was in that theologic chair, and age had not yet taken aught from the glossy brightness of his locks, or wrinkled his brow, or dimmed the fire and lustre of his eye. That mental force, the quickening power of which we daily felt, the world now feels and acknowledges. To his pupils how distinct and how refreshing is his memory,

a supposition as that they are to be admitted into an organic union with other Presbyterian sects, then the basis of that organic union, in order to be clearly honest, must say that a subscription to the Cumberland recension of the Westminster Confession shall be recognized as a sufficient profession of orthodoxy.

We say nothing at present about the attempt to define the sense in which the Confession is to be received ; but we may say that if the Convention could have overcome the Presbyterian passion for uniformity, and if instead of assuming that in order to organic union, every man must make profession of his doctrinal views in the same form of words, it had distinctly set forth the principle that there may be two or more summaries of Christian doctrine, differing from each other in sundry particulars, while any of them may be sufficiently evangelical and correct to serve as a test of orthodoxy,—much more would have been done than was done for the early and permanent unification of the sects there represented.*

The third article of the proposed basis provided only for “the Presbyterian form of Church government,” and was unanimously adopted without debate.

How to satisfy the conscience of the Psalm-singing denominations, without surrendering the liberty of the Hymn-singer, was perhaps the most difficult part of the work undertaken by the Convention. The fourth article of the proposed basis relates to Psalmody, and is as follows :

“The book of Psalms, which is of divine inspiration, is well adapted to the

* The “Heads of Agreement assented to by the United Ministers in and about London, formerly called Presbyterians and Congregational” (1692) were proposed and accepted as a basis of union, though not of organic union. One Head of Agreement was in these words :

“VIII. OF A CONFESSION OF FAITH.

“As to what appertains to soundness of judgment in matters of Faith, we esteem it sufficient that a church acknowledge the Scriptures to be the word of God, the perfect and only rule of faith and practice ; and own either the doctrinal part of those commonly called the Articles of the Church of England, or the Confession, or Catechisms, Shorter or Larger, compiled by the Assembly at Westminster, or the Confession agreed on at the Savoy, to be agreeable to the said rule.”

state of the Church in all ages and circumstances, and should be used in the worship of God. Therefore we recommend that a new and faithful version of the Psalms be provided as soon as practicable. But, inasmuch as various collections of Psalmody are used in the different churches, a change in that respect shall not be required.

In this article there is, first, a clear statement of the principle which all parties represented in the Convention hold, with one accord, and no contradiction of the distinctive principle held by the exclusive Psalm-singers. The inspired Psalms of the Old Testament are not obsolete under the New Dispensation. They were sung by Christ himself and his Apostles. They have been used in Christian churches through all the centuries. They ought ever to be used in worship. Next, the article gives a gentle suggestion that Rouse's version, though dear to Scotch Presbyterians as the book of Common Prayer to English Episcopalians, is not absolutely perfect. A new and faithful version is represented as a thing to be desired. Meanwhile the schism is to be got rid of by introducing the two principles of congregational liberty and mutual toleration.

As yet, the ulterior results which the Convention seemed to promise, while it was in progress, have not become matters of fact. The proposed basis of union has not superseded the negotiations, which were already far advanced, for a reunion between the Old School and New School branches. Such a result would have opened a grand chapter in the history of Presbyterianism. In a general union, the New England influences which are still so powerful in the New School body would have been counterbalanced by the *perfervidum ingenium Scotorum* contributed by the United Presbyterian and Reformed Presbyterian sects. In such a union, the churches of Dutch origin, with their special traditions and their heavily conservative tendencies, might have been a makeweight to secure the equipoise of parties and to keep the great machine of government from ending in a crash. But nothing like that has come to pass. The Dutch churches, henceforth refusing to be called by that name, and professing to be simply and purely "*the Reformed Church*," entertain no thought of being absorbed into any union of Presbyterian sects, but, on the con-

trary, are expecting perhaps, that their organization will absorb the rest. In the Reformed Presbyterian sect, disintegration is already beginning to result. Those members of it who, like Mr. Stuart and his pastor, Dr. Wylie, have outgrown its prodigious narrowness, and from whom we suppose the call for the Convention came, are beginning to be excinded for singing hymns and holding religious communion with Hymn-singers, and will soon be found in the reunited (not the United) Presbyterian Church—if the proposed reunion shall be effected, or—if there be no reunion—in the Old School branch. The negotiations for reunion were in some respects helped forward by the debates in the Convention. Some of the Old School brethren there, and particularly Dr. Hodge of Princeton, obtained new light, and were convinced that the New School men, when they solemnly profess to “receive and adopt the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Scriptures,” really mean what they say, and are expected by their presbyteries to mean much more than they say. Two clauses from the “basis of union” proposed by the Convention were incorporated into the remodeled “terms of reunion” by the joint committee of the two General Assemblies. Opposition to reunion was much weakened on both sides, and especially on the Old School side, by the good feeling which was diffused in all directions from the Convention. It has become evident, that if the hope of Pampresbyterian union under one supreme judicature is ever to be realized, the process must begin with the reunion of the two great branches.

The final report of the joint committee was presented to each of the two Assemblies (which met this year, the New School at Harrisburg, and the Old School at Albany, on the second day of their sessions), the 22d day of May. Few of our readers need to be informed that the report, after much discussion in both Assemblies, was approved in both,—in the Old School by a large majority against a powerful opposition,—in the New School unanimously, or rather *nemine contradicente*, the few who could not vote affirmatively having been excused from voting. The “terms of reunion,” therefore, are now remitted to the presbyteries for ratification or rejection; and if at the next annual meeting of each General Assembly

it shall appear that two-thirds of the presbyteries in each connection have consented to the plan, the reunion will be declared complete; and arrangements will be made for one General Assembly in 1870, which shall be neither Old School nor New School, but will yet be considerably less than Pampresbyterian.

We have little doubt as to what the result will be. At the end of thirty-three years the schism of 1837 will be no more. As members not of any Presbyterian schism, great or small, but of the Catholic Church of Christ, we heartily rejoice in the prospect. The original separation—in the long quarrel which produced it—in the measures by which it was effected—in the sectarian competition which it made inevitable—was a great scandal, dishonorable to the Christian name. The continued existence of two great sectarian organizations in such relations to each other, both acknowledging the same doctrinal standards, both having the same form of government, both using ostentatiously and persistently the same title—has been a continual scandal. We are willing to believe that the movement, with the enthusiasm on both sides urging it forward, indicates the prevalence of the evangelical spirit, and of Christian thought and feeling, against traditional antipathy. Our hearty desire is that the movement may proceed till the restored "Presbyterian Church in the United States" shall have drawn all the minor Presbyterian sects into union with itself—the attraction of gravitation toward the greater body overcoming the projectile force of organized schism. But we must be allowed to say, that, after that consummation, if history is philosophy teaching by examples, the union so auspiciously undertaken, and now so devoutly expected, will be, at the longest, not much more permanent than the separation has been.

This is not an agreeable vaticination, and if our utterance of it were likely to hinder a single presbytery from ratifying the treaty of reunion, we would even be silent. But we are studying an instructive chapter of ecclesiastical history, and we cannot do justice to the subject without a little more attention to some details of the plan on which the reunion is to be brought about. A little criticism of the plan, in the light

which history throws upon it, will show why we think that the union, with whatever shouts of *Esto perpetua* it may be inaugurated, will hardly outlast the generation that is making it.

On former pages (pp. 637-639) we have given a sufficient abstract of the plan as first reported by the joint committee in 1867. The plan as now submitted for ratification differs from the first report in only a few particulars—the most important changes being a modification of the first article, and the introduction of what is now called the tenth article, giving up entirely to the Old School party one point which was in dispute before the separation. In the New School Assembly, that tenth article, stipulating “that the presbyteries possess the right to examine ministers applying for admission from other presbyteries,” was naturally regarded with jealousy and aversion; but we do not anticipate trouble from that quarter. When the right of one presbytery to examine a minister, who comes dismissed and commended from another presbytery, shall begin to be used for annoyance and persecution, that will not be the beginning of trouble. The trouble will have begun long before in the existence of parties “hateful and hating one another.” We see the elements of future trouble not in the stipulation of this tenth article, but in the jealousy that demands it, and in the responsive jealousy that is afraid of it. In our way of thinking on such subjects, nothing is more reasonable than that the members of a presbytery should freely and kindly examine any minister who comes to them, with whatever credentials, to have the immediate superintendence of one of their congregations and to be a co-bishop with them in their joint bishopric over all their churches. The relation between him and them must have mutual confidence for its basis; and our experience is that a minister coming into new relations, as a pastor, and as associated with neighboring pastors, is introduced into the confidence of his brethren by a friendly examination, sooner and more effectually than he could be by a bale of written credentials.

It is in the many and careful, yet really worthless, stipulations of the first article, more than in all the rest, that we see a cloud much bigger than a man's hand, rising as it were out

of the sea, and portending a tempest. The first edition of it was comparatively unobjectionable (p. 637); for it only implied that charges of Antinomianism and Fatalism on one side, and of Arminianism and Pelagianism on the other, had formerly been bandied between the parties, and that the two bodies now recognize each other as honestly and fairly accepting the Confession of Faith. The new edition, by trying to mean more, encumbers itself with clauses which are needless, if the parties have confidence in each other, but which, if that mutual confidence fails, will soon prove to be worthless. It now stands thus:

"The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted 'as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;' it being understood that this Confession is received in its proper, historical—that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed—sense. It is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be allowed in the United Church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate Churches; and the Government and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, shall be approved as containing the principles and rule of our polity."

We assume that when the treaty of reunion shall have been duly ratified, this article will be a constitutional rule, binding all judicatories in the reunited church—just as the "Fourteenth Amendment," having been ratified by the requisite number of States, has become a permanent addition to the Constitution of the United States. Let us ask then what it means more than the well known Constitution of the Presbyterian Church has always meant. What will be its worth and force in a new conflict of theological systems?

1. A question has arisen in our thoughts, whether the clause (copied from the Philadelphia basis of union) which recognizes the Scriptures as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," does not, in fact, derogate somewhat from the formerly exclusive authority of the Confession, whether it does not imply that the Confession, not being an infallible rule of faith or practice, may contain some errors which were not corrected by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in 1788, and that

therefore an appeal may be taken, at any time and on any particular point of doctrine, from the fallible authority of the Confession to the higher and infallible authority of the Scriptures. This would indeed be a new element in the Presbyterian Constitution. But we cannot think that any such thing was intended by the joint committee or by either Assembly. The Old School party would not permit the change. The New School leaders, if they dared to desire it, would not dare to ask for it.

2. Was it ever pretended that the Confession of Faith has more than one sense? The Bible has been represented by Rabbinical and mystical interpreters as having everywhere a double sense, and sometimes as having beneath its obvious meaning a multiplicity of senses, each deeper than another; but we never heard of anybody trying to find a double sense in the Westminster Confession. Surely "the proper historical sense" of that document is the only sense that anybody ever dreamed of finding in it. How much, then, is the explanation worth when the man who "sincerely receives and adopts the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Scriptures," proceeds to say that he receives it "in its proper historical sense?" And when the farther explanation is added that in his sincere belief the "proper historical sense" is also "the Reformed or Calvinistic sense," how much more does anybody know about the man's orthodoxy? Was any man ever known to deny or doubt that the theological system in the Westminster Confession is the Reformed or Calvinistic system? Have not the New School Presbyterians always professed—both before and since the excision—to be Calvinists? Can any divine of that party be named—living or dead—who has not always regarded himself as holding all that is essential to Calvinism? Dr. Lyman Beecher was prosecuted for the sin of hypocrisy and falsehood in pretending to receive and adopt the Confession of Faith. Would his prosecutors have been silenced and satisfied, if he had declared, with all possible solemnity, that he received it "in its proper historical—that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed—sense?" We doubt not that when Prof. Henry B. Smith moved and carried the introduction of that clause into the Pampresbyterian basis of

union, he really thought he was doing something that ought to satisfy somebody, and perhaps everybody. But when we find the same clause gravely inserted into the terms of Old School and New School reunion—whether as a new defense of orthodoxy or as a security for liberty and peace—we must be allowed to ask, What is it worth? What is there that can possibly be expected to come of it?

3. Is there any solid value in the added stipulation, "that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, *which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system*, are to be allowed in the United Church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate Churches?" Who is to be the authoritative interpreter of this compact? Where is the court of last resort? If it be alleged that Prof. Smith's "method of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession," is not one of those methods "which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system," how is the question to be decided? The fact that his theology, inasmuch as he has never been judicially censured for teaching it, "has hitherto been allowed" in the New School Church, is by no means conclusive, even if it be admitted as true; for the question to be decided will be whether his theology impairs the integrity of Calvinism. Neither of the two parties to this treaty is to survive the ratification of it. Neither of them will have any rights under it, or any concern in the execution of it. There will be no New School Assembly to protest that Prof. Smith's theology is guarded by the terms of reunion, or in any way to stand between him and the more formidable General Assembly, which the treaty once ratified will have called into being. If that "supreme judicatory" shall decide that his theology "impairs the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system," what appeal will there be for him and his friends, or what redress?

4. We ask, then, whether it is expected that this treaty, if ratified, will extinguish the old Scotch breed of heresy-hunters. Dr. George Junkin, the prosecutor of Mr. Barnes—the same who in the Philadelphia Convention would have made a powerful argument against organic reunion, had he not been

choked off by the "five minutes' rule,"—a truly good man, we believe, notwithstanding his ecclesiastical litigiousness—has gone from the church militant. Dr. Joshua L. Wilson, the prosecutor of Dr. Lyman Beecher, rested from his labors long ago. The men who prosecuted Dr. Duffield—we have forgotten them. But are there no more of the same sort? The debates on this very question of reunion, in the late General Assembly at Albany, are extremely suggestive of what may happen when the reunion shall have been consummated. Take this passage as a significant specimen. We quote from a summary in the American Presbyterian of June 18.

"Dr. Montfort [a member of the joint committee, and a leading advocate of reunion, replying to a statement by Dr. Backus, of Baltimore] said, 'A member of the committee said to him that he was unwilling to accept any basis which tolerated the views of Mr. Barnes, whom he declared a representative man in the New School body, and whose views he declared as extensively prevalent as those of any other man in that connection. He (Dr. Montfort) replied that he thought Mr. Barnes held the governmental theory of the atonement; that he could not consent to open the doors for its propagation; and that if the basis was to be thus interpreted he could go no further in this matter of reunion. *To this it was replied by our New School brethren, that Mr. Barnes was not a representative man among them. They gave evidence that his views did not prevail to any considerable extent among them.*'"

Will not the way be open, then, for some successor of Dr. Junkin to renew the prosecution of Mr. Barnes, if the life of that beloved and honored servant of Christ shall be extended into the millennial era of reunion? Who can tell us that Dr. Junkin will have no successor? It seems that even in the joint committee there was an explicit understanding that "the governmental theory of the atonement," as held by Mr. Barnes, may be counted among those "methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession," which "impair the integrity" of Calvinism. Surely the creed of heresy-hunters is not likely to become extinct among men, to whose thought "the Reformed or Calvinistic system" is so narrow and so fragile.

5. We have shown that while we regard the expected reunion as certain, and rejoice in the certainty, we do not regard the stipulations and formal agreement in the first article of the terms of reunion as being of any value. What then is really the ground on which these two organizations are to be merged

in one? To us the reunion seems to be taking place simply on this ground; the majority of each organization has confidence in the majority of the other. We believe that the mutual confidence is not unreasonable. The theological rancor that raged in so many of the Old School clergy thirty years ago, and in so many of the laity under their influence, is much abated. Among the younger men, and especially among those who are most efficient in the proper work of the ministry, many, we believe, have unconsciously gained more freedom in their way of thinking and of preaching, than was characteristic of that party in the time of the excision. The sides and angles of the old triangle are less conspicuous. We believe that the great Christian doctrine of an *atonement*, not for the elect only, but for the whole world—a doctrine which *is* the gospel, though it happens not to be named in the Confession of Faith—the doctrine which some men would stigmatize by calling it “the governmental theory”—is gradually displacing, in Old School pulpits, the narrow and hampering doctrine of a literal redemption by bargain and sale, or of an exact satisfaction for the sins of the elect, with no full and free salvation provided for all. We believe that perhaps the majority of preachers in those pulpits to-day regard the gospel as a veritable power, which, by the grace of the awakening and quickening Spirit, may become in any human soul the power of God to salvation. It might be rash to say that there is now as much of the New School gospel in the Old School branch, as there was in the undivided Presbyterian Church, when Barnes and Beecher were tried for heresy; but we are confident that not only the professors in the New School Seminary at New York (one of whom is a member of an Old School presbytery), but the professors at Auburn and at Walnut Hills, might preach to Old School congregations by the year, and not be suspected of heresy. At the same time, there have been some corresponding changes in the way of thinking and preaching on the other side of the line. Not a few Old School ministers, we believe, have passed over to “the other branch,” not because of any change in their theology, but only for convenience. Probably some New School ministers have affected the obsolescent phraseology which is regarded in some quarters as

the only orthodoxy. Generally, if we mistake not, the preaching is less controversial—less argumentative against “limited atonement” and “natural inability”—than in the former time. Thus it is that the reunion is taking place on the ground of a mutual confidence already established between the majority of one party and the majority of the other.

Why then will not the union be permanent? Why may not the Presbyterian Church, thus reconstructed, absorb into itself all the sects, and become “the church of the future,” so long expected? There is no need of showing why. It is enough that the history of Presbyterianism, in Scotland, in Ireland, and in America (to say nothing of Australia), is a history of controversies and litigations ending in organic schisms. Let others explain how this has happened in each successive instance, and demonstrate to their own satisfaction that it ought not to have happened. The uniformity of the phenomenon is enough for us. What has been, will be. It is true that, in one sense, “history never repeats itself;” but it is equally true that, in another sense, history is always repeating itself. When a certain machine has exploded ten times, and has been ten times reconstructed on precisely the same model, there is good reason to believe that it will explode the eleventh time. We say nothing to disparage the usefulness of the Presbyterian machine. All honor to the contrivers of it for the good which it has done! But as we see our good brethren of the Old School and New School branches toiling with much din of hammers and rivets to reconstruct, without any additional safety valve, the huge machine which exploded in 1837, we cannot share their confidence that there will never be another explosion.

ARTICLE II.—LIFE IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN
THE DAYS OF THE TYRANTS.

*Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants ;
or, Civilization and Barbarism.* From the Spanish of
DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO, LL. D., Minister Plenipotentiary
from the Argentine Republic to the United States, with a
Biographical Sketch of the Author, by Mrs. HORACE MANN.
[First American from the third Spanish edition.] New
York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. Cambridge:
Riverside Press. 1868. Crown 8vo., pp. xxxvi. 400.
Portrait.

If wise men's coins are fool's counters, so it is often possible to put the stamp of wisdom on some base popular phrase, and make it answer a good purpose as an instrument of association. Thus the cry, "America for Americans," may be recognized as a sound political dogma the moment we interpret it by a definition of Americans, which includes all who have faith in America; and the old watchword, "Manifest Destiny," cast aside when signifying a greedy materialism, may be taken up anew and made fairly to represent the growing ascendancy of American ideas of civil liberty. Whether it be the destiny of the United States, like the famous magnet, to draw the bolts from all the ships of state floating in American waters, there can be no question that the existence of a republic with a political life formulated in a written constitution, is modifying the character of other nationalities as a mere Utopia never could do, and that all forms of government, however remote from the republican, are subjected to the influence which it is the manifest destiny of a working idea to exert.

But it is our purpose here only to illustrate the general truth by a single example, and to show something of the kind of life led by an unimportant state of South America in its attempt to realize within its territory the ideas of republican

government set in motion by the success of the United States; nor can it be without advantage to us to see ourselves reflected in this mirror, and to get some oblique light cast upon our American civil liberty from the image set up on those South American plains.

It is not claimed, indeed, that the Argentine Republic owes its existence and form solely to the example set by the United States, for the connection between the Spanish colonies and Spain, France, and England, has always permitted the admission of European ideas, even the ideas of extremists among European republicans, yet it is evident that the impetus given to all the unsteady South American Republics was mainly communicated almost directly from the powerful presence of a great existing republic on the same side of the Atlantic, in some cases actual contact making it impossible to resist the influence. The constitution of the United States has been the copy-book example which, with frequent smears of the page, they have endeavored to imitate, their hands cramped from unfamiliarity with the task.

But the written constitution of the United States is not the power which creates and sustains the life of our republic, and the most exact imitation of the letter of that instrument would only seem to render more certain the political death of any country which had not that current of republican life in its veins, which could assimilate this political nutriment. The conditions of life in the Argentine Republic, when the Spanish viceroy was deposed in 1809, were by no means the same as those presented in the thirteen colonies of America at the Declaration of Independence; nor is the political character of the country, after nearly sixty years of real and fictitious republicanism, so fixed but that casual observers might question the force of republican institutions, as here exhibited. Nevertheless, we think it will appear in the issue that ideas have not lost their power even here, and that this republic, struggling after a realization to itself of ideas which had been wrought out under other conditions, was attaining a stronger life, and has to-day achieved a higher rank among states than would have been possible under any colonial pupilage which would have spared it autonomic labor; and an examination of the

problems which are now vexing the young republic will show a singular likeness to the important questions arising within our own nation.

If the Argentine Republic is ever to be a great nation, it will possess a commensurate physical greatness. High mountains bound it on the west, a vast river system separates it from Brazil on the east, and its entire extent is a vast plain.

"Immensity is the universal characteristic of the country: the plains, the woods, the rivers, are all immense; and the horizon is always undefined, always lost in haze and delicate vapors which forbid the eye to mark the point in the distant perspective, where the land ends and the sky begins. On the south and on the north are savages ever on the watch, who take advantage of the moonlight nights to fall like packs of hyenas upon the herds in their pastures, and upon the defenseless settlements. When the solitary caravan of wagons, as it sluggishly traverses the pampas, halts for a short period of rest, the men in charge of it, grouped around their scanty fire, turn their eyes mechanically towards the south upon the faintest whisper of the wind among the dry grass, and gaze into the deep darkness of the night, in search of the sinister visages of the savage horde, which, at any moment, approaching unperceived, may surprise them. If no sound reaches their ears, if their sight fails to pierce the gloomy veil which covers the silent wilderness, they direct their eyes, before entirely dismissing their apprehensions, to the ears of any horse standing within the firelight, to see if they are pricked up or turned carelessly backwards. Then they resume their interrupted conversation, or put into their mouths the half-scorched pieces of dried beef on which they subsist. When not fearful of the approach of the savage, the plainsman has equal cause to dread the keen eyes of the tiger or the viper beneath his feet."

One general character of flat, unbroken country predominates; the mountain groups in the centre, and some projecting spurs of the Andes toward the north, scarcely interrupting the monotony. Sometimes, as in the north, immense forests spread for days and days of travel; sometimes the plain is covered only with stunted bushes, changing into belts of trees by the river courses, and again a smooth velvet-like surface stretches, as if illimitable, toward the south. The country may be traversed by heavy wagons, with scarcely an obstacle for hundreds of leagues, and this ease of conveyance is duplicated by the broad system of navigable rivers which come together in the east from all parts of the horizon, to form the Plata, flowing into the sea past the cities of Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. It is this river system that seems to hold the latent greatness of the country. Broad streams, flowing

through richest plains, that have borne along floating trunks of trees and idle boughs, must surely one day bear great navies. Cities are washed by their waters, and yet the inhabitants turn away from the great avenues, and, mounting their horses, ride slowly over the broad, trackless plains. Neither the Spaniard who found the country, nor the natives who roamed over the plains had any sailor instincts. The plains were the country, the rivers only obstructions, to be crossed when necessary, by plunging in and riding the swimming horse from island to island, until the other side was reached.

The country here, as elsewhere, determines the man. He has had no great obstacles to contend against, and thereby to gain mastery over himself also; nature has lavished her abundance on him, and so long as no other force than nature enters into his daily life, so long will he continue to be the idle slave of his own servant. Hence it is that there is no real community of life. Men roam over the plains as unhampered by social and legal restraints, as their cattle are unchecked by fences and enclosures. They lead a nomad life, more nearly approaching that of the Arabs than any other of the American Indian races; and the characteristics of Arab society are here reproduced, for here as there the simplest relation obtains—that of a chief and followers. Nor are the moral characteristics, so far as they are determined by natural conditions, very different from those observable among Arab or Tartar tribes. Col. Sarmiento describes a scene which he once witnessed, “worthy,” as he says, “of the primitive ages of the world which preceded the institution of the priesthood.”

“In 1888 I happened to be in the Sierra de San Luis, at the house of a proprietor whose two favorite occupations were saying prayers and gambling. He had built a chapel where he used to pray through the rosary on Sunday afternoons, to supply the want of a priest, and of the public divine service of which the place had been destitute for many years. It was a Homeric picture: the sun declining to the west; the sheep returning to the fold, and rending the air with their confused bleatings; the service conducted by the master of the house, a man of sixty, with a noble countenance, in which the pure European race was evident in the white skin, blue eyes, and wide and open forehead; while the responses were made by a dozen women and some young men, whose imperfectly broken horses were fastened near the door of the chapel. After finishing the rosary, he fervently offered up his own petitions. I never heard a voice fuller of pious feeling, nor a prayer of purer warmth, of firmer faith, of greater beauty,

or better adapted to the circumstances, than that which he uttered. In this prayer he besought God to grant rain for the fields, fruitfulness for the herds and flocks, peace for the republic, and safety for all wayfarers. I readily shed tears, and wept even with sobs, for the religious sentiments had been awakened in my soul to intensity, and like an unknown sensation, for I never witnessed a more religious scene. I seemed to be living in the days of Abraham, in his presence, in that of God, and of the nature which reveals Him. The voice of that sincere and pure-minded man made all my nerves vibrate, and penetrated to my inmost soul."—Pp. 18, 19.

The education of the *gaucho*, as the Argentine plainsman with Spanish language is called, is what grows from the tussle of man and brute. Isolated almost from his fellows, he spends his time among bulls and the beasts of the pampas. He acquires an eye quick to see, a hand quick to move, and an ear able to detect the faintest rustle of his enemy in the bush. There have arisen, indeed, out of this peculiar life, certain distinct occupations, marked by extraordinary powers of sense, as if man, using nature as the tiger and the fox use it, had been rewarded, by the keen sight and hearing and quick intelligence of roving animals. Of these occupations, one of the most conspicuous is that of the Rastreador or track finder.

"All the gauchos of the interior are Rastreadores. In such extensive plains, where paths and lines of travel cross each other in all directions, and where the pastures in which the herds feed are unfenced, it is necessary often to follow the tracks of an animal, and to distinguish them among a thousand others, and to know whether it was going at an easy or a rapid pace, at liberty or led, laden or carrying no weight.

"This is a generally understood branch of household knowledge. I once happened to turn out of a by-way into the Buenos Ayres road, and my guide, following the usual practice, cast a look at the ground. 'There was a very nice little Moorish mule in that train,' said he, directly. 'D. N. Zapata's it was—she is good for the saddle, and it is very plain she was saddled this time; they went by yesterday.' The man was traveling from the Sierra de San Luis, while the train had passed on its way from Buenos Ayres, and it was a year since he had seen the Moorish mule, whose track was mixed up with those of a whole train in a path two feet wide. And this seemingly incredible tale only illustrates the common degree of skill;—the guide was a mere herdsman, and no professional Rastreador.

"The Rastreador proper is a grave, circumspect personage, whose declarations are considered conclusive evidence in the inferior courts. Consciousness of the knowledge he possesses gives him a certain reserved and mysterious dignity. Every one treats him with respect; the poor man because he fears to offend one who might injure him by a slander or an accusation; and the proprietor because of the possible value of his testimony. A theft has been committed during the

night ; no one knows anything of it ; the victims of it hasten to look for one of the robber's footprints, and on finding it, they cover it with something to keep the wind from disturbing it. They then send for the Rastreador, who detects the track and follows it, only occasionally looking at the ground as if his eyes saw in full relief the footsteps invisible to others. He follows the course of the streets, crosses gardens, enters a house, and pointing to a man whom he finds there, says, coldly, 'That is he !' The crime is proved, and the criminal seldom denies the charge. In his estimation, even more than in that of the judge, the Rastreador's deposition is a positive demonstration ; it would be ridiculous and absurd to dispute it."—Pp. 32, 33.

But, perhaps, an even more noticeable character is the Baqueano, or Path-finder. He is a topographer whose maps are in his head, who has surveyed the country with an eye as unerring in its estimate of distance and direction, as if it were a human instrument ! He knows the country as thoroughly as a pilot knows the harbor where he plies his vocation, and in time of war his wonderfully accurate knowledge makes him indispensable to the general, who with his aid may dispense with maps.

"Conceive the situation of a commander condemned to be attended by a traitor, from whom he has to obtain the information without which he cannot succeed. A Baqueano finds a little path crossing the road which he is following ; he knows to what distant watering-place it leads. If he finds a thousand such paths, some of them even a hundred leagues apart, he is acquainted with each, and knows whence it comes and whither it goes. He knows the hidden fords of a hundred rivers and streams, above or below the ordinary places of crossing. He can point out a convenient path through a hundred distinct and extensive swamps.

"In the deepest darkness of the night, surrounded by boundless plains or by forests, while his companions are astray and at a loss, he rides round them inspecting the trees ; if there are none, he dismounts and stoops to examine the shrubs, and satisfies himself of his points of compass. He then mounts and reassures his party by saying, 'We are in a straight line from such a place, so many leagues from the houses ; we must travel southwards.' And he sets out in the direction he has indicated, without uneasiness, without hurrying to confirm his judgment by arriving at the town, and without answering the objections suggested to the others by fear or bewilderment.

"If even this is insufficient, or if he finds himself upon the pampa in impenetrable darkness, he pulls up herbs from different places, smells their roots and the earth about them, chews their foliage, and by often repeating this proceeding, assures himself of the neighborhood of some lake or stream, either of salt or of fresh water, of which he avails himself upon finding it, to set himself exactly right. It is said that General Rosas knows the pasturage of every estate in the south of Buenos Ayres by its taste.

"If the Baqueano belongs to the pampa, where no roads exist, and a traveler asks him to show the way straight to a place fifty leagues off, he pauses a mo-

ment, reconnoitres the horizon, examines the ground, fixes his eyes upon some point, and gallops off straight as an arrow, until he changes his course for reasons known only to himself, and keeps up his gallop day and night till he arrives at the place named."—pp. 36, 37.

Another type of character, rather occasional than professional, is the Gaucho Outlaw, who yet appears so frequently, that he may be said to belong to a class. He is one who has passed out of even the small power of law which has a hold upon other ganchos, with his hand against every man, especially against the white man. The lawful ganchos regarding him rather with dread and fear than hatred, and sharing in his hostility to the whites, harbor him when he comes amongst them. If he happens to fall in with soldiers, he exhibits no fear, but making himself one with his horse, sets upon them, slashes right and left, and lying stretched on his horse's back to avoid the bullets sent after him, rides off into the wilderness.

"This white-skinned savage at war with society and proscribed by the laws, is no more depraved at heart than the inhabitants of the settlements. The reckless outlaw who attacks a whole troop, does no harm to the traveler. The gaucho outlaw is no bandit, or highwayman; murderous assaults do not suit his temper, as robbery would not suit the character of the *churriador* (sheep-stealer). To be sure, he steals; but this is his profession, his trade, his science. He steals horses. He arrives, for instance, at the camp of a train from the interior; its master offers to buy of him a horse of some unusual color, of a particular shape and quality, with a white star on his shoulder. The gaucho collects his thoughts, considers a moment, and replies after a short silence: 'There is no such horse alive.' What thoughts have been passing through the gaucho's mind? In that moment his memory has traversed a thousand estates upon the pampa; has seen and examined every horse in the province, with its marks, color, and special traits, and he has convinced himself that not one of them has a star on its shoulder; some have one on their foreheads, others have white spots on their haunches. Is this power of memory amazing? No! Napoleon knew two hundred thousand soldiers by name, and remembered, when he saw any one of them all the facts relating to him. Therefore, if nothing impossible is required of him, the gaucho will deliver upon a designated day and spot, just such a horse as has been asked for, and with no less punctuality if he has been paid in advance. His honor is as sensitive upon this point as that of a gambler about his debts."—pp. 40, 41.

Something has been hinted in these descriptions of the strong poetic side of Argentine character. The Indian of romance almost seems to appear actually on the scene when we look at the gaucho. The story teller and the minstrel are there, recognized as distinct members of this drifting society, and the

improvisations of the minstrel are drawn not only from the wild, perilous feats of the mounted herdsman and gaucho outlaw, but the terrible revelations of nature enter into the poetry and give it an originality and a truthfulness which attest the absence of European models. With something of the fervid imagination which he ascribes to the gaucho poets, and so perhaps investing them and his countrymen generally with a faculty partially his own gift, Sarmiento asks:—

“What impressions must be made upon the inhabitant of the Argentine Republic by the simple act of fixing his eyes upon the horizon, and seeing nothing?—for the deeper his gaze sinks into that shifting, hazy, undefined horizon, the further it withdraws from him, the more it fascinates and confuses him, and plunges him in contemplation and doubt. What is the end of that world to which he vainly seeks to penetrate, he knows not. What is there beyond what he sees! The wilderness, danger, the savage, death! Here is poetry already; he who moves among such scenes is assailed by fantastic doubts and fears, by dreams which possess his waking hours.

“Hence it follows that the disposition and nature of the Argentine people are poetic. How can such feelings fail to exist, when a black storm-cloud rises, no one knows whence, in the midst of a calm, pleasant afternoon, and spreads over the sky before a word can be uttered? The traveler shudders as the crashing thunder announces the tempest, and holds his breath in the fear of bringing upon himself one of the thousand bolts which flash around him. The light is followed by thick darkness; death is on every side; a fearful and irresistible power has instantaneously driven the soul back upon itself, and made it feel its nothingness in the midst of angry nature; made it feel God himself in the terrible magnificence of his works. What more coloring could the brush of fancy need! Masses of darkness which obscure the sun; masses of tremulous livid light which shine through the darkness for an instant and bring to view far distant portions of the pampa, across which suddenly dart vivid lightnings, symbols of irresistible power. These images must remain deeply engraved on the soul. When the storm passes by it leaves the gaucho sad, thoughtful, and serious, and the alternation of light and darkness continues in his imagination, as the disk of the sun long remains upon the retina after we have been looking at it fixedly.”—Pp. 27, 28.

We have given these extracts freely, because we desire to set before the reader, as clearly as our limits will allow, one element in the conflict which has been going on in the Argentine Republic; the more entire presentation of the gaucho's character in the work before us enables us to see with greater distinctness the material which has rendered the conflict so deadly, and is capable of rendering the amalgamation so fine in its results. For widely as the gaucho is removed from the civilization which he hates, there is within him a capacity for magnificent development. He may not pass into the frock-

coated citizen born and bred with European civilization, but, under the educative influence of true government, we think he is likely to prove almost a new contribution to the human race. The conflict between civilization and barbarism which has been going on in the Argentine Republic, has not been solely a conflict between men representing one and the other system; it has been a conflict of systems, and it is possible that *gauchoism*, so to speak, may be so refined out of the gaucho population that the residuum of character shall present a splendid basis for a truly admirable nation.

It is time to glance at the representative of civilization, opposed by this barbarism. To speak briefly, and indeed accurately, barbarism finds its home on the plains, civilization in the cities. Of these the most prominent is Buenos Ayres; the most singular in its interest, Cordova. The former, like most of the cities in South America, is regular in outline and conventional in character; its position and its relation to European commerce have given it a cosmopolitan character; here, for the same reason, revolutionary impulses were quickest set in motion; with its ear turned to Europe it heard the latest theories of government and caught the first breath of popular tumult. Here began the movement against Spain, and here was the final triumph of the gaucho when he had got supremacy over the interior cities. Cordova, on the contrary, the city of priests, represents the conservative element of Argentine civilization, conservative of traditional dogmas rather than of fundamental principles. Señor Sarmiento, led away perhaps by his eagerness for strong contrasts, has drawn a striking picture of the exterior and interior of this strange city.

"Cordova, though somewhat in the grave old Spanish style, is the most charming city in South America in its first aspect. It is situated in a hollow formed in an elevated region called the Altos. So closely are its symmetrical buildings crowded together for want of space, that it may be said to be folded back upon itself. The sky is remarkably clear, the winter season dry and bracing, the summers hot and stormy. Towards the east it has a promenade of singular beauty, the capricious outlines of which strike the eye with magical effect. It consists of a square pond surrounded by a very broad walk, shaded by ancient willow trees of colossal size. Each side is of the length of a *cuadra*,*

* Eighty-five yards in Montevideo, one hundred and twenty-seven in Buenos Ayres.

sure is of wrought iron grating, with enormous doors in the centre of each of the four sides, so that the promenade is an enchanted prison, within which its inmates circulate around a beautiful temple of Greek architecture. In the chief square stands the magnificent cathedral, of Gothic construction, with its immense dome carved in arabesques, the only model of mediæval architecture, so far as I know, existing in South America. Another square is occupied by the church and convent of the Society of Jesus, in the presbytery of which is a trap-door communicating with excavations which extend to some distance below the city, which are at present but imperfectly explored; dungeons have also been discovered where the Society buried its criminals alive. If any one wishes to become acquainted with monuments of the Middle Ages, and to examine into the power and the constitution of that celebrated religious order above referred to, Cordova is the place where one of its greatest central establishments was situated.

"The inhabitant of Cordova does not look beyond his horizon; that horizon is four blocks distant from his own. When he takes his afternoon stroll, instead of going and returning through a spacious avenue of poplars as long as the Paseo of Santiago, which expands and animates the mind, he follows an artificial lake of motionless and lifeless water, in the centre of which stands a structure of magnificent proportions, immovable and stationary. The city is a cloister surrounded by ravines; the promenade is a cloister with iron grates; every square of houses has a cloister of nuns or friars; the colleges are cloisters; the jurisprudence taught there, the theology, all the mediæval scholastic learning of the place, is a mental cloister within which the intellect is walled up and fortified against every departure from text and commentary. Cordova knows not that aught besides Cordova exists on earth; it has, indeed, heard that there is such a place as Buenos Ayres, but if it believes this, which it does not always, it asks: 'Has it a university? but it must be an affair of yesterday. How many convents has it? Has it such a promenade as this? If not, it amounts to nothing.'"—pp. 114-117.

The other cities, capitals of provinces, are islands in the great waste of the plains. Grass grows up to the very streets of the town. They do not, we speak now of the earlier days more than of the present, send forth humanizing influences into the plains, but the gaucho life hems them in on every side, and the security possessed by them is due quite as much to the gaucho's scornful tolerance, as to their own cohesive power. These cities are the representatives of that civilization which came over with Spanish colonists, and was supported by Spanish soldiers and the Spanish name. It was modified but little by the new exigencies of life; it had scarcely vitality enough to impress upon the gaucho more than the language of the Spaniard in a corrupt form, and the religion of the Spaniard debased by superstition. When the revolutionary ideas in Buenos Ayres and the other cities brought about a deposition of Spanish government, grown now too weak to maintain its supremacy,

there was no cohesive principle of government arising from the wonted association of the people which could take its place. The provinces, loosely bound together before, under the viceroyalty, fell apart into isolated solitary fragments, with very little self-governing capacity, ready to yield to the strongest. And yet, weak, inefficient as was this civilization, it had something in common with the advanced life of Europe which was not to be found in the gaucho's tent. Education, though cast in a mould antiquated and ill-adapted to modern and new world uses, had yet made them capable of receiving ideas. Religion, though incrustated with puerilities, was yet a power that opened a higher life to them; and their commerce with the old world kept open the channels of thought, and allowed them to share in the general advance of other nationalities. It would have been a calamity indeed if the gaucho, with his superior force and cat-like cunning and ferocity, had wholly subdued the citizen. For such a victory, so far as it was achieved, meant the relapse of the country into its former wild condition. The gaucho could advance in the scale of race only as he was conquered, and this first step in his progress is even now scarcely taken.

It is not our purpose to describe the progress of the conflict which took place between the two forces thus arrayed against each other. Its details in Señor Sarmiento's vivid recital cannot be condensed into a paragraph. It is enough to say that the gaucho barbarism, with its glittering knife, its contempt for death, its wonderful physical development, obtained for a time the supremacy of country over city, a supremacy which could be maintained only by terrorism and by abusing the instinct for obedience to law which belongs to civilized communities. But the gaucho triumphing over the citizen had no further world to conquer, for such a triumph led to nothing beyond; he could only return to his cards and horses, content to extract from the victims of his power the wealth which he hoarded. The minor functions of government he resigned to those who could read and write, and who could manage affairs. Meanwhile the true country existed in the minds and purposes of exiled patriots, of men of ideas who watched their opportunity. Rosas, the embodiment of that spirit which was fast relegating

the Argentine country to its old barbarous condition, had yet to deal with a civilization which was not effete, but vital. The success of Dr. Francia in Paraguay, and of his heirs in government, Lopez, father and son, could not fall to Rosas so effectually, because the civilization which he had under foot was able to spring up again to life and assert its right to live.

It did spring up, and one of its leaders in the movement of 1851-2, which resulted in Rosas' overthrow, was Señor Sarmiento, who, ever since that time, has unquestionably been the foremost man in his country. The reader who follows his career as marked by Mrs. Mann in her biographical sketch, will have his respect deepened, and his confidence in the triumph of liberty in the Republic increased, as he observes the unswerving fidelity of this man to the principles which governed him, principles which led him in the moment of victory to refuse a share in the triumph which he had helped to secure, because of the unfaithfulness of the victorious general, who was evidently aiming to secure for himself, in overthrowing Rosas, merely the succession to Rosas' tyranny. Sarmiento kept aloof from the government, applying himself with more energy to sowing the seeds of that true liberty which he desired for his countrymen.

For from the beginning of the rise of civilization against the oppressive barbarism which had, holding it down, itself grown weak, this statesman becomes in our mind the best representative of the new life of the nation. From boyhood he had been thrown at every turn of events into opposition to the barbarous element; instinctive at first, this opposition had by degrees become the rational, clear-sighted antagonism of a highly organized nature, quick with an impulse for freedom, against a lower, brute, unreasoning, and savage instinct. An intimate acquaintance with the web of politics in his own country, added to years of study and observation in Europe and the United States, had made him the true leader of his nation in its resurrection, and as ideas of civilization have gained the ascendancy, he, chief representative of these ideas, has come forward as the nation's chief magistrate. So at least it seems as we write, for the result of the recent election for the presidency, though slow in its announcement here, seems strongly to point

to Col. Sarmiento as the successful candidate.* Yet even now there comes news of revolutionary movements instigated by his opponents. We hail even the probable election of this statesman as an indication of a forward movement in his country, since the one prominent ground of his nomination has been his efforts in behalf of common schools. The nation which will elevate to its highest office the man whom it delights to call the **SCHOOLMASTER**, has surely learned the great lesson of modern republicanism.

An intelligent American can hardly read the life of this Republic and of its prominent representative, without seeing in it again and again the broken image of his own country, and a new illustration of the vital energy existing in Republicanism. Our fathers laid the foundations of our nation upon an existing society, whose bases were town government and the free schools. We have seen how the absence of one of these elements, in connection with a system closely allied to ignorance, has constituted a barbarism which it was the gigantic task of the purer civilization to exterminate. The conflict in this form is over, to be renewed doubtless in other guise, so long as light and darkness are set against each other; and the problem which engages the minds of the thoughtful to-day in the United States is that involved in the preparation for the highest social freedom of the forces, black and white, set free by the victory of civilization. How fast can we transmute ignorant freedmen and ignorant poor whites into intelligent citizens?—this is a question which is the condition of national growth and true prosperity. Far away, at the southern extremity of the continent, a society accepting the same instrument of government which we have had, has likewise had to pass through a conflict, more open, and lasting for a longer period than our own, but, alike with ours, the conflict of civilization and barbarism. The barbarism there also was ignorant; it had for its central idea the many led as dogs by the few, and as the forces were more equally disposed than with us, so the resultant peace is a peace which looks still into the

* Since these lines were written, advices from South America make the news of Col. Sarmiento's election certain.

gulf of revolution. Yet there also, the old question is the prevailing one—how shall we make the ignorant wise enough to govern themselves, the passionate and instinctive man a rational, orderly citizen? Republicanism as an idea requires inexorably for its substantial existence that its adherents shall be rendered capable by education of apprehending it in its ideality as well as accepting it as a fact, because it happens to shelter them.

It is because Señor Sarmiento has been true to the highest principles of Republicanism, and has by virtue of this fidelity drawn after him a nation groping for light, that we commend this book as one worth the study of Americans. Nor can we well enter upon it without reading it to the end. It is a brilliant work, the production of a man possessed of a high order of imagination, of keen discrimination of character, of partiality for truth, of remarkable literary power. Moreover the patriot is using the *littérateur's* power, and the life of a nation rising, struggling, overcome, renewing its life, triumphant with bated breath, is fused with his glowing words. It has been Señor Sarmiento's constant work to set the life of the United States before his countrymen, that they might see embodied those ideas which they recognized as existing with them *in posse*. For this he has made his words sound in their ears for a generation. We owe him a double debt that he has turned and shown us his country. If there is a manifest destiny in our Republic, it is to extend the idea of civil liberty, regardless whether the area of the United States be extended with it. That idea has found and possessed the Argentine Republic. It remains that the two countries should be drawn closer to one another by this bond, and it is to such labors as those of Col. Sarmiento and of his warm-hearted biographer, that we look for the union.

ARTICLE III.—THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1848.*

THE sensualist school has undergone, in the course of our century, a transformation which it is important to recognize and to examine. After enjoying a prodigious authority for more than sixty years, from the publication of the first essay of Condillac, the *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, to the *Elements of Ideology* of M. Destutt de Tracy, and to the famous work of Cabanis, it is well known that the philosophy of sensation was obliged to undergo, at the commencement of the new century, two redoubtable attacks, at first the rude shock of the theological school, led to the assault by Joseph de Maistre; soon after, the polemic, less passionate, but not less sure in its blows, of the new spiritualist school, which was then beginning to grow up under the vigorous discipline and the authoritative teachings of Royer-Collard. What happened? The sensualist school succumbed, and we have been able to see the enfeebled heirs of Locke and Condillac perish without themselves leaving heirs.

The struggle seemed terminated, when all at once, near the end of the Restoration, sensualism reappeared with extraordinary noise and influence. It was no longer the old Condillac ideology of Garat, of Volney, of Laromiguière; it was a sensualism wholly new, sprung from the loins of our century, adapted to its tendencies, its passions, its customs, all armed with economic theories, its hands full of utopias, social, political, and

* The present Article is the sequel of one on the same subject, which was printed in the last number of the *New Englander*. Referring to that Article, M. Saisset observes: "It was thus that I fought the positive philosophy in 1846. Since then, the school of M. Auguste Comte, which had been up to that time a speculative school, has become a political sect, and even a sort of religious communion. It has consequently been necessary to look at it in this new aspect and to combat it again; this is the object of the following Article, published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in August, 1850."

religious. It did not yet call itself socialism, but it was socialism in the cradle: it invoked the names of Charles Fourier and of Saint-Simon.

Various causes explain the birth and the progress of Saint-Simonianism; and first, that remarkable development of manufacturing and commercial activity which characterized the Restoration. A long peace after gigantic wars, free institutions which gave an impulse to minds long kept down, the progress of the physical sciences fertilizing industry by a thousand marvelous discoveries, the charm of a new science inviting men to discover the sources of wealth in order to increase its abundance and facilitate its distribution—this was a combination of influences which prepared the way for sensualism. Add to this the prodigious upward movement impressed upon the lower classes by the Revolution, the thirst for well-being and advancement of every kind, which must necessarily result from the overthrow of all barriers, from the leveling of all classes, and you will have no difficulty in understanding the rapid fortunes of the schools of Charles Fourier and of Saint-Simon: for we must not mistake; although Saint-Simonianism has assumed all forms because it has had all ambitions, although it has announced itself as a new metaphysics and a new religion, if you look for the reality of things under the clothing of its revealers, through these profanations of sacred things, and behind the formulæ of an equivocal pantheism, that which was hiding in the background, that which constituted the power of the sect, that which was to give it a deplorable popularity and a long influence, was that attractive, that magic word, which is indeed the *dernier mot* of sensualism: rehabilitation of the flesh. This is the new Christianity of Saint-Simon, this is that golden age of which he was the prophet, this is also the paradise, baptized by Fourier with the name of *phalanstery*, and promised, even in this world, to the elect.

The revolution of July burst the dikes which restrained the audacity of the disciples of Saint-Simon. In their inflamed imaginations, in the midst of a people still moved by combat and enraptured by victory, a crowd, idle, agitated, intoxicated with hope and with novelties, this religion of terrestrial happiness, this mysticism at once sensual and democratic, preached by men who were young, eloquent, full of ambition and

of ardor, excited a curiosity which resembled enthusiasm, and the rapid success heating all heads, the innovators no longer set bounds to their desires; they openly aspired to change the beliefs, the customs, the institutions of society, and to lay their hands upon the power. The excess of this ambition ruined everything. The new religion could not hold its ground against the first smiles of irony; its morals seemed suspicious to the public conscience; the government caught the alarm, and to complete the disgrace, discord crept in among the apostles, the *fascies* of the Great College broke, and the future church went down miserably in the most vulgar of shipwrecks.

Saint-Simonianism appeared annihilated; it was only eclipsed. In dissolving, it formed a certain number of sects which continued to live, to act, to circulate through the thousand channels of the periodical press and to diffuse themselves insensibly by serious books, by the theaters, by novels, among all the classes of society, especially among the laboring classes. One of the numerous offshoots of the Saint-Simonian stock was the school of M. Buchez, who claimed to unite ultramontane catholicism with the demagogue spirit, Robespierre with St. Paul, the canons of the councils with the decrees of the Convention. These strange catholics had their tribune in the *Européen*, later in the *Atelier*, and from these two centers of action proceeded a great number of publications, of which the only one which is not completely forgotten, is the *Parliamentary History of the French Revolution*. Still freer from all connection with the religious orthodoxy, three well-known members of the great college, M. Pierre Leroux, M. Jean Reynaud, M. Carnot, associated themselves in a somewhat vague doctrine, that of the continued progress of humanity. The most considerable work of this group of writers was the *New Encyclopædia*. While these two schools disputed for the honor of continuing the work of Saint-Simon, a faithful friend of the master, M. Auguste Comte, founded in his turn a school destined in its plan to displace all the religions and all the philosophies.

By the side of these three great branches of Saint-Simonianism, the school of Charles Fourier, more ancient but lost for a moment in the transient splendor of its rival, revived under the active direction of M. Victor Considérant. To the

Phalanstery succeeded the *Phalanx*, and this was in turn replaced by the *Pacific Democracy*. At the same time there came upon the stage a certain number of writers very diverse, but all united by an incontestible though indirect filiation to the first impulse of socialism; I speak of the author of *Icaria*, M. Cabet, already engrossed in drawing to himself the working classes by the coarse charm of his ludicrous Eldorado: of M. Louis Blanc, whose ill-omened book on the *Organization of Labor* reproduces so visibly the famous Saint-Simonian hierarchy; finally, of another writer, as obscure then as he has since become famous, who, in a strange and original composition, laid down all the thoughts which have supplied his subsequent publications—M. Proudhon. All these schools spread silently, and few statesmen, even the most eminent minds, were really aware of their existence, when all at once, finding an outlet on the 24th of February, they overflowed and displayed to all eyes their prodigious vitality.

To assure one's self of the progress which the socialist sects had already accomplished at the end of the monarchy of July, it is only necessary to glance at the composition of the new powers. There was not a single sect-leader whom the wave of the revolution had not raised to the very highest posts. As member of the provisional government, M. Louis Blanc installs in the Luxembourg a second government which threatens every moment to devour the other. Not to speak of M. Cabet, an influential part of a third government, that of the clubs, we find at the Hôtel de Ville, M. Buchez, who will soon become the president of the constituent assembly: he will have there as colleagues, M. Corbon of the *Atelier*, M. Roux-Lavergne of the *Européen*, all his ancient co-religionists in socialism, M. Pierre Leroux, M. Proudhon, M. Considérant. And who have been charged with the ministry which touches the highest interests of society, public education, worship? Three ancient Saint-Simonian preachers: M. Carnot, M. Jean Reynaud, M. Charton.

The socialist school is now in power. We will not ask it, how it used it or why it lost it. Simply occupied with the speculative march of ideas, we propose this single question: since socialism passed from the rôle of Church triumphant to

that of Church militant, what has it produced, as regards ideas? What has become of its philosophy? In answer to this question we find everywhere dissolution and silence. Where is the school of the *Européen*? It tried to revive; it could not. M. Buchez is silent; his former colleague, M. Roux-Lavergne, has abandoned the flag; changing his form without changing his substance, the ardent apologist of the Terror has become one of the champions of ultramontaniam and of the inquisition. Where is the school of the *Encyclopædia*? Dissolved. Its great work? Interrupted. The spiritualism of M. Jean Reynaud could not agree with the pantheism, more and more marked, of M. Pierre Leroux. Has the phalansterian school been more fortunate? No; the supreme effort which it is making at this moment to rise, is only the convulsion of death.

We will not ask M. Proudhon how his philosophy fares, for he has never had one. M. Proudhon, who is especially versed in economic matters, has tried, it is true, to generalize his views, to approach the great questions of religion and of ontology, but here, as elsewhere, he comes to no conclusion. He has a great passion, the passion for contest. He has in the service of this passion a great talent, the talent of dialectic, not of that fruitful dialectic, of which Socrates and Plato have left us the marvelous models, which discusses in order to convince and which destroys only to reconstruct, but of a dialectic, negative and sterile, which divides everything in order to dissolve everything, and denies for the sake of denying. The ambition of this capricious genius is to be stronger against religion than the strongest atheists, and more powerful against atheism than the most powerful servants of God. He is a conservative in order to combat the revolutionists, and a revolutionist in order to combat the conservatives. No one has struck harder blows against property, less hard, however, than those which he has inflicted upon the adversaries of property; in turn a skeptic and a believer, pious and impious, sensible and chimerical, a mind very formidable certainly but more certainly sterile, a strange being, made of pure light and profound darkness, a monstrous product of an epoch of

subtlety and of dissolution, an obscure, equivocal and intangible thing, of which the true name is chaos.

In this shipwreck of the socialist schools one only makes an effort to keep afloat; it is the positive school. At the present moment the little church of M. Auguste Comte is the only one among the offshoots of Saint-Simonianism which has not been absorbed by politics; the only one which discusses, which writes, which tries to organize itself; the only one in which there is a master who is listened to, and disciples docile and united; the only one, in a word, which attaches its social, moral, and political theories to a philosophy. It is this which gives to this school a real importance—it has had the merit to discover and the frankness to accept the true formula in which the secret thought of all the socialist sects sums itself up. The doctrine of M. Auguste Comte is the philosophy of socialism. Of all its professions the most legitimate is clearness. Its object is to simplify everything, and its great means is elimination; the process is admirable, and will transform this mysterious, diverse, and complicated world, in which, it tells us, so many powerful intellects have, up to this time, wasted themselves in vain, into a world in which everything will be clear, homogeneous, and harmonious.

If we consider the horizon of human science, that which strikes us at first is its immense extent and the prodigious complexity of the objects which it embraces. If we consider only the world of the senses, we see unfolded in the immensity of space the infinite scale of material beings, from the inert and coarse mineral to the masterpieces of the most accomplished organization. By the side of this universe, so vast and so varied, there is another, still more profound, the moral world, where human liberty unfolds its infinite grandeurs and caprices, and which presents to science the triple enigma of the individual, of society, and of the human race. To all the mysteries of these two worlds, join that of their correspondence and their harmony, and you will still have only the contingent, the finite world; but above it, human thought conceives of the infinite, the absolute, the region of the possible, the sphere of the ideal, of which the center is the Being of beings. This is the field which is divided among *savants* and philosophers, an

immense space which only a few rare minds have been able to embrace,—Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz.

Now here is the secret which the positive philosophy has discovered to simplify the problem, to bring it within the reach of every one. It begins by declaring that the ideal, the absolute, does not exist. The human race, it is true, adores God, and the philosophy which accepts this sacred faith consecrates it by the genius of Newton and Malebranche. No matter. M. Comte undertakes to prove that the human race and that genius are wrong. He suppresses God out of love for simplicity; henceforth no more absolute ideas in science, nothing but relative ideas; no more metaphysics, ontology, theodicy; there is no science but that of nature. This is the first simplification.

Nature comprehends two orders of things—physical beings or matter, moral beings or mind. Let us suppress mind—let us keep only matter. No more phenomena of consciousness, no more psychology, no more ideology—nothing but the mathematical and the physical sciences. This is the second simplification.

We are approaching unity, but we have not yet reached it. For the physical world has two elements—the one, grasped by the senses, phenomena; the other, which escapes the senses, space and time, matter in itself, the essences of bodies, the causes of phenomena. Let us again suppress all that; there will remain only visible and palpable phenomena, and laws, which are only these phenomena generalized.

What admirable unity! What homogeneity still unknown in the material sciences, in their method, in their results! The *beau idéal* of simplification is reached. Yes, this is marvelous, and who can complain of having bought at too high a price this incomparable simplicity? What does it cost after all? Only these three things—God, the mind, and liberty.

What are the consequences of this metaphysics? They have been a thousand times deduced. If God and the soul are only words, illusions, one single object is worthy to interest us—our terrestrial destiny. The present life—that is the sole field of our activity, the sole ideal to which that ardor for progress and felicity, which is the basis of our nature, may

aspire. Now, if the laws of humanity are like those of the physical world, moral liberty and responsibility are at an end. The measure of the right of each person is force or necessity. Every individual has, then, the right to all things, provided only he desires them and is capable of getting possession of them. The rehabilitation of the flesh, the transformation of the earth into paradise, the right to labor, the legitimacy of force, the reign of the masses, all the chimeras and all the brutalities of socialism naturally find their place in a doctrine of which the first principle is the negation of God, and the last consequence the idolatry of the human personality.

I repeat, then, the philosophy of the positive school is the philosophy of socialism. That which is half hidden behind the apocalyptic mysticism of M. Pierre Leroux, and the false and declamatory religiosity of M. Louis Blanc, that which tries to disguise itself under the systematically obscure jargon of Fourierism or in the capricious movement of the antinomies of M. Proudhon,—all this becomes clear, precise, consistent in the doctrine of the positive school. Open the last publication of M. Comte. This is its epigraph: "To reorganize without God or King, by the systematic worship of humanity."* As the reward of such frankness, the positive school deserves that we should stop a moment with it, and that after having called to mind its origin, we should examine what it has produced since the revolution of February.

M. Auguste Comte belongs to that generation of contemporary minds who, trained to excess in their youth in mathematical studies, have arrived, by the way of algebra, at the metaphysical and moral sciences. From the commencement of his career as a writer, near the end of the Restoration, we find him, together with M. Olinde Rodrigues, in the company of Saint-Simon. He belonged to that small number of faithful friends who did not abandon the unfortunate dreamer in his days of anguish, and who piously closed his eyes. When the disciples of Saint-Simon thought a little later of transforming their master into a Messiah, M. Auguste Comte did not

* Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme, par Auguste Comte, 1850. 1 vol., 8vo.

associate himself with these errors. A studious man, he was engrossed in the composition of a great work,* in which, following the traces of Bacon and of d'Alembert, he subjected all the human sciences to a profound analysis, compared them in their principles, their objects, their methods, and finally classed them in a new order, destined to impart to them a powerful impulse and a fecundity till then unknown. This enterprise, in spite of the extensive knowledge displayed in it and the promised grandeur of its results, languished in a twilight, but little removed from obscurity, when it found, to animate it with his ardor and enrich it with his talents, a writer justly honored, an able and learned man, the editor and translator of Hippocrates, M. Littré. I do not know whether the positive philosophy is destined to make its fortune in the world, but it is certain that it will owe much to the new adept, who not only employs for its propagation that clearness of style which one always expects of a writer like M. Littré, but besides, a fervor of adhesion and a *naïveté* of enthusiasm which are extremely rare and surprising.

The positive school boasts that it predicted the 24th of February: what is certain is that it welcomed it heartily. Seeing the last monarchy fall, M. Comte was convinced that the greatest result of this revolution would be the final inauguration of the positive régime. He summoned, therefore, his disciples to a new mission. Thus far they had been confined to a region wholly scientific; the moment had come to approach the grand applications. They even went further: they attempted active politics. They addressed themselves to the laboring classes; they resumed the public courses of lectures held on Sunday for working men, with an indefatigable zeal, and, it must be added, with an absolute disinterestedness. They published pamphlets, articles, plans, political, industrial, religious, pedagogic. Here were certainly a great ambition and great efforts. Let us see in what degree the results correspond to such high professions.

I think I do no wrong to the positive school in reducing

* Cours de Philosophie positive, par Auguste Comte. 6 vol., 8vo.

what it would call its practical ideas to four principles: a religious idea, the worship of humanity: a political idea, the dictatorship of the lowest class of the people: an idea of social economy, the right to labor realized by the State: finally a pedagogic idea, education based on the mathematics and equal for all.

Let us begin with the religious idea. It attaches itself to a pretended law of the history of the human race, which M. Auguste Comte considers as his principal discovery, and which he calls the sociological law. To understand this strange language, it is necessary to know that M. Auguste Comte, in the best possible faith, believes himself the inventor of a new science, sociology. The only predecessor, whom he consents to recognize, is Condorcet. Upon this we will make one or two preliminary reflections. And in the first place, the science which it pleases M. Auguste Comte to call sociology has long been known under the name, philosophy of history; neither M. Comte nor Saint-Simon, nor even Condorcet invented it: it goes back to personages who have made some figure in the world, Bossuet, Vico, Lessing, Herder. In general the positive school does not shine by the novelty of its ideas. The sole discovery which incontestably belongs to it, is that of the two following words: *sociology*, *biology*. Add to these the word *positivism*, with which this school has thought it necessary to decorate itself, and you will have the complete account of its inventions.

Let us examine, however, the great sociological law of M. Auguste Comte: it is as follows, in few words:

Man is cast into this vast universe, into the midst of a great variety of phenomena, which solicit his curiosity, excite his wants, and in turn protect and threaten his existence. It is a want of his nature to account for these phenomena, to make an effort to grasp their connection and their unity. The only means of accomplishing this, if we are to believe the positive philosophers, is experience; but experience is long and difficult; it demands centuries, and man lives but a few days. What does he do? In place of addressing himself to experience he gives full play to his imagination. He connects the phenomena of the universe with secret powers which he is

pleased to idealize, to adorn with all perfections. This is the whole secret, and the whole basis of religious institutions.

These institutions belong to the youth of civilization. Now in proportion as a society develops, the more its intelligence expands, the more observed facts accumulate, the more the *exact* sciences become organized, so much the more also do religious symbols tend to fall into discredit. Sooner or later faith passes away and gives place to the reign of philosophy. What is the rôle of this new force? First, to destroy religion, which is in the eyes of M. Comte its principal utility; then, to substitute for the primitive symbols, metaphysical conceptions, abstract beings such as cause, substance, the soul, unity, the absolute. Systems flourish for a time, but as the human mind is radically incapable of penetrating beyond phenomena into the region of essences and causes, systems contradict one another, clash, and end by making themselves contemptible to common sense. Then it is that men, ripened by a double experience, begin to recognize the limits of their faculties and the conditions of a real and fruitful knowledge of the universe. They observe, they calculate, and no longer trust to anything but experience. This is the epoch of the positive sciences.

Such is the supreme law of the human mind, and M. Comte, after having deduced it by analysis, flatters himself that he finds the confirmation of it in history. Thus the existing civilization was formed under the empire of Christian beliefs; this was the middle ages, the theological *régime*: its emancipation was accomplished by the Reformation and by philosophy; this is the modern age, the age of the metaphysical *régime*: it remains to reorganize society which has fallen to ruins; this will be, of course, the work of the positive philosophy.

If this law is true, what consequence must be drawn from it in regard to the present and future existence of religions? Evidently, that their time has gone by: they may have been useful to society in its cradle, but a civilized society has nothing to do with them, they can only impede its development.

This is not all. Up to the present day a distinction has been made between natural religion and positive religion. Diderot said that all forms of worship were heresies against natural

religion. While condemning the variable forms of the religious idea, he kept its principle. M. Auguste Comte sees in Diderot only a feeble mind, who stopped midway. Why are positive religions false? Because they pretend to reveal unfathomable mysteries, the mysteries of the absolute. But if the absolute is inaccessible, natural religion has no better foundation than the creeds: it is without an object; it is a deceptive chimera of the heart, or a proud and barren abstraction of the brain.

The evident conclusion is, that all religion, in its substance as well as in its form, revealed or reasoned out—dogmas, worship, sentiment even, all must perish, and that even its name is to be forgotten. In a word, M. Comte might subscribe to that expressive utterance of a disciple of Hegel, M. Feuerbach: "The religion of the future will be non-religion."*

Do the positive philosophers accept the prophecy of the young Hegelians? We should indeed expect even this rigor of a school which plumes itself upon its daring. In face of absolute atheism M. Comte has shrunk back. This does honor to his character, but we are considering his system.

The positive philosophers appear to have comprehended a great truth which will lead them far, if they will follow it to the end, and that is, that the root of religion is indestructible. Societies are born and perish, sects disappear; man remains what nature made him, a religious animal. It follows that a philosophy which does not explain and cannot satisfy this immortal need of man, is a powerless philosophy, and that a society from which religion is banished is an impossible society.

The positive school feels this necessity, while denouncing it. It has sought to find what would be, if God were suppressed, the object of the respect and adoration of humanity; it has found nothing better than man himself. On this point also, the positive philosophers agree with the disciples of Hegel. M. Feuerbach at Berlin, and M. Auguste Comte at Paris pro-

* See the work entitled, *Qu'est-ce que la religion?* By Hermann Ewerbeck. Paris, 1850.

pose to Christian Europe the worship of a new god, the human race.

This doctrine, absurd and rude as it is, has its root in the profound and subtle system of Hegel. The German philosophy, it is true, proclaims God under the name of absolute, of subject-object, of idea; but this God, considered in himself, is only the abstraction or rather the phantom of existence. He has not a life which is peculiar to himself: he exists only in becoming everything in turn, space, time, crystal, plant, animal, finally man. It is in man that God finishes and accomplishes himself; it is in man that he becomes conscious of himself. And in this way, according to Hegel, if man, like everything else, has his essence in God, God has his consciousness in man.

Here M. Feuerbach stops his master and argues against him with irresistible force: "What!" says he, "will you force us to separate these two inseparable things, the consciousness of a being and its essence? Will you make us say that man has his essence in God and God his consciousness in man? Oh, no. Let us be consistent and sincere, let us say that if man possesses the consciousness of God, he possesses also his essence, he is God."

Admirable, I say in my turn to M. Feuerbach and M. Auguste Comte; but you too stop half way. You are timid atheists; was it worth while to deny natural religion and positive religion in order to invent another still? What is the use of having suppressed the absolute, the ideal, the transcendental, if you propose for our worship, not a real, palpable, positive thing, but an abstract being, the human race, an indefinite being which never realizes itself, an ideal, an absolute?

Would you be consistent? Follow the example of the disciples of Feuerbach, M. Stirner, and M. Charles Grün: propose to each individual to worship himself, to proclaim himself God. The individual, become God, loving only himself, regarding all his passions, all his lusts as legitimate and sacred things—such is the religion of sensualism and demagoguery gone mad.

Let us congratulate M. Auguste Comte; he stopped with the worship of the human race, and this idea appeared to

him so practicable and so sensible, that he immediately busied himself with organizing it. In rivalry with the theophilanthropists and Sylvain Maréchal, he has imagined a new worship. This worship is to have its liturgy of which M. Comte offers us a specimen ; it is a positivist calendar* in which each month is placed under the invocation of a man of the first order, such as Moses, Cæsar, or Shakspeare. Each Sunday has for its patron a man of the second order, Buddha, St. Augustine, Mozart ; finally every day takes the name of a man of the third order, Lao-Tsen, Anacreon, Lucretius, Galen, Héloïse, Rossini. This grotesque pantheon, in which Dr. Gall figures as a divinity of the second order, while Pascal and Voltaire are classed among the divinities of the third order, in company with Miss Edgeworth, Sophie Germain, and Mme. de Motteville—this is the ludicrous assortment of gods and goddesses, which M. Comte proposes to substitute for the God of Bossuet and Newton.

Is it necessary now to insist much on the ideas of the positive school in regard to political organizations, social economy, and pedagogy ? The gentlest thing that we can say of them is that they are on the same level with its religious ideas. Is there any conception in the world more in discredit with all sensible minds, more completely stripped by discussion and experience of every shadow of foundation than the government of the proletariat, in other words, to call things by their true name, the dictatorship of ignorance, unless it be the right to labor, which is practically nothing but the right to salary without labor, or indeed, equal education for all, which ends in universal degradation. Let it suffice for us to show that these foolish doctrines, incompatible with all society, are the inevitable consequence of the sensualist principle adopted by the positive philosophy.

Sensualism destroys in two ways the foundation of all political organization and of all social economy, namely, right. It denies law, by denying every absolute notion and by recogni-

* *Culte systématique de l'Humanité.—Calendrier positiviste, ou Système général de Commémoration publique, par Auguste Comte. Paris, 1850.*

zing only phenomena and relative things. Law stands in the same relation to force as the ideal to the real, the absolute to the relative. If there is no absolute, the fact alone exists; law is only a phantom, like duty, like God.

This is not all; the positive philosophy denies the mind; it will not recognize two distinct universes, or even two essentially different orders of facts, sensible facts and facts of consciousness. It absorbs psychology in phrenology, the soul in the brain, mind in matter. Now if there is only one order of phenomena, physical phenomena, if there is only one order of laws, the fatal laws of matter, liberty is still only a chimera, and without liberty there is no more duty or right. This is clear, or there is nothing clear in the world.

If this is so, any society worthy of man is impossible. From the moment when force is the only rule, when there is nothing sacred above the individual, neither protection for his weakness in law, nor limit to the abuse of his power in duty, two alternatives alone are possible. Either you will allow each individual force to give the rein to its appetites; which is the régime of unlimited liberty, in other words, anarchy; or you will establish by force an inflexible order in which each individual will be enclosed as in a band of iron, which is despotism. A violent order or universal disorder, these are the two extremes between which there is no mean.

Hobbes saw this clearly. A great logician, he understood perfectly that the sensualist principle furnishes no other means of escaping from anarchy but despotism, and he accepted this consequence totally, putting in the hands of the authority, persons, property, conscience, everything, even to the words of language and the axioms of mathematics.

On this point our socialist schools are divided according as they incline to one or the other of the two opposite tendencies; on the one hand, the political and economical organization dreamed of by M. Louis Blanc, that is, absolute despotism; on the other, the negation of all power, the famous *an-archy* of M. Proudhon. In which direction does the positive school lean? It appears to lean temporarily, at least, to the side of Hobbes and of M. Louis Blanc, that is, to the side of despot-

ism. If there is indeed one truth upon which the most eminent publicists have up to this time agreed, it is that the first condition of a free society is in the separation of functions. The positive school, on the contrary, lays down the principle that the law is essentially an act of the executive function.*

It was also generally agreed that government is a difficult thing and demands great intelligence. The positive school does not hesitate to charge with the government the least enlightened class of society. Working men, it says, are much more capable than cultivated minds. And why? Because the enlightened classes have been spoiled for three centuries by *metaphysical education*.

All minds are struck with the serious harm which results from the excess of political centralization; I mean the supremacy of large cities and especially the dictatorship of Paris. What does the positive school do? It says that it belongs exclusively to the great cities to dispose of the executive power. It charges Paris with the government of France and governs Paris itself by *three eminent proletaries*.†

But this, it will be said, is the *beau idéal* of tyranny. Is it not to be feared that such a power may ruin itself by its very force? Does it not need some counterpoise? The positive philosophy has found one, and what is it? The clubs; yes, the clubs. The positive school has a passion for this instrument of government. It prefers it to everything, even the press,—*a thing too abstract*, it says,—even to universal suffrage, for this decisive reason, that “the proletaries hold less to the right to suffrage than to the right to clubs.”‡ It will be said, this plan is not new, it is the régime of 1793, the dictatorship of the committee of public safety resting on the Jacobin club. The positive school replies that the régime of 1793 was, to be sure, very good, but it claims to perfect it. It is anxious for the departments and wishes to do something for them; it charges them with the administration of the finances of the state and

* See M. Auguste Comte, *Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme*; and M. Littré, *Application de la Philosophie positive*. Paris, 1850.

† *Application de la Philosophie positive*. Chap. X.

‡ *Id.*, Page 140. *Rapport à la Société positiviste sur le nouveau gouvernement révolutionnaire*. Page 25, sqq.

finding itself in a liberal vein, it pushes its generosity so far as to acknowledge that *people in easy circumstances* are better adapted than working men to affairs of this kind, so that in this model society the *bourgeoisie* will vote the budget and the proletariat will be charged with spending it.

In listening to such folly we seem to be dreaming; but here is something which crowns the whole: if the positive philosophers are to be believed, that which to-day causes the strife between the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat, is the vice of their education. The former has received the detestable metaphysical education; the latter has been spoiled by an education still worse, the religious education. For this must be substituted a single uniform and universal education, the positive education. What is, then, you will say, this new education? An admirable but a very complicated affair;* it comprehends not less than six great sciences. It begins with the mathematics, that is to say, with the most abstract thing in the world. It is with this mild and pleasant milk that infancy is to be nourished; it is with algebra that its imagination and its heart are to be developed. Then will come astronomy, physics, and chemistry, to prepare these young souls for the wonders of *biology* and to give them by means of *sociology* the finishing touch. This is what is called a complete education. And besides, M. Auguste Comte, fearing to pass for an enemy of letters, adds to his programme Greek, Latin, and the Fine Arts.

M. Auguste Comte's solicitude for the working classes is admirable. He not only gives them the right to labor, by imposing upon the authority the formal order to realize this right, and *always to have at its disposition the funds necessary for this*, but he also pours out upon them all the riches of science. The humblest artisan will be versed in the secrets of biology; there shall be no farm-hand ignorant of the philosophy of history, and if any reader accuses me here of exaggeration, I shall be forced to acknowledge to him that M. Auguste Comte even threatens women with obliging them to learn the six grand positive sciences.

* Id. Chap. V.—The report already cited. Page 16, seq.

At the spectacle of such absurdities is it possible to repel a feeling of sadness? One motive only has induced us to exhibit so gloomy a picture; it is that even the excess of error in sincere minds, in honest hearts, in very learned men, led away by a false principle to the very last degree of extravagance, is sometimes instructive.

ARTICLE IV.—THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.

[The following Article, which was delivered as an Address at the last Anniversary of the Theological Department of Yale College, is a timely and strong attack on that great error, which has been so fruitful of evil to the Church,—the doctrine that the Christian ministry is a priesthood. One of the leading functions of the ministry—that of teaching the truths of the Gospel—is emphatically set forth. In addition to what is usually meant by teaching, there is likewise a pastoral office which belongs to the ministers of Christ. They are not only appointed to teach, but also to *rule*, not in an arbitrary spirit, yet in some appropriate meaning of the term. They are not merely teachers, but likewise “overseers” of the flock. (Acts xx. 28.) Moreover, it is, to say the least, open to doubt whether the extirpation of the false doctrine that the clergy are endowed with priestly prerogatives would produce that catholic unity among Christians which it is desirable to realize.—EDS. OF THE NEW ENGLANDER.]

As we reckon time on the scale of our brief and hasty lives, it is now many years since I went out from these Theologic Halls, and these walks of sacred learning. According to the average of human life which vital statistics establish, more than a generation of the world's human population has since then been born and passed away. Wondrous changes have, in that interval, passed over ourselves and all things around us,—this venerable seat of learning, our country, the world.

Other men, in my student days, were filling these chairs of instruction, venerable indeed in mind, in wisdom, in character, but not yet venerable in age. Taylor was in that theologic chair, and age had not yet taken aught from the glossy brightness of his locks, or wrinkled his brow, or dimmed the fire and lustre of his eye. That mental force, the quickening power of which we daily felt, the world now feels and acknowledges. To his pupils how distinct and how refreshing is his memory,

as of one of the brightest visions of our youth; not merely as a mental and moral force, which waked us to thought, and kindled our souls to generous emotions; but as a personal presence of unequalled attraction, the most perfect specimen of manly beauty we have ever been permitted to behold! Old men must be pardoned for inquiring When shall we behold his like again?

And Goodrich, too, was there, in the prime and mature dignity of his manhood, with his own fervid evangelic eloquence; and Gibbs, too, the most patient and careful of scholars, as he was often called, "the orthodox sceptic;" and one who is still with us, and permitted by the kind providence of God to mingle in the social reunions of this anniversary, not less dear nor less venerated than the departed, but of whom it becomes us to speak with less freedom.

I need not say what changes have come over this venerable university, this city, and our dear country. Nor need I speak of that great and terrible wilderness, which in these years has been transformed into a garden,—of nations born and grown to the maturity of wealth and numbers,—of the "forest primeval," and the prairie grass, with all its profusion of flowers, passed away, and almost reckoned among things forgotten, and in their places mighty cities, with all their wealth and wickedness, and bands of iron spanning a continent, the thoroughfares of swift communication for a commerce the like of which the world had never seen before, and myriads of acres of yellow grain, and the uncounted flocks and herds from which you yourselves are deriving your daily food. From the scene of those mighty transformations which under my own eye have changed the face of nature herself from the wilderness to the garden, and from the landscape which furnishes the outlook of my own humble abode, I come to utter a few words to-night in the ear of fathers that still live, of brethren who are now standing up in the forefront of the mighty conflict, and of sons and younger brothers, who are to-day buckling on the armor, as we were forty years ago.

You will readily believe that the scene of that rude conflict with nature and old chaos herself, not yet, I must mournfully own, quite vanquished, has not been very friendly to tranquil

study and scholarly acquisition. From whence then is such an one as I to derive a theme suited to such an occasion as this? The question is embarrassing, and awakens serious apprehension, lest I should say nothing worthy of the place where I am to speak, and of the audience I am to address. Any attempt to bring up fresh treasures from the deep mines of theologic learning would be quite unsuitable. It would be "carrying coals to Newcastle." I must therefore fall back upon a consideration which has already more than once conducted me through a similar difficulty. When my brethren express a desire to hear my voice in assemblies where so much of learning and wisdom are gathered, I cannot help understanding them to express a desire to know how some one of the great religious and social questions which in this age of ours are interesting all minds, and engrossing all hearts, appears to one whose life-work has thrown him among far other moral scenery than that to which our brethren in New England are accustomed. Astronomy needs, to the completion of her grand results, observations taken in the remotest latitudes and longitudes of our planet. A faithful observer, though conducting his observations in some obscure and remote corner of the world, and under many difficulties, may yet, by care and industry, and fidelity to science, be able to report results which may not be unwelcome to the highest astronomical learning of the age.

The Church of Christ is, in many respects, in a condition quite analogous. She has not indeed to discover that science which is the instrument of her benignant power. That is given her in the divine word. But from that word she has to evolve it, not only by the lights of sacred learning, but through the teaching voices of divine Providence. She has to apply the divine word to all the developments and endlessly varying circumstances and conditions of this our common humanity. Rightly viewed there is no ulterior condition of humanity which may not help us to a clearer and a deeper view of the work of Redemption. The missionary to the heathen, or the obscurest laborer on our western frontier, may enjoy *some* advantages for studying those developments of Christian truth which preëminently belong to this age, not enjoyed in our

most favored seats of learning. He may be able to report *some* aspects and phenomena of the great religious problems of the age, which men laboring in more favored fields have never beheld. This consideration is apt to occur to me as constituting perhaps the greatest part of my fitness to speak on such an occasion as this.

I have therefore chosen for the theme of this occasion, **THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.** I wish especially to view this subject, as it appears amid the practical developments of the nineteenth century, and the solemn experiences which attend a sublime endeavor to found and build the Church of Christ in every portion of a great empire reclaimed from the wilderness in a single generation.

The war of the great rebellion taught the nation much, which, thank God, we can never unlearn, however much we may try. Has our great Home Missionary enterprise taught the Church of Christ anything which she cannot unlearn? If it has not, it must be because "the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." And there is no one subject in relation to which we might more reasonably hope to get wisdom from the prosecution of such a work, than that to which I am proposing to call your attention—the true conception, the nature, the functions of the Christian ministry.

There are essentially two conceptions of the ministry, which have divided Christendom for ages; one of them regards the minister of Christ as a mediator between God and man; the other regards him as a teacher of God's revealed truth. A mediatorial Priesthood—a teaching ministry: each of these must be considered in its turn.

It must be admitted that a vast numerical majority of all who have been connected with the church of history, have regarded the Christian minister as a mediator between God and man. They have believed that the gospel cannot come to the people—the million—in the fullness and completeness of its provisions, without his intervention and assistance; that he is in some sense divinely authorized to lead in the public devotions of the people, and to be their spiritual teacher and guide, by virtue of his ordination; especially that baptism

and the Lord's supper are in such sense *sacraments*, that they can only be exhibited to the people by a duly ordained ministry. And that any Christian man not so especially authorized, who should minister in them, would be guilty of the sin of Uzzah, who was slain because he touched the ark only to steady it,—a service which by divine appointment belonged to the priests alone; in short, that in greater or less degree the Christian ministry is a divinely appointed priesthood.

This conception of the ministry is in general quite rejected and abandoned by Protestants. Especially is it by those who adopt and cherish the Congregational Polity. Their fundamental principles of church polity, and their denominational literature discard a human priesthood and all mediatorial ministrations of men, and concentrate the entire Priesthood of a redeemed world, in the one great High Priest of our Profession.

And yet it has long seemed to me a strange and perplexing phenomenon, that in all Christendom you find comparatively few minds that do not still tenaciously cling at least to some shreds and rags of this same mediatorial and priestly conception of the ministry. It is beginning indeed to be again admitted in this country, as it was in the old Plymouth colony, when that sturdy Puritan layman, Robert Cushman, preached the first sermon that was ever published in these colonies, and as it has ever been maintained by our Congregational brethren in England, that an ordained ministry has no monopoly of the preaching function; that a layman may, without usurpation of sacred functions, stand in the pulpit and expound the word of God, if he expounds it truly. But there are comparatively few congregations, in which there are not many who will be shocked, if he closes the service by uttering the Apostolic benediction. This is regarded as an *absolution*, which an ordained ministry, a Christian priesthood alone, can dispense. When they hear these words fall from the lips of a layman, they experience a shock, as though the crime of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram had again been committed before their eyes, and in the very sanctuary of God. There are few ministers of any denomination known to me who include them-

selves in the number of those on whom the blessing of the Triune God is invoked in this formula. It is on *you* not on *us*. The minister seems to stand between the Lord and the people, to be the organ of God's blessing on them. The change of that little pronoun *you* into *us* would convey volumes of meaning. Some have accepted the propriety of the change.

Still more widely and persistingly, it is believed, are priestly ideas connected with the ministry, in relation to the exhibition of baptism and the Lord's supper. Even in that great inorganic Mississippi valley, where we are supposed to be all too regardless of order and form, churches—Congregational churches—are without baptism and the supper of the Lord, for months and years, because they have no ordained minister to break the bread, and pour out the wine, and invoke the Lord's blessing on the service, and to apply water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. It seems to be forgotten that all the Lord's people are *in Christ*, and by being in him become a "royal priesthood;" and that baptism and the Lord's Supper are not sacraments to be *administered* to ordinary believers by a duly qualified priestly order, but rites to be observed by the whole multitude of the disciples, and that wherever two or three are assembled in the name of the Lord, there the Lord himself is with them; there is the whole Christian Priesthood, all the privileges of the church of Christ; and that in the name of the Lord they are qualified by every divine gift and authority, to open the household of God to the returning prodigal, and receive him in baptism, and to commemorate redeeming love and redeeming blood, in the use of the symbols of the Master's own appointment.

To some it may seem, that the continuance in the midst of us of these rags and remnants of a priestly ministry is not of consequence enough to merit particular notice on such an occasion as this. But this view can hardly be maintained. Such phenomena as those I have referred to prove, that when our fathers of the Reformation came out from Babylon, they did not come out empty, but brought away a good deal of Babylon with them. The assertion cannot be denied, that the Protest-

ant Christian world has never fully and intelligently discarded the notion of a mediating Priesthood in the Church of Christ. Many a conflict between the advocates of such a priesthood and their more Protestant brethren, which has shaken Christendom with its din and its tumult, has been utterly abortive of any good result, because the combatants were all on the same side of the question. Rome or prelacy presented a false issue, and Protestants accepted it, and therefore gained no victory, because they contended for nothing worth contending for.

Wise and good men came out of the Papal Hierarchy in good earnest, but they brought with them this notion of a mediating priesthood, the very central and foundation principle of that old Hierarchy itself; and that principle, tenaciously adhered to by the Reformers themselves, has been the germ from which other-rival and usurping hierarchies have sprung "thick as leaves in Vallombrosa," and have filled Christendom with their rivalries, their ambitions, their usurpations, and their profitless and endless conflicts. Our country, and especially our great central valley, has become one vast receptacle, into which each of these Protestant Babylons is pouring its militant legions, and the vast battle field on which these legions are perpetually facing each other in battle array.

While I use language so strong, with the full assurance that it is not the language of exaggeration but of truth and soberness, let me not be misunderstood. I am not blind to the fact that probably in all the Christian denominations of our country, there are multitudes of true Christian disciples, who live and work and die in the true spirit of the Master. I rejoice too to recognize the fact, that in these last years, and even in these last months, there has been a greatly increased consciousness of their oneness in the Lord, and a growing wish to cherish that consciousness, and to manifest it before God and men in fitting words and works. And many do and will so manifest it, in spite of all the antagonism of rival systems, corporations, and governments. And I am persuaded that this blessed light which is dawning on us is to shine brighter and brighter, even unto the perfect day, and that, in God's own

good time, it is to break out into another reformation, no less blessed than that of the sixteenth century.

But it is no less true, just as I have stated it, that these hierarchies, ecclesiastical systems, do stand facing each other in battle array year after year; that, if they ever sleep, it is on their arms; and that their antagonisms do constantly oppose insurmountable obstacles to this desired and longed for manifestation of oneness of the Christian brotherhood, and hopelessly obstruct the most needful and natural coöperation of good men and true, in every work of faith and labor of love; and that they will more and more fill our country and fill Christendom with the din of their conflicts, till we abandon the false ideas out of which they one and all do spring.

If we would emancipate ourselves for ever, and entirely from this false conception of a priestly class in the church of Christ, we must not only admit, what Protestant writers on the ministry generally do admit, that succession from the Apostles is not of the essence of the ministry; that if a body of Christian people were cast upon an island, beyond hope of any intercourse with the Christian world, and with no ordained man among them, they are quite capable, by the help of a present Saviour, of originating a ministry with all its powers and functions, so that we not only exult with the excellent Dr. Stone in his "Church Universal," that the Christian ministry "has not been lost," but more than that, that while a Christian people can be found on earth it never can be lost; I say we must not only join with the voice of Protestant Christendom, outside the Prelatical churches, in acknowledging this, but we must reject the idea of a priestly class altogether, originating in a succession from the Apostles, or in any other manner whatever.

Doubtless order requires that some one preside, and become the voice and the hand of the brotherhood, whenever these rites are observed. But that presiding officer is only the voice and the hand of the brotherhood; his ordination has conferred on him no peculiar sanctity, no peculiar authority to administer, other than that which he derives from the choice of his brethren to the performance of an official service, which can-

not be performed by all, and therefore must be performed by one in the name and in the stead of all.

An assembly of the true disciples of Christ is *never* without the whole Christian priesthood. They are all and always "*kings and priests*;" and if it be necessary to the edification of the body of Christ that baptism be administered or the supper be observed, they are always competent to designate one of their number to perform these acts, in the name of the brotherhood.

If any one is disposed to question the correctness of these positions, in the light of scripture and ecclesiastical history, the time allotted me on this occasion will admit of little argument. I am surrounded to-night by those who are much better able to inform you than I profess to be, whether they can be overturned by valid arguments derived from these sources. To me it seems quite evident that they cannot. In what portion of our Lord's teaching, or of the Acts of the Apostles, or of their letters, can an intimation be found, that the presence of an ordained minister and his administration was necessary to render baptism and the Lord's supper valid? or acceptable to the Head of the Church? or edifying to the brotherhood? If this idea were not now in the church, and thrown back upon the New Testament, like so many inventions of later times, could it ever be derived from any intimation therein contained? If so, from what direct teaching or valid inference? And if those ideas of a mediatorial ministry to which I object, are not sustained by the authority of scripture, then must it be exceedingly mischievous to assume them, to admit them, or to act upon them. It renders us feeble, powerless, in our controversy with the impudent pretensions of Prelacy. We, says the Prelatist, have the only ministry duly qualified to administer the sacraments and pronounce the Apostolic benediction on those who rightly observe them. Our answer is, or generally has been, No; our qualifications to administer and exhibit the sacraments are as good as yours. Amid all the endless conflicts and confusions of ecclesiastical history, such a claim is not easy to be demonstrated to the clear understanding and the full apprehension of the unlearned and the unthinking or of the bigoted and the superstitious. But if it can be shown

from scripture itself, that the whole idea of a clergy qualified by divine authority to administer sacraments and pronounce absolutions, is without the smallest sanction of the divine word,—an invention of after times of darkness and superstition and semi-paganism, thrown back, and besmeared upon the fair face of the New Testament as it came from Apostolic minds and hearts, this is an argument easily understood and appreciated by the unlearned, and apprehended by the feeblest intellect.

If the issue is a Presbyterian or Congregational Priesthood against a Prelatical Priesthood, I think we impose on ourselves the doom of the fabled Sisyphus, forever to roll a heavy stone up the hill, only that it may recoil upon us, and rush down again to the bottom. But if our issue is, *no* priesthood but the great High Priesthood of Jesus Christ, against a Prelatical and Popish Priesthood, the conflict is easy, and the victory will soon be finally and for ever ours.

If to any, as possibly to many, these views seems loose and anarchical, I reply, that the suggestion is certainly not undervalued, nor unconsidered; and my answer to it is distinct and definite. The notion I *oppose* is anarchical, and my suggestion is *only the first step out of chaos into regions of light and order*. The notion of a mediatorial ministry, under almost infinite varieties of degree and of form, is the true and only origin of that religious anarchy which is only most distressing and heart-sickening where population is most heterogeneous, and mind most active and most free, but which is spreading itself, like the swarm of locusts in the Revelation, over all Protestant Christendom; and which fails to manifest its presence in Catholic countries, only because the same swarm long since in those lands devoured every green thing, and nothing now remains for it to feed upon. I say that this religious anarchy is the direct and inevitable outgrowth of *this very notion of a mediatorial ministry*; and will spread itself more and more widely, and darken the world still more gloomily, and shut out the rays of the sun of righteousness from still increasing millions, till it is finally and for ever abjured by the whole Christian brotherhood.

That religious anarchy and confusion which nowhere else is

so prevalent and so terrible as in our young empires of the Mississippi valley, is the direct, *logical*, and inevitable result of the conflict of rival corporations, each claiming to represent Christ and his kingdom, and each seeking to administer Christian ordinances and to become spiritual guides to the largest possible number of the people. The Roman Catholic says: "Come to us, we only have the Church of God and the Ministry of Christ's appointment." The Episcopalian says, "Come to us, for we only have all these." The Presbyterian of each of the several ecclesiastical corporations bearing that name; the Methodist, whether Episcopal, Wesleyan, or Protestant; the Baptist in each of the almost innumerable divisions into which Baptists are divided, each of these says, "Come to us, for if ours is not the only channel through which the sacraments and the preaching of the word can be administered to the people, it is at least more acceptable to God, and more edifying to the body of Christ, than any other."* Neither can substantiate his claims from the divine word: that is impossible. No trace of such an organization as either of them advocates, can be found in Scripture. Each of them gives reasons for preferring his system, which seem plausible to many. Yet none can produce an argument which can convince more than a minority of the Christian people, that its claims are superior. Thus the brotherhood is rent into many fragments, to be placed under the jurisdiction of these several clerical and ecclesiastical corporations, to receive from them its ministry, its instruction, and its sacraments. This is essential anarchy in principle, and must certainly produce anarchy in practice, as long as each tree continues to bear its own proper fruit. Remedy in the present order of things seems as hopeless as remedy for northeast winds in New England.

Or state the case thus: The idea of a Christian priesthood, other than that of the Great High Priest, is utterly foreign to the New Testament. The introduction of that idea, the turning of the teaching ministry of the Apostles into a mediating priesthood, was, however, at once the earliest and the deadliest of those corruptions of Christianity, which, by inevitable consequence, brought on the great Apostasy, and filled Christen-

* See note on page 720, at the end of the Article.

dom with a darkness which, like that of Egypt, could be felt. At the Reformation, this fatal error was not clearly seen, and purged away, root and branch and seed, as it should have been, but, under various modifications and limitations, was adhered to by the Reformers, and made the germinating principle of new organizations. Indeed, most of them would not have assailed the organization of the Papal Church at all, had they not been forced to do so, in order to protect themselves in holding and propagating a pure gospel.

Hence to this day the church, as an actually existing institution, as well as the church of history, with scarcely any exception since the Apostolic age, may be defined *a corporation* whose function it is to mediate between God and Christian people, in providing for the disciples of Christ the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper.

While all bowed to the authority of Rome, she was the only corporation through which the Lord's people could have the sacraments and absolution. The Reformation did not reject this mediatorial function of the church, but established numerous, for the most part, national corporations, to perform it. Soon came division of these so-called national churches. Many rival corporations, each claiming and exercising the same mediatorial function, sprang up, and sought to obtain the adhesion of as many as possible of the people. And as generation after generation of Christian history has been passing, new conflicts have arisen. New divisions have become inevitable and new mediating corporations have come into being, with all the fiery zeal of intensely heated partisan conflict. This is sect as we behold it. This is the germinating principle, from which the religious anarchy of the nineteenth century springs. Its origin is to be found in that bitter root, which Paul saw, as the mystery of iniquity, already working, and out of which grew the great Apostasy itself.

Let us go back then to first principles. That is our only remedy. If Jesus Christ did make a mediating priesthood, in any degree or under any limitations, necessary to the due instruction and edification of his people, and institute a corporation, with power to furnish such a priesthood to the Church forever,—in the name of God, let us find out where and

what it is, and submit to it, and bring this terrible anarchy to an end.

But if Christ has made such a priesthood necessary to the edification of his disciples, and yet has made no provision for supplying this want, but left all Christian people at liberty to supply it in whatever manner they may think most expedient and edifying, then nothing but anarchy remains to the whole church of God under heaven. In that case Christ himself *instituted* anarchy.

But if the whole idea of a priestly or ecclesiastical corporation having power to stand thus between the Lord and his people is a usurpation, if the Great High Priest is the only Priest that Christianity knows, and all born into the kingdom are born, not only to an inheritance of a share of the kingdom, but in the "royal Priesthood" also, then may the Lord's people, wherever and whenever assembled in his name, provide for their own edification, and the enlargement of his visible kingdom.

The first of these conceptions is that of a spiritual despotism, which must banish liberty and spiritual life from the earth. The second is the conception of a principle of anarchy, potent enough to fill all the future with confusion and sorrow, and in its ultimate result to bring back into the religious world chaos and old night. The third is the blessed union of freedom and social order, under which the desert shall rejoice and the wilderness bud and blossom as the rose.

This brings me to speak of the true conception of the Christian ministry, to the development of which the remainder of this discourse must be devoted.

The idea which is central in this conception, I have been compelled to anticipate in unfolding that false conception to which the true stands in contradiction. It is that our Christianity knows but one Priesthood, the Priesthood of our crucified Lord, into the coinheritance of a share in which Priesthood, every true disciple is born, when he comes into the kingdom. The whole multitude of the disciples are to be "kings and priests unto God." The glorious company of the redeemed constitute a "royal Priesthood." The true Christian ministry then begins with Christ himself, in the manger, in Gethsemane,

and on Calvary, and embraces every Christian disciple in every age and land. Every one that is born of God is not only to receive life, but within his measure to impart it; not only to receive light, but to become himself a radiant; not only to hear the glad tidings, but to publish them. The essential nature of the kingdom, and our calling into it, require and necessitate this. In a society so constituted, there can be no monopoly of preaching or praying, or of any other sacred function. Each is endowed with the privilege of becoming as light as possible, and therefore of shining as much as possible.

Just here, however, we are met by the consideration, that, in all human society, the teaching function is one of the gravest and most indispensable, and the importance of it pervades all civilization. Savages only are without teachers, and just in proportion as this great function is degraded or neglected, men descend towards the savage state. And in respect to no human interest and hope is this function so indispensable, as in respect to religion, duty, God, the life everlasting. It is also to be observed that such is the inevitable ordinance of God, that by far the greater portion of the life energy of most men is employed in serving tables. When they have performed the labor necessary to provide for the physical and temporal wants of themselves and those whom God has made dependent on them, little either of time or energy is left for their own improvement in knowledge, or for the instruction of others. Hence the Church has found in every age the need of securing to herself the undivided energies of such minds as God has made "apt to teach," not as we often say to "serve at her altars," for she has no altars but the "mercy seat," around which all disciples of Christ meet on a perfect equality; but to perform for her and in her behalf, this teaching function. And that they may give themselves wholly to this good work in the service of the Church, it is fit that they be relieved from the service of tables, by having their temporal wants provided for. When we speak of a Christian ministry, as distinct from the whole Christian brotherhood, we ought to mean those who, by their own superior endowments, and by the choice of their brethren, are devoted to the performance of this high function.

And as a Christian ministry this is their whole and only function. They are like Paul, who testified that the Lord sent him, "not to baptize, but to preach the gospel." They may baptize,—Paul did sometimes. But it is not because they have any clerical authority, whereby baptism is rendered valid or acceptable. They may preside at the Lord's table—it is fit they should, but not because the validity or edifying power of the rite depends at all on their official presence; but only as teachers of the truth of God, and authoritative teachers only so far as they utter God's truth in respect to the nature of the observance, the glorious relations and realities it is designed to express, and the qualifications required of those who would observe it. They may take an important part in administering the discipline of the church. But it is still only as teachers, having authority only so far as they truly interpret and apply God's truth, to the several cases which may arise. A minister of the Gospel presiding at the supper, or in a church meeting, or admonishing an erring brother, or administering consolation to the sick and the dying and the mourning, stands as exclusively on his reasons, and derives his authority as exclusively from the truth of God which he exhibits, as when he is expounding the word of God from the pulpit. He is the hand and the mouth of the one royal priesthood, obeying the last great commission, "Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Of this teaching function, however, certain very peculiar characteristics are to be noted.

I. The true Christian minister is, in the highest and only desirable sense, clothed with divine authority. The messages which he has to deliver to the church and to the world are messages from God, and are backed with God's authority. He is not set to teach human speculations or philosophies. He is not set to dam up the waters of human passion and selfishness, and arrest their destructive course, by any mere devices or inventions of man. If he were so, if he had nothing better and stronger to rely on, no wise man would or could, with any faith or hopefulness, devote himself to the work. But this is not his condition. The sum and substance of his teaching is the religion of the Bible, viewed as a revelation from God,

and, having proved its efficacy by its power over individual character and the history of the race, through many centuries. If one truly derives his messages to the people from this fountain, he is a messenger of God to men; he is an ambassador of Christ. And God will own and honor his word by the gift of His Spirit.

No sight can be more pitiful than one which, in this age, we often behold, of men who reject with scorn and contempt all that is supernatural and divine in the gospel, and yet flatter themselves and their followers, with the notion that they are Christian ministers. It is a disgusting delusion. They are no more Christian ministers, than one would be a teacher of the Newtonian Astronomy, who should deny and deride the law of gravitation. I say it is pitiful. If the gospel, historically considered, is a myth, or a collection of myths; if all that is supernatural in the Bible is delusion; if nothing in our religion is tenable but those few shreds of Christ's morality, which would remain when his divinity, his atonement, and his resurrection have been rejected, why should wise men call themselves Christians? What is there in such a tissue of delusions and superstitions as Christianity, on that supposition, becomes, to induce men of thought who have discovered all this, and seen through and through it, still to attach themselves to Christianity, and call themselves by its name, and claim more truly to represent it, than the men who reverently accept its claims to be a supernatural revelation from heaven? I have no claim and no wish to say, that men who deny the supernatural elements of the gospel may not be right, or to say how God will judge them at last. But I have a right to say, that they are not Christians and Christian ministers, and that their claim that they are, is neither in good taste, nor yet quite fair and honest. They will find it difficult to escape falling under the woe denounced on hypocrites, false pretenders. Every true Christian minister preaches that old fashioned gospel which Paul declared to be the power of God and the wisdom of God. The sooner we succeed in setting forth the characteristic peculiarities of Christianity, with such discriminating clearness and power, that whatever men may believe, they will no longer give any heed to such miserable preten-

sions, the better will it be for a world that needs a Saviour, and for the honor of the church, which surely ought so to exhibit the gospel, that it cannot be so belied with any hope of success.

II. A ministry, whose whole function lies in teaching, has need of every variety and degree of culture, which is attainable in each successive age. A priestly ministry has less and less need of high culture, just in proportion as it exalts the mediatorial and degrades the teaching function. It is therefore that wherever, as in the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches, the priestly function has become everything, and the teaching function nothing, the great body of the clergy have been ignorant and degraded. And in all churches, when a ritual becomes the all important thing in the service, and religious teaching occupies a very small and unimportant place, the attainments and the culture of the ministry become of small importance. It requires neither learning nor talent to say prayers, and administer rites according to a prescribed rubric.

I remember a few years ago to have attended a Sabbath afternoon service in an old English Cathedral, well known to history, as it still shows upon its battered and partially demolished walls, the pounding it got from Cromwell's Ironsides. During the exhibition of the church service which was chanted, or intoned perhaps they call it, the church and the vestibule were crowded; but as soon as that was over most of the audience took a very hasty departure. Many more would have gone, but the door leading to the center aisle was kept fastened, so that those who were in it, of whom I was one, were obliged to stay and hear the sermon. I was certainly of the opinion that those who made their escape at the close of the singing were fortunate. When I visit Bristol cathedral again I shall take a seat in one of the side aisles. You cannot degrade preaching and exalt ritualism in public worship without lowering the standard of ministerial qualification and culture.

But the teaching function, no matter what a man is to teach, always requires culture, and the more of it he has the better he will be qualified for his work. And when a man is to spend his life in teaching the Christian religion in all its endlessly

varied applications to individual, social, and political life, to defend it against the attacks of all enemies, and to commend it to the favorable consideration of all minds, in all conditions of thought and feeling, the demand for a wide and varied and generous culture, of which he will be conscious, will be far higher and more urgent than in any other avocation in life. Far be it from me to deny that a man who knows the gospel well, in the deep and earnest experiences of his own heart, and yet knows little else, may often prove a very successful minister. But whenever all, or the great body of the ministry, are such, nothing but disaster and feebleness can come of it to the cause. And in a living, teaching ministry this never can be so. The necessities which such a ministry will always feel will create a demand for wider and still wider culture. And this felt necessity, this conscious want of the Christian ministry, is one of the chief forces which has founded colleges and universities, and stimulated the mental activity of modern Christendom. The cause of learning will never languish, in a community which honors and reveres a teaching ministry.

III. This teaching ministry must be consecrated to its work in a spirit of the highest and most exemplary self-abnegation. This, for the very obvious reason that a teacher of moral or even of practical truth of any kind, whose life is not accordant with his teaching, will never fail to find his instructions despised, and himself scorned as a hypocrite. The center of the gospel is Christ—not a mere theological Christ—but the Christ of evangelical history—the Christ “who though he was rich for our sakes became poor, that we, through his poverty, might be rich.” This Christ is not only the Saviour of the world, but he is the model and the example of all true virtue, true holiness in the Universe. None are saved, none can be saved, but those who, in this characteristic particular, have become Christ-like. Without the spirit of self-sacrifice there is no gospel, no salvation, no church, no ministry. One cannot teach, though he have the powers of an archangel, what he does not know. And one who has not the spirit of self-sacrifice does not know Christ or his gospel, and cannot teach Christianity. He may teach a philosophy or a system of meta-

physics, but the gospel he cannot teach, for he does not know it, and, till he learns self-sacrifice, cannot learn it.

And it is precisely here that all those notions of religion utterly fail which reject a divine Saviour, God manifest in the flesh. They would teach the morality of the gospel they say, but they cannot teach the morality of the gospel, for they cannot learn it. The morality of the gospel can be learned, in its fullness and distinctive peculiarity, only at the cross of a divine Saviour. It is only from that cross that the doctrine of self-sacrifice has gone forth to pervade the Church of Christ in all ages, and save the world for which Christ died. He that rejects that cross rejects the fountain, the only fountain from which Christian morality flows.

The necessities of Christ's kingdom in this world require such self-sacrifice, in order to the accomplishment of its sublime destiny. *No* exigency of human history that has ever arisen has made any equal demand for the spirit of heroic self-sacrifice. It brought the Lord of glory to this world of sin and sorrow, and it saves only by imparting to men a like spirit. I once heard a minister of the gospel assert,—it was before the war, of course,—that in our age the spirit of heroism is dead. I could hardly restrain the utterance of my indignation. The spirit of heroism is not dead, and as long as Christianity lives, never can die. Nobler heroism earth never saw than that manifested in the history of the Missions, domestic and foreign, of this our own country. And never had the church greater need of it than to-day. The Christian teacher must still follow the course of our emigration, as it spreads itself in ever widening circles over the vast plains of the still unpeopled West, and amid all the dells and gorges of the Rocky Mountains, and along all the shores of the Pacific, to found and to build on the ever receding border of the wilderness, the school, the college, the church, and every institution of Christian civilization. And when shall that border cease to recede? When there *is* no more wilderness; when the whole habitable earth shall smile and bloom under the blessed sunshine of a Christian civilization. I would fondly, yet doubtfully, hope, that there may be little more call for the heroism of the battle field; but for the higher and nobler heroism of

Christian self-sacrifice to carry the gospel to the destitute and the perishing, the demand was never more imperative than now. It is often said, and I think it is true, that all systems that have power in the world, have in them some germs of truth. When I consider how much mischief Jesuitism has done in the world, I should feel disposed to make that an exception. But after all I cannot. I must admit that its power is chiefly due to the fact, that it does embody, with peculiar intensity, this distinctive principle of Christianity, self-sacrifice—self-abnegation—not indeed for Christ, not in consecration to him, but to the order. Ignatius Loyola himself describes this self-abnegation in the expressive Latin phrase, “*Perinde ac cadaver* ;” even as a dead body, the very limbs and muscles of the body to be moved not by one’s own will, but by the will of another. As a representation of the completeness of the consecration, I accept the figure as a symbol of the consecration of the true Christian minister to the cause of the Master. And yet I loathe the figure. It is not as dead men that we are to be consecrated, but as living men, and never so truly and nobly alive as when most consecrated to him and his work ; not to the society of Jesuits ; not to any sect or any party ; to any human authority and control ; but “ to him that loved us and gave himself to die for us,” and to the enlargement and unification of the Christian brotherhood. This is not death ; it is life, and all else is death.

IV. Finally : such a teaching ministry is the only ministry that can hold its power among the mighty intellectual elements of this our modern civilization. A mediating priesthood is for the infancy, not for the mature manhood of the human race. So judged the unerring One. He gave to the Jew a mediating priesthood, but only as a wise parent gives toys to children. And even in the progress of the Jewish state, we see the mediatorial element of that priesthood falling into the background, and the teaching element brought more and more into the foreground. And when the desire of all nations came, He completed mediation in his own person on the cross, and abolished all human priesthood for ever. The infancy of man was past ; his maturity was come. Such too is still more the experience of Pagan priesthoods. Amid the high culture and

civilization of the Grecian and Roman periods, the mummeries of their priests excited only the contempt and the scorn of their cultivated classes. And just after the Christian era, we find them openly exposed to the keen and cutting satire of a Lucian.

So will it fare in our age and in coming ages with any mediating priesthood, any religion of rites and ceremonies, and lighted tapers, and holy vestments, and ancient rubrics, and pious genuflexions, and the sanctified utterance of prescribed forms of approach to God—they are the toys of childhood, still kept in use amid the graver cares and duties, and clearer discernments of mature life.

But a ministry of truth, standing on its reasons, clad in the armor of righteousness, and appealing to the understanding and the conscience of the human race, in behalf of “the forgiveness of sins,” “the resurrection of the body,” and “the life everlasting,” “reasoning of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come,” will never cease to be powerful, and will only become more powerful, as the human intellect is more cultivated, and civilization more mature.

It was in the very age in which the old priesthood was writhing in mortal agony under the satire of a Lucian, that Christianity conquered the empire; and it will be in the age in which the sham priesthoods which have been substituted for the gospel are passing into neglect and contempt, that the gospel itself, in its spiritual elements, will conquer the world. They say “the ministry is losing its power over the mind of Christendom.” If it is so, the ministry is losing its hold on the moral and spiritual truths of the gospel. It is like Bunyan’s Pilgrim in his conflict with Apollyon—he had lost his sword; let him grasp that again with good firm hand, and he will easily give the beast a wound, which will send him howling in pain to his hiding place. The ministry of Christ is not losing its power and never will—it is only the ministry of sect and priestly mediation.

In no portion of her history since the reformation, has the church come so near to a full conception of the ministry she needs as in the time of Cromwell. There was just then a dawning of such a day of power to the Church of Christ on

earth, as remains even yet only a bright prophecy of the future. It was a glorious dawn shut in before the sun was up, by the dark and frowning clouds of returning despotism. It is true Cromwell and his Ironsides used very carnal weapons at Naseby, Dunbar, and Worcester. But that was only against those who would by force deprive them of "the liberty of prophesying." And in that they were in the right. I have a better opinion of the men of the Apostolic age, than to believe that had it been possible for them to form that clear and definite idea of a Christian State which Cromwell and his fellows had, and to meet force by force in the defense of it, they would have tamely suffered the brutal tyranny of Nero and the other Roman emperors. "If thou mayest be free, use it rather," they would have said. But when our Puritan fathers had vindicated their liberty, no men had more exclusive faith in purely spiritual weapons. And these very men were more terrible to the enemies of the gospel in the pulpit, than they were to the abettors of civil and religious tyranny on the field of Dunbar. It seems to me that we have need to take up the work much in the same place where they left it.

Fathers and brethren, I congratulate you on the progress of provisions for a sound theological education in this great University. Lay those foundations, rear up those walls, that, from this mother of Institutions as well as of men, there may go forth, in increasing numbers and strength, a teaching ministry, quite emancipated from all the bonds of a priestly ritualism, to carry along all our vast frontier as it is ever moving Westward and Southward and Northward the messages of salvation, and the organizing, civilizing power of spiritual Christianity. He who knows not our new empires in the great valley, knows not the power of Yale. Her sons have an omnipresence over all that vast region, which can be claimed for the sons of no other seat of learning. Let her still retain her national character, let her sons still accompany the emigrant, as he scares the deer and the wolf from their primeval homes. Let him still found the seats of learning and open the deep fountains of a Christian civilization, within hearing of the woodman's ax, and the howl of the wolf. It is our duty, our privilege to see to it, that no part or portion of this good land

is given up to a degrading worldliness, and a God-denying materialism. Such is the danger of those vast regions we are reclaiming from the prairie and the forest.

Rear, then, the halls of your noble University, and let the nation feel the attractions of this venerable seat of learning. But give it not over for a moment to a science which knows no God but nature, and no soul but force. If Yale ever sees that day, her glory will have departed; the days of her national and cosmopolitan influence will be gone for ever. But let that evangelical spirit which laid her first foundations inspire her still, and consecrate the maturity of her strength, as it did the feebleness of her infancy, and her influence shall be co-extensive with the effort of the Church of Christ to publish his salvation to every kindred, and tongue, and people, under the whole heaven.

Note from page 708.—It is perhaps not easy to determine what Congregationalists would say of this matter. Their utterances would be diverse. Many certainly would say, "Our Ministry is just as well qualified to administer sacraments as any other." Some might say, with the author of this Article, "All the Lord's people are priests," by virtue of their vital union with the great High Priest."

ERRATUM.—On page 700, line 34, for "ulterior," read "actual."

ARTICLE V.—OUR FINANCES.

THAT all should be just, and more punctiliously so in cases in which the party dealt with has no power of redress, is universally admitted; but as the aggregation of people which constitutes a nation has no common soul to suffer for its delinquencies, many seem willing to profit by public wrong, and let the penalty fall upon the individual instruments of it. They would not cheat their country's creditors, nor even incur the suspicion of any such design, but are willing that others should repudiate for them, and thus hope to participate in the profit without having their characters tarnished or their personal credit or safety impaired. But no member of a community can thus escape the penalty of its dishonor. If the individual is not polluted, his character is stained by the national guilt or meanness. The dishonesty of a nation imposes upon each of its citizens the onus of proving that he is not a knave.

The power of a country, too, is essential to the protection of every citizen of it, and to destroy its credit is to destroy its protecting power. When loss of credit arises from want of means, a nation may still be respected; but when, with ample resources, it refuses to pay, or seeks by a show of fraudulent intention to frighten its creditors into a compromise, it loses both credit and character, and can no longer sway by moral, or coerce by physical, agencies. We are at the moment insisting upon the right of our naturalized citizens to exemption from foreign allegiance. With the taint of repudiation upon us we could exert no moral influence upon such a question, nor could we enforce our doctrine by any physical demonstration. A case recently occurred, in which one of our adopted citizens was arrested in France as a deserter, on the ground that he had been drafted after having emigrated to this country, and had not answered to the demand of the government under which he was born for military service at his hands. Our moral influence proved to be sufficient, and had it not been, all our national power would have been put forth in his behalf.

We are also now insisting that England shall pay for the depredations of the Alabama upon our commerce, and with a strong probability that our claims will be paid without a resort to arms. But morally and physically weakened by evading the payment of our creditors, what could we do? England might tauntingly tell us to pay our own debts, rather than make such demands of her, as France could have bidden us be sure that we could command the services of our own citizens, before we interfered with her claims upon those born on her soil. Without credit we could neither equip an army nor float our navy. We should be powerless either to protect our rights or to resent insult. It may be said that the resource of taxation would still be left to us; but national dishonesty so demoralizes a people, that with the taxes increased to the maximum ability to pay, the amount which will reach the treasury will still be insufficient for the proper expenditures, with the additions by waste and fraud engendered by the same laxity of principle. Already the most alarming feature of our position is the indication that there is not sufficient honesty among us to insure the faithful collection of the revenues, and a government which, at tremendous cost, subdued a formidable rebellion, ingloriously succumbs to a villainous gang of whisky distillers. The next expedient for the demands of war is a resort to forced loans; but this soon paralyzes productive industry and absorbs its accumulations, reducing the community to a semi-barbarous condition, as is practically illustrated in our neighborhood.

It appears then that attacks upon our credit are more subversive of our power, as well as more destructive to our honor, than assaults upon our arms, and that treason in that form is more dangerous, and should be regarded as much more odious than armed rebellion, as fraud is meaner than open combat with equal or superior force. But the folly of the recent insidious attacks upon our credit is even greater than their meanness and guilt. By foolishly threatening to pay the holders of our promises bearing interest in other promises without interest—in greenbacks—when we had no greenbacks to pay with, our credit and reputation have been wantonly injured without even the *chance* of pecuniary gain. Any man

who, in the management of his own business, should commit such a blunder, should thus destroy his financial credit and moral reputation, without the possibility of any compensating advantage, would be deemed a fit subject either for an idiotic school or a lunatic asylum.

Even those so obtuse that they cannot comprehend abstract reasoning, or even arithmetical computations, should learn something from facts before their eyes. Massachusetts, actuated by high moral principle, harmonizing with an enlightened and clear perception of her material interests, by paying gold without question, has sustained her honor and her credit, and thereby, in her comparatively small financial operations, already profited to the amount of millions.

It may be said, in mitigation, that some of those who advocate payment in depreciated paper contemplate the emission of \$1,200,000,000 of greenbacks to take up the bonds which they contend may legally thus be paid. No one has yet had the hardihood to claim that this \$1,200,000,000 is never to be paid in coin, but only that the time of payment is to be indefinite or payable when convenient. The bribe thus proffered to the people to fraudulently depreciate the currency is the gain of the interest on the \$1,200,000,000, or \$72,000,000 per annum—a large sum, well worth attention. But though large, what is it compared with the disadvantages of a fluctuating, irredeemable currency, on such a scale, and the general disarrangement thereby of a business, the gains of which, in a normal condition, paid the cost of government, furnished a generous living to all the people, and left a surplus of over \$1,000,000,000 of gold value? The additional labor required to do the business with such a currency, and its influence in diverting labor from production to mere speculation in its products, would far more than offset the \$72,000,000 which it is proposed to save by the inflation.

Issue this additional currency, making in all nearly \$2,000,000,000, when the amount required at gold value is only \$500,000,000, and it would, even if its eventual payment at some indefinite time were undoubted, be worth only \$500,000,000. The aggregate value or purchasing power of an inflated currency of reliable promises to pay gold, will be

just equal to the amount of gold required to effect the exchanges. In our case it would be only \$500,000,000, and it would be passed and received at that rate. It may be supposed that this result would be modified by capitalists at home or abroad withdrawing the paper from use, and holding it for the profit of eventual payment in gold, but it is obvious that so long as parties would pay any interest upon it for use, this would not be done. It would be loaned to these and put in use. But in the case in hand such relief would be cut off in another way. It would be obvious that the same reason which is assigned for paying the bonds in greenbacks, viz., that they were bought with greenbacks, would apply to paying the holders of the currency only the 25 per cent., which they paid for it, and in such case its value to hold would only be 25 per cent., payable at a time indefinitely future, say only 20 per cent. But for the same reason it would again be reduced below the 20 per cent., and thus run down continually until wholly refused. This last consideration relates to the credit of the currency rather than to the effect of its quantity; so long as by common consent it is accredited as the universal medium of exchange in the country, it will have the aggregate value which is required for that service or use, say \$500,000,000 and no more, and if double or fourfold that amount is put in circulation each bill will pass for half or quarter its nominal value, for, as just shown, so long as any one will give any interest for its use, the whole will be forced into use at this depreciation in its purchasing power. The effect of such a currency upon the business of a country would be exceedingly injurious.

With the measure of value four for one, nobody would risk investments in the means of saving labor which did not immediately give back a very large part of their cost. No one would build storehouses for grain, or mills to grind, or railroads or ships to transport it. Such enterprises as the Pacific railroad would have to be abandoned and roads already built would only be repaired under conditions onerous to the public. The companies would not buy rails for repairs at fourfold price, unless they could get tenfold price for their use, because by a change in the currency they might any day lose all the extra cost. Our farmers could not afford even to replace their

wornout reapers and threshing machines, and would soon be reduced to the old modes by scythe and flail. Add to these disadvantages that of sustaining in extravagant living an army of speculators and peculators engendered by inflation, and the \$72,000,000 of interest sinks into insignificance, compared with the loss and burden put upon the country in the process by which it is proposed to save it. But let us note this process a little more in detail. In the first place the bondholders would lose say three fourths the amount of their bonds. A large portion of this would fall not on wealthy capitalists, but on the depositors in savings banks and holders of small amounts, either of bonds or of the previous issue of currency, to whom it would bring actual privation and suffering, and another large portion would be more severely felt by laborers than by capitalists who employ them. Most of the latter class would profit in other ways by the change in value. Take, for instance, the case of a baker, who, when the inflation occurs, is employing men at fifty dollars payable at the end of each month, and having a month's stock of flour on hand, of which each laborer will convert thirty barrels per month into bread. The cost of the thirty barrels of flour before the inflation is, say

	\$500	
Cost of labor,	50	— 550
Add for customary profit,	50	

Value of the bread in sound currency, \$600.

Its value in the inflated currency will be \$2,400. So that for this month he pays the laborer with a quarter the quantity of bread he would have done, and as all other articles rise in the same proportion, the laborer for this month's wages can obtain only a quarter the usual quantity of supplies. This may be divided over a longer period than one month, but this loss of three quarters of a month's wages must fall upon him. It may be argued that this gain to the employer and loss to the laborer are only temporary, and will eventually be neutralized by an equal decline in prices when a sound currency is restored. This is at most only partially true, for the capitalists and dealers immediately begin to charge extra profits as guar-

antee for this risk of decline, and prices to the laborers and other consumers are thereby enhanced during the whole period of inflation.

There is also an actual addition to the cost of production and distribution, not only from the consequent deficiency of labor-saving apparatus before alluded to, but from the increased labor of doing business with such a currency. With the additional risks attending it, ordinary prudence requires that a man should curtail his operations and do less in proportion to his capital. With the necessity for increased thought and vigilance to guard against losses by its fluctuations he can give less attention to other details, and hence more persons are required to manage the same business. This makes a loss to the whole community. The bad effects of an irredeemable paper currency have been so repeatedly proved by actual experience, that it seems strange that it should still find advocates. Our continental money, the subsequent separate experience of nearly every State in this Union, and our present condition, furnish ample testimony of its baneful effects. In the Southern Confederacy we have a warning of what would be our fate if we adopted the plan of the expansionists. There, one common ruin and almost universal destitution and suffering have been the result. It may be said, and truly, that the effect was there aggravated by civil war; but it was only aggravated, and such an emission of paper money, without any war, would have been attended with very nearly the same pecuniary results. No labor-saving machinery being provided, and even the reward of manual toil made uncertain, product would have been diminished till the necessities of life became scarce. The writer has seen a community of great productive ability reduced to great straits, by an inflated irredeemable paper currency, when there was no aggravation by war. In the revolution which succeeded the great expansion of 1834 to 1837, the citizens of the State of Mississippi were much embarrassed by debt. This arose in part from the cost of clearing the land and other expenses incident to recent settlement; and partly from speculation at the high prices which the expansion engendered. Most of their banks failed, and various devices were resorted to to supply the imperative demand for a

medium of exchange which exists in all civilized communities, and which is an essential element of social progress. In one intelligent community, well executed bills of one to five dollars each, *payable in Thompsonian medicines*, were current; and in another their change bills read, "The faith of the Ten-pin Alley pledged for fifty cents."

The urgent necessity of the hour, however, seemed to call forth the talent suited to the emergency. One man, regarded as a miracle of financial ability, stepped forward to supply the want. He was hailed as the Nicholas Biddle of the South, and regarded as the deliverer of his country. With wonderful energy he put press and paper in requisition, and flooded the State with Brandon Bank bills. With these he and his coadjutors bought the cotton crop of a large section of the State. The day was not long enough and they bought by night also. The planters, in the rage which then possessed them for producing cotton, had neglected to raise food; they sold their cotton for Brandon Bank bills or other paper of about equal value. This sufficed to pay a portion of their debts, but very soon the flat boatmen refused to take it in payment for corn or provisions, and among an active and energetic people, possessing an abundant area of one of the richest soils in the world, in a productive season, with no war or pestilence, with only the calamities incident to bad currency, there was actual suffering for food.

In view of the apparent sincerity of those who still advocate expansion, it would be unfair to charge the principal agent of this suffering with intentional fraud. He may only have been misled by the same glittering and seductive fallacies which now bewilder some of our statesmen. That on witnessing the result he ran away and hung himself, should incline us to a charitable verdict. If the proposed plan of increasing our currency by thousands of millions to pay the bonds should be adopted, we should probably see suffering for food among the laborers, even in this land of abundant provisions and prudent forethought. They will find, some pay-day, that their month's wages will hardly suffice for a day's living, and if the authors of such calamity should not then, like their Mississippi proto-

type, have the grace to hang themselves, it is very probable that at least their effigies would grace a lamppost or a gallows.

On this matter the thoughtless and ignorant are easily deceived. The laborer or mechanic who has not investigated it, and only knows that he does not get enough greenbacks to buy food for his family, readily believes that this is because there are not greenbacks enough, and hence he clamors for more. He is naturally very skeptical as to the demonstrated truth that the greater the quantity issued the greater will be his deficiency. This, on its face, is to him a mystical paradox, directly opposed to the evidence of his senses; and yet he may readily perceive, that as the products are not thereby increased, giving to every man double the amount of greenbacks cannot enable the holders to buy double, or even add at all to the quantity of products which each can obtain. If, as generally happens, the additional issue is unequally divided, the favored class will gain at the expense of the others, who are thus very conveniently swindled of a portion of their rightful share. Our legislators are presumed to be capable of understanding the subjects upon which they are to act; it is their duty to give the requisite thought and attention to them, and they can no more excuse themselves for wrong action by the plea that the people demanded it, than a druggist can excuse himself for administering arsenic to an importunate customer who thought it was white sugar. The fact, however, seems to be that a very small portion of the people desire either expansion of the currency or payment of the bonds in greenbacks. This small portion, being made up of active, pushing speculators and noisy demagogues, appears much more numerous than it really is. In the Chicago Convention, every section of our country being represented, these doctrines were rebuked with great unanimity, and the speeches of prominent democrats encouraged the hope that they would be discountenanced by the New York Convention in July.

Necessity can no longer be even asserted. Profound thought and the actual experience of centuries have demonstrated that an inflated currency fosters gambling and speculation at the expense of regular industry; that it makes the reward of toil uncertain; diminishes product and increases the cost of its

distribution to the consumers, and that it is demoralizing in its tendency. There is now no excuse for the lawmakers who inflict it upon us, and no apology for their action, except that of an ignorance unpardonable in those who assume the duties and responsibilities of legislators.

It would be easy to show that our losses from inflated currency have already been more than \$1,000,000,000, or that our public debt has been nearly or quite doubled by its use.

But independently of the increase of our debt and the diminished ability to pay it, which still continues as a consequence of our financial policy, the unequal distribution of the burden brought about by the same means is worthy of serious consideration. During the war the average depreciation of our currency was about 50 per cent.; in other words, the nominal prices of staple commodities were nearly double what they would have been with a sound currency. But the wages of labor did not advance in the same ratio. The risks of doing business upon such a fluctuating currency were so great that large profits were necessarily charged by those who risked *capital* in trade, or put it out in any way to be repaid by future production.

Hence, in the division of product, the laborer had to concede to the capitalists a larger proportion than usual, of course getting for themselves less than their customary share of what they produced.

Besides the laborers, there was another large class, upon whom economy and privation were thus enforced, including all those who were living on limited incomes derived from interest of money loaned by themselves or by trust companies and savings and other banks, or upon fixed salaries which were not increased with the depreciation of the current money, in which, by force of law, they were obliged to receive their dues. The effect upon all those was just the same as though Congress had enacted that all such should pay an income tax of 50 per cent. per annum, and collected it with unflinching certainty. Here was a monstrous wrong inflicted upon a large class, embracing a large proportion of the widows and orphans and most helpless families among us, and a wrong which, to the extent of the depreciation of the currency, we still persist

in inflicting upon them. Those who, with capital, have activity, ability, and skill to use it, obtain more than their fair share of products, and the laborers must take less; while those who, from age, sex, debility, or other cause, are unfitted for hard work or active business, must take a yet smaller share. Any man may now find, in his own neighborhood, families who have thus been compelled to submit to unwonted privation, or perhaps been obliged to choose between the physical pangs of hunger and the mental agony of dependence upon the charity of others. Often, no doubt, their sense of self-respect, their cherished hopes and honorable pride have forbidden them to complain, and their sighs have been heard and their anguish known only by Him whose ear is ever open to the cry of the weak and the oppressed. They have suffered in uncomplaining silence, preferring to starve rather than beg or excite a mortifying pity by exposing their destitution, while most of them have been as guileless of the cause of their suffering as the gazelle of the bow which speeds the fatal shaft.

Previous to the war, the South, by its peculiar institution, imposed all the burdens of the community upon an unprotected class, rendered helpless by ignorance and disabilities legally enforced upon them; and in our imposition of so large a portion of our burdens upon the weak and helpless there is something akin to this; though it does not involve the repulsive brutality of slavery, it too nearly resembles it in its injustice and its meanness. To persevere in thus taxing this class is a national disgrace, and for the wrong and the suffering consequent upon it the party in power and permitting it will ultimately be held responsible even by those who cannot trace it either to their action or inaction. During the war more large fortunes, even at gold value, were here accumulated than at any previous period of our history, and with no corresponding losses among the trading and wealthy classes; and yet the aggregate spare income of the nation was then very much diminished, nearly all of it being absorbed in the cost of war. Nor except among the injured classes, to whom I have alluded, was their increased economy. It is then clear that these large fortunes must have been made up from the accumulated savings of the coerced economy and privation of the laborers and

those living on limited incomes from salaries, rents, or interest of money. By the instrumentality of an inflated currency, their savings were concentrated in the hands of the active traders and grasping speculators. If this is an intended result of the legislation which continues to inflict this currency upon us without even a pretence of necessity, it is a crime deserving the severest retribution; and, if this result was unforeseen, it betrays an ignorance which a very little thought would have enlightened, and which is therefore unpardonable in those who assume the duty of directing our national affairs.

But it is still seriously asserted that we have not currency enough. At a very recent period money was exceedingly scarce in the Atlantic States, and the West complains that it does not have enough. Reduce this sectional complaint to its ultimate, and every man will tell you he wants more greenbacks than he has got or can get, and hence, as each individual wants more, it may be inferred that the aggregate community wants more. Though this is not the form in which the advocates of expansion put it, some of their arguments amount only to this.

These advocates certainly do not mean to say that it is desirable to have a greater bulk, or greater number of current bills, without any increase of value; or that doubling or quadrupling their present thickness, size, or number, without any increase in their aggregate value, is desirable.

Some of those who demand expansion still assert that the depreciation of our currency does not arise from its excessive quantity. They say we have less per *capita* in this country than in England or France, and hence argue that we should expand rather than contract our issues. This argument is fallacious in many ways. If it is admitted that we have less than our proper share of the currency of the world, it is obvious that we shall not remedy this difficulty by increasing the volume of our paper issues, which, as already stated, will add nothing to its aggregate value; the value of each bill will lessen just in proportion as the quantity is increased. A man might, as well say, I have not got as many dollars as my neighbors; I will cut each of mine in two, and still call each one a dollar. No one need object to this. Those who make

exchanges with him on this basis may take his money at his new valuation and double the prices of their commodities. Diluting the paper currency by issuing double the quantity required will have the same effect as depreciating the weight or value of coins by one half. The warmest advocate for expansion will hardly assert that the end he desires could thus be attained.

But the amount of currency required by a country, or the share of the circulating medium of the world which properly belongs to it, depends upon so many elements that no inference drawn from its mere ratio to population is reliable.

A community in which each individual produces a large portion of what he consumes, will require less than one in which each sells the product of his own labor and buys his supplies of others.

The degree of confidence which exists among the members of a community is also an important element. If in April a manufacturer lets a farmer have iron or cloth on his verbal promise that in December he will in payment deliver corn from the crop he is then planting, and those employed by the manufacturer to make the iron or cloth will take his promise then to pay them in this corn, these exchanges can be effected without any other medium than words spoken. Or if the manufacturer takes the farmer's note payable in December, and gives his own to his workmen on same time, the exchanges will be made with a medium which the parties can themselves supply upon their own credit; and, on the day due, these notes may all be settled through a clearing house in which they balance, and thus the whole exchanges be effected without resorting to the general circulation. If they will not trust one another, then they must pay real value down, or substitute some acceptable credit, *e. g.* pay gold, or give the credit of the government in the form of greenbacks.

The great confidence reposed in each other enables bankers to establish clearing houses, with a daily saving of the use of millions in the settlement of their exchanges. It is evident then that such comparisons between communities diverse in character, and differing also in the amount and kind of business and in the mode of doing it, very imperfectly indicate the

amount of currency required for each, and certainly such deductions should not be urged against the results of actual experience.

If we now admit that greater *value* of currency is desirable, we come to the question whether increasing the issue or any other legislative provision can accomplish this object? If Congress has the power of creating value without labor, or can enable us without limit to get the products of labor in exchange for that which costs no labor, how thoughtless, how remorseless in them to let us all be toiling and moiling at the plough, the loom, and the forge, to produce value which their mere fiat would create. Again, under the broadest admissions it would in view of the facts still be pertinent to inquire if it would be expedient for our rulers to promise a dollar's worth of our labor in the future for seventy cents worth down. The fact, however, is, that no addition to the actual value of the currency can be effected by increasing its nominal quantity.

It is universally admitted by all who have given any thought to the subject, that, other things remaining the same, increasing the quantity of coin in the world would not increase its aggregate value or purchasing power; that if the quantity were doubled, each dollar would buy only half of the products of labor that it would have done before such increase. The same would obviously be true of any section, however small, provided all interchange of coin or of coin metals with the rest of the world were rendered impossible. Suppose that in this country labor being worth one dollar per day, and all other things in that proportion, 400,000,000 of dollars is required to make the internal exchanges. If the quantity of coin should, under the conditions just mentioned, be increased to \$800,000,000, other things would be at double price, and in fact the value or purchasing power of the \$800,000,000 would be just what the \$400,000,000 was before the expansion. It is a peculiarity of currency that its aggregate value, as compared with the exchanges it has to effect, cannot be altered by merely changing its quantity. The amount required will vary inversely as the rapidity of circulation (*i. e.* with the greater or less amount of exchanges which a given sum can effect in a given time). This may be increased by mechanical contri-

vances for rapid movement, or by increased confidence among individuals, admitting of such institutions as clearing houses; but other things being the same, the actual value or purchasing power of the whole currency, be it one million or a thousand millions of gold or of paper, will be the same. This peculiarity, however, consists in the accuracy with which the depreciation may be comparatively stated, rather than in any exclusive application of the general principle which, with some modification, applies to other things as well as to currency. If, for instance, we had in this country double the quantity of wheat required for bread, and its export were impossible, it would fall to a price at which it would all be used. If, for instance, it were usually worth two dollars per bushel for bread, and there was no other use for it except to feed swine, and for this its value was only one dollar, its price would fall to one dollar. Currency as such has only one use, that of effecting exchanges. Any excess of it cannot be devoted to other purposes, and hence it must decline in price or exchangeable value, till the whole is required for that purpose.

If, as before assumed, wages being one dollar per day and its products in proportion, 400,000,000 of dollars are sufficient and \$800,000,000 are permanently put in circulation, labor and its products will rise to double price, and the value of the \$800,000,000 will buy the same amount or have the same aggregate exchangeable value that \$400,000,000 had at the old standard. Its aggregate value would still be just the equivalent for \$400,000,000 of days labor or its product and no more.

These positions, true even of gold, are, obviously, at least equally true of paper currency made up of the most reliable promises to pay gold, and in regard to this the condition of non-export is at once reached. If our internal trade at gold prices requires only \$500,000,000, and the government issues \$700,000,000, its whole value will still be only \$500,000,000, and gold will be at 40 per cent. premium, fluctuating to the one side or the other of that average point, with the varying conditions of supply and demand. The argument then that the government should increase its issues to make money plentiful, is wholly fallacious, such increase adding nothing to its aggregate value or its power of effecting exchanges.

Indeed, from some other considerations it has been demonstrated, that the practical effect of expansion must be to make money scarce. This was experimentally proved in the great inflation of 1834 to 1836, and again in that of 1844 to 1856. This however would not apply to a currency, the credit basis of which was doubted. It is always easy to exchange certain value at very full price for doubtful promises of payment.

It is evident that in the case of a surplus of wheat above stated, that a large crop might command less money than a smaller one, and it would then be to the interest of the holders to destroy the surplus quantity, as the Dutch monopolizers did with spices. In the case of currency the reduced value being the same, the owners of it would neither gain nor lose by destroying the excess. If we have seven dollars for every five needed, then if all would combine and every one burn two-sevenths of all he owned, they would not individually lose anything, and would confer a great benefit upon the community—relieving it of the excess and its attendant evils. By the owners I do not mean those who merely have the current money in possession. They may owe it to others at whose charge the two-sevenths should be destroyed, whether it be in their own pockets or in those of their debtors. But both wheat and currency are always in too many hands to admit of such combination.

The evils of a depreciated currency being admitted, the important question is, how can we best get rid of it?

We have now about \$700,000,000 of paper which, gold averaging about 140, is worth \$500,000,000 in coin, indicating that the last amount is what is now required to effect our internal exchanges at gold value. This seems larger than the calculation founded upon the supposed amount prior to the war, the increase of our population and products, and the addition to the precious metals in the world during that time, added to the increase of the latter in other countries by the disuse of them in this, would justify; but it is impossible to ascertain how much coin entered into our circulation before the suspension of specie payments. This element is the more important because it counts in the estimate in two ways; first as indicating an amount to be replaced with paper, and again

as adding to the quantity of gold in other countries to which ours has gone, requiring a corresponding increase of currency here to keep our proportion good. We may therefore fairly assume that the gold value of our \$700,000,000 of paper for use is \$500,000,000. To get a gold basis we must correct this discrepancy between the nominal and actual value.

There are various modes of doing this. The most direct would be to withdraw \$200,000,000 of paper. The government could do this by collecting that amount more than is required for its current payments and retiring it from use; or it could fund that amount, giving bonds which would be taken to get the interest and not for use as currency; or it might require the National Banks to withdraw any portion of the amount, and surrender it in exchange for the bonds held as security for its issue. As the debts due those banks would all, by the process, become payable in gold value, they might thus withdraw the whole amount, and still be benefited by so doing. Another mode of rectification would be to depreciate our coins to five-sevenths of their present value. People will now give five-sevenths of a gold dollar for a paper dollar, and if the gold dollar were reduced to five-sevenths, its present value, they would as readily exchange at par. In this case the whole paper issue now out would be required, and its actual value would remain the same, viz., \$700,000,000 in the new coin, or \$500,000,000 in the old or present coinage. The discrepancy between the nominal and actual value of our currency being corrected, in either of the above modes, the paper money would in fact become convertible into gold at par, and specie basis be practically reached without any law commanding it.

The depreciation of the coinage is so generally associated with national dishonesty, that without good reason we ought not to think of subjecting ourselves to the suspicion which attaches to such a measure. There are, however, good reasons why *some* reduction should now be made. It is desirable to have the value of coins made uniform throughout the world, and to do this the readiest way seems to be to adopt that of France. This would require our gold coins to be reduced about 7 per cent. Nearly all the indebtedness among us is

now payable in paper, which is about 28 per cent. below par. To return to a specie basis reduced 7 per cent. in value would relieve the debtors of one-fourth of the difference at the cost of the creditor. If this were done, and with the requirement that all contracts properly payable in gold should be paid at the old standard, little injustice would be done; the faith of the nation would be preserved, and an important change be effected with less disturbance to trade than would result from making it under normal specie paying conditions. Those who loaned specie value without stipulating for like payment would still be the losers by thus receiving only 93 per cent. of the amount in payment. But they would also lose as much in the value of their interest in less than three years, and a law which substituted paper for coin payments—a law which only necessity could justify—must entail some evils upon the community. With this reduction in the value of our coins we should only have to withdraw \$160,000,000 of paper to reach specie basis, which could be very easily accomplished. The plan proposed by Mr. Endicott of substituting compound interest notes for the amount to be withdrawn would tend to throw the contraction upon the periods at which the currency could be most conveniently spared, and thus lessen the disturbance to trade; but that the contraction should begin at the earliest of such periods a portion of these notes, instead of four, should bear six per cent. interest in currency. This being much below the rate obtained on government bonds, may be regarded as a comparatively low rate, indicating abundant supply of money, and hence, that when that rate prevails, it is a proper time to contract. Without thus reducing the volume of paper to the quantity required to make the exchanges for which it is used, at gold value, or ample provision to do it, no law requiring specie payments would avail. As well enact that people should pay their debts whether able to or not. Something more than a legislative edict is required.

If with only \$100,000,000 of gold at its command the government should resume, the gold would all be taken at once, and another \$100,000,000 be demanded; for gold would still be at 20 per cent. premium. On the other hand, some recent writers of financial reputation, assert that the government must

as a prerequisite to resumption be prepared to redeem all the greenbacks with coin. This is an exaggeration of the difficulty, and tends to discourage the effort to surmount it. When the paper is so reduced that it is only sufficient to effect, at gold prices, that portion of the exchanges for which it answers as well as coin, the point of resumption or of actual convertibility at par is reached. Reduce the paper below this, and it would command a premium in gold (unless there was at the same time a like deficiency of gold for the purposes to which it was best adapted). This was clearly shown in the case of the \$50,000,000 of paper issued early in the war, and which was receivable in lieu of gold for duties on imports. So long as there was more out than was needed for this purpose the notes of this issue were at a discount, but when the quantity was reduced they commanded a small premium in gold, not that they would pay more custom dues, but simply because they could be more readily, safely, and cheaply transferred from the debtor to the creditor—there being at that time no circulating notes or certificates representing gold.

Some writers of the same class think that legalizing contracts payable in gold would gradually improve the currency, and lead to resumption. That such contracts should be legalized is eminently proper. Nothing but the real or *supposed* necessities of war could justify such tyrannical restraint upon a people having any pretension to free government. It may, however, be doubted whether the effect upon the currency anticipated by these writers would be realized. In former cases of bank suspensions, when coin was the only lawful money, paper only was used as currency, and hence it seems very improbable that without this advantage gold would not now get into common use. But suppose it should, say to an equal extent with paper, the whole paper currency would then be applied to one-half the amount of business for which it is now used, and consequently its value, instead of being 72, would be only 36 cents to the dollar. Experience does not encourage the hope that at this, or even a much greater depreciation, it would be discarded. At Buenos Ayres the paper currency has long been worth only three to six per cent. of its nominal value,

and though very inconvenient and very destructive to their prosperity, the people there persist in using it.

The mere depreciation has no tendency to cause a portion of currency to be withdrawn. For the reasons before stated, its *real* value never can be in excess of what is required for the uses to which it is applied; and hence the demand for the whole, when there is only \$500,000,000, is no more than if the quantity were tenfold the amount; and it is just as likely to be scarce or insufficient for trade with the greater as with the lesser quantity. Again, as before stated, no portion of a currency will be hoarded for eventual payment so long as it will command interest for use, and as interest is paid in kind, those hiring can afford to pay the same per cent. upon a depreciated as upon a sound currency.

ARTICLE VI.—DR. N. W. TAYLOR'S THEOLOGY : A.
REJOINDER TO THE "PRINCETON REVIEW."

WE must give our Princeton friends a little more help towards the understanding of Dr. Taylor's system. We doubt not that the Article of Dr. Hodge in the "Princeton Review," which we examined in the April No. of the *New Englander*, would be pronounced by ninety-nine out of every hundred of Dr. Taylor's pupils a caricature of his opinions. So, with all respect for the motives of its Author, we were compelled to regard it. In our review, we specified the particulars in which it was incorrect or unfair, and made use of the occasion to expound some features of Dr. Taylor's system, in respect to which he is frequently misrepresented. With the exception of a single, slight inaccuracy, which we ourselves first discovered and pointed out, our Article requires no amendment.* Our Reviewer—in whom we recognize a respected friend—in the July number of the "Princeton Review," has not succeeded in convicting us of the least error in our representation of Dr. Taylor's doctrines.† But although the Reviewer does retract—rather grudgingly—one reiterated misstatement of Dr. Hodge, that, according to Dr. Taylor, God "brings all the influence that He can to secure the conversion of every man," he yet seeks in general to vindicate Dr. Hodge's Article, and seconds

* Besides hearing Dr. Taylor's lectures as a pupil, we had the opportunity, for several years, of daily conference with him on the principles of his system. Moreover, we took the precaution to read the manuscript of our Article to his venerable surviving colleague, the Author of the Paper in the *Christian Spectator*, in review of Fisk, from which Dr. Hodge quoted, and who may be supposed to know his own opinions as well as anybody can tell him. The manuscript was also read before five or six theologians residing in New Haven, who were intimately acquainted with Dr. Taylor and with his teachings. It will thus be seen that some pains were taken to make the Article a correct representation of his system, and that some advantages were enjoyed for securing this result.

† Pp. 382, 383.

him in the attempt to identify Dr. Taylor's system with Pelagianism.

How is this attempt prosecuted? And what is the difference between ourselves and the "Princeton Review," on this subject? Dr. Taylor made it the work of his life, so far as he labored as a theologian, to combine two elements—the truths involved in man's freedom, and those involved in man's dependence—into a coherent system. He never thought of giving up either of these elements. He clung to one as firmly as to the other. He made one as prominent as the other. Whether he was successful, whether his solution of the problem will stand, is not here the question. Now, his opponents take one of these elements or conceptions—the power of contrary choice, draw from it such inferences as *they think* it involves, and set forth these inferences as if they were his opinions. This is the besetting sin of controversialists. The Germans aptly call it *consequenz-macherei*—the manufacturing of inferences for an opponent, which he repudiates. That this practice is ethically indefensible, none will dispute. Would it be fair, for example, in us to ascribe to the Princeton theologians the deductions which we think to follow logically from their doctrine of gratuitous condemnation for Adam's sin? Would it be fair to impute to them the doctrine that God is the author of sin? Dr. Hodge declares that Dr. Shedd's theory of Original Sin involves materialism and leads to Pantheism. Would it be just to call him a materialist or a Pantheist? Would it be right to ignore all that Dr. Shedd may say in defense of theism and of the spirituality of the soul? How unjust it would be to style a professed believer in the Saviour's divinity a "humanitarian," and, paying no heed to the rest of his teaching, to quote exclusively his assertions of a human nature in Jesus! Yet it is by a like process that Dr. Hodge and our Reviewer would prove Dr. Taylor a Pelagian. In some cases, as we showed in our last Article, propositions are attributed to him, which he explicitly denied. Our Reviewer admits that there are declarations of Dr. Taylor that clash with the Reviewer's interpretation of him; but these are spoken of as the unconscious utterances in which a Christian mind will occasionally contradict its own errors. This explanation, in the

case of Dr. Taylor, is little less than diverting. He thought on these questions with steady assiduity for nearly half a century; he canvassed them with a multitude of pupils, many of them acute and able men; he went through the fires of a long controversy. There never was an instance where this idea of "unconscious testimonies to the truth" is more completely inapplicable. Besides, these sound doctrines, whose alleged inconsistency with his Pelagianism is accounted for in this charitable way, were in the forefront of his system, deliberately announced, exactly defined, and elaborately defended. The fallacious procedure of Dr. Hodge and of our Reviewer may be exposed in a word. In effect, they say that Dr. Taylor held to the power of contrary choice, and therefore could not have held to moral inability; and then from this power to the contrary they spin out all their baleful conclusions, which they describe as if they formed a part of his system. Now, why not take the opposite course and maintain that as he held to moral inability, he could not have held to the power to the contrary? He declared his belief in inability as strenuously as he asserted the power of contrary choice. If, on account of the alleged incompatibility of the two doctrines, he is to be charged with denying one of them, it is logically and ethically as fair to rob him of the one as of the other. We do not say that there are not incongruous elements in Dr. Taylor's theology. We do say, however, that even this is not to be lightly assumed. He was one of the most acute of thinkers; one of the most industrious too, and conscientious. The objections brought against his system were familiar to his mind through a long series of years. He carefully considered them and believed himself able to show that they are destitute of force. It is, then, not to be hastily affirmed that he adopted contradictory opinions in philosophy and theology. But this, we repeat, is not the question in debate. The question is not whether his opinions were true or false, but what his opinions were. And on this question we insist that neither Dr. Hodge nor our Reviewer, however honest their intentions, have given a fair and just representation. They will never interpret Dr. Taylor correctly, until they look at his system on all sides, and

more from his own point of view, and cease to blend their own inferences with their description of his teaching.

We shall best subserve the chief end we have in view, which is the elucidation of certain points in Dr. Taylor's system, and at the same time incidentally confute criticisms of the Reviewer, if we bring out as distinctly as possible several of Dr. Taylor's leading doctrines.

1. *Dr. Taylor's doctrine of the previous certainty of every choice, which certainty is dependent on the antecedents of the choice.*

The Reviewer quotes from a paragraph in our previous Article the following sentences :

"The true solution of the problem, in Dr. Taylor's view, is in the union of the doctrine of the previous certainty of every act of the will—a certainty given by its antecedents, collectively taken—with the power of contrary choice. * * * He held to a connection between choice and its antecedents, of such a character as to give in every case a previous certainty that the former will be what it actually is. The ground or reason of this certainty lies in the constitution of the agent and the motives under which he acts; that is to say, in the antecedents taken together. The infallible connection of these with the consequent, the divine mind perceives; though we may not dogmatize on the exact *manner* of His perception. The precise nature of the connection between the antecedents and consequent, Dr. Taylor did not profess to explain; but he held that the same antecedents *will* uniformly be followed by the same consequent.

The Reviewer is not quite clear in his comments on this passage. He remarks that under this view "actual contrary choice is precluded." Of course it is precluded; that is, there is a previous certainty that the choice *will* be what it is. This is what Dr. Taylor asserted. The Reviewer observes again: "If this consequent *i. e.* choice be thus indissolubly connected with what precedes, and with a certainty sure to Omniscience, does not this connection surely preclude the contrary choice?" "Surely?" Yes, and this is exactly what Dr. Taylor maintains; surely, but not necessarily, there being a power to the opposite. The Reviewer seems to question, although he does not directly deny, the correctness of our representation of Dr. Taylor in this particular. We therefore affirm that he taught the propositions contained in the paragraph quoted from our Article as distinctly and emphatically as he taught the truth of the existence of God. We are permitted to extract a few

passages from the unprinted manuscript of his Lectures on the Will, which comprise a very elaborate and masterly examination of that subject. At the outset, in his opening lecture on "Moral Liberty," he defines his doctrine as follows:

"The freedom of the will, the doctrine of moral liberty maintained in these pages, differs from any which places moral liberty in freedom to execute choice in external action; for it places it exclusively in internal liberty. It differs from any which places it in freedom from all involuntary restraint or compulsion, or freedom from an opposing will; for it might as well be placed in the freedom of a body moving in one direction, not to move in the opposite direction at the same time. It differs from any which places it in a self-determining power of the will, by which it determines every volition by a previous volition; for the absurdity of such a self-determining power is fully asserted and exposed. It differs from any which denies the previous certainty of all volition, and its consistency with moral liberty. It differs from any which asserts that the freedom of the will consists in its freedom or exemption from dependence on every cause external to the will, which determines it to choose as it does and not otherwise; for the dependence of volition on such a cause is asserted and maintained to be consistent with moral liberty. It differs from any which denies *all* previous necessity of volition; for it admits, if any choose to affirm, that kind of previous necessity which is given by certainty. But the doctrine of moral liberty now maintained, denies that there is any *cause of volition* which gives the *necessity* of volition, or which gives an impossibility of the opposite volition instead of the actual volition. If there is such a cause of volition, a cause which gives the impossibility of the opposite volition instead of the actual volition, then the doctrine of moral liberty is groundless and false. But if the cause of volition, or the cause that the mind chooses as it does and not otherwise, gives merely the certainty of volition, and not its necessity, or, what is the same thing, not an impossibility of the opposite volition instead of the actual volition, then the doctrine of moral liberty is true. Even the possibility of such a cause of volition subverts every argument for necessity as opposed to moral liberty, and leaves every argument in support of moral liberty in full force. Hence the question,—the only question on which the controversy respecting moral liberty depends, is whether it be possible in the nature of things that there should be a cause that the mind chooses as it does and not otherwise, which gives *the certainty* without giving the necessity of its so choosing.

"The advocates of moral liberty often betray a groundless reluctance to admit that there is a *previous certainty* of all volition; that there is a cause external to the will itself of its choosing as it does and not otherwise; and especially to admit that there is that kind of necessity of volition which mere certainty gives; not perceiving that neither of these things is inconsistent with the highest conceivable degree of moral liberty. The advocates of necessity, in most cases, seem not to be satisfied with maintaining merely the previous certainty of volition, nor that there is a cause of this certainty, nor yet that there is a necessity of volition given by this certainty; but are strenuous in maintaining a *cause* of volition which gives *the necessity* of volition, lest the door should be opened to chance or hap-hazard contingency. The great truth to be maintained in the view

is moral liberty. The great error to be exposed in the view of the hap-hazard contingency. The desideratum is to bring one of the two to see that the certainty of volition given by its cause, and the necessity given by its certainty and not by its cause, can in no degree endanger the doctrine of moral liberty; and to bring the other to see that though the necessity of volition as *seen* by its cause is denied, yet so long as the certainty of volition as given by its cause (and the necessity of volition as given by its certainty) is admitted, no support is given to the doctrine of hap-hazard contingency. Could the contending parties be brought clearly to see, and steadily to admit, that the certainty of volition as given by the cause of volition is consistent with power to the contrary volition in the given circumstances; or that the cause of volition gives the certainty of volition without giving the necessity of volition, or without giving an impossibility of the opposite instead of the actual volition, no ground of controversy would remain. It would then be seen on the one hand that the doctrine of the *providential* government of God over his moral creation, with all the momentous truths which it involves, has an adequate basis in the previous certainty of every volition; and on the other, that the doctrine of the moral government of God, with the moral agency and responsibility of man, has an equally substantial foundation in that liberty which results from power to the contrary choice. When, therefore, it shall become an admitted principle—an axiom with the contending parties—that certainty of action (volition) is consistent with power to the contrary, then and not till then can we hope that the controversy concerning moral liberty will end."

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The Reviewer might have found in Dr. Taylor's published writings an argument to establish the proposition "that God secures the accomplishment of those of his providential purposes which respect human action, *through the constitution of man and the circumstances in which he acts.*"* We stated that Dr. Taylor held that "the same antecedents *will* uniformly be followed by the same consequent," *i. e.*, volition. This is implied throughout his discussions respecting the will; but he expressly says: "*The principle that the same mind in the same circumstances always chooses in the same manner is incontrovertible*, and renders it impossible to prove the hap-hazard contingency of volition." He argues for this proposition at length, from the admitted axiom that every event must have a cause. In regard to God's foreknowledge of free actions, Dr. Taylor says: "That God cannot foresee the actions of his creatures, unless their actions are *certain* under his government, is indeed undeniable. That God cannot foresee the actions of creatures, without knowing that given *ante-*

* Moral Government, II., 312.

cedents will be followed by given actions as their *consequents*, is equally undeniable." "My incapacity to tell *how* God foreknows the actions of free agents, no more warrants a doubt of the fact of his actual foresight, than my incapacity to tell or conceive *how* he creates a mind is a reason to doubt this fact."

Thus the paragraph cited by the Reviewer from our Article is shown to be in every particular a precise description of Dr. Taylor's teaching. What does the Reviewer say of it? At the first reading of his remarks, they seemed to us to sanction the doctrines set forth in the quotation. He says: "It is, in itself considered, simply the doctrine of common Calvinism and Catholic Christianity in regard to the relation of predestination and foreknowledge to the acts of free agents. According to this, free agency and antecedent certainty coincide, so that all free acts are rendered certain by antecedent causes, which reach back to the divine decree." The Reviewer seemed to be hoisting the banner of Taylorism on the walls of Princeton. But it will be observed that he qualifies his approval of the doctrine of the quotation by the phrase, "in itself considered." He also connects with it inferences which Dr. Taylor denies to be legitimate—such as the rejection of the power to the contrary, the assertion that sin can always and everywhere be prevented by divine power without impairing free agency, etc. What we desire to insist upon is that the quotation accurately represents Dr. Taylor's opinions, which to this extent, by the admission of the Reviewer, are coincident with "common Calvinism and Catholic Christianity." There can no longer be any excuse for saying or implying that Dr. Taylor did not hold to the previous certainty of volitions—a certainty dependent upon their antecedents, or the constitution and circumstances of the agent.

2. *Dr. Taylor's doctrine of character, as consisting in a voluntary principle, or state of the will, which controls the inward as well as the outward life.*

Dr. Taylor held, as we have before explained, that at the foundation of all specific moral choices or actions, there is a generic, elective preference of a chief good. Men are not continually choosing this good, but having once chosen it, they continue in the state of preference in which their choice,

whether good or evil, placed them ; and, in the case of sinners, they commonly do not reflect or think of this deep fountain of action until they are awakened by the call to repentance. The opponents of Dr. Taylor frequently ascribe to him more superficial views of moral character and action. The Reviewer complains that we refer to the doctrine of the older writers that all sin is voluntary, although they did not distinguish, as he did, between sensibilities and will. This difference we carefully pointed out, but we still claim that in his profound view of the nature of character he stands in the same line with these writers. The same thing which he calls a governing purpose is held, under other terms of description, by President Marsh and Professor Shedd in their definitions of character. Although Dr. Taylor distinguished, as all thorough and consistent theologians at the present day must, between feeling and will, he did not hold, as the Reviewer erroneously states, that sin and holiness belong "to acts of the will with respect to known law, exclusively of the sensibilities." Choice is a complex state of mind, involving both thought and feeling. Dr. Taylor thought that the preference at the bottom of character carries with it the affections of the soul. It is "predominant" within the soul, as well as over the conduct. Mark the following statements in regard to it :

"It is what is commonly called the *governing principle* of the mind, inasmuch as in its true nature and tendency, it reigns over the whole man, controlling and directing all other action in subservience to the accomplishment of its object or end." "As a predominant principle, whether the morally right or the morally wrong principle, it sways and determines all—all thought, *all feeling or emotion, all desires*, all volitions, all subordinate and all executive action—the whole inner and outer man. It is the grand central power which takes under its dominion the entire productive energy of a moral being. It thus employs powers the most exalted—powers which in comparison degrade all others—powers unparalleled for good and for evil—either for the best, or for the worst conceivable results of power."^{*}

Of the good and evil preference of the soul, he says :

"Each is an act of *the will and heart*, or an elective preference, by which I mean that it includes two elements, viz., choice and affection." "The morally right act or state of the mind is often spoken of as an act of the will—an elective act—an act of choosing. *Vide* Deut. xxiv., 15-24; Prov. i., 29; Isa. vii., 15;

* Moral Government, I., 41.

Luke x, 42. *The more prominent element, however, in this state of mind is affection; and hence it is most frequently designated in some manner which presents it as a state of affection.* In these cases, however, the language is so used as to show that it is a *supreme* affection; or that it is love not as a mere constitutional emotion, but as involving an act of the will; i. e., that it is an elective preference. Matt. x, 37; xdl, 37; I John ii, 15, 16; Acts xi, 23.”

That the root of responsibility is in the will, or elective faculty, is indeed maintained; but that the exercise of this faculty carries with it the affections, is not less clearly set forth.

3. *Dr. Taylor's doctrine of the permanence of character, and in the case of sinful character, of its hopeless permanence, apart from the inward operation of supernatural Grace.*

One of the prime characteristics of the governing preference, on which Dr. Taylor most earnestly insisted, is its permanence. It is something fixed, abiding. Thus, speaking of the fundamental principle of character in general, he says :

“The preference of an object as supreme has a peculiar tendency to perpetuate itself, by confining thought and feeling to its object, and engrossing the whole mind with it. It thus strengthens feeling, and strengthens itself, and becomes *permanent* so far as it can be, with a physical possibility and yet with the lowest probability of change.” “As soon as it exists, and without use or custom, it is a supreme affection fixed on its object as the chief good—as the portion of the soul—and is thus in its very beginning what philosophers have called it—a *habit* of the mind.” “It is found to be *permanent*—to be engrossed with and ever intent on its object—to be ever present in the mind in relation to its object, that its object may never be disregarded, nor fail to be obtained for want of constancy or fixedness of affection.”†

Instead of denying the self-perpetuating tendency of sin, or making light of it, he contended for it with all his resources of eloquence and reasoning. And now we come directly to the question: Did Dr. Taylor hold the doctrine of moral inability? To answer the question, we must first determine what is meant by moral inability. From the time of President Edwards this term has had one established signification, viz., a fixed disinclination such as involves the certainty of its own continuance. President Edwards in a hundred places lays down this definition. He who believes that every impenitent sinner will continue an impenitent sinner without converting grace, believes in moral inability, in the New England sense. Is it requisite to prove that Dr. Taylor held, defended, preached and pro-

* Moral Government, I. 49.

† Ibid. p. 26.

claimed this doctrine? Is it necessary to take up room in citing passages from his printed and unprinted writings, to establish what everybody who knows anything of his teaching ought to know? The infallible certainty of the perseverance of every sinner in impenitence, if left to himself, was a cornerstone in his theological system. Let a single paragraph suffice as an example of his uniform teaching on this theme.

*"Not a human being will comply with the terms of life without divine grace. Abundant as is the provision for the salvation of all, unqualified as are the overtures of pardon and life, free as men are from all preventing influence from God, abundantly able as they are as moral agents to comply with the terms of salvation, and willing, yea, solicitous as God is that they should comply and be saved, not one will do it. Left to themselves, each and all of them will persist in rejecting Christ, and by their own choice plunge into perdition. I wish you to look at this world of sinners in this condition. Nothing but voluntary, willful perverseness can ruin any one of them. Yet with all that eternal mercy has done, with the same powers in kind which angels possess, yea, made in this respect in the very image of God (Jas. iii. 9,) and invited and allured by all the entreaties and proffers of redeeming grace—in defiance of all the motives a universe can furnish—they will go down to hell, if the interposing grace of God does not prevent."**

4. Dr. Taylor's doctrine of the sovereignty of God in the bestowal of renewing Grace.

We subjoin a few remarks under this head, in addition to those offered in our former Article. In his Discourses on Election, Dr. Taylor inculcates the doctrine that "God has eternally purposed to renew, and sanctify, and save a part only of mankind." This doctrine, he declares, is distinct from that of a "national election," the only election which is admitted by "Pelagians, Arminians, and, indeed, all who oppose the orthodox doctrine." Again, it is not an "election to salvation, or a purpose to save a part of mankind on condition of foreseen repentance and faith." This, he says, "is not the orthodox doctrine of election, properly so called; nor by any means all that they believe respecting God's purpose to save a part of mankind. This is not merely a purpose to *save*," it is "a purpose to *renew, sanctify*, and save a part only of mankind."

"If we believe in the necessity of divine influence to change the heart, in other words, that holiness in man is the gift of God, we must believe that God

* Revealed Theology, p. 378.

purposes to give a new heart of holiness to all to whom he does give it ; and that if he begins the work, and carries it on, and finishes it in eternal glory, He *designed* to do what He does. For who will say that God ever acts without design ; that He does anything without intending to do it ? Is that grace of the Holy Spirit which is to produce, perpetuate, and bless God's redeemed kingdom, directed by chance ! Does ignorance or fate sit at the helm of the universe and sway its destinies ? We all know, and we all believe, that if God has made us Christians He meant to do it ; or, in the language of the Apostle, ' of His own will begat He us.' Without a feeling or note of discord, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists, are ready to join in the song, ' Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give glory.' **

This is not an exceptional utterance of Dr. Taylor. It is a fair specimen of his usual strain of remark on this subject. He denied, as we have before shown, that the grace of the Spirit is given indiscriminately, or in equal measure to all. Holding that converting grace is indispensable to the sinner and his only hope, he was very earnest in controverting the position frequently taken by Arminians, that this grace is always at the sinner's command.

"Three views of the dispensation of the Spirit may be taken. One, that God will wait and be ready to grant His Spirit whenever the sinner is ready to receive it. The second, that He will not now grant repentance. The third, that He will do as He pleases—give, or not give, as it seemeth good in His sight. Now, to illustrate the tendency of these views, let us suppose a case. Suppose a man wishes to go from one place to another by steamboat, and that on the most urgent and important business. Suppose, also, like every sinner, he has some business of less consequence which he would be glad to transact before he sets off. Suppose, now, he sends a servant to the captain of the boat to see whether he will not accommodate him in this respect by waiting half an hour, and the captain to return one of the following answers : first, that ' he will wait, as he wishes.' Now, he goes quickly to his business here instead of hastening to the boat. Or : ' he will not wait a moment beyond the hour.' The man looks at his watch and finds it too late ; it cannot be done now ; and all is despair, and of course no effort. But the third answer is, ' He will do as he pleases ;' and now he looks at his watch and sees that he may reach the boat and he may not. Now he runs ; he flies. Not a moment must be lost. So the sinner, if he believes he can safely defer, will defer. If there is no hope from present action, he will not act. But when, by immediate action, he may succeed, and by delay all may be lost, then, if ever, will he hasten to his God and Saviour." †

Now, the Reviewer misconceives and so entirely misrepresents the position of Dr. Taylor on this topic. He charges Dr. Taylor with teaching, in one of the Essays on the Means of Re-

* *Revealed Theology*, p. 274, seq.

† *Practical Sermons*, p. 269.

generation,* that salvation is at all times practically within the sinner's reach; whereas, in the paragraphs referred to, from which the Reviewer cites fragmentary passages, Dr. Taylor is contending against this doctrine with the utmost energy. He is arguing to show that whilst the sinner is dependent on the sovereign will of God for regenerating grace, he ought to set himself at once to the performance of his duty, and may reasonably do so, since "it *may* prove to be a fact that he shall perform it;" that is, that the grace of God will now, as a matter of fact, produce this result. If it be a known truth, an absolute certainty, that he *will not* now repent, he will make no effort. But this *may be*, in the counsels of God, the very hour: let him then awake, arise, and turn from his sins! But let him not flatter himself that the Spirit will always remain with him or come at his beck. There is only a "peradventure." In short, he cannot know that God will, or that God will not, convert him at this time.

"Were the grace," says Dr. Taylor, "on which the sinner depends, *known* to be at his own disposal, always furnished and ready for his use until the hour of death; would he not take new courage to go on in his iniquity?" "Why the solemn and reiterated charge not to grieve—not to resist the Holy Ghost? Why the solemn asseveration, that He shall not always strive with men? Why these monitory cautions, if there is no danger of being abandoned by His heavenly influence! Why, if there is no giving up to a reprobate mind, and to strong delusions that infallibly terminate in damnation,—why are we expressly told of those on whom this judgment infallibly lights even in this world?" "Why, without one word of exception or qualification throughout the sacred volume, in respect to all preliminary acts and doings as the ground of hope, is the sinner shut up to the faith; and all that can cheer or sustain his guilty bosom, fixed to the single point of duty with the mere 'peradventure' that God will give him repentance? Why is all this, if God does not design to impart a fearful uncertainty to the prospect of the sinner's conversion?"†

With these paragraphs, and pages more of the same purport, staring him in the face, the Reviewer attributes to the Article the doctrine that "regeneration is wholly the sinner's act," without the admission of "the lowest form of inability!" We sincerely acquit the Reviewer of all designed misrepresentation; but if he had quoted the paragraphs from which he has picked out a few scattered sentences, he would have demonstrated to his readers the incorrectness of his interpretations

* *Christian Spectator*, 1829. Pp. 692-712.

† *Ib.*, 1829. Pp. 707, 708.

and the groundless character of his inferences. He would have shown them that, instead of denying the doctrine of dependence, Dr. Taylor was aiming to find in the impressive assertion of that very truth a cogent and affecting motive for immediate action on the part of an awakened sinner. The Reviewer has misled himself by the ambiguity of the word *practicable*. An awakened sinner, says Dr. Taylor, is not to be told that his salvation is not now practicable; he is to be told that it *is* practicable. The context makes the meaning perfectly clear. It may be the appointed time of his conversion. The probability that it is so is sufficient to prompt him to action,—to warrant him in striving to enter into the strait gate. The dependence of the sinner is no ground for inaction, nor for presumption.

"How much probability of success, as pertaining to those imperfect efforts which sinners make in turning to God, is best adapted to prompt them to immediate action? One thing is certain, there is no promise of God that his grace shall attend these attempts of the sinner. So far from it that for aught we can say to him, he may be already given up to hardness of heart. Not only is there no certainty of success in these attempts, but in proportion to the probability of it, and the facility of performing the unwelcome task, the danger of delay is diminished, and with it the pressure of the motive to present effort. Nor is this all. If there is a high probability of success from present attempts, then there is a higher probability than would otherwise exist from future attempts; and it is this belief, it is this false persuasion, that the work can be easily done now, and easily done at any future time, that is the solace of the sinner in procrastinating his duty to his God. To influence him, then, most powerfully to present action in duty, *the prospect of success must be viewed as doubtful*. It must be lowered down to what the Apostle calls a *peradventure* that God will give repentance."*

Overlooking the ambiguity of the terms "may" and "practicable," as they occur in two or three sentences of the Essay on the Means of Regeneration, the Reviewer has fallen into the mistake of attributing to Dr. Taylor a view quite contrary to the explicit doctrine of that Essay and to his uniform teaching and preaching on the subject of the sinner's dependence. He has represented Dr. Taylor as holding that the sinner, viewed as dependent on grace, has salvation completely and at all times within his reach; whereas his real doctrine—a

* *Revealed Theology*, p. 433.

doctrine most emphatically and constantly asserted—was that the sinner, thus viewed, can *never* be *sure* on this point, and that his reasonable hope of being blessed with renewing grace may become indefinitely small.*

What becomes of the charge of Pelagianism brought against him by the Princeton theologians? We observe that in the *Outlines of Theology*, his opinions are usually described as semi-pelagian, and carefully distinguished from the Pelagian forms of doctrine. But now it seems that they are considered by Dr. Hodge and our Reviewer as not only Pelagian, but worse. We called attention, in our Article, to two essential points in which Dr. Taylor was in radical opposition to the Pelagians. The one was his doctrine of moral inability, growing out of the self-perpetuating tendency of sin. In reply to what the Reviewer says of the view of Pelagius on this topic, and to the use which the Reviewer makes of a passage cited by Neander, we have only to refer to our former Article, where the atomical view of character is shown to be a leading peculiarity of Pelagianism. It is alike futile to attempt to make it out that the Pelagians did, or that Dr. Taylor did not, believe in the hopeless permanence of sinful character—in moral inability. The other point to which we drew special attention was Dr. Taylor's assertion of the need of the supernatural

*The Reviewer rather bluntly contradicts our statement that Dr. Hodge agrees with Dr. Fitch in "not teaching that grace is, properly speaking, irresistible." He calls it a "groundless statement." Are we to infer, then, that Dr. A. A. Hodge has made an improvement in theology under this topic? He says of the special influences of grace, peculiar to the Christian: "The second class of influences are certainly efficacious, but *are neither resistible nor irresistible*, because they act from within and carry the will spontaneously with them. *It is to be lamented that the term 'irresistible grace' has ever been used.*"—(*Outlines of Theology*, p. 389.) We confess to the error, if it be an error, of supposing that the younger Dr. Hodge was not only speaking for him-elf, but for the senior Professor also. As Dr. A. A. Hodge affirms that special grace is *not* irresistible—"neither resistible nor irresistible"—and *laments* that the term "irresistible" should ever have been applied to the subject, it follows that both our Reviewer and the senior Professor are responsible for causing him lamentation. But Dr. A. A. Hodge may console himself with the reflection that he agrees with President Edwards, who calls the question whether grace is irresistible or not "perfect nonsense."

operation of the Holy Spirit. We said that Dr. Hodge had let fall a very misleading remark, when he made Pelagius and Dr. Taylor agree perfectly, because the former, as well as the latter, held that "men do actually obey God without grace." We proved, from Augustine, that the Pelagians excluded the Spirit's influence from their conception of grace. We think that candor required of the Reviewer that he should directly admit that Dr. Hodge, in this instance, had inadvertently done Dr. Taylor great injustice. As he has not done so, we are obliged to reiterate our accusation. What did the Pelagians mean by grace? Here we call on a competent scholar, Dr. A. A. Hodge—the initials are right this time—to tell us. "Pelagians," he says, "assert . . . that the Holy Spirit produces no inward change in the heart of the subject, except as he is the author of the Scriptures, and as the Scriptures present moral truths and motives, which, of their own nature, exert a moral influence upon the soul." "Pelagians maintain . . . as to God's grace, that it is nothing more than the favorable constitution of our own minds, and the influence exerted on them by the truth he has revealed to us, and the propitious circumstances in which he has placed us."† "The Pelagian theory differs from all the rest"—that is, the Romish, Arminian, and Oberlin theories of Perfection— . . . "in denying the necessity of the intervention of supernatural grace, to the end of making men perfect." It is a question of historical fact. It is the question how Pelagianism, according to the understanding of Augustine and his orthodox successors, defines grace. We submit to our readers that the incorrectness and injustice of identifying Dr. Taylor's opinion, on this subject, with that of the Pelagians, have been fully demonstrated. We understand Pelagianism as Dr. A. A. Hodge does; it is undeniable that Dr. Taylor taught that no man repents or is holy without the supernatural intervention of the Spirit. The proof of the incorrectness of Dr. Hodge's charge is complete.

The Reviewer follows Dr. Hodge in the attempt to fasten on the New Haven divines the Jesuit theory of *scientia media*.

* *Outlines of Theology*, p. 385.

† P. 412. The same thing is said on p. 402.

He contends that, on their theory of the will, there is no other possible mode of foreseeing free actions; but as he maintains also that on their theory foreknowledge, even by *scientia media*, is logically precluded, we do not see that he does anything to establish his point. He certainly does not shut them up to *scientia media*, by showing that they are cut off from this, as well as every other, theory of foreknowledge! What was Dr. Hodge's definition of *scientia media*? "God foresees who will, and who will not, submit to the plan of salvation. Those whom He foresees will submit, He elects to eternal life; those whom He foresees will not submit, He predestinates to eternal death. The New Haven divines adopt the same distinction, and apply it to the same purpose." The doctrine here imputed to the New Haven divines is (1) election to life or salvation, instead of election to faith, and (2) election on the mere ground of foreseen faith. Now it is strange, at the outset, to find Dr. Hodge quoting, in support of his charge, this sentence from Dr. Fitch's Review of Fisk, in the "Christian Spectator" of 1831: "it was to *be* believers, and not *as* believers, that He chose them under the guidance of His (*scientia media*) foreknowledge." This is election "*to be* believers," not election to salvation in consequence of faith foreseen. We affirmed that although Dr. Fitch, in this instance, uses the term *scientia media*, he does not apply it in the sense of the Jesuit theologians, and that he does not teach the doctrine ascribed to him by Dr. Hodge. The difference is that Dr. Fitch holds that the renewal of the believer, as well as its consequences, is the object of a distinct purpose on the part of God, and is the effect of special measures which secure this result. "The New Haven divines did not teach that grace is given in equal measure to all individuals; nor did they teach that the number of the elect is made up of those who were foreseen to be most pliable under recovering influences, and *vice versa*."

Dr. Fitch was led to introduce the term *scientia media*, in refuting the charge of Fisk, that according to Calvinism, God forms his decrees blindly. "If God must predetermine events in order to know them," said Fisk, "then, as the cause is in no case dependent on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed, and his plan contrived, independently of his knowledge,

with apparent contradictions, seeming impossibilities, all of which Dr. Lange, on the wings of some grand symbolic idea, lightly surmounts. Not less important, in view of the leading object of this commentary, is another consideration. On this theory, of what we may call the universal sense of Scripture, as distinguished from the double sense, fourfold sense, &c., the homiletical resources of the commentary are indefinitely increased. The most unpromising material, a genealogical table even, becomes at once rich in hidden meaning. To those who are in quest of the raw material for sermons, we cannot commend a better commentary, nor to those who seek illustration of the real meaning of Scripture a worse. This is buried hopelessly out of sight under the weight of Dr. Lange's "General Preliminary," "Exegetical and Critical," "Doctrinal and Ethical," "Homiletical and Practical" Remarks.

We have still to speak of the work of the translators and editors. With Prof. Lewis's translation, which covers the Introduction to Genesis, and the first eleven and last fourteen chapters of the Commentary, we have little fault to find. He rarely misses the sense of the German. His additions, however, which fill near a hundred pages, and which comprise a special introduction to the first chapter of Genesis, discussions, some of them at considerable length, of particular passages or subjects suggested by them, and numerous philological and doctrinal notes, do not add, proportionately, in our estimation, to the value of the work. They make an unwieldy book still more unwieldy. Though a little less fanciful, his interpretations are as wide of the historic sense, and as dogmatic as Dr. Lange's. On the philological side, also, where his learning is most conspicuous, the want of sound method and sober judgment is no less so. Such linguistic philosophy as we find in his "Excursus on the Confusion of Languages," or such etymology as that which identifies Oceanus with Gihon, and the Latin *genus* with Cain, ought not to be any longer possible.

The remainder of the work, viz.: the Introduction to the Old Testament, and chapters xii.—xxxvi. of the Commentary, have been translated by Dr. Gosman;—a translation which will take rank with the worst published, and may perhaps become a classic among them,

"By merit raised to that bad eminence."

Not only in passages of more difficulty but often in the simplest idioms and constructions he is at fault. That our language is not too strong, the following examples will show.

Dr. Fitch, as well as by Dr. A. A. Hodge. Says Dr. Fitch: "Dr. Fisk overlooks the distinction made by Calvinists, between an election to *holiness* and an election to *salvation*. The latter all Calvinists admit to be conditional—to 'have a reference to character!' God has elected none to be saved, except on the condition that they voluntarily embrace the Gospel, and persevere unto the end. But the question is, How comes any man to *comply* with this condition—to *have* the character in question? Does not God secure that compliance? Does He not elect the individuals who shall voluntarily obey and persevere? Calvinists affirm that He does. The election unto *holiness* is the turning point of their system. They never speak of an election unto *salvation*, except as founded upon it—as presupposing God's purpose to secure the *condition* of salvation, in the hearts of the elect."* "They simply affirm that it is owing, in *fact*, to His influence"—the influence of the Spirit—"that impenitent sinners submit to God and accept of the Saviour."† "The only inquiry then is, whether it is a fact that God does actually render certain the perseverance of those who believe." "It surely cannot be disproved by the mere fact that *means* are adopted and employed by God, to secure their perseverance in faith. 'But,' Dr. Fisk replies, 'the end was' in this case 'fixed before the means.' We reply that the end is secured *by* the means. The purpose of God to employ the means, with the certain knowledge that they would secure the end, is the only proper account of his purposing and fixing the end."‡ "It is a gracious interposition of the Spirit of God, which secures the repentance and faith of a sinner; and constitutes the certainty of his thus differing from his fellow sinners, who still continue impenitent and under condemnation."§ "Why do given sinners repent? Is there no ground of certainty, but what lies simply in their *powers* of agency? for we think Dr. Fisk's scheme necessarily involves this. Does God use no influences and means to induce sinners to come to him with voluntary submission and accept of life? Are these influences and means

* *Christian Spectator*, 1881, p. 619.† *Ibid.*, p. 623.‡ *Ibid.*, p. 623.§ *Ibid.*, p. 633.

brought to bear alike on all nations and on all individuals! We object, therefore, to this scheme, that it does not embrace the whole truth."* Christians "owe it to the *grace* of God that they turn and live."†

This is surely neither the Arminian nor the Molinist doctrine.

After quoting from the New Haven divines sundry extracts relating to moral agency and the prevention of sin, our Reviewer says: "They describe a free-agency, which is an utter negation of the power of God to predetermine its actings, by any antecedents which ensure the certainty of acting in any given way, to the exclusion of the contrary." "Let what will be supposed, such a possibility of choosing either way remains, that there can be no 'evidence or proof,' because there can be no antecedents, no decisive influence, fixing the choice in any given way, and therefore no preceding certainty, evidence, or proof that it will be so." The Reviewer is at perfect liberty to hold that unless the will be determined by "creative omnipotence," there is no possibility of securing the certainty of its action; that, on any other supposition, human actions cannot be foreseen; that if God cannot prevent all sin, He cannot prevent any; but he should distinctly advertise his readers that Dr. Taylor denied every one of these propositions and declared each of them a *non sequitur*. Dr. Taylor affirmed that God does prevent sin, and a vast amount of sin. All that he asserts in the passages cited, is, first, that free-agency ever involves a power to sin; secondly, that from this it follows that no *a priori* argument can be formed—no argument founded on the *nature of agency*—no "evidence or proof" in this sense, that a being who *can* sin, *will not* sin. He met the skeptic who says that God might have prevented sin where he has not prevented it, and might have done this with no disadvantage to the system;—precisely as Bishop Butler meets him in the sixth Chapter of the First Part of his Analogy, by calling these objections "mere arbitrary assertions." The statement that "the origin and continuance of evil might easily

* *Christian Spectator*, pp. 680, 681.

† *Ibid.*, p. 683.

have been prevented by repeated interpositions; interpositions so guarded and circumstanced as would preclude all mischief arising from them," Butler calls an unauthorized assertion, which cannot be established. Dr. Taylor said the same. The mischief that might be conceived to arise, as the result of such interpositions, is the outbreaking of evil in another quarter, or the impairing and destruction of free-agency itself. Dr. Taylor did not think it necessary to assert that such mischiefs *would* follow; it was enough for him, as for Butler, to declare that they might result, for aught that the skeptic can prove to the contrary. If Dr. Taylor is charged with overthrowing the doctrine of a Divine government by his views on this subject, he at least sits in the pillory in good company,—even side by side with the Author of the immortal "Analogy."

What was Dr. Taylor's main proposition respecting the prevention of sin? It may be that God could not wisely, benevolently prevent the sin which He actually has not prevented. This, all agree, is a safe and harmless doctrine. "That God *could* not"—that is, it was not within the *power* of God thus to do. Why not? A frequent answer was, because sin was the necessary means of the greatest good. This dogma, said Dr. Taylor, not only limits the divine power; it affixes dishonor to his other attributes of wisdom and benevolence. The question of the skeptic—of Epicurus and of Hume—returns: Why not have prevented sin? Dr. Taylor did not say that perhaps God "could" not; as if He needed, or could be conceived to have, more power than omnipotence; but He could not *wisely*; that is, without such interpositions as would result in more harm than they prevent. But what harm, it is further inquired, can be conceived to attend such exertions of divine power? In reply to this question, Dr. Taylor gave the more specific response that such a supposed interposition, altering as it would the existing system of influence, *might* occasion sin elsewhere, or *might* involve the maiming or destruction of the powers of free-agency. Thus the exclusion of sin, its exclusion at least from the best system—the system now established—*may* not be an object of power; it may be impossible, as being incompatible with the conditions of such a system. The head and front of Dr. Taylor's offending had this extent, no more.

He gave an explication of an admitted principle. In insisting, as he did, in passages quoted by the Reviewer, that it is impossible to prove *a priori* that *any* free agent can be prevented from sinning, he was maintaining a premise on which his refutation of the skeptic must rest. He was merely guarding the approaches to the citadel. If the will can be swayed by *dint of power merely*; if this be the proper conception of the will and of the nature of divine influence upon it, Dr. Taylor saw clearly enough that he had no ground to rest upon in meeting the infidel objection. The question of the prevention of sin, under that view, is an easy problem in mechanics. There is a finite quantity of power opposed to an infinite quantity of power; and, according to the doctrine of forces, the finite power must always give way. Dr. Taylor insisted on the proposition that "a being who *can* sin, may sin"—so far as *a priori* evidence is concerned—with the end in view that we have described. His aim was not, as a hasty reader might suppose, to disparage the possible reach of divine influence, or to glorify man, but rather to lay a foundation in what he deemed a right conception of free-agency, for his defense of the proposition that possibly God could not wisely or benevolently prevent the sin which He has actually permitted to exist. Dr. Taylor can not be fairly judged unless one takes into view the whole scope of his reasoning.*

It is true that Dr. Taylor was a life-long opponent of the Princeton theology. Gratuitous condemnation for Adam's sin; congenital sin inflicted upon the sinless by a judicial decree prior to

* It has been stated before that Dr. Taylor deemed his general view on this subject necessary to the vindication of the sincerity of the Gospel invitations. An anecdote here may not be out of place. A friend of Dr. Taylor—we will call him Dr. A.—in the early days of the New Haven controversy, thought it quite sufficient to say that in itself considered God desires the repentance of the non-elect sinner, but all things considered He does not. This, he said, was basis enough for the entreaty addressed to sinners in the Gospel. One Saturday evening, being in New Haven, he called on Dr. Taylor. After conversing a little, Dr. Taylor said: "Dr. A., *in itself considered*, I desire you to spend the evening with me; but as I have a sermon to write, I desire, *all things considered*, that you should not; *but I entreat you to stay*." Dr. A. laughed and retired, and afterwards said no more of his favorite formula.

their existence; sin meriting damnation, before the least consciousness of a rule of right; absolute natural impotency of the soul to throw off the bondage to evil thus engendered in it; literal endurance of the legal penalty by Christ, but only for a part of mankind, selected by mere will, without reference to results in the general good; right of this fraction to claim salvation as a matter of strict justice, their punishment having been endured; conversion of this fraction by dint of creative omnipotence acting irresistibly within their souls; perdition of all the rest, judicially inflicted for a sin done before they were created, for propagated sin which they could not prevent, and for not believing in an atonement never provided for them, and when all power of thus believing had been extirpated from their souls, through the necessary effect of an ancestor's transgression;—this system, 'Dr. Taylor thought, in its logical implications, blots out human probation and with it the moral government of God. He did not think that it comes up to the inspired definition of the Gospel,—“Good news of great joy unto all people.”

It has been no part of our design to advocate Dr. Taylor's opinions in speculative theology. Let them be judged according to their merits. The injustice of branding his system as Pelagian, is the point on which we insist. When the Socinian controversy broke out in New England, Dr. Taylor set himself earnestly against the views of character which were brought forward by the Unitarian leaders. These views were essentially Pelagian. In opposition to their theory, he was led to give great prominence to the doctrine of the simplicity or unity of character, and of total depravity, involving the need of regeneration. Here, he rightly judged, was the real turning-point of the controversy. Hence he spared no effort to show that natural traits and the virtues of unrenowned men do not involve holiness, and that moral quality strictly pertains to the underlying principle, either love to God or the opposite. His conviction of the need and the reality of the Spirit's influence has been already evinced. Let the reader mark the annexed passage, which accidentally meets our eye in turning over the pages of his “Revealed Theology:”

"In Regeneration, the sinner, in view of truth and through the influence of the Holy Spirit, does his duty. Through grace, the sinner, as a free, voluntary, accountable subject of God, obeys him. This is the great change, the glorious transformation of moral beings in moral character. . . . This is that new creation, compared with which 'the former shall not be remembered, nor come into mind.' If any should be curious to inquire how can these things be, or what is the *precise mode* of the Spirit's operation beyond what is involved in the facts now stated, I answer, no man knows, no man can tell what it is. To any one who says it must be this or that particular mode and can be no other, I should say, 'there are more things in Heaven and earth than your philosophy has dreamed of.' He who knew how to create a mind, may know many ways in which he can influence mind,—ways in which *he can secure mental action in perfect accordance with its nature as mental action*. By that influence of the Spirit of God, which we call *Inspiration*, He produced in the minds of the sacred writers and first preachers of Christianity, intellectual acts—thoughts, acts of memory and of reasoning, views of truth, which otherwise could not have existed in their minds. Still these were as truly their own mental acts as any other. *THEY* thought, *THEY* remembered, *THEY* reasoned. So in Regeneration, God can produce *moral* acts or exercises in the mind, which otherwise would not exist, and which shall be as truly moral acts, and the acts and exercises of the sinner's own powers and his own acts, as were they to take place without divine influence. Without creating new powers, God can bring the sinner to use aright those he already possesses. He can bring the sinner to love him and to repent of sin, and yet the sinner do all the loving and all the repenting. The reality of this divine influence is known by the *results*, not by the *mode* of their production. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth. So is every one that is born of the spirit.' The omniscient God knows how to produce, and does produce, by His word and by His Spirit, right moral acts or exercises in the mind, in a way perfectly consistent with their nature. This is enough for us to know."^{*}

Is this the way in which Pelagians write? Had Pelagius written this passage, could any ancient synod have been persuaded to condemn him? They understand Church History well enough at Princeton to know that had Pelagius or Cœlestius or Julian written the paragraphs relative to moral inability, and the need of the Spirit, which we have quoted on these pages from Dr. Taylor, no respectable council in the ancient Church would ever have declared against either of them. It is high time, then, to abandon this loose and indiscriminate style of denunciation. That Dr. Taylor believed some things that Pelagius believed, does not make him a Pelagian more than the adoption by our Reviewer of some of the tenets pro-

^{*} *Revealed Theology*, p. 394.

fessed by Priestley, renders him a Socinian. If every man is a Pelagian who believes that a sinner who accepts the Saviour has the power to reject him—and to this the reasoning of Dr. Hodge and the Reviewer must come—then John Wesley was a Pelagian, most of the evangelical Lutheran theologians of the present day, men like Neander and Julius Müller, with nearly all of the Fathers before Augustine, must be counted in the same category. Having in mind English Calvinism in the varieties which it has assumed for the last two centuries, we should call Dr. Taylor a moderate Calvinist. He was as much of a Calvinist as Doddridge, or Baxter, or a score of other honored leaders in the Reformed Church. No man weakens his cause by a fair treatment of adversaries. In saying this we hardly need repeat that we exonerate the Reviewer from all intentional injustice and cordially reciprocate his expressions of personal respect.

ERRATUM.—Page 745, line 6, for "seen," read "given."

union of a marriage pair must at least continue until a formal act of the State shall pronounce it ended by some misconduct of one of the pair towards the other.

But although Christian morality and a State where faith in Christ prevails will take fundamentally the same view of marriage, yet the State may require in certain minor points that which the Church forbids, or forbid that which the Church either ordains or allows, or it may at least allow that which the Church disapproves. The first procedure may be illustrated by the conflict between civil marriage and the sacramental theory of the Roman Church. The law of France, and of other lands which have adopted French views, requires all persons contracting marriage to go through a form of civil contract before a magistrate, and then the marriage is *legitimum*. As for the rest, it leaves to their own consciences whether they shall apply to the priest, the minister of the sacrament, for the solemnization of their union, so that it may be *ratum* according to the Church view. The Catholic Church has been obliged to endure this, although it considers the separation of the civil contract and the sacrament to be inadmissible, since the contracting parties are the administrators of the sacrament. And with this feeling the Concordat between the Pope and Austria, made a few years since, did away, we believe, with the civil contract, which within this present year the force of public opinion has restored to its former place in the laws.* So also a state may prevent marriages which are valid according to Church law from having validity by civil law, as must happen if it admit into its legislation a greater number of cases of nullity than the ecclesiastical law recognizes.

But these cases of conflict between State and Church law are of minor importance, especially in Protestant countries; the most common attitude of the State, outside of the thoroughly Catholic lands, is to sanction by its legislation that which the doctrine of the New Testament and the general sentiment of Christian Churches condemns. Here there is properly no conflict. The State says to the Church in regard to marriage and divorce you must take your own course and pro-

* Comp. Richter Kirchener. 6th ed., § 268.

vide for the purity of life and discipline by your own measures. The State is not bound to extend its legislation over all the departments of morality, still less is it required to protect religion by punitive statutes. We do not, in societies which have advanced far beyond the simplicity of the family state, generally punish lying or drunkenness, or filthy words or sabbath-breaking, or other outward offences which a Church may fairly notice by its discipline. Why is it obligatory on the State in the case of marriage and divorce to follow the strict rule laid down in the New Testament? Were the State to require what Christian doctrine forbids, or forbid what the Church requires, it would be tyrannical, it would be at war with a power co-ordinate with itself, in the end it would perish; but when it simply allows married persons to separate from one another for causes not recognized by Christ, it lays no burthen on tender consciences, it comes into no conflict with religion, it leaves the remedy against the evils of an imperfectly moral code in the hands of the Church, which is the main support of morality in Christian lands.

We admit the justice of the position that the State is not bound to forbid many things which the individual may do in his outward actions which are sins in the sight of God, and even injurious, on the whole, to society. There is a difference between doing this and legalizing what is considered by Christian people to be contrary to the law of the New Testament. All that they ask is, that, in the matter of divorce, the State should abstain from action; that it should enact no laws making immoral separations legal, and thus giving a bounty to immorality. When the State imposes no penalty on drunkenness, or lying and sabbath-breaking, its attitude is simply negative. And here it does not cut off a remedy, if, by either of these sins, a man inflicts an injury on others, as through violent assault, or slander, or disturbance of the public peace. But when it grants a divorce for a year's desertion, for instance, or for misconduct destroying the happiness of the marriage relation, its action is positive. It removes from the obligations of the marriage relation persons who otherwise would be under them; it grants the power of marrying again to persons who otherwise would have no such power. Its

action, therefore, is not at all like its inaction in cases of individual immorality.

And there is, moreover, a difference between the effects of the two. When sabbath-breaking is not punished by civil law no one would infer that the State thought it right, but when divorce is allowed for causes confessedly not sanctioned by the New Testament, the State steps forward as a teacher of an opposite morality from that of the New Testament. Owing to the manifold relations of marriage, as well to the civil condition as to morality and to religion, people will be very apt to feel that divorce is perfectly right, and the influence of bad doctrine thus taught by the State will run over within the pale of the church, to divorce it from Christ's law, to trouble it with many perplexing questions, to injure its discipline and its purity. This must be true in Catholic lands, if the law of the church and the law of State are at variance; how much more must it be so in Protestant or mixed countries, where there is no such distinct and sweeping law of church action as the Catholic doctrine of the sacramental quality of marriage.

The law of the State, as it seems to us, can take only one of two positions in regard to marriage: either it must teach that it is neither bound nor inclined to support Christian law, or that there is such an inveterate leaning towards divorce that the evils from a stricter law would be greater than those which attend the present loose one. That this is a good ground for imperfect legislation, we admit; but what a confession of impotence and of a corrupt civilization to be obliged to go back to the customs of a half barbarous society like that of the Jews under Moses, and to own that the ennobling conceptions of Christ, which must influence law if they are generally entertained, have even as yet no practical sway. Moreover, what if it should turn out that the laws themselves, by their own bad qualities, have multiplied divorces and corrupted opinion. New York and Connecticut, contiguous States, differ vastly in their divorce legislation. Is there naturally any greater "hardness of hearts" on this side of Byram river to account for this difference, or is it due to the unwariness and unskillfulness of legislators?

But whatever be the attitude of the State, the Church must

stand upon the principles of the New Testament as she expounds them, and apply them to all who are within her reach. The minister, if his celebration of marriage be not a farce, can no more join in marriage two persons who, in his view, have no right to form such a union, than he can aid any other immoral proceeding. Suppose the persons intending such a union to be a woman put away for other cause than that of adultery, and a man, whoever he be, to whom our Saviour's words would have application—"that he who marrieth her who is put away committeth adultery." How can the fact that such a union is legal in the least degree justify a minister of Christ in giving a religious sanction to an act which he believes to be an adulterous one? Ought he not to say, in solemnizing such a union, "whom God hath *not joined* together let not man put asunder." Or can the minister take the ground that he is merely an official person in solemnizing marriage, whose duty extends only to the point of throwing the influence of religion around the commencement of a most important relation; while the question whether the two persons who ask for his blessing upon their nuptials have the responsibility of deciding whether their union is legal and Christian. But if he carried out this principle he would be an official person, and nothing more, in celebrating the Lord's Supper, and thus any one who wished ought to have free admission to the Lord's table. There could then be no discipline, because, even in the case of gross offenders, it must needs be left to themselves whether they have repented or not. In the case of celebrating marriage, the minister's duty is comparatively easy. A specific act is requested of him by persons whose past life is generally notorious, whose former relations are matter of common fame, if there be anything scandalous about them. The question what they think right is of minor importance for him. He might as well indorse a forged note on the ground that it must be left to the conscience of the forger to decide upon the morality of his act, as to help two persons to enter into a union which he regards as adulterous, on the same ground. In the case of giving access to all to the Lord's table, the principle in question would be more justifiable, because in the strictest churches much must be left to

individual consciences just at that point. But it is a false principle in all ministerial acts, and would, if allowed, destroy the purity, if not the life, of the Christian Church.

The duty of the minister, in the case supposed, seems to be clear. There is another and a more important point to be considered in reference to the duty of the Christian Church in the treatment of those of its members, who, under the law of the State, contract or dissolve marriages against the law of Christ. This, we say, is the most important question, and it is so for two reasons. The first is, that in all countries where a civil marriage is required, or where—as in many parts of this country—a marriage, performed by some civil authority, has the same validity as one celebrated by a minister of the Gospel, the refusal of the minister to act in a certain case has no great bearing, since the civil authorities can take his place. The minister satisfies his own conscience; perhaps he awakens discussion in his parish, and that is all. But a loose, unchristian habit of the Christian Church, or of Christian Churches in a community, in reference to marriage and divorce, sets up an insurmountable obstacle to the recognition and observance of Christ's law of marriage. It excuses bad civil legislation; it inculcates bad principles on the members of the Church; it fails to teach what it ought to teach, what principles of discipline were designed to teach. Practically it supports the State in its attitude of disregard to Christian law. It thus tends to break up the spirit of discipline, to put to silence the voice of the Church in favor of holiness, and to take away its power of standing up in the world as the main support of Christian morals.

The other reason for the importance of this inquiry in regard to the duty of the Church, as it respects divorce, is to be found in the occasional difficulty of the questions which may present themselves. Or, in other words, until State law comes nearer to Christ's law, and until the churches cease to regard the State law of divorce as their standard of morality, multitudes of persons will be entrapped into forming unions which Christ forbids. These cases, and especially certain hard cases, where the unchristian marriage was long since consummated, may cause extreme perplexity to such as desire to obey Christ, and

at the same time are aware how harsh and grinding invariable rules of discipline must be, especially in a period of transition from a loose neglect to a healthy observance of Christian rules.

We say "a period of transition," implying thus that at present in this country Christian discipline in the matter of divorce by no means attempts to execute the law of the Gospel. Is not this so? Has not the looseness in the matter of divorce passed over from the State to the Church? As the one holds that its only concern in questions of divorce is the maintenance of individual rights with a certain supervision of the welfare of society, does not the other, to a great extent, refer such questions to the consciences of the parties who have by divorce, or by marrying divorced persons, sinned against Christ's law? So far as we can learn, all Protestant churches in this country are loose and negligent in such cases. There are none, indeed, that would not exclude adulterers from the communion, even though the State rarely attempts to inflict its slight penalties for this crime. But there are few cases, we apprehend, where persons legally married receive church censures, however unchristian their relation may be, whether judged by Christ's law, or by Paul's rule, as generally interpreted. This slackness of discipline may have arisen from the extreme rarity of such cases among the members of the Church: for a long time there was no especial reason for deciding what was the meaning of the commands given by Christ or by his apostles, since cases of divorce within the Church, if known at all, were for adultery and desertion alone. Even after the State abandoned the Christian position usually taken by Protestants, the practice of divorce was confined to the more unprincipled classes of society. The Church was thus taken unawares, and its lay members, naturally thinking that divorce is a matter of State legislation, overlooking the religious side of marriage and the precepts of the New Testament, and regarding it in the light of a civil contract, were prepared for any slackness of discipline which was not intolerable. The ministers, we judge, are more enlightened than the laity, and a reform in discipline may be more difficult in those forms of Protestantism where "the power of the keys" is entrusted to the congregation than in

those where the eldership and the minister, or the latter alone, exercise this authority, according to a general law of the particular denomination. Within a brief period, several cases have come to our knowledge where ministers in Congregational churches refused to sanction marriages of divorced persons, and several others where the church sustained the looser view of divorce contained in State law against the opinion of the minister who, in one instance, resigned his place on account of the collision. In another case, an association of ministers refused to recommend one of their number to another body, because, in their opinion, he had put away his wife unlawfully. As the Congregational churches have always been comparatively strict in sustaining the discipline of the New Testament, it is likely that they will be, many of them, the foremost to restore it in case of divorce, while others of them will be the last to abandon a habit of slackness which the New Testament condemns.

Our impression then is, that Christian churches in this country do not stand where they ought; that the cause of this, in part at least, is the insensible influence of bad State law; that the ministers, as a body, are aware of the evil affecting and threatening the purity and gospel order of their churches, but that many of the laity within the Church overlook the law of Christ entirely. It is cheering and a source of hope for the future welfare of society to observe that great bodies of Christians are moving for reform and for return to the old usage in respect to the discipline of divorce. We have had occasion to know that for some time many of the ministers of the Congregational churches in Connecticut have had their thoughts turned in this direction. The Episcopal Convention of Connecticut held at Middletown, in June of the present year, considered the same subject and expressed their sense of the evil of existing State legislation in decided resolutions. The Methodist Church, North, also, at their late triennial meeting in Chicago, embraced divorce within the topics of discussion; and although no general law of that Church, as far as we can learn, was passed, the attention given to this point is a favorable sign. We understand also that the subject is to be brought before the triennial convention of the Protestant

Episcopal Church, which is to meet in a few days. Such movements cannot fail to end in a removal of a part of the evils into which the churches of the land have fallen through the influence of bad legislation.

But as long as the Church follows the law of Christ, and the State makes another law dissolving marriage on slighter grounds, there will be frequent cases of legal but unchristian divorce and marriage. What is the duty of the church when such cases arise in which one of the parties at least is a member of the church, and amenable to its discipline?

First, we may take the ground that the parties in unchristian divorce and marriage have acted according to their own views of duty, and ought to be undisturbed. This might be a sound rule of action if the rule in the Scriptures were not a clear one; if the churches had not formally reaffirmed the rule as their basis of discipline—as we suppose them to have one—and if there were no important social reasons for giving it all possible support. It is hardly conceivable that, when the Apostle bids the Christian wife, who has for certain causes departed from her husband, to be reconciled to him or remain unmarried, he did not take it for granted that a violation of this command would be visited with church censures. It is still less conceivable that when Christ calls putting away a wife for any cause short of her fornication by the name of adultery, he did not intend that it should be treated as such by his church, at least, if not by the State. For these are tangible open acts, not like states of mind capable of two interpretations, but ascertainable by the ordinary rules of evidence. Moreover, the individuals concerned, after the church or churches shall have taken a position, can no longer plead ignorance or the excuse of legality. Add to this that there is no barrier against bad law, no adequate protection of society within the sphere of those relations with which both Church and State have to do, unless the Church not only gives its advice in the way of a general rule, but makes use also of the single weapon of self-defense and of terror to evil doers that is within its reach—exclusion from its privileges. Let the law not forbid polygamy, and let a man with four or with many wives seek to enter the Christian church. Is not the benefit

to society of a protest against polygamy, and of a refusal to admit a polygamist into or to continue him in the church so great, that there could be no doubt how the church ought to act in a case like this? Ought a change of the law which forbids more than one wife to make Christians feel that discipline should be slackened in such cases, or ought not this change to be a reason rather for enforcing discipline?

We conceive, then, that no believer in the gospel and in the duty of retaining purity among believers, not even a Quaker, who limits discipline to its lowest terms, can dissent from our position, that in cases of marriage and divorce where the Christian law is violated, the church ought to interfere,—to prevent by its authority, and to censure by that essential power of excluding unworthy members, which belongs to all societies, even of the most voluntary character. The Catholic Church is not to be blamed for the ground it has taken in this matter. Its law of divorce may have gone beyond that of the gospel. Its system of prohibited degrees is an addition to Christian morality, as is confessed by the frequency of dispensations; but assuredly it is not wrong in refusing to make the law of the State its basis of action concerning divorce rather than the law of Christ, nor in feeling itself called, whatever be the law of the State, to educate the people and protect its own principles by ecclesiastical censures.

But secondly, while recent cases of divorce or of marriage with a person unlawfully divorced may be of easy handling, when once the rules of the church are distinctly laid down, there still remains a class of cases which call for a separate consideration. We refer to cases where the offense against the Christian rule of marriage occurred long since, where the parties in their irreligiousness only aimed to keep within the law of the State, and have for years reputably sustained the relations of man and wife, but now, having at last felt the influence of the gospel, are seeking to become members of some church of Christ. If they had lived in concubinage, the case would present no difficulty, for solemn marriage would repair the fault, they might repent and do honor to the sacred laws of morality by turning their condition into one allowed by God and by Cæsar both. But in the case supposed, where the

sin of the individuals concerned was one of thoughtlessness at first, where the existing relation is not only permitted but the severance of it is forbidden by civil laws, what position shall the Church take? Shall it take the position of the Catholic Church and require the entire discontinuance of their union, at least until the death of a previous husband and wife, or the similar position of the extreme abolitionist, who, because slavery originates in wrong, would require all slaveholders, under all circumstances, to make their slaves free or be cast out of the Church? Shall it—we say—take this rigorous view of practical morality, or shall it say that cases may arise where, by a sort of equity, the ordinary rule ought to be set aside, or where there is a sort of prescription against the original and in favor of the existing condition. We confess ourselves to be of this latter opinion, and to hold that the positive precept of marriage, like some other positive precepts, must bend to the necessities of the case. The peculiarities in such extreme cases, where the marriage relation is concerned, are due in part to the fact that marriage has a civil as well as a religious side; that the State may even forbid the separation of persons who ought never to have been united in marriage at the outset; and in part to the fact that marriage itself brings the parties to it into a unique relation, a relation exclusive, most intimate, and often involving the highest interests of children. We take in fact the same ground which the Catholic Church takes in regard to prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity. The general rule is valuable, but there may be reasons for dispensation. As for prohibited degrees, the dispensation comes before the marriage, but there can be no permission beforehand, no consent of the church to such marriages as we now have in view. It comes afterward, when, like heathen, the married pair forsake a life of ungodliness and seek the privileges of Christians. But the case differs from some which may present themselves when heathen seek admission into the society of Christ. A man must leave all his wives except the first, or, at least, except one, both because polygamy is directly opposed to the spirit of the gospel, and because it would almost ruin a newly founded church to allow part of its members to have many wives while others have but one. In the

case, however, which we have supposed the couple continue with a Christian spirit a union which began without it, they honor the holiness of the church by repentance, and a *restitutio ad integrum* is impossible.

But it may be said that there is a very plain course for parties thus married against the strictness of Christian law to take. Let them separate and lead a life of continence apart. This would be the Catholic way of cutting the knot. But here there are two obvious difficulties, the disaster to children from breaking up the family state, and the perils of an enforced celibacy. A better way, in our judgment, where such peculiar cases arise is to consent to the state *de facto*. It may be right even for the usurper to continue his sway against all justice in a certain condition of a people, when his power has stood the test of years, and all the relations of society have conformed themselves to the altered state of things. The same holds good in the case which we have been considering. Let the church, while it cannot be a party to any violation of Christ's law, accept an old condition of things within certain limits without seeking to tear up or overthrow.

As long as the State legislates on one set of principles and the Church on another, there must be a conflict between the two powers, or else the Church must succumb, for the State has the outward positive relations of life under its control. But the two powers may be brought near to one another, so as not to come into frequent conflict at least, by the efforts of the church, to teach the true doctrine concerning marriage and divorce, and by its healthy discipline over its members. There will then remain those pariahs of society who lie outside of all Christian influences and care nothing for the sanctity of marriage, and those civilized, refined heathens who look on marriage as a mere contract, or as a respectable kind of concubinage. Even now divorce and marriage with a person divorced against the rules of the New Testament are principally confined to these classes. It is for the benefit of these classes, then, and in order to fulfill its office of purifying instead of corrupting society, that the law of divorce needs extensive reformations and improvements. The Protestant churches, if once awake to present evils for which State law and a low

conception of marriage are accountable, can take care of themselves and of the interests put into their hands. But how far ought a reformation to be carried and at what ought reformers to aim? A Christian would be glad to have an end put to all conflict and possibility of conflict between the two authorities, to have divorce or separation granted only on account of adultery and malicious desertion. In the present state of Christian countries, however, this extent of reformation is altogether unlikely to be attained. In this country especially, where the divine in government and in social life is so generally overlooked, where doctrine concerning the State and the relations of men so generally takes the vulgar, apprehensible form of contract, where the desire of speedy enjoyment and the quick procurement of the means of it are degrading the moral sentiments, it cannot be expected that reforms of our divorce laws will be very thorough. Lawmakers will say that they are not bound by the morality of the New Testament in their legislation touching rights and the common welfare, that you may as well separate two parties who hate and injure one another rather than vainly strive to reach the inaccessible ideal by your laws which the next legislature can alter, and that strictness in prohibiting divorce will not prevent social evil but will only force it to pour its fiery floods by a new crater upon society. We are disposed to take the ground, therefore, on which alone the defects of the Mosaic legislation can be justified—that the hardness of men's hearts prevents a better system—and to inquire not what is the best possible law, but what are some of the features of a law that is at once desirable and feasible.

A main feature of a good law will, of course, be to hold out no inducement to a husband or wife, who is dissatisfied with the present condition, to get a divorce, in order to contract a new alliance. Of course, the innocent party brings the petition or libel, and is able by forbearing to do so to prevent the other for an indefinite period from carrying out his or her purposes. And, of course, the lawmaker never intends to bring such a motive before the discontented consort. But the law offers in fact a premium for divorce whenever the disadvan-

tages of such a step for the guilty party are inconsiderable. We maintain, therefore, in particular,

1. That the adulteress and the husband guilty of adultery ought never to be allowed to marry the partner in his or her crime. We are disposed to go farther and preclude the guilty wife, perhaps also the guilty husband, from contracting marriage with any person whatsoever, at least until the death of the innocent partner. In the *projet* of the *code civil*, as it came before the Council of State, the adulteress could never marry again, and the guilty husband could never marry his concubine. M. Tronchet having said that this prohibition for the woman could have a dangerous influence on morals by furnishing an excuse for future lewdness on her part, the law was amended so as to enact that the culpable party in cases of adultery could never marry his or her accomplice. (Art. 298.) We doubt the correctness of the conclusion while we admit that Tronchet has some reason for his opinion. Granting that some women thus branded by society will thus act, the question recurs whether it is worth while to save them at the expense of public virtue. Is it not better for society that such a woman lose her ordinary right by way of penalty—even as a citizen sometimes loses his right of office or of suffrage by fighting a duel or by bribery—than that the honorable state of the matron be degraded by her participation in its privileges. But, however this may be, we wonder that the law of England and a number of the United States should put nothing in the way of a divorced wife's marriage to her paramour. And this is the more strange in those codes which, like the law of Connecticut, impose the penalty of a long imprisonment upon persons guilty of adultery, while they permit such persons to marry whom they will the day after divorce has been decreed. The penalty is never inflicted, and the adulteress “wipeth her mouth” and takes the airs of an honest woman.

2. But again, adultery ought to be made penal—as it is in almost all the States—and provision should be made that the penalty should follow the sentence of divorce without any other trial. This suggestion will surprise some, perhaps, but it is simply borrowed from the Code Civil. (Art. 298, u. s.), “*La femme adultère sera condamnée par le même jugement—*

a la réclusion," etc. The authors and revisers of that well-considered code did not contemplate a loose procedure like that which prevails among us, but a careful trial, and the same judgment which separated the parties was followed, simply on the requisition of the public officer, by the imprisonment of the woman.

The question here arises whether adultery ought to have the same definition for the man and for the woman, and the same penalty, whichever sex is guilty. According to all the ancient codes and many of the modern there is a distinction made between the sexes, and the distinction affects the law of divorce.* The crime is the same, except that it is justly regarded as a greater advance in wickedness for women as a class to be unfaithful in the marriage relation than for men. The harm done to society by such unfaithfulness is far greater for the women, when her guilt is so to speak inside of the family, than when the father of the family commits the crime. There are strong reasons for making a discrimination in punishment against the woman, and we incline also to set up those limitations on divorce for a husband's adultery which appear, in the principle, in English law and the French civil code.

3. In all cases of divorce, where the blameworthy party is allowed to marry again, such marriage within a certain term ought to be made unlawful. This will render it necessary of course that the court decide, according to the evidence submitted, which of the partners is blameworthy, and it may happen that both are so in the same or in different degrees. The Prussian law requires such a decision. Among us, as outward specific acts are noticed almost exclusively, the parties can hardly share the civil blame, and the faulty party cannot have a decree in his favor, with the *seeming* exception of cases where a wife deserts her husband on account of ill treatment. But whoever can have the fault fastened on him ought to be forbidden to marry for a considerable period. According to the *code civil* this interval is three years in the case of divorce by mutual consent. Beyond question such enforced delay for

* See what has been said in former articles on the provision in Roman civil law, French, and English law., etc.

a considerable period would act as a very powerful motive in favor of the good conduct of married parties. This is shown not only by the nature of the case, but by experience in the Rhenish Prussian districts under French law, where although divorce by mutual consent was allowed, only a very few cases of it occurred during thirty-six years. We believe that if parties divorced by the provisions of the omnibus clause in the law of Connecticut, could not marry again for two or three years, the number of divorces would be greatly lessened. Nay, if instead of that clause, the divorce by mutual consent were introduced into our code together with the French limitation above mentioned of three years, we should be much better off than we are now.

4. Separation from bed and board without dissolution of wedlock may be resorted to in some cases and as a temporary measure. This kind of separation was unknown to the ancients, and owes its origin, we believe, to the Apostle's words—"but if she depart, let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband,"—which refer, as we have given our reasons for supposing, not to separation for the cause of adultery but for minor faults. Being consistent with the doctrine that marriage is indissoluble and is a sacrament of perpetual efficacy, it gradually superseded divorce *a vinculo* which involved the opposite doctrine. Since the decree of Gratian was compiled, that is from about the year 1150, the only separation known to the Catholic Church, and to Catholic countries fully obedient to its law, is from bed and board for a longer or shorter period, for life in the case of a woman's adultery, for a time on account of smaller offenses against the law of marriage. The feelings of the Catholics, trained up for centuries by their theory of the sacraments, ought to be respected in the legislation of a country where religions live side by side on an equal footing. Hence in every case where divorce is allowed by our laws either the petitioner who gains his point ought to have the choice between absolute divorce and separation, or else the wishes of the two parties ought to determine in this respect. The latter appears in the present form of the code civil: "il sera libre aux époux de former demande en séparation de corps." The former was contained in the projet before it was

amended: "L'époux qui aura le droit de demander le divorce pourra le borner a la demande en separation de corps et des biens." We should unite the two in this way: if the parties can agree, the decree of the Court may pronounce a separation instead of a divorce; if they cannot—as, for instance, in the case of mixed marriage—the petitioner or libeller may decide. For he, being the injured party, ought to have his choice; and he might have continued the state of marriage by taking no legal notice of the offence. But it is questionable whether his power to put a bar in the way of the other party ought to be perpetual.

But aside from those instances where religious scruples, fairly respected by the law, incline the parties to qualified separation, we cannot help feeling that this kind of divorce is liable to very grave objections. Such separation is only defensible on religious grounds, and if it prevailed in the law it would destroy the balance between the civil and the religious weight of marriage, throwing the former out of the scale altogether. The offended party has rights which he claims have been invaded and demands reparation. But the law refuses him reparation, in order that the offending party may be held to repentance. In no other case of wrong is such a principle admitted. But a still greater inconsistency with justice lies in this, that he is deprived for the future, it may be for his life, of an important right. He cannot marry again, because of the wrong done by his partner. It is like chaining a husband or wife to the corrupting body of a guilty consort executed by the law's sentence. It is, moreover, a source of great temptation. Let the sentence be that of lifelong separation for adultery. Is it likely that the majority of husbands would remain continent under that legal constraint, and cannot the toleration of concubinage in Catholic countries and the levity with which it is regarded be thus in part accounted for? And, still further, the same cause will lead people to make light of adultery, because the choice will be between a separation which has no effect on the marriage relation and a winking at the grossest violations of its sanctity? Will not the parties be tempted to think that to continue as they are, with the allowance to each other of leading no very strict life, is

better than to make a noise about family matters which can have no other effect than that of giving liberty to a married pair to live apart ?

Such are some of the moral and jural difficulties attendant on separation from bed and board, when looked at as a general substitute for divorce. But the evils mentioned exist in but a slight degree when it is applied as a temporary measure for those less grievous offenses against the family constitution which do not preclude reconciliation. Cruelty and drunkenness, which are offenses, for the most part, of the husband, render the wife's state of life intolerable ; desertion and crime, subjecting to a long imprisonment, break up the family state. But the violent man, the sot, the vagabond, the criminal, may be reformed ; and what better school can he be in than that where he can feel himself to be repairing injuries and recovering the love of a wife and of children. Let the separation, then, be reserved for cases like these, as a temporary expedient, until it can be seen whether reform is to be hoped for. Then after a long enough probation, let the separation be turned into divorce on petition of the injured party. The Massachusetts law allows this substitution, or, in other words, permits remarriage, after five years from the passage of the decree, on application of the innocent party, and after ten years, on application of either party. In the *code civil*, power is given to the party who was originally the defendant, in all cases excepting where the complaint is against a woman for adultery, "to demand a divorce from the tribunal" after three years of separation. This permission given to the defendant, it is alleged, does no injury to the other's conscience, for although this act makes it free for him also to marry again, he may still consider himself bound by the law of his church.

5. The consequences of divorce, as it regards property, ought to be such that the injured party shall sustain as little pecuniary loss or deficiency in the means of support as possible, and the culpable party shall be deprived of the benefits which the marriage or a marriage settlement placed within his or her reach. This was the great motive held out by Roman law, for although adultery was punishable from the time of Augustus, the penalty must have been rarely, if ever, inflicted, and

divorce on other grounds enjoyed impunity. The arrangements in regard to this point are various in the different codes, and the adequate treatment of it would far transcend our limits. But the general principle is not only that the innocent and injured partner shall not lose the pecuniary advantages formerly derived from the connexion, but also that, in gross cases at least, the offending party shall actually suffer in his goods on account of the wrong doing. Something here must be left to the discretion of the court; but there ought to be some positive law directing and limiting that discretion.

6. The same may be said of the custody of the children, if there be any. The general principle here is that misconduct, which has broken up the family state and made light of all household endearments, shows unfitness to take charge of the children. They with the property sufficient for their maintenance must be entrusted to that one of the married pair who has been proved to be most regardful of the family interests, or, in case of such a person's incompetence, to some third person.

7. The laws ought to be specific and for determinate causes, and little discretion should be left in the hands of judges. To put the whole matter under the control of the judges without any specific legislation would, we are persuaded, be fruitful of evil. The judges would vary in their decrees—some granting divorce for slight grounds, others being more rigid. In such a country as ours, especially with an elected judiciary of short continuance, they might come to represent the public opinion, whatever it were, or there might be such a pressure of the bar upon them that they could not resist. Accordingly almost all our codes have been specific in their definitions of the causes justifying divorce, and have left but little freedom in the judge's hands. Few of our statutes indeed give the courts too great power. The great error consists in the allowance of divorce for indeterminate causes, although neither of the parties has committed any act that can be taken hold of. Such causes are incompatibility of temper and conduct which permanently affects the happiness of the marriage relation. We have already called the attention of our readers to the mischief which the "omnibus" clause has worked in the

State of Connecticut. Such a law brings the judges oftentimes into extreme perplexity, for the happiness of the marriage relation is a very vague thing, and a thing capable of being painted in very false colors by an interested party. It may be affected by great and small injuries, by unkind words, by lasting differences of policy in the management of children, or by a husband's refusal to give a wife money that she may dress ambitiously and above her rank. It adds strength, as Mr. Loomis observed in his Article, to other weak grounds of divorce. When a charge of habitual drunkenness or of failure to support is not sustained, this plea comes behind and props up a weak case. It tempts parties to marry improvidently, and opens the door through which they can escape from matrimony, for it amounts to not liking one another, and the dislike is enhanced by the prospect offered to the hopes of one or the other of making a more advantageous connexion. Let the acts then be palpable on which a decree of divorce is based, and if the state of society is such that it shall seem desirable to separate parties on such vague grounds, let there be no dissolution, or at least no immediate dissolution of the marriage tie.

8. The procedure in petitions or libels for divorce needs a great change in many of the States, and the laws of the different States ought to be brought into a substantial uniformity. With regard to the first point we leave reforms to those who are better able to judge—to the better class of lawyers who have no interest in encouraging applications for divorce by looseness of procedure, and who know what effect a change in practice is likely to have. But any one, lawyer or not, must be aware of the miserable state of things now existing in some of the States, and no one, who will compare the careful, thorough law of the *code civil* with most of our statutes relating to divorce, will feel any great respect for American legislation. Let us be allowed to illustrate the state of things by a single case occurring not a hundred miles from where we write. A woman had been married less than three months, when, on occasion of her making evening visits or a visit with a young man, her husband remonstrated, and high words took place. She left him, and earned her own living in another

town. After about three months more she brought a petition for divorce, and the grounds alleged were adultery, habitual drunkenness, cruelty, and misconduct destroying domestic happiness. The three first the lawyer put in, it would seem, to strengthen his cause. The adultery was with a person unknown to the party complained of; habitual drunkenness was a false allegation, and had it been true, drunkenness for three months ought not to be regarded as habitual in the legal sense; cruelty he had scarcely a chance to commit. The man had of course a notice served on him, but, as we suppose, did not care to incur the expense, or to bring back to his house a woman whom he conceived to have injured him, and who did not want to keep him company. The divorce was allowed by the court. The woman apologized afterwards for the charge of adultery, and said that the lawyer put it in. What went on the record we know not, but the records are so made up that many false charges appear on their pages.* We are persuaded not only that they are unreliable, but that they tend to give a false impression of the number of adulteries which are annually committed. When the judge thinks that possibly one or more higher offenses may have given cause for divorce, and that at all events the suit, if not the non-appearance of the party complained of, furnishes proof of bad relations in a household, he will be apt, if an omnibus clause permits it, to decide favorably upon the petition. And hasty examination of a case with pressure of an interested lawyer, may not only break up a family, but put a permanent stamp on a man's or a woman's character.

It has been suggested that in *ex parte* proceedings a state's attorney should *ex officio* be the guardian of the interests of

* We add *ex abundanti* an extract from a letter written by a legal gentleman in Indiana. [The seventh clause, to which reference is made, runs thus: "Any other cause for which the court shall deem it proper that a decree shall be granted."] It frequently happens, says that gentleman, "that the petition, which is not sworn to, contains several statutory cases, and perhaps also states facts which could only be the basis of a divorce under the seventh clause; and as the evidence is heard orally, and no evidence is kept of it, probably in not one in five of the records of divorces can the real ground of the divorce be obtained from the paper with certainty."

the absent defendant. The laws of Indiana, where there are many such cases, strive to make their peace with justice and righteousness by thus protecting the absent party, but as the attorneys "have no acquaintance with the causes, their efforts are generally nominal."*

It would seem then that the laws ought to take greater care both of the absent defendant's interests and of him who is too poor to incur the expenses of the suit. We add that when the suit is not *ex parte*, and when the proceedings issue in a jury trial, divorce cases, at least on the complaint of adultery, ought to be secret—that is, no report of them ought to be allowed to appear in the public journals. The prurient curiosity of bystanders and the right of publicity do not weigh enough to counteract the interests of morality.

The subject of divorce is complicated in this country by the number of jurisdictions and the ease of emigration. Just as a good paper currency was impossible when every State licensed its own banks, so it is with divorce laws. He who cannot get what he wants under the severe laws of New York, can become a free man by a short stay in Indiana. The validity of a divorce there need not, it is true, be always admitted by New York. Yet the facilities for such proceedings are among the worst parts of our system. Those who seek to reform the laws in this important article, will be bound to endeavor to stop those leaks which loose legislation in one State occasions every where else.

We have considered divorce legislation as immediately affecting the Christian church, and as affecting society outside of the company of professed Christians. But for the interests of the Church of Christ it is not essential and absolutely necessary that the laws in this particular should be reformed. Indeed we may say that a greater facility of divorce than now exists, that even the allowance of divorce whenever the parties unite in desiring it, would assuredly awaken men of Christian principles to the evils of society; the discipline of the church would become stricter; and even in a country like ours, where

* We use the words of the same gentleman whose opinion we have quoted in the last note.

Christians are no corporate or united body, but an aggregate of persons belonging to different, and often jealous denominations, where their joint action is almost out of the question, the evils of society, the greater they became, would the more rouse all those who bear the name of Christian to a common feeling, if not to concerted measures for their suppression. Christianity developed the purest principles of family life, and the noblest conception of marriage, in the midst of Greek and Roman society, where divorce was almost unrestrained, and under Jewish law, where, besides this freedom of divorce, polygamy was tolerated. And this it did before the sacramental theory was formed, and marriage regarded as one of the sacraments. So now, if they have any vitality, that is if they are really Christian, Christian communities can take care of themselves. "Do your worst then," we say, "in the matter of legislation. Make marriage in your codes a contract which the parties can dissolve at will, which either party can dissolve for very trifling reasons, which the State will dissolve for a great number of wrongs. Let your laws punishing adultery impose a penalty which nobody will mind, and let them be a dead letter. You but awaken then in the Christian communities an increasing sense of their responsibility as the guardians of morals; you only quicken in them the purpose to introduce within their own pales a stricter discipline, and to seek to leaven society more with their pure principles. Thus, by your heathenish laws, you arouse the sensibilities of conscience and the instinct of self-preservation in a society which has immense power when once fairly in motion; you practically throw society into the hands of new legislators, and you will lead round a cycle of things when your laws will give way to stricter ones more consonant with the principles of morality, and when you will be looked upon as the enemies of social progress."

Greatly to be desired then as is a reform in divorce legislation, if the direct interests of religion are considered, it is not for this reason absolutely necessary, because the Christian church can resist and counteract, and more than neutralize the existing laws, however bad they may be. But such reform is of immense importance, when we look at the effect of legislation on the general interests of society; when we look especi-

ally at those vast classes who, even in a country like ours, receive no direct influence from Christian truth and the Christian church. What is to be done with and for the lower classes of society, in a country like ours, is one of the gravest of questions for the mind of a benevolent man. In a country which is mainly Protestant, the noblest things—the right of private judgment, and the intellectual light which always accompanies an open Bible—are a “savour of death” to the neglected classes: they are made self-confident, vain, uneasy, ready to receive the crudest falsehoods, and to reject the most venerable truths. Religion appears to them a restraint, and religious people they are jealous of because these, in the natural order of things, get above them. So liberty also is another “savour of death,” as they know not how to use their political right, fall into the hands of demagogues, and become, as a class, a political power within the State. Their cry is for freedom from restraint. Free rum, free Sundays, free suffrage, free divorce, and the like are their watchwords; and those who expect to get into power by their votes, if they have any better or higher aims, are afraid to contradict them. What is to elevate or purify these classes? They stand aloof from the ennobling influences of religion; politics do not wash them clean; their “little learning is a dangerous thing;” their facilities for sensual gratification are less limited, perhaps, than those of the working class in any other land. There is no help for them, unless it lies in the voluntary movements of Christian enterprise, teaching the knowledge of Christ, and with it elevating the idea of family life. But loose divorce laws corrupt family life at its foundation, for it is hard for such persons to believe that what law sanctions is not right. Here then the conflict, between low views of marriage and divorce and the views contained in the New Testament, is waged with the greatest sacrifice of the interests of society. If one out of five or six of the marriages within a certain class is dissolved by law, and the law with the procedure in the courts almost offers a bribe to get rid of a husband or wife, how is family life to be sustained, how is it to have for that portion of the community its venerable or holy character. And the low conception of marriage tends to creep up into higher circles, as some of

this class, from time to time, rise in respectability and wealth. Since, then, reforms in the divorce laws are especially needed for the lower stratum of society; since this class is most demoralized and corrupted by the fatal facility of the existing laws, and since it has in itself no power of self-recovery, when once thoroughly debased, it becomes all Christian and all benevolent persons, on their account mainly, to unite in an attempt to procure a reform in the laws concerning divorce, to bring legislation as near to the Christian standard as the people will bear. We do not conceive that a reform in law would remove all the evils to which the marriage state is subject. Law cannot reform beyond a certain point, because "it is weak through the flesh." But bad law can corrupt even more than good law can purify.

But would not a strict divorce law defeat its own end? It certainly might, and that in two ways; first, by creating opposition enough to obtain an alteration of the law, and then, in a corrupt state of society, by tempting to sin within the marriage relation, if a person cannot free himself from its constraints. Yet it must not be supposed that, if divorce were confined to cases of adultery or at least to gross violations of marriage duties, such more flagrant crimes would be multiplied. This would be the case, if the law gave the adulterer the advantage of marrying again, but not if it took away the right from him or delayed the exercise of it for a term of years. And on the other hand loose divorce laws do not prevent adultery, as is abundantly shown by the history of Roman society under the emperors.

We entertain no fear then that a system of divorce laws coming nigh—gradually, if it must be so—to the severity of the New Testament, will defeat its own end, and only force the corruptions of society into a worse channel. It is the defects of our present system that are corrupting. A system more in accordance with the idea of marriage could not, if accepted, fail to purify society.

ARTICLE VIII.—THE WOMEN OF THE NORTHWEST
DURING THE WAR.

Our Branch and its Tributaries; being a History of the Work of the Northwestern Sanitary Commission and its Auxiliaries, during the War of the Rebellion. By MRS. SARAH EDWARDS HENSHAW. Including a full report of receipts and disbursements, by E. W. Blatchford, Treasurer; and an introductory chapter by Hon. Mark Skinner. Chicago: Alfred L. Sewell. 1868. 8vo. p. 432.

IN a former number of this Review, January, 1865, we devoted some space to Mr. Stillé's very able and interesting History of the United States Sanitary Commission, and to considering the general objects and labors of that national organization. A field so wide and varied could no more be deemed exhausted by a single Article than the whole subject of the rebellion by a review of the Reports of the Secretary of War. Yet, in the great number of other topics that press upon our attention, we should hardly return so soon to the consideration of this. But the beautiful and fascinating volume before us, introducing itself as one of the very first complete contributions to the art of bookmaking from the great Northwest (itself the child of New England), and the record by a woman's pen, of the surpassing patriotism, devotion, ability, and achievements of Western women, opens up thoughts entirely apart from the splendid work to which it specially relates; thoughts among the latest born of the reflections of the age, and intensely interesting, both in their survey of the past and their visions of the future.

The publisher, in his circular, announces with what he "trusts is commendable pride, that while most of the books bearing the imprints of Western publishers are manufactured at the East, 'Our Branch' is throughout a Western production. . . . It was stereotyped at the Chicago Type Foundry,

where also a large portion of the type was made; the paper was made at the West, and not only were the maps drawn and printed, and the whole book printed and bound in Chicago, but the printing was done on a press manufactured in every part, from the patterns up, entirely in this city." His pride is abundantly justified. For elegance of material and workmanship, for good taste, for completeness in making up, and for careful correctness in revision, this volume stands in the foremost rank of American books, and puts to shame the shabbiness of some of our great Eastern houses in even their most important and profitable publications. It is deeply interesting to observe such evidence of the mighty progress which the West is making in the most advanced arts of civilization. The mind delights to contemplate that not distant era when its boundless resources, not of rich, deep loam alone, but of minerals, of metals, of fuel, of water power, of ingenious brains and cunning hands, shall be in course of harmonious development, with results of wealth and of mental and social advancement unparalleled in the history of the world. It is common for Western orators, even among those of the better class, to disparage New England, to charge it with jealousy of the West, and a narrow selfishness in its policy of protection to American industry, which is claimed to be detrimental to Western interests. Such imputations are entirely unjust. Nothing pleases us more than to behold the newer portions of our common country steadily approaching and even outstripping us in those rivalries where the success of each redounds to the common honor and the common benefit. As the West becomes more independent of the East, by the accumulation of capital, it will free itself from these suspicions and come more and more into that sympathy with New England in questions of political economy which it already feels in those of political virtue and moral principle. Its swelling wealth will flow naturally into all the different channels of investment, and as its splendid enterprise takes on every form of manufacturing industry, it will emerge from the flimsy and soap-bubble philosophy of free trade theorists. With the means to produce, it will realize that *production* and not *exchange* is the creator of wealth, and will devote itself heartily to that true

policy of every nation, and especially of every *young* nation, the development of all its resources and all its energies by promoting industrial activity in the greatest variety of forms. Most heartily, then, do we welcome every indication like that afforded by the volume before us, that the West is becoming the rival of the East in arts which it has hitherto left almost unattempted. Most cordially do we extend to it our encouragement and congratulation, and not only to the West, but to the South, and to every portion of our land, upon the successful establishment of any new branch of industry even in competition with ourselves. For apart from the fact that thus are strengthened the bonds of union, and thus advanced the general prosperity, it is by such rivalries as these that we ourselves shall be stimulated to greater skill than we have as yet attained, and to advancement to untried labors in the realms of use, and beauty, and luxury.

But the book possesses a far deeper interest than that of its illustrating the skill and taste of Western workmen and the enterprise of Western publishers. It contains a record of patriotic devotion, of splendid generosity, of wisdom, fortitude, and achievement on the part of the Western people which cannot be read without wonder and admiration. The story is no mere statement of glittering generalities. Mrs. Henshaw's graphic and picturesque pen is never oblivious that it is inditing history, and it deals precisely with facts and figures. It tells us exactly in dollars and in cents, in bushels and in pounds, what Western generosity did for our soldiers during the war; and when we consider the comparative and, in many cases, the absolute poverty of those young communities, and read the stupendous contributions which poured from them to the army in a constant stream, we doubt whether the annals of effort at the East could show so honorable a record.

It is principally, however, as a history of woman's work in the war that the volume at this time engages our attention. Its value in this respect is exceedingly great, not only as a collection of interesting facts but as bearing upon the much discussed questions of woman's social, intellectual, and political capacities. That grand army of American women, a part of whose labors in their country's cause is here described by one

of themselves, while laboring during those four years of self-devotion strictly within their appropriate sphere, have done more to establish the claims of their sex to equality of social and civil rights than all the female orators and journalists, clamoring from forums and hanging about legislatures and political conventions, could accomplish in half a century. The great capacity and peculiar adaptedness of woman to manage enterprises on the largest scale, even those demanding great labor, untiring assiduity, and the most abounding energy, tact, and business talent, were never before so grandly demonstrated, and may even be almost pronounced a new discovery. Mrs. Henshaw tells us that these superior qualities displayed themselves at the very outset of the work :

“The energy, earnestness, and intelligence with which these patriotic women entered upon their labors, are worthy of record. The books of the Commission show, under this date, a collection of letters from the northwestern women, far and near, from cities, towns, hamlets, and far-off prairie settlements, that is, of itself, a monument to the patriotism, ability, and cultivation of the writers. Instructions, evincing remarkable clearness of intellect and precision of thought, were asked for on every side; societies, admirably organized, were reported; details for their management were arranged, evincing so much forethought, tact, and resources; the methods of mercantile business were so readily learned and so skillfully adapted to existing circumstances, as almost to justify the exclamation of an on-looker: ‘The northwest is full of wonderful women.’”

It is true that, with wise deference to conventional prejudice and to the promptings of female self-distrust, a number of able and influential gentlemen were associated with the lady managers of the Northwestern Sanitary Commission, who performed their laborious and responsible duties with an ability and fidelity beyond all praise. But we very much doubt whether most or all of these services might not have been as well performed by women, at least by women educated to the work. Some of them certainly, including those for which women are thought least qualified, were in fact performed in part by ladies, such as addressing public meetings, visiting the front, and inspecting field and post hospitals. Among the most interesting of Mrs. Henshaw's sketches are those which narrate the labors of the lady managers in these so-called masculine employments. We read with no diminution of our reverence and respect, but rather with an increase of both,

that Mrs. Hoge developed a remarkable talent for conducting a public meeting; that "Mrs. Livermore, in public speaking, had a great charm of voice and intonation, which singularly stole on the attention;" and how one of the ladies, visiting the army at Vicksburg, "was in the rifle-pits and passed through the loop-holes forty feet from the enemy, while the balls whistled within ten inches of her head, and she was sprinkled with falling leaves and branches." Long before the war closed indeed the personal presence and assistance of woman, anywhere and everywhere where work was to be done for the relief or prevention of suffering, had become so common and of such established value that they ceased to excite remark. Her labors were gratefully accepted at home and in the field. Her influence, exerted in a thousand different forms, became a recognised and important agency in the conduct of the war. The thirty thousand American women who, as Mrs. Henshaw tells us, belonged to the Aid Societies of the Northwest, are rightly denominated by her "the army at home." They were as truly engaged in the prosecution of the war as their brothers, husbands, and sons who carried muskets in the field.

We do not think that we exaggerate the importance of these facts when we say that they create an epoch in the history of woman, and must inevitably have a great influence upon her future. Participation in war has always been regarded as giving the highest claims to social rights—and few have been the nations that have permitted their defenders to remain disfranchised. In the movement now going on for female equality in political privileges, the agitators have a new and powerful answer to an argument never very conclusive, but which has been often made against their claims. "Women must not vote," it has been said, "because they do not fight; they ought not to possess the right of ruling the country which they cannot defend." The objections to this proposition are three in number. It goes too far, it does not go far enough, and it is not true. It goes too far, for under it *all* who actually bear arms, including minors and aliens, should have the franchise. It does not go far enough, for it excludes from suffrage all who do *not* bear arms, the aged, the infirm, and men of

business or scholastic pursuits. And that now at least it is not true, we have seen already. The true argument against female suffrage lies, as it seems to us, in the social and domestic evils which it would induce, and this objection seems likely to be forever insuperable. Yet when we consider the vast advance which the sex has made toward equality with man in dignity, influence, and civil rights, since she has had favorable opportunities for exhibiting her capacities through a better or more general education, and through more free participation with men in various forms of skilled labor, and in social and business affairs, we can hardly doubt that even without the elective franchise these new developments of her value in war will secure for her as great an increase of political influence and respect as her services in the defense of liberty have brought her of honor and gratitude.

We can hardly doubt also that the grand work of self-denial and patriotism in which American women so earnestly labored for four long years, had its effect in enlarging and elevating their own character. The whole people indeed was educated by the war to a true comprehension of the principles involved in it, and a spirit of self-sacrifice for their sake—so that it developed from a struggle for the suppression of a revolt to a contest for universal freedom. A similar change was observable in the progress of sanitary aid societies from their original purpose of providing comforts for volunteers from particular neighborhoods to a wide and general labor for the national armies. Mrs. Henshaw vividly reminds us of those early days when female enthusiasm in every village, with well intended, but uninstructed zeal, expended itself in scraping lint and making "havelocks" for county regiments. We ourselves recall the fact that a night or two before the departure of the first Connecticut troops for the seat of war, an entire company was sent to bed at an early hour of the evening in order that the ladies might improve their martial appearance by sewing stripes upon their pantaloons. Every locality felt naturally a special interest in its own volunteers and for some little time after the Chicago Branch of the Sanitary Commission was established "almost every box arriving at the depot of the Commission was designated for some specific military

organization." But it soon became clear to all that these distinctions were unjust as well as unwise and impracticable, and it is to the lasting honor of those women who had husbands, brothers, and sons in the army, that "their noble ardor rose to the necessity of the times. Patriotism as a motive took the place of one more personal, and was found abundantly able to stimulate their exertions, so long as exertion was necessary." But we should still be unjust to those noble-hearted women if we did not refer to the fact that their generous humanity was untarnished by bitterness. In the hospitals and on the field, wherever under any circumstances Union and rebel soldiers were intermingled in a common suffering, no distinction was ever made between them in the bestowal of attention or the distribution of supplies.

The intense interest which women always feel in the results of their labors was of signal advantage in this association, by compelling the strictest fidelity and economy in its distributing agents. Mrs. Henshaw, with instinctive interest in this subject, takes great pains to inform us what extraordinary and incessant pains were systematically taken to secure these results, and their remarkable success. There is not the least doubt that never in the history of the world were such enormous supplies distributed with so little waste, diversion, or loss. We are glad to find in connection with this subject a full and most conclusive refutation of the reports so common and so discouraging that the Sanitary supplies reached in but a partial measure the privates for whom they were specially designed. In every instance that such a report reached the association, we are told it was instantly followed up and traced back to its source. The author was ascertained, evidence solicited, and the most careful inquiry instituted. Numerous instances are narrated in full, and we are informed that with scarcely an exception it was ascertained beyond the possibility of doubt, that the charge was unfounded or unreasonable. This sense of responsibility for the best services, and for the highest economy, vigilance, and activity was naturally stronger in all ranks of this voluntary association than under the military government which breaks down so largely the habit of self-reliance; yet we firmly believe that no inconsiderable part of

the prudence and good management which actually obtained, was due to the fact that for the most part women furnished the supplies and women watched their distribution. The study and practice of housekeeping is an excellent school of economy and tact, and most of the mothers and wives of every community have profited by it to an extent that is little appreciated. Accordingly, when such a woman as glorious Mrs. Bickerdyke was brought in contact with the frightful recklessness and waste of war, it roused all the indignation and the energy of her nature.

"It was on the breaking up of the hospitals at Savannah, that Mrs. Bickerdyke began to develop one of her specialties. The order had gone forth, and everything was being made ready. On approaching, one day, the main hospital, she espied a huge pile of soiled clothing—sanitary shirts and drawers, blankets and sheets—evidently prepared for some form of destruction. 'What is to be done with these?' she inquired in a tone of remonstrance. 'They are to be burned,' was the reply. 'Burned!' she exclaimed. 'Burned! These goods that belong to us, and that the wives and mothers of the Boys have worked so hard to send!' 'Nothing else can be done with them,' was the answer; 'you see they are soiled and bloody; there are too many of them to be washed, and they cannot be moved in this state.' 'I'll show you, sir, that they *can* be washed,' she said; 'don't touch them until you hear from me!'

"She went to the proper officer, and asked that a detail of seven men might be sent her for Monday. The day sacred to the American wash tub arrived, and with it men, teams, barrels, and kettles. The hospital yard was turned into a laundry. Washing, wringing, boiling, and drying, went rapidly on. Tuesday, the same. Wednesday, likewise. And so of Thursday, and Friday, and Saturday. Mrs. Bickerdyke superintended every process, all the while attending to her sick; never forgetting at the right hour to give this one an egg, and that one a brandy punch. New relays of men were sent each day; for the work was tiresome, and the supervision was vigorous. 'That's no way to wring!' she would exclaim, seizing the garment and giving a specimen twist, while her pupil looked on, in hopeless admiration. The men worked willingly, for everything Mrs. Bickerdyke did was right, in their eyes. The clothes were washed, dried folded (there was no ironing) boxed, and sent to the next point of destination." pp. 72-74.

Our readers will be interested in another instance:

"Mrs. Bickerdyke did her part toward preventing waste, in a manner peculiarly her own. On the breaking up of a hospital, there was, as has been shown, much destruction. Many valuable articles were thrown aside, for want of transportation, such as pans, cooking utensils, stoves, and soiled clothing. These she gathered up. A large stove, sent from the Chicago Sanitary Commission, was found by her in the woods, at Farmington, and removed by her instrumentality to

Corinth, where it did much service. The clothing thus thrown away was nearly all new, but soiled. She employed relays of negroes to wash it, and then returned it to the hospitals.

"The list of 'articles restored to usefulness' in one day's washing at the Corinth laundry, will enable the reader to judge how many weeks of Aid-Society toil it took, to meet the waste of one hospital; and will suggest an answer to the oft-repeated question, as to what became of all the sanitary goods that went to the Commission at Chicago.

"The list is as follows:

1,582 Sheets,	478 Pillow Cases,	130 pairs Socks,
600 Towels,	400 Handkerchiefs and Napkins,	80 Quilts,
32 Blankets,	70 Bedsacks,	5 Blouses,
6 pairs Pants,	200 Shirts,	175 pairs Drawers,
22 Feather Pillows, emptied and washed. pp. 90, 91.		

Another list of discarded articles secured by Mrs. Bickerdyke from the cellar of a Government hospital, and washed and restored to service in four days is given in another place,

" 1,500 Government Shirts and Drawers,	610 Woolen Shirts,
800 Sanitary Shirts,	216 pairs Woolen Pants,
520 pairs Sanitary Drawers,	1,852 Government Sheets,
383 pairs Woolen Socks,	542 Government Pillow Cases"

p. 115.

If during the war all government property had been in charge of women, and every woman a Mrs. Bickerdyke, there would have been little need to-day of discussing the wickedness and folly of repudiation.

Our Article has already extended beyond its purposed limits, and we must bring it to a close. We had marked page after page of the book for extracts to illustrate the intense interest of its incidents, and the charm of its graceful and often brilliant style. Those which we have given, however, though not among the passages selected for the purpose, must suffice. Indeed it is difficult to cull from the 300 pages of the narrative any particular portion which can claim a special excellence or interest, or to recall, when its fascinating pages are closed, which of its graphic pictures absorbed us most. We congratulate the authoress upon her triumphant success in this her first important literary enterprise; and we congratulate not less the noble army of co-laborers in the immortal work whose rise and progress this book describes, and by whose request its preparation was undertaken, upon the beautiful and enduring memorial of those labors which has been given to the world through the united efforts of their historian and their publisher.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

LANGE'S GENESIS.*—Dr. Schaff, in the sketch which he gives of Dr. Lange, in his "Germany, its Universities, &c.," calls him "a poetical theologian and a theological poet." We should hardly expect from the union of these characters a perfect commentator; and Dr. Lange does not disappoint us; there is almost enough of the poet to spoil the theologian. Dissatisfied with the results of the historico-critical school, which has given Germany her present advanced position in the field of biblical science, and yet not content with either the literal interpretation of traditional orthodoxy, or the allegorical interpretation, taken separately, he has endeavored to combine them both in a new method.

The following passage which occurs on page lxviii of the Introduction (we translate from the original instead of quoting from the American edition, for reasons which will appear hereafter), well illustrates his position:

"Paradise had a real and a local existence, but it was at the same time the symbol of the ideal paradisaic earth. The same is true of the four streams. Whether by the river, in the midst of the Garden, the region of the fountain-head of the four streams be not indicated, may be left undecided; enough that it was really single, and that it was at the same time the symbol of the entire fountain-head of blessing on the earth. Whether the Tree of Life in the Garden, as an individual, was a physical plant, or rather the glorification of nature connected with the appearance of God in the Garden, may be a question; as a symbol, it expresses the entire saving and living force of nature under the revelation of the Spirit. The tree set as a test of obedience existed in some form or other, but by it all nature is in a measure designated as a test. The serpent, however, as the organ of a tempting spirit of the other world, is not only the type of temptation and sin, but, as a reptile of the early time, also the type of its brutality, its degradation, and its final destruction."

The advantages of this method of interpretation are at once apparent. The merely literal interpreter finds his path obstructed

Genesis: or the First Book of Moses, together with a General Theological and Homiletical Introduction to the Old Testament. By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D. Translated from the German, with additions, by Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D., and A. GOEMAN, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 665.

with apparent contradictions, seeming impossibilities, all of which Dr. Lange, on the wings of some grand symbolic idea, lightly surmounts. Not less important, in view of the leading object of this commentary, is another consideration. On this theory, of what we may call the universal sense of Scripture, as distinguished from the double sense, fourfold sense, &c., the homiletical resources of the commentary are indefinitely increased. The most unpromising material, a genealogical table even, becomes at once rich in hidden meaning. To those who are in quest of the raw material for sermons, we cannot commend a better commentary, nor to those who seek illustration of the real meaning of Scripture a worse. This is buried hopelessly out of sight under the weight of Dr. Lange's "General Preliminary," "Exegetical and Critical," "Doctrinal and Ethical," "Homiletical and Practical" Remarks.

We have still to speak of the work of the translators and editors. With Prof. Lewis's translation, which covers the Introduction to Genesis, and the first eleven and last fourteen chapters of the Commentary, we have little fault to find. He rarely misses the sense of the German. His additions, however, which fill near a hundred pages, and which comprise a special introduction to the first chapter of Genesis, discussions, some of them at considerable length, of particular passages or subjects suggested by them, and numerous philological and doctrinal notes, do not add, proportionately, in our estimation, to the value of the work. They make an unwieldy book still more unwieldy. Though a little less fanciful, his interpretations are as wide of the historic sense, and as dogmatic as Dr. Lange's. On the philological side, also, where his learning is most conspicuous, the want of sound method and sober judgment is no less so. Such linguistic philosophy as we find in his "Excursus on the Confusion of Languages," or such etymology as that which identifies Oceanus with Gihon, and the Latin *genus* with Cain, ought not to be any longer possible.

The remainder of the work, viz.: the Introduction to the Old Testament, and chapters xii.—xxxvi. of the Commentary, have been translated by Dr. Gosman;—a translation which will take rank with the worst published, and may perhaps become a classic among them,

"By merit raised to that bad eminence."

Not only in passages of more difficulty but often in the simplest idioms and constructions he is at fault. That our language is not too strong, the following examples will show.

Speaking of the Jewish people, Lange says :

"So ist es um der Vaeter willen die seine tiefste Eigenthumlichkeit repraesentiren," u. s. w. ; i. e., Thus for the sake of the fathers (i. e., the patriarchs), who represent its profoundest peculiarity, etc., Dr. Gosman translates, page 10, "Thus for the Father's sake, whose profoundest peculiarities it represents," a somewhat startling assertion!

"Die neuere Kritik ueberall aus den heiligen Urkunden des antiheidnischen konkreten Monotheismus, d. h. aus dem Alten und Neuen Testamente heidnische Vorstellungen herausliest oder vielmehr, dergleichen ueberall in den heiligen Text hineinliest;" i. e., Modern criticism discovers everywhere in the sacred records of the anti-heathen, concrete monotheism, i. e., in the Old and New Testament, heathen conceptions, or rather introduces them everywhere into the sacred text; Dr. Gosman renders, page 23, "Modern criticism *rejects* from the sacred records of the anti-heathen, concrete monotheism, i. e., from the Old and New Testament any heathenish idea or representation, or rather brings these same notions and representations into the whole sacred text." The blunder is so palpable that one might detect it without the aid of the German.

"Der Gegensatz der religioesen Weltanschauung und der weltlichen im medialen Sinne;" i. e., The opposition between the religious method of looking at the world (which goes back directly to the first cause), and the profane or mediate method (through the medium of second causes), Dr. Gosman renders, page 29: "The opposition between the religious and secular view of the world in a *medieval* sense."

"Die verschiedensten Gegner aber finden es mit einander fabelhaft, dass die Bibel ueberhaupt von jenen vorgeschichtlichen Dingen mit der vollkommensten Zuversicht einen ganz genauen Bericht erstattet;" i. e., But the opponents who differ most widely agree in thinking it wonderful that the Bible, with the most perfect assurance, should give a very exact account of those prehistoric matters (i. e., the creation). Dr. Gosman translates, page 71, "But the opponents who differ most widely agree in this, that it is fabulous, that the Bible should make an entirely new report of pre-historical things, with the most perfect assurance."

But instead of extending this random list, as we might do indefinitely, it will be less entertaining, perhaps, but more useful to examine a page of his translation more in detail. On page 449,

we find the following errors: "Nach Knobel hat der Jehovist, indem er selbstaendig erzaehlte, was hier nicht der Fall sein soll, den Vorgang mit Sarah schon Kap. xii. 11—20 berichtet," *i. e.*, "In Knobel's view, the Jehovistic writer has already reported the occurrence with Sarah, ch. xii, 11—20; his narrative being there, but not here, independent. Dr. Gosman: "In Knobel's view the Jehovistic writer has recorded the occurrence with Sarah already (ch. xii. 11—20), because he could then do it independently, which could not be the case here."——"Sich verschulden," to incur guilt, is rendered "to walk under the general sense that he had done wrong."——"Stand es aber einmal so mit der Maxime," *i. e.*, this principle once adopted is translated, "but if the saying were then founded and chosen."——"Gottloses Wesen," wickedness, is translated "godless beings."——"Nach Kurtz war die noch nicht verbluehte oder wieder verjuengte Schoenheit der Sarah das Motiv;" *i. e.*, according to Kurtz, the still blooming or the rejuvenated beauty of Sarah was the motive. Dr. Gosman renders "was *not* the motive."——"Negeb, das Land gegen Mittag;" *i. e.*, Negeb, the region to the South, he translates, apparently under the impression that he is preserving the Hebrew idiom, "the South—the land towards the mid-day." [For the same reason, doubtless, chap. xxviii. 14, he adds, in brackets, as explanatory of the *west, east, north, south* of our common English version, the words *evening, morning, midnight, mid-day*, though the idiom is as little Hebrew as it is English, belonging only to the German.]——"Sich niederlassen," to settle down, to take up one's abode, he translates, "To descend."——"Hier ganz nahe bei einem Winterstrome stand ein grosses und beruehmtes Kloster;" *i. e.*, here, close by a winter torrent, stood a great and renowned convent, he translates, "there stood very near here, in a winter stream, a great and renowned convent."

With these citations, which are all to be found upon a single page (and we have omitted two or three which we might fairly have quoted), we shall close our qualitative and quantitative analysis of Dr. Gosman's translations. As a commentator, Dr. Gosman is hardly less brilliant. His readers have reason to congratulate themselves that his annotations, unlike Prof. Lewis's, are largely quotations. His chief authorities being, however, Murphy among the English, and, among the Germans, Keil, of whom Dr.

Lange had already given us more than enough, the congratulation need not be extravagant.

Of course we do not hold the publishers, who have given us this work in good faith, responsible for Dr. Gosman's shortcomings. But when they speak of Lange's Commentary as, "beyond doubt, the most comprehensive and important biblical work of the age—the very best commentary which the united Evangelical scholarship of Europe and America can produce at the present time," are they not going quite as far as custom permits in such statements? What are the facts of the case? The writers employed upon the commentary (we speak of the original Bibelwerk), are, with hardly an exception, men of no great eminence, or what in the present case amounts to the same, eminent in other departments than that of Biblical science. In Germany, no such distinction is claimed for the work; the exaggeration would be too evident. The German publishers say, "The work addresses itself to a definite and limited circle of readers,—that of Evangelical pastors, to the exclusion of every other consideration and want." It is not a commentary for scholars, but is practical rather than critical in its aim. Whatever is done to it by Dr. Schaff, however, bears the mark of exact and comprehensive scholarship.

HENDERSON'S COMMENTARY ON JEREMIAH AND LAMENTATIONS.*—The appearance of this reprint, so long after the original publication of the work (in 1851), we take to be an index of the poverty of English and American scholarship rather than a testimony to the permanent value of this Commentary. It is so far below the standard of good German Commentaries that it is difficult to admit its possible superiority to other English works as a sufficient *raison d'être*. Dr. Henderson's translation is in no wise remarkable for force or beauty, nor is his judgment such as to give to his interpretation of the more difficult passages any weight of authority. The Commentary is brief, and might, without serious injury, have been made briefer, at least in the critical portion. Since the laborious collations of Kennicott and De Rossi, Hebrew scholars have ceased to look for any material aid in the restoration of the original text to the variations of the manuscripts. Not only

* *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah and that of the Lamentations*, translated from the original Hebrew, with a Commentary, Critical, Philological, and Exegetical, by E. HENDERSON, D. D. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1868. 8vo

are these variations unimportant, for the most part, but the comparatively recent date of even the oldest Hebrew manuscripts, and the fact that the differences observed point to one uniform revision of the text, take away what little value for critical purposes they might otherwise possess. But Dr. Henderson takes account of them as gravely as if he were writing a commentary on the New Testament. It is characteristic throughout of his method of interpretation that the events of history are made the measure and the test of the prophet's meaning. To interpret prophecy aright, you have only to read history backward. Thus with respect to the Messianic prophecies, his only inquiry is, "Is the prophecy, or is it not, Messianic?" He does not stop to consider the particular form of the Messianic idea with a view to trace its progressive development; but, the question as to its Messianic character being settled in the affirmative, he has only to apply a pocket lens to read in it all the details of our Saviour's life. His method also leads him to expect the future restoration of the Jews to the Holy Land. Prophecy means to him little else than *prediction*, and this radical misconception of the prophetic character and calling is a bar to the proper interpretation of the prophetic writings.

MR. BACON'S SERMONS ON THE SABBATH QUESTION.*—The observance of Sunday is generally held by Christians in Great Britain and this country to be binding on them in virtue of the fourth commandment of the decalogue. The moral part of this commandment they understand to comprise the observance of one day in seven, the statute being so far modified by the New Testament as to substitute the first for the seventh day of the week. But the observance is still, in their view, legal or statutory in its foundation. This view has extensively prevailed among English-speaking Christians since the rise of Puritanism. There are some, however, and probably an increasing number, who, while favoring the devout observance of Sunday and opposed to the conversion of it, or of any part of it, into a holiday, adopt a different opinion respecting the ground on which the institution rests. They do not think that the fourth commandment is of universal application, as is supposed in the prevalent theory. They adopt,

* *The Sabbath Question*.—Sermons Preached to the Valley Church, Orange, N. J. By GEORGE B. BACON, Pastor. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 664 Broadway. 1868.

in general, the doctrine on this subject, which was espoused by Calvin, Luther, and other Reformers, and is maintained by most theologians on the continent of Europe. With them the observance is a privilege, and is binding as such rather than in consequence of an explicit law. It rests on the Christian feeling which demands such a commemoration of the great fact of Christianity, the Resurrection of Jesus; on the selection of this day as the day of worship by the Apostolic Church, and on the grateful, unanimous imitation of their example in subsequent ages; on the obvious utility of the observance both for the body and soul; and on other considerations of a kindred nature. The subject is one which is likely to occasion much discussion. There is no ground for denunciation on either side. A calm and temperate discussion of the whole subject would be highly useful. The party of the minority have found a good representative in the Author of these Discourses. Written for an ordinary congregation, they constantly keep in view the end of practical edification, and their Christian tone is one of their conspicuous merits. Mr. Bacon's aim is not merely negative; he seeks to build up more than to pull down. He does not seek to remove what he deems an imperfect view without endeavoring to supplant it by one more complete. In discourses of this character, we cannot look, of course, for an array of exegetical and historical learning; but the fruits of such studies are apparent on their pages, and the liberal, scholarly spirit is never wanting. The following are the titles of the several discourses: The Sabbath of God; The Purpose of the Jewish Sabbath; The Use and Abuse of the Jewish Sabbath; The Lord's Day a Privilege; The Lord's Day Honorable; The Right Observance of the Lord's Day. If this unpretending volume should elicit renewed attention to the important subject of which it treats, and result in a thorough discussion, free from that unchristian vituperation which is the bane of such controversies among us, it would accomplish a great good. But whether this result follow or not, it is gratifying that discourses marked by so much ability and by so cultured and Christian a spirit are delivered in any of our pulpits.

REV. A. F. HEWIT ON "THE PROBLEMS OF THE AGE."*—
Several Catholic divines, converts from Protestantism, have

* *Problems of the Age*; with Studies from St. Augustine on Kindred Topics. By the Rev. AUGUSTINE F. HEWIT, of the Congregation of St. Paul. New York: The Catholic Publication House, 126 Nassau St. 1868.

undertaken of late the formidable task of reconciling the rights of reason with the claims of the Papal Church. It is pleasant to find sober reasoning and philosophical argument in the room of the angry or contemptuous vituperation which is only too common among Catholic polemical writers. This volume indicates a thoughtful spirit on the part of the writer, as well as much literary culture. It is an able book. We regret that we are precluded at present from a detailed examination of its propositions and arguments. We must say that Mr. Hewit's theology appears to us decidedly anti-Augustinian, and not up to the standard of orthodoxy as defined by St. Thomas, especially in the article of Original Sin. We notice an occasional overstatement; as when he says, (page 5 of the Essay on Augustine), that this Father "had the most perfect heathen culture of the day, and all the wealth of heathen science and art." The fact is that Augustine's culture was very imperfect. Besides being ignorant of Hebrew, he had only a smattering of Greek. This last defect he himself deplors in his *Confessions*, and his readers have occasion to deplore it still more. When Mr. Hewit adds that he had an intimate knowledge of the Church Fathers before him, he errs again. Augustine knew the Greek fathers chiefly through Latin translations, and these must have been, in some cases, faulty.

THE BOOK OF PRAISE * is offered to the Christian public in the name of the General Association of Connecticut, by a committee of pastors, to whom its preparation was entrusted.

As long ago as 1797, by request of the same ministerial body, President Dwight undertook to prepare an edition of Watts's Psalms with Select Hymns, which was published three years later, and during the next generation was universally used by the churches in this State. At a later day the same Association having noticed "an increasing diversity in the collection of Psalms and Hymns for public worship used in the churches under their pastoral care," and judging "that the unity and fraternal communion of the constituent portions of our ecclesiastical commonwealth would be greatly promoted, if the churches, without any abridgment of their liberty, could unite in the use of one book of Psalms and Hymns and Spiritual Songs in all their assemblies,"

* *The Book of Praise*; or, Hymns and Tunes for Public and Social Worship. Prepared under the sanction and authority and in behalf of the General Association of Connecticut. Hartford: Hamersley & Co. 1868.

adopted measures which resulted in the publication, in 1845, of what is commonly known as the Connecticut Collection of "Psalms and Hymns." Of this work various editions have been called for, with and without tunes, and the proceeds of the copyright, which is held in trust by the Association, have been appropriated from year to year to the work of domestic missions. Though very generally adopted, this book never gained exclusive possession of the field occupied by its predecessor, and owing partly to the merits of more recent works, and partly to the persistent efforts of publishers, there is still great lack of uniformity in the hymn books used in our churches. It was reported to the Association in 1865, that eight different collections of psalmody were in use in 285 churches of the State; fifty-one of which had retained the Church Psalmody (whose publication antedated that of the Connecticut Book); thirty-nine having introduced the Sabbath Hymn Book, and nine the Plymouth Collection, while one hundred and sixty-eight, or seven-twelfths of the whole number used the Psalms and Hymns recommended by the Association.

The attention of the General Association has been turned to this State of things from year to year, with various plans for a supplement or a revision, and in 1866, in response to an overture from the New Haven Central Association, it was "Resolved, that the following ministers, namely, W. T. Eustis, Jr., E. P. Parker, M. M. G. Dana, H. N. Dunning, and L. L. Paine, be appointed a committee to prepare a revision of the Psalm and Hymn Book, and publish the same with the concurrence of the trustees of the Psalm and Hymn Book, provided satisfactory arrangements can be made with the publishers." The next year this committee reported progress, and at their instance the following resolution was adopted:

"That the committee appointed the last year to prepare a revision of the Psalm and Hymn Book, namely, W. T. Eustis, Jr., E. P. Parker, M. M. G. Dana, H. N. Dunning, and L. L. Paine, be authorized to publish a Hymn and Tune Book, using, if found desirable, the title and tunes of the 'Congregational Hymn and Tune Book,' whose copyright is owned by this General Association; and to employ the publishers with whom they may be able to make the most satisfactory arrangement."

The result of the labors of this committee appears in "The Book of Praise," which is a volume of 406 pages, containing 76 selections for chanting, 974 metrical pieces, and about 240 hymn tunes. It has been with them a labor of love, without any pecuniary

recompense, and the copyright is vested in the General Association, not, it is understood, for the sake of profit, but to retain the control of the text, and guard it from undesirable emendations. Several churches have adopted it since its publication in April last, and we are informed that successive editions have been disposed of as rapidly as they could be furnished.

How useful this volume may prove to be, how popular it will become, how practicable its music will be found, must be left for time to determine; but there are some points of adverse criticism, which we propose frankly to state.

We deem it unfortunate in the *first* place that the compilers should have felt called upon to prepare a new book, instead of making a revision of that already in use. The design of their appointment was surely not to introduce a new candidate for ecclesiastical favor, but to remedy the evil resulting from the use of a variety of hymn books already too great. Can it be that the committee misunderstood this design? We confess ourselves at a loss to explain the opening sentences of the preface, which are as follows:—

“The General Association of Connecticut, constrained by a demand from many quarters for a more satisfactory book of praise, at its annual meeting in the month of June, 1867, passed a resolution instructing and authorizing a committee of five pastors—namely, W. T. Eustis, Jr., E. P. Parker, M. M. G. Dana, H. N. Dunning, and L. L. Paine, to prepare and publish, in their behalf, a new Hymn and Tune Book.”

But the appointment of this committee, as we have shown, was a year earlier than the date they give, and their instructions were “to prepare a *revision of the Psalm and Hymn Book*, and publish the same with the concurrence of the trustees of the Psalm and Hymn Book.” The next year, at their own request, they were authorized to publish a Hymn and Tune Book, using, if found desirable, titles and tunes of a book owned by the Association; but we see nothing either in the letter or the spirit of this commission to indicate that they were discharged from the duty of *revision*, and instructed instead, to prepare a *new* hymn book.

Still farther, this preface implies that their labor began in 1867; “thus instructed and authorized, the committee immediately set themselves to perform the work given into their hands, striving to fulfill both the letter and spirit of the commission they had received:” whereas it is understood that nearly a year’s labor had

already been performed, the selections of hymns having been mainly determined some months beforehand.

An examination of the "Book of Praise," shows that in thus aiming to make a *new* book, the committee have constantly, and, it would seem, needlessly, departed from the book which they were instructed to revise, in such a way, and to such an extent, as to make the readings which they have adopted very unsatisfactory to those who have long been accustomed to the text of the Connecticut Book of Psalms and Hymns. The editors give us to understand that they themselves have inaugurated no changes, and have gone back to the original readings, except when the manifest improvement and popular sanction were unitedly in favor of alteration. They say, "with respect to the 'alterations' of hymns, suffice it to say that the hymns in this book have been faithfully compared with the original forms, so far as such comparisons were possible; and the original readings have been faithfully adhered to, except where hymns have been manifestly improved by alterations, as well as sanctioned by usage. That this rule of criticism is indefinite, and leaves the door still open to errors and abuses, the editors are well aware." Our objection is that in the application of the rule, so slight regard should have been paid to the usage which has been long established where the Book of Psalms and Hymns has been circulated. The editors of the latter volume, in their preface, said: "Pieces of recognized merit, such as those of Watts, will be found, for the most part, unaltered, even when some slight improvement seemed to be in itself both practicable and desirable. Compositions less hallowed by long use in our churches, have been more freely corrected to adapt them to the work, to remove offenses against taste, and to make the form and expression more lyrical;" and in their index, the hymns in which they had made changes, were designated as altered.

In comparing the two books we have marked no less than 140 hymns, in one or more stanzas of which the readings, which the long usage of our Connecticut churches has sanctioned are discarded for others which come to us now as novelties. Some of them, moreover, are decided improvements, but a large portion of them are embarrassing to worshippers, and unfortunate in a book proposed as a substitute for the Psalms and Hymns. Some of these changes lead us to question the thoroughness of the comparison attempted by the editors in their search for original readings. Thus hymn 687, in its most familiar form as sanctioned by

the usage of the Connecticut Book, the Church Psalmist, the Sabbath Hymn Book, the Book of Worship, and the Episcopal Collection, and as written by Newton in the Olney Hymns, is a Common Metre Hymn :—

“ Approach my soul the mercy seat,
Where Jesus answers prayer.”

But as we find it here, the last stanza is omitted, and the other stanzas are lengthened out to Long Metre, so as to read,

“ Approach, my soul, the mercy-seat,
Where Jesus *sits to* answer prayer;
Thus humbly fall before his feet;
For none *have ever* perished there.

“ Thy promise is my only plea;
With this I *humbly* venture nigh;
Thou callest burdened souls to thee,
And *surely* such, O Lord, am I.

“ Bowed down beneath a load of sin,
By Satan *tempted*, sorely pressed,
By war without, and fears within,
I come to thee, my Lord, for rest.

“ Be thou my shield and hiding-place,
That *safely* sheltered near thy side,
I may the fierce accuser face,
And tell him, *Jesus*, thou hast died.”

The last lines of Hymn 916 in departing from the reading of the Connecticut Book, depart also from Newton, the Sabbath Hymn Book, the Church Psalmist, and the Book of Worship, and follow the Church Psalmody in the reading,

“ Bless thy word to *old and young*;
Fill us with a Saviour's love;
When *our* life's short *race* is run,
May we dwell will with thee above.”

In another hymn we find a departure from a reading long sanctioned by usage, and certainly preferred by the author, (Hymn 803) :—

“ Wake the song of jubilee,
Let it echo o'er the sea!
Now is come the promised hour,
Jesus reigns with *sovereign* power!”

This reading follows the Church Psalmody, but “*glorious* power” is the original reading, which might have been found in the Supplement to Dwight's Watts, published in New Haven some years

since, and which unquestionably should be adopted in a book designed for use in Connecticut. So in the 723 Hymn,

"Glorious things of thee are spoken,"

We have the readings,

"Chose thee for his own abode."

"What can shake *her* sure repose?"

"*She* can smile at all *her* foes."

Where the Connecticut Book following Newton reads,

"Formed thee for his own abode."

"What can shake *thy* sure repose?"

"*Thou* may'st smile at all *thy* foes."

The second stanza of this hymn is one for which we look in vain in Newton, to whom it is ascribed.

So Dwight's version of the 88th Psalm (282 H.),

"While life prolongs its precious light,"

is modified by transposing the second stanza,

"While God invites, how blessed the day,"

to the close, much to the detriment of the unity of thought, since in this way the pronouns of the second person are introduced without an indication of the character of the persons addressed. So in Hymn 510, by omitting a stanza of Newton's addressed to Jesus, the third stanza begins abruptly,

"By *thee* my prayers acceptance gain,"

where it is better to retain the emendation of the Connecticut Book, "By *him*."

In two verses of that beautiful hymn of Dr. Muhlenberg's,

"Oh, cease, my wandering soul (304),

we find departures from the original as found not only in the Connecticut Book, but in the Episcopal and Plymouth collections, and Temple Melodies, "All *this* wide world," for "All the wide world;" and "Oh, haste" for "hasten."

Such familiar hymns as

"Rock of Ages! cleft for me," (552.)

"Jesus, lover of my soul," (550.)

"Return, my roving heart return," (426.)

"How firm a foundation," (599.)

"Behold the throne of grace," (694.)

"Come, my soul, thy suit prepare," (701.)

"Forever with the Lord," (853.)

and scores of others, hardly less familiar, are presented in a shape so unusual as to occasion serious embarrassment to assemblies which have been accustomed to use the other collections of sacred song commended to them by the General Association of this State. And we cannot but feel that that the committee would have discharged their duty more satisfactorily, and would have made a better book had they been more considerate and conservative of time-honored and familiar stanzas.

Taking the collection as a whole, we do not like to complain of *omissions*, for one of its most praiseworthy features is that so much has been pruned away, the retention of which would have swelled the volume without increasing its value. For practical use, we should prefer a still larger reduction in the number of hymns, though sometimes, we judge, *stanzas* have been omitted out of regard to the exigences of the page, which would not have been dropped had the arrangement of the music favored their retention. If any one doubts whether a collection of 974 hymns is large enough for public and social worship, we simply suggest that a congregation singing six of these hymns every Sabbath, and never repeating one, could not go through the book in three years. We regret, however, the omission of some songs which first came into notice in the "Psalms and Hymns," such as Dr. Fitch's

"The God of peace, who from the dead,"

and

"Lord, at this closing hour,

and Dr. Bacon's

"Hall, tranquil hour of closing day."

Far more available for public worship all these, than such hymns as

"Silently the shades of evening

Gather round my lonely door," (75.)

and

"The bird let loose in Eastern skies, (686.)

There's nothing bright, above, below," (112.)

and that hymn of lamentation and expostulation, rather than of praise,

"What various hindrances we meet, (688.)

We miss, too, some favorites old and new, which we would gladly have in our hymn book, especially these:

"Shine on our land, Jehovah, shine!"

"The Saviour, when to heaven he rose."

"Songs anew of honor framing."

"Jesus, hail, enthroned in glory."

"The prince of salvation in triumph is riding."

"Lord, when we bend before thy throne."

"We all, O Lord, have gone astray."

"O God, of sovereign grace."

"I've found the pearl of greatest price."

"Saviour, listen to our prayer."

"Forgive my folly, O God, most holy."

"From foes that would the land devour."

"Watts and Charles Wesley" (says the preface), "are the principal contributors to this collection. While there are very few *new* hymns in this book (and these, for the most part, from the pen that wrote 'My faith looks up to thee'), there are not a few of rare beauty and merit, which have never been published in any similar collection."

We find fourteen ascribed to Dr. Palmer, only half of which are new. The editors have done well in avoiding the temptation to fill up their pages with hymns written for the purpose. The novelties are sufficiently numerous, and while it may be true that Watts and Wesley are the principal contributors, their pieces unitedly do not contribute one fourth of the selections. The selections from Charles Wesley are upwards of forty, and there are nearly as many of Doddridge's, and also of Montgomery's and Mrs. Steele's.

A book commended by the General Association deserves careful attention in respect to its doctrinal instruction. We suppose that the churches, having been taught by the Sabbath Hymn Book, may be willing to sing of the day of the nativity as a holy day,

"Thus we greet this holy day, (H. 171.)

but it will not surprise us if more fault is found with the last stanza of Hymn 160,

"Light on thy hills, Jerusalem!

The Saviour now is born!

And bright on Bethlehem's joyous plains

Breaks the first *Christmas* morn."

We find also a hymn of Whittier's, which is probably one of those "of rare merit and beauty which have never been published in any collection," and which, whatever beauty it may have, we should

like to see expurgated from this. From a point of purely natural religion, with no acknowledgment of a Redeemer, though with a sense of guilt and shame, it represents our comfort as coming alone from the confidence that *God is good*. The writer is drifting on the ocean, but does not see "The Star! the Star of Bethlehem."

1. "I bow my forehead to the dust,
I veil my eyes for shame,
And urge, in trembling self-distrust,
A prayer without a claim.
2. "I see the wrong that round me lies,
I feel the guilt within,
I hear with groans and travail-cries,
The world confess its sin.
3. "Yet, in the maddening maze of things,
And tossed by storm and flood,
To one fixed star my spirit clings;
I know that God is good!
4. "I know not where his islands lift
Their fronded palms in air;
I only know I cannot drift
Beyond his love and care.
5. "And so, beside the silent sea,
I wait the muffled oar;
No harm from him can come to me,
On ocean or on shore!

The Book of Praise is designed not only to be sung, but to be sung congregationally. "With regard to the music of this collection, the editors have endeavored to select tunes which would render congregational singing practicable, profitable, and pleasant,—avoiding the extremes of *common-place* music on the one hand, and of too *difficult* music on the other." To the greatest part of the music we award the praise of being familiar and good. Most of the standard popular tunes to which our congregations are accustomed are to be found here, and in many cases wedded to the hymns with which they have been associated for years. About one-fourth of the whole number are repeated two or three times. But we miss many tunes, to whose omission we are not reconciled.

Why should we not have Cowper, for

"There is a fountain filled with blood,"

and Lenox, for

"Blow ye the trumpet, blow,"

and Olney, for

“The Spirit in our hearts,”

and Iowa, for

“A charge to keep I have,”

and Harwell, instead of Sicily (!), for

“Hark! ten thousand harps and voices,”

and Maitland, for

“Must Jesus bear the cross alone?”

Why not have Windham, and Shawmut, and Southwell, and Owen, and Barby? Mr. Bradbury's *Omer* is a sweeter tune than *Altar* for Bonar's hymn,

“I lay my sins on Jesus,”

and his *Miserere* is better than *Hamburg*, for

“With broken heart and contrite sigh.

We do not remember noticing one of Mr. Bradbury's tunes in the volume, and yet his productions are unsurpassed in popularity. While we regret the omission of these and a few other tunes, we have complaint to make also of some of the adaptations as unsatisfactory and ill-advised. We mention some of the most unfortunate. Hardy (page 280) is a tune from the Sabbath Hymn Book, designed, like Lanesboro', for that small class of common meter hymns which allow a repetition of the third line. This does very well with the first stanza of Hymn 676:

“Our Father, God, who art in heaven,

All hallowed be thy name!

Thy kingdom come; thy will be done,

In earth and heaven the same.”

But this will not do in the next stanza, because the third line is too closely linked to the second and fourth to allow such suspension of the sense. Even in reading it, the effect is most disagreeable.

“Give us this day our daily bread;

And as we those forgive

Who sin against us, so may we

Who sin against us, so may we

Forgiving grace receive.”

The same mistake in adaptation occurs in Hymn 679, [1, 3] and 681 (5.)

On page 94 we find Addison's beautiful version of the 19th Psalm, a long meter hymn of six stanzas, or more properly of three double stanzas. No part can well be omitted without marring the unity of the whole, and yet, according to modern taste,

it is rather long for public worship. It demands a double tune, and certainly allows no interlude between the third and fourth, and the fifth and sixth stanzas. But in the Book of Praise it is set not only to a single tune, but to Park street, which requires the repetition of the last line of every stanza,—thus adding six lines to the hymn, and marring it by its repetitions. The hymn,

“When I survey the wondrous cross, (181.)

is set to strains from Cherubini in three-four time, whose tripping movement seems entirely unsuited to the penitential words it accompanies. Another peculiarly unfortunate adaptation is found on page 172, where Burton, an air from Donizetti, is set to some of our sweet hymns of repentance. We can see no fitness in selecting such a jubilant melody for the words,

“Is this the kind return?
Are these the thanks we owe?
Thus to abuse eternal Love,
Whence all our blessings flow!”

On page 344, “an old Provencal melody” is adapted by Mr. Parker to Alford’s version of the Dies Iræ. But the stanzas of six lines divide into equal parts at the end of the third, while the natural pause in the music is at the end of the fourth line; a kind of “breaking joints” which does better in brick work than in song. And a similar mistake occurs on page 324, where “Corner Stone,” a tune in L. P. M., whose natural pause is at the end of the third line, is set down for hymns in L. M. six lines, with the pause at the end of the fourth line!

We wonder, too, at the arrangement of the words of the 145 Hymn,

“Lord of earth! thy forming hand
Well this beauteous frame hath planned,”

so far inferior as a lyric to the same hymn as found in the Sabbath Hymn Book and the Book of Worship.

After the editorial statement of the design in the selection of tunes to avoid music too difficult for congregational singing, we were surprised to find among the tunes some, like Greenfield, p. 250, and Linwood, p. 329, and Rome, p. 267, marked as quartettes, and many more, like Harmony, p. 139, Serene, p. 155, Mercy, p. 174, Weberton, p. 200, Huntington, p. 209, Grostete, p. 211, Hullah, p. 226, Grace, p. 228, Webster, 251, Greenport, p. 251, Weber, p. 286, Adrian, p. 284, and Harvest Home, p. 366, which we have noted as not only unsuitable for congregational singing, but also as involving such difficulties of harmony or

melody as to be unlikely to win their way to favor in the majority of the choirs, even, to which this book will be offered. We do not understand how a book prepared with the avowed aim of rendering congregational singing practicable, profitable, and pleasant, should have leaned so far the other way.

Professional musicians are finding great fault also with many of the original tunes as being exceedingly faulty in what is called "musical grammar,"—one particular fault, which offends a trained ear as much as the pronunciation *mornin* for *morning*—offends our sense, and which violates the rules of music as much as the expressions *they is not* and *they an't* violate the rules of good English,—is noticed as occurring no less than forty times. It has been promised, however, that these and numerous typographical errors will be amended in new editions. These faults may not hinder the popularity of the book, for it is not always safe to assume that the present popular taste will coincide with the dicta of scientific musicians, and if the people choose to sing consecutive fifths, they will do so, law or no law,—even as now in congregational singing, the tenor voices constantly, and sometimes even the base voices, run higher than other male voices which are employed upon the treble notes.

The selection of chants is good, but we have had less interest in examining that part of the volume, because there seems so little probability of its being made serviceable to our churches; a probability so slight, that we think their interest would be consulted by the reduction of price, which would be secured by omitting entirely this portion of the book. The churches must be very few,—we are not sure of one,—which have thus far successfully practiced for any length of time congregational chanting.

Looking at the book from our point of view, we cannot feel, with all its excellencies—and it has merits which we have not discussed—that it meets the necessity which led to the appointment of the committee by the General Association. It does not give promise of being the book in the use of which the Congregational churches of this commonwealth can be united. We come to this conclusion regretfully, and while we appreciate the diligent devotion of the editors to the work they have undertaken, we are heartily sorry that having done so well they have not done a great deal better. Yet if it were possible and courteous to recommit the work to them for reconsideration and revision, we are not sure but that it might yet be made so acceptable and complete as to secure a permanent place in almost all our churches.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ANGLO-SAXON MANUAL.*—The plan of Professor Shute's Anglo-Saxon Manual is excellent, deserving all praise and approval. Now that the older dialects of English are receiving so much more attention than ever before, just such a work as this, comprising within the same covers all the aids that the student needs for gaining an acquaintance with the oldest English of all, the English of Alfred and Cædmon, was eminently a desideratum. If the excellence of its execution were at all accordant with that of its conception, it would be sure of a hearty reception from teachers and scholars throughout the land, and would bring a harvest of gratitude and profit to its author and publishers. With all its faults, it is welcome, and will be extensively used; indeed, that it has reached a second edition before we have had time to notice the first shows that it has already found a wide sale; the fact, moreover, is a gratifying indication of the degree of interest now felt in the class of studies it represents. In the dearth of good and convenient books in its line, we can commend it as the best now attainable. Prof. Shute, however, is evidently no profound Anglo-Saxon scholar, nor has he been willing to take sufficient pains to perfect his work. His dependence on the authorities to whom he acknowledges obligation is little less than slavish. Thus, he has almost literally copied Prof. Hadley's Compendium of Anglo-Saxon Grammar (given in the preface to the last edition of Webster's Dictionary), instead of going independently to that author's chief authority, Heyne; and his alterations rather mar than improve his original. His Syntax is put together out of Klipstein, and is mostly rubbish. His notes upon the selections from Anglo-Saxon authors are not much better. What is worst of all, the Glossary is altogether insufficient, being scanty, awkward, incomplete, and inaccurate. After so very brief and compendious a grammar, this concluding part of the work should have been compensatingly full, stuffed out and running over with aid to the learner. As it is, we venture to say that, even after the

* *A Manual of Anglo-Saxon for Beginners*; comprising a Grammar, Reader, and Glossary, with Explanatory Notes. By SAMUEL M. SHUTE, Professor in Columbian College, Washington, D. C. Second edition, with Corrections, and a Supplementary Glossary. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 12mo. pp xxi., 207.

Supplement of the second edition, no beginner can read one of the extracts in the Reader without the help of Bosworth's Dictionary, or of a teacher well versed in the language. We regret having to point out these various defects in a book to which we wish well; but if Prof. Shute does not greatly improve it in a third edition, he must expect to see it ere long driven out of the market by something better.

DEUTSCH'S PRACTICAL HEBREW GRAMMAR. *—The plan of this work is commendable, and in spite of grave faults of execution, we are inclined to think it will be found useful. The Grammar is by no means complete enough to answer all the needs of the student, but may serve as an introduction to the language. Its value is, however, impaired by the not unfrequent occurrence of loose and inaccurate statements; e. g., § 30, speaking of one form of the Infinitive, the author says: "It is called *construct*, because it is always connected with the prefixes or with a following noun." But this Infinitive may also perform the part of subject, object, predicate, and nearly every other part in the sentence of which any other substantive is capable. It is this facility of entering into syntactical combination which gives it its name, and which distinguishes it from the Infinitive Absolute, which with difficulty lends itself to these combinations. Of the nature of the Infinitive Absolute, we do not find that our author anywhere gives an explanation, only certain usages having no apparent bond of union. Again, in § 54, which treats of verbs *Lamedh He*, after remarking that the final radical was originally *Yodh* or *Vav*, he states that "all forms ending with the third radical change *Yodh* into *He*," and, farther on, that "in the third pers. fem. sing., the *He* is commuted into *Tav*, in order to avoid the repetition of *He*." The first of these statements is at least calculated to mislead, and the second is positively incorrect. The vowel called Kamets, § 45.2, is Kamets-Chatuph, as its origin, from Kholem, proves.

The exercises, in particular the English-Hebrew Exercises, we regard as the most valuable feature of the book. But though the author assures us that he has "taken great care to select valuable sentences, containing either an important historical fact or a sen-

*A new Practical Hebrew Grammar, with Hebrew-English and English-Hebrew Exercises and a Hebrew Chrestomathy. By SOLOMON DEUTSCH, A. M., Ph. D. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 8vo. pp. 268.

tentious moral," we fear he has neglected a more important consideration, viz., to make them properly progressive. We do not find the assertion of the preface that "they anticipate nothing, but exactly keep pace with the student's progress," borne out by our examination. The use of the verbal and nominal suffix pronouns, a very perplexing subject to the beginner, is introduced into the earlier exercises, long before the conjugations and declensions, which alone can teach him to combine the forms for himself, are given. Each separate instance of their use is thus made a needless task upon the memory, since the combined form must, in each case, be given him. It seems, moreover, to have been the aim of the author, (in the preface he reckons the great number of Hebrew words used among the merits of the work), to introduce into each exercise as many new words as possible, seeking rather to enlarge the student's vocabulary, a less important consideration at this stage of his progress, than to increase his familiarity with forms.

It is not uncharacteristic of the whole method of the book that in the vocabulary belonging to the Chrestomathy, if a verb has occurred, in the selections given, only in one of the derived conjugations, the signification of this only, and not the fundamental meaning as well, is given. The typography of the book is in general excellent, but the use of the same type in the translation of the Hebrew words and phrases, and in the rules which they illustrate, is not to be commended.

A better service to the cause of Hebrew learning than the present work would have been a translation of Seffer's *Elementarbuch der Hebraeischen Sprache*, (3d Ed. Leipzig, 1861), which is constructed on the same general plan, but is somewhat more complete and has fewer faults.

COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT: 1689—1706.—In this new volume of the Public Records of Connecticut, from August, 1689, to May, 1706—edited by the State Librarian, Mr. Charles J. Hoadly—there is some information given relative to the last trial for witchcraft in 1692, in the town of Fairfield. It appears that the jury there found Mercy Disborough guilty according to the indictment, and the Governor pronounced sentence of death upon her. But there is no evidence that the sentence was carried into execution. In fact, we believe that there is no evidence that any person was ever punished capitally in the State of Connecticut

for being a witch. Mr. Hoadly states that he has prepared "a somewhat extended account of cases of witchcraft in Connecticut," which it is to be hoped he will soon publish.

BARNUM'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE. Parts 22, 23, 24, 25.—This excellent work is now completed, and is offered to the public at the moderate price of five dollars. The volume is creditable alike to the editor and the publisher, and we are sure Mr. Barnum will find himself abundantly recompensed for his labors by the favorable reception which will be given to it everywhere in the country.

MANNERS.*—This is a sprightly, and in every way, charming book, written by Mrs. Sarah J. Hale—long the editor of "Godey's Lady's Book"—on a subject which is always fresh and full of interest to both young and old. She has expressed her opinion here, in some fifty chapters, on a large number of the social questions of the day, and everywhere displays a thorough good sense and kind feeling which cannot but call out the hearty approbation of every right-minded reader. From among many chapters which have interested us, we refer to only one which bears the title, "Sunday our National Defence," which contains an argument for what has been called the American manner of observing the day which has always seemed to us deserving of attention.

* *Manners*; or, Happy Homes and Good Society All the Year Round. By Mrs. SARAH J. HALE. Boston: J. E. Tilton & Co. 1868. 12mo. pp. 377.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The Speech of Mr. John Checkley, upon his Trial at Boston. In 1724. With an Introduction, by Rev. E. H. Gillett, D. D., of Harlem, New York. 8vo. pp. 33. [This is a careful reprint of a very rare tract which was published in 1738. It is interesting on account of the light which it throws on the early history of Episcopacy in New England. The Rev. Dr. Gillett, in an introduction, gives an extended history of the theological controversy to which Mr. Checkley's publications gave rise.]

Annual Report of the Board of Education of the State of Connecticut, presented to the General Assembly, May Session, 1868; together with the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board. 8vo. pp. 172. [This Annual Report of

the indefatigable Secretary of the Board of Education of Connecticut, Hon. B. G. Northrop, is a very valuable and interesting document. The facts embodied here respecting the various library associations in Connecticut; their early history, their present condition, and their educational value, are deserving of special attention.

The Augsburg Confession, literally translated from the original Latin, with the General Creeds, and Introduction, Notes, and Index. By Prof. C. P. Krauth, D. D. Philadelphia. 12mo. pp. l. 91.

An Ecclesiastical History, from the first to the thirteenth century. By Rev. C. W. Butler, D. D. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, Haffelfinger. 8vo. pp. xv., 600.

THE REBELLION RECORD.—The last number—the seventy-third—of this important documentary history of the Slaveholders' Rebellion, is now published. Made up entirely, as it has been, from official documents, and covering the whole period of the war, its importance can hardly be over-estimated; and it should find a place in every public library in the country.

THE REPRINTS OF BRITISH PERIODICALS BY THE LEONARD SCOTT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 140 Fulton Street, New York.

The Edinburgh Review, July, 1868.—Salem Witchcraft.—English Dictionaries.—The Apocryphal Gospels.—Lytton's Chronicles and Characters.—Wellington's Correspondence, 1819-1825.—The Modern Russian Drama.—Letters and Speeches of Léon Faucher.—Prince Henry, the Navigator.—New Germany.—The National Church.

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The London Quarterly Review, July, 1868.—The Life of David Garrick.—Indian Railways.—Coleridge as a Poet.—Gunpowder.—Marco Polo and his Recent Editors.—History of Lace.—Sir Roderick Murchison and Modern Schools of Geology.—Proverbs, Ancient and Modern.—Ireland Once More.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, July No., 1868.—Historical Sketches of the Reign of George II., No. IV.—Lady Mary Wortley Montagu.—The Odes of Horace.—Grace Owen's Engagement.—Peter Pindar.—Motley's History of the Netherlands.—Cornellius O'Dowd.—Marcus Antonius.—Orestes.—Shall we Follow this Man?

August No., 1868.—The Right Honorable Benjamin Disraeli, No. I.—The Odes of Horace.—*Recit d'une Sœur*.—How Frank Thornton was Cured. By Bob Considine.—Letters from a Staff Officer with the Abyssinian Expedition.—Historical Sketches of the Reign of George II., No. V.—The Poet.—Cornelius O'Dowd.

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
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
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
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
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